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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
The Degree of Ph.D. in Economics 
AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO 
EV ALUATING AND UNDERSTANDING 
ALTERNATE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
by Iete Rouatu 
The main objective. of this study is to try to understand how money affects real output. 
Despite the long history of this subject and the existence of several theories that try to 
explain how the monetary effect is transmitted to real output, there is still no consensus on 
how the transmission actually works. To put it in a more practical context, there is still a 
knowledge gap between the time the monetary policy is implemented and the time the 
effects are felt on real output (or inflation). In the literature this interim is dubbed the 'black 
box'. Using the various tool kits of the VAR system, such as the impulse response function, 
the forecast error variance decomposition and Granger-causality test, this study hopes to 
open the lid of this so-called 'black box' and see what goes on inside. In operational terms, 
this involves examining and evaluating the different transmission mechanisms with 
particular focus on the bivariate relationships within each theoretical model. Furthermore, 
in an attempt to follow the sequence of the causal relationships as indicated in the different 
monetary transmission models, two transmission mode~e used: a 'serial' and a 'parallel' 
transmission mode. And in order to compare the overall performance of the different 
transmission models, composite or summary measures pertaining to the responsiveness, the 
explanatory power and the Granger-causal effect of each model are used-but these are still 
based on the bivariate relationships within each model. The analysis is initially carried out 
using New Zealand data but in order to see whether the results hold in other countries, the 
analysis is extended to Australia. One important reason why Australia is chosen is because 
of the divergence of the output paths of the two countries since the mid 1980s when New 
Zealand undertook major economic and financial reforms-before then, the outputs of the 
two countries seemed to move together. Because the interest is generally on money and its 
real effect, the empirical analysis started off with the monetary neutrality and 
supemeutrality tests using Fish and Seater (1993) framework. 
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The results of the empirical analysis show fairly interesting and important insights. On the 
neutrality tests, the monetary long run neutrality proposition is not rejected however money 
supemeutrality is decidedly rejected. There is also evidence from the impulse response 
analysis of monetary non-neutrality. This provided the logical basis for carrying out the 
monetary transmission analysis. The results show that each transmission model propagates 
the monetary impulse differently-at least there is evidence to suggest that the effects on 
output, in terms of timing and magnitude, are different. The importance of the credit 
channel, in particular the credit-consumption channel, is also evident from the analysis. 
Furthermore, the use of the interest rate instead of the money supply as the source of 
monetary impulse changes the responsiveness or the effectiveness of the transmission 
models. In Australia the money supply shows a fairly dominant effect on output while in 
New Zealand the interest rate seems to have more influence on output path, especially in 
the long run. This finding supports the contention that 'money matters'. Another useful 
insight is the lower response of fixed investment to interest rate shock in New Zealand 
compared to Australia. The exchange rate response to interest rate shock however is higher 
and more persistent in New Zealand than in Australia. The result of the counterfactual 
analysis in which New Zealand interest rate is modified as to follow that of Australia in the 
1985-90 period shows that New Zealand would have got a higher output had it followed 
Australia's interest rate movements in the period indicated. These results, needless to say, 
have important policy implications. The introduction of the serial and parallel transmission 
concept and the use of the summary measures greatly facilitated the analysis. 
Key words: monetary transmission mechanisms, serial transmission, parallel transmission, 
direct transmission, bivariate relationship, unit roots, stability, long run multipliers, vector 
autoregression (V AR), impulse response function, forecast error variance decomposition, 
Granger-causality. 
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1.1 Overview of the study 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this study is to examine and evaluate the different mechanisms by 
which a monetary impulse gets transmitted to real output-in the literature these processes 
are called: monetary transmission mechanisms. This topic is of great interest to both 
academic researchers and to policymakers. To academic researchers, this topic is actually 
the extension of the money-output relationship (or monetary neutrality proposition) that has 
caused so much debate and controversy! among economists since David Hume first wrote 
his essays Of Money and Of Interest in the 18th Century. To policymakers, understanding 
. the mechanism is crucial for the proper formulation of monetary policies. Despite extensive 
studies on the issue, up to now there is still no consensus as to how the mechanism actually 
works, prompting some researchers to call it the 'black box,2. Lown and Morgan (2002) 
refer to it as "one of the great mysteries of economics". But while there is no consensus yet 
on the propagation mechanism there are however useful insights that have been gained 
from past studies and which are now being put to practical use, one key example is the 
adoption of inflation-targeting by central banks in some countries-including New Zealand 
and Australia. This policy is based on the idea (and on empirical evidence) that money is 
neutral in the long-run, i.e. changes in money are fully reflected in price level in the long 
run hence there is no need to 'target' real output. Another imp~T!ant empirical finding is 
that short-term interest rates have significant influence on real variables (see, for example, 
Bemanke and Blinder (1992)) hence the use of interest rates as the morietary policy tool by 
many central banks these days. In the same spirit, this study will try to extract important 
and useful information that policymakers3 could use or at least refer to when considering or 
in the process of formulating macro policies. In some sense one could view this study as an 
attempt to 'peek' into the so-called economic 'black box' . 
1 This is well documented in many published books, see, for example, Begg et al. (1991), Gale (1982), 
Hillier (1991), Levacic and Rebmann (1982), Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998), Snowdon et al. (1994), 
Stein (1982), Stewart (1972), among others. 
2 See, for example, Bemanke and Gertler (1995), Morsink and Bayoumi (2001). 
3 Particularly those in New Zealand and Australia. 
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There are several theoretical propositions that attempt to explain the monetary transmission 
mechanisms-Mishkin (1995) lists four main channels while the Mosser and Kuttner 
(2002) paper discusses six channels. However, within each main channel there are 
variants4, hence the total number of possible transmission mechanisms would be more than 
six. This study concentrates only on four main channels, viz., the interest rate, the exchange 
rate, the other asset price effects (or consumption wealth), and the credit channels. 
In order to have a fairly comprehensive and systematic approach to the issue of monetary 
transmission, the empirical analysis starts off by testing the classical monetary neutrality 
and supemeutrality propositions. These preliminary tests may be considered as an attempt 
to answer the more fundamental question: Does money affect real output? After this, the 
estimation and evaluation of the different transmission mechanisms is undertaken using 
New Zealand data. The important issue here is: How does money affect output? This is 
followed by a similar analysis on Australian data with the intention of comparing the 
transmission mechanisms between the two countries. This will not only provide useful 
information about the institutional settings or unique characteristics of the two economies 
but may also provide an explanation as to why New Zealand output path levelled off in the 
mid 1980s while Australia's output continued almost uninterrupted in the same period. The 
question of interest is: Can the monetary transmission mechanism explain this divergence 
in output paths? To specifically answer this question, a counterfactual experiment is 
conducted in which New Zealand interest rates are modified to follow that of Australia-
this is the last part of the empirical analysis. 
The empirical part of this study is based on the vector autoregression (V AR) framework5. 
In particular the VAR's innovation accounting tools, such as the impulse response function 
and the forecast error variance decomposition, as well as the Granger-causality test, are the 
main tools in the analysis. The advantage of this approach is that it allows interactions and 
feedbacks from all variables within the model, i.e. this avoids the problem of having to 
choose which variables are exogenous or endogenous6-a common problem facing 
4 For instance, instead of fixed investment one could use private consumption expenditure. 
5 The V AR framework is widely used to study the transmission mechanism. For instance, in their paper, 
Mojon and Peersman (2001) said: We use VAR models, which is the most widely used empirical 
methodology to analyse the transmission mechanism. 
6 This is aptly illustrated by Iha and Donde (2001) when they said, "For example, in our analysis, it would be 
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economists since no consensus has ever been reached as to how the economy is to be 
modelled. Another important feature of the V AR is that it allows, through its vector moving 
average form, a direct relationship between exogenous shocks and the endogenous 
variables. The use of the lagged values is also consistent with the fact that the effects of 
policy decisions take time to be felt in the economy7, i.e. the system provides a dynamic 
nature that is very important for simulation and policy analysis. Furthermore, the reduced 
form of the VAR is consistent with the rational expectation theory8. 
In addition to the V AR tool kits that have been mentioned above, other ~seful analytical 
constructs, like the long run derivative of Fisher and Seater (1993) and the summary 
measures of the transmission mechanisms are also used in the analysis. These summary 
statistics are intended to compare the 'responsiveness' or the 'effectiveness' of the different 
transmission models. Another novelty introduced into the analysis is the idea of viewing 
the transmission process as consisting of two main modes: 'serial' and 'parallel' transmission 
modes-this is a concept from physics and is considered useful here because it provides a 
logical and systematic approach to studying the transmission mechanisms. 
A distinguishing feature of this study, which is slightly different to most other empirical 
studies, is the preferred use of the actual unadjusted data series9 wherever possible. Only 
when serious estimation failure occurs because of the nature of the 'raw' data will 
appropriate adjustment or transformation be performed. One motivation for this is the fact 
that most studies done in the past, because of the extensive adjustments made on the data, 
are often difficult to interpret or understand. In many instances., this leads only to 
qualitative interpretations that are not very helpful to policymakers. This is unfortunate 
incorrect to hypothesize that the Fiscal deficit causes money supply, but in turn is not affected by it. We 
thus used a framework in which there is no apriori endo-exogenous division of variables. The natural outlet 
for this is a VAR". . 
7 The lag effects of government policy is well articulated in Uselton (1974). And in their introduction, 
Mahadeva and Sinclair (2002) point out that: A central bank's interest in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy arise from the fact that it takes time for monetary policy to exert its maximum impact on 
inflation. This implies that accurate information on the lag-period is required. 
8 Before this the 'adaptive' expectation model was very popular but as explained in Thomas (1993, p. 127), 
the rational expectation model superseded the adaptive model because of some serious deficiencies noted 
in the adaptive model. 
9 This means leaving the data seasonally unadjusted and in the original units (i.e. not transformed to 
logarithmic values). 
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because after all the extensive and complicated analysis that had been done, only a few can 
read and understand the results. Hopefully this drawback will be avoided in this study. 
Data from New Zealand is used because this is where this study is undertaken-and 
Australia provides an interesting reference point because of the similarity in the output 
paths of the two countries before the introduction of the economic and financial reforms in 
both countries lO in the mid 1980s. Also the proximity and substantial interactions, both in 
terms of trade and comovements of people between the two countries, make the comparison 
interesting. 
1.2 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the monetary transmission theory while Chapter 3 contains a review of 
past empirical studies on neutrality and monetary transmissions. The econometric issues are 
discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 outlines the methodology and the modelling strategy and 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 both contain the analysis and the results. The study's policy 
implications, its limitations and suggestions for future research, as well as a brief 
concluding statement, are all grouped in Chapter 8. 
10 For details of the reform in New Zealand see Dalziel and Lattimore (2001). Scollay et al. (1993) also 
contains useful references about the reform process in New Zealand. 
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Chapter 2 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the concept of 'monetary transmission' may have been around since monetary 
theories were first developed\ the use of the specific term 'monetary transmission' was 
more recent. In fact, as recent as 1999, Bennett McCallum referred to the varied meaning of 
the term used by several authors and said, "More generally, many writers on the subject 
restrict their attention to the effects of monetary policy shocks, while some are concerned 
only with effects on real variables,,2. In any case because 'monetary transmission' is 
basically an extension of monetary theory, it is necessary to start off the discussion with 
. standard monetary concepts and theories. These should provide some theoretical basis for 
understanding the transmission mechanism at work, even though it is important to 
emphasise that there is still ongoing debate on this subject-as Plosser (1989)3 said, "The 
role of money in an equilibrium theory of growth and fluctuations is not well understood 
and thus remains an open issue". 
Monetary theory is a vast and complex field and a single chapter on it cannot do justice to 
the long and extensive evolution of great thoughts, including periods of bitter and 
controversial debate4, that have gone into its formulation into one of the main, if not the 
most important, branches of contemporary macroeconomics. _ This is not to say that 
eventually a single and acceptable consensus has been reached-in fact, there still remains, 
though in a slightly different form, mainstream debate between the New Classical (real) 
equilibrium business cycle theorists and the New Keynesians (Snowdon et al., 1994, p. 42). 
This diverse and disparate view of monetary economics is somewhat captured in Gale 
(1982, p. 3) when he said, "There are several reasons for not attempting an encyclopaedic 
I As embodied in the classical quantity theory of money or in the IS-LM framework of Keynes. 
2 See McCallum (1999). . 
3 As cited in Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 255). 
4 Initially the debate was between Keynes and the classical economists in the 1930s, then later in the mid 
1950s to 1960s, the Monetarists, in particular Milton Friedman, attempted the re-establishment of the 
'quantity theory of money' approach in the macroeconomic analysis (see for example, Friedman (1995), 
Snowdon et al., 1994, p. 138). Interestingly, the more recent real business cycle theorists claim that money 
has no systematic relation to any real variable at any time (see Brunner and Meltzer, 1990) while the New 
Keynesian models include interest rate--a kind of tum around process given that initially the 'Classicals' 
(in particular the Monetarists) argued for an important role of money in setting policies while 'orthodox' 
Keynesians assign low priority to money. 
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treatment. . ......... monetary economics lacks a single "paradigm" which is adequate to 
describe the disparate phenomena that involve money in an interesting and essential way. 
Different models and different analytical methods are used to study a wide variety of 
theoretical problem; but they all have a claim to be included in the corpus of monetary 
theory". In other words, the nature and scope of monetary theory is too wide and too 
diverse and consequently it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to cover 
adequately the subject in a single chapter like this. In view of this some bias selection will 
have to be made here of the topics to be included and discussed. Naturally the first part of 
the discussion will focus on the nature and definition of money including the role of the 
banking system. After this the discussion on some theoretical models linking money and 
real output will be made and lastly, we will look at the transmission theories, in particular 
the more common transmission models like the traditional interest rate, the exchange rate, 
and the credit models. 
2.2 What is money?5 
Money in its basic and more understood form is a 'medium used to facilitate exchange of 
goods or services'-i.e. a convenient mechanism used to avoid the inherent problem of 
'double coincidence of wants' in a barter system. Keynes (1930, p. 3) refers to it as: 
Something which is merely used as a convenient medium of exchange on the spot may 
approach to being money, inasmuch as it may represent a means of holding general 
purchasing power, and Galbraith (1975, p. 5) describes it as: What is commonly offered or 
received for the purchase or sale of goods or other things. Mishkin (1998, p. 9) gives a 
more .concise definition of money: anything that is generally accepted in payment for goods 
and services. Stressing the economist's interpretation Mankiw (1998, p. 314) said, "Money 
is the set of assets in the economy that people regularly use to buy goods and services from 
other people". A totally different but interesting definition of money is given by Guttmann 
(1994, p.19), "Money is a social institution subject to historic evolution. Its modus 
operandi varies according to period and place. This is even true today". The use of the 
words: 'something', 'anything', 'set of assets', and 'institution' is unfortunate because it 
creates the ambiguity and the 'open-ended' classification that makes it hard to define 
exactly the term 'money' -this poses problems to theoreticians as well as to empirical 
5 A useful discussion of the origin and the evolution of money can be cited in Dalziel (2001) second 
chapter. 
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researchers6, and this could be one reason why it is so difficult to get a single acceptable 
monetary theory. 
In modern days, money is generally comprised of bank notes, coins, and checking deposits, 
and possibly deposits that are close substitutes for currency (Dwyer and Hafer, 1999), but 
in the distant past money would have been some form of precious metals7, tobacco or 
simply sea shells. The terms often given to these different forms of money are: commodity 
money, fiat (token) money, and bank deposits. Obviously commodity money is no longer 
important these days however it is interesting to note Guttmann (1994) claim that there had 
never been 'true' commodity money throughout modern civilizations-even gold and silver 
coins were actually 'tokens,8. Keynes (1930) also talks of commodity money and fiat money 
but on the third category he used the term, 'managed' money. This category, which Keynes 
. defines as a hybrid between the other two well-known categories, is not very clear9 and is 
difficult to find an equivalent or close representation in the monetary literature. Keynes has 
another money category which he calls 'bank money' that is more consistent with the 
banking deposit or 'credit' money commonly cited in the monetary literature (see, for 
example, Guttmann (1994) and Dalziel (2001». 
Fiat money, Keynes (1930, p. 7) says, "is representative (or token) money, (i.e. something 
the intrinsic value of the material substance of which is divorced from its monetary face 
value )-now generally made of paper except in the case of small denominations-which is 
created and issued by the State, but is not convertible by law into anything other than itself, 
and has no fixed value in terms of an objective standard". This summarises the current 
nature of bank notes showing clearly the important role of the State as the main issuer 
which by implication means the government has direct control on the supply of this type of 
money. This is different to credit money that is created by the action of the banking sector 
6 The empirical problem is stressed by Thomas (1993, p. 350) when he said, "While at the theoretical 
level it may be quite appropiriate to talk about 'money' in a very general sense, for empirical work a 
precise definition is obviously necessary if required data series are to be obtained". 
7 For example, Galbraith (1975) listed silver, copper and gold. 
8 Guttmann (1994, p. 30) argues strongly against the classical treatment of money as a commodity and 
declares, "We do not live in a barter economy, and our prevalent form of money is certainly not a 
commodity that comes out of a regular production process. Today we operate in a regime of credit-
money, whose characteristics escape the majority of economists still fixated on defining money as just 
another good ", 
9 In fact, Keynes (1930) himself admitted the difficulty by saying (p. 9), "Thus managed money is in a 
sense a hybrid between the two; and, perhaps for this reason, its qualities are not so easily understood", 
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when extending loans on the basis of their deposit reserves lO• This is an important issue 
because it could mean a weakened role of the monetary authority in conducting an effective 
monetary policy. As Dalziel (2001) in his first page points out, "The difficulty is that 
virtually all money in modern economies takes the form of bank deposits that are created, 
not by the monetary authourities,. but by the credit extension activities of private banks. 
Consequently, central banks are able to influence the volume of this credit-money only 
indirectly, particularly through policy-induced changes in the banking system's base 
interest rate". Guttmann (1994) gives an even lesser role to the central bank by saying (p. 
33), "The central bank controls only the excess reserves that enable banks to create new 
money. It does not control the willingness of banks to lend out these excess reserves . ..... 
Finally, the central bank does not control the public demand for bank loans". The 
significance of this issue is well illustrated in Paul Volcker (2002) Address to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and the Federal Reserve Board: When the central bank tries to 
restrain, the natural instinct is to find some way round it, to find money substitutes and new 
political instruments less directly under the influence of the central bank. If they cannot 
find the way economically, they will look for it politically. He continued on and said, "So it 
seems to me-and I say this with some tentativeness-that the market is going to try to 
minimize the use of the 'base money', the one thing the Fed controls. Ifno interest is paid 
on base money, market participants will try to minimize the need to hold reserves or 
currency, or develop other payment systems, once again trying to work around any 
constraint set up by the central bank". Obviously the possibility of the banking sector or 
the markets to find ways of circumventing what the central bank does in order to meet its 
liquidity requirements, shows another feature of money-namely as an institution that can 
change or evolve according to circumstances, in line with the description of money by 
Guttmann (1994) as indicated earlier. 
Based on the foregoing discussions we see that whilst money can be any 'medium' that the 
state or the monetary authorityll issues out in order to facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services, it is also becoming quite clear that the ability of the banking sector and the 
markets in general to create 'new money', or money substitutes, could undermine the 
monetary authority's role in influencing the economy. However, looking at this issue from 
10 This is known also as 'fractional-reserve' banking. 
11 Usually the central bank or the government itself. 
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the banking sector perspective, Guttmann (1994, p. 33) says, "This ability to add liquidity 
gives banks a much more important role in our economy than their reduction to the status 
o/intermediaries in standard economics would imply". In fact many empirical studies have 
confirmed the importance of the bank credit transmission channell2 -in addition to the 
traditional interest rate and the exchange rate channels (these will be discussed in more 
detail in sub-Chapter 2.4). 
Having discussed the nature and the form of money, the next problem is to actually define 
money in a way that is consistent over time and meaningful for analytical purposes. 
Obviously this is an empirical issue-as Mishkin (1998) points out, there is no precise 
definition of money supply because it depends on the classification and aggregation 13 of 
other assets that could be substituted for 'money proper'-such as bank deposits, bank 
savings, etc. Though there may be slight differences in the definitions from country to 
country, the following monetary aggregate definitions are currently used by the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand14• 
Currency 
Ml 
M2 
M3 
= notes and coins on issue from the Reserve Bank 
= currency + checkable deposits 
= Ml + all non-Ml 'call funding , (includes overnight money andfunding on 
terms that can of right be broken without break penalties) 
= all New Zealand dollar funding of M3 + Reserve Bank repos with non-M3 
institutions. This is the broadest aggregate, i.e. includes M2 as well. 
Other important definitions15: 
Monetary base (R) 
Money supply (M) 
Money supply (M) 
Money multiplier 
= Currency (C) + Bank reserves (R) 
= Currency or Ml or M2 or M3 
= Money multiplier x Monetary base (H) 
= Money supply (M)! Monetary base (H) 
Note: Monetary base is also called the 'central bank money' or 'high-powered money' . 
12 As noted in Estrella (2002) opening statement: While there is no prevailing view of the monetary policy 
transmission, the credit markets are important in practically every mainstream view. 
13 On the aggregation issue, critics of Friedman claimed that he arbitrarily aggregated different definitions 
of money in order to back up his claim that shrinking monetary aggregates caused the recessions (see 
Krugman, 1994). And on the definition of money, Peterson (1996) says, "The proper definition of 
money remains an unsettled issue. Basically, this is an empirical question .... n. And in their comment on 
Chetty (1969) paper" On Measuring the Nearness of Money", Steinhauer and Chang said, "If such a 
measure could befound, then one could use it to construct a better money supply total". All these reflect 
the fact that proper money measure or definition is a difficult and problematic issue. 
14 Extracted 1 October 2003 from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand webpage: 
http://www.rbnz.go-vt.nzlstatistics/monfiniC lInotes .html 
15 Taken from Blanchard (1997, p. 93-97). 
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Having explained what is money and having looked at its different definitions, the next 
section will look at its specific functions. Of course these are closely related because the 
representation of the monetary concept was made as to ensure that the desired functions 
could be achieved. As Guttmann (1994, p. 22) puts it, "the central position of money 
emerges only when we take a claser look at what lies behind its so-calledfunctions". And 
in a more specific and explicit statement, Orphanides and Solow (1990) say, "In order to 
make sense out of any theory attempting to examine the possible effects of changing the 
level/rate of growth of money on real variables, one must explain the very existence of 
money in the economy. Why are people willing to hold money and what is its function?" 
These issues will be considered below. 
In the standard monetary theory, there are generally three functions assigned to money: as 
'unit of account', 'store of value' and 'medium of exchange'. The first function allows 
otherwise heterogeneous commodities to be commensurable in terms of money-prices. The 
second function facilitates intergenerational transfers, i.e. provided it does not get devalued 
by accelerating inflation, money preserves purchasing power over time. And the last 
function-namely, as a medium of exchange, avoids the barter exchange problem of 
'double coincidence of wants'. However in postulating different monetary theories, 
economists sometimes extend the functions or the roles of money in order to facilitate their 
models and this is why conflicting or ambiguous results arise from alternative theories, i.e. 
because of the different hypotheses about the functions of money (Dornbusch and Frenkel, 
1973)16. 
2.3 Money, Output, and the Controversy 
With some ideas now of what is money and what are its functions, our next discussion will 
focus on its relationship with real output17 . Needless to say, this is an important section 
because this relationship has been the centre of controversy ever since Hume first wrote his 
essays on Money and Interest in 1752. Basically the issue is that while some reckon that 
money affects real output, others think it has no effect, i.e. neutral 1 8 • Then there are those 
16 As cited in Orphanides and Solow (1990). 
17 In the literature, there are other important relationships such as money and inflation, money and interest 
rate, etc. but the focus of this paper is more on money and real output. 
18 This is the classical hypothesis embodied in the quantity theory of money. A well articulated exposition . 
of the neutrality and supemeutrality of money can be cited in Patinkin (1989). 
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who argue that money can affect real output in the short run but not in the long run. Still 
others talk of unexpected (or unanticipated) money having real effects while the systematic 
portion does not-a rational expectation outcome. And more recently, some monetary 
models19 ignore the monetary aggregates all together and instead use only the interest rate 
(see, for example, McCallum (2001)). As a matter of fact, the great debate between Keynes 
and the Monetarists that started in the mid 1950s revolves around the issue of money and 
its effect on real output. So while the issue, on the surface, seems quite straightforward, 
there are substantial and complex theories and arguments underlying the issue. The 
following discussions will try to summarise some of the important views on this issue, 
particularly from the standpoint of the different major macroec0nomic schools of thought-
such as the Classicals, Keynesians, and the Monetarists. It should be emphasised, however, 
that these major schools have further subdivisions or variants that have their own 
interpretations as well, such as the New Classicals, the New Keynesians and Post-
Keynesians. 
First it is important to point out that even Hume himself was faced with the dilemma of 
having to admit both the 'neutrality' of money and its 'non-neutrality'. For instance, one of 
his paragraphs goes like this2o : 
It is indeed evident that money is nothing but the representative of labour and 
commodities, and serves only as a method of rating or estimating them. Where 
coin is in greater plenty, as a greater quantity of it is required to represent the 
same of goods, it can have no effect, either good or bad .... 
The above statement clearly highlights the inconsequential impact of money, i.e. money's 
neutrality. Now let us see Hume's other writing: 
When any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is not at first dispersed 
into many hands but is confined to the coffers of a few persons, who immediately 
seek to employ it to advantage .... The farmer and gardener, finding that all 
their commodities are taken off, apply themselves with alacrity to raising more . 
.. .. .It is easy to trace the money in its progress through the whole commonwealth, 
where we shall find that it must first quicken the diligence of every individual 
before it increase the price of labour. 
19 Such as the new-Keynesian models or that of the central banks. The real business cycle school, on the 
other hand, holds a fairly strong view of no monetary effects whatsoever on real activities. 
20 As cited in Lucas (1996) NobelPrize Lecture. 
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This second statement implies there is at least a short-term impact of money on real output, 
i.e. money is non-neutral. Obviously these two paragraphs of Hume give two conflicting 
roles or effects of money and one can argue therefore that the controversy actually started 
with Hume himself. As noted by Lucas (1996), "This tension between two incompatible 
ideas-that changes in money are neutral units changes and that they induce movements in 
employment and production in the same direction-has been at the centre of monetary 
theory at least since Rume wrote". It is interesting to note here that Lucas in fact looked at 
the same issue in the 1970s and in his 1996 Nobel Prize Lecture he said, "So much thought 
has been devoted to this question and so much evidence is available that one might 
reasonably assume that it has been solved long ago. But this is not the case: It had not been 
solved in the 1970s when I began my work on it, and even now this question has not been 
given a satisfactory answer". Lucas continued on and claimed evidence of monetary 
neutrality from the 45-degree line graph of money growth against inflation rates from 110 
countries. He said, "Indeed, how many specific economic theories can claim empirical 
success at the level exhibited in figure 1?" However, as pointed out by Bullard (1999), the 
specific evidence of monetary neutrality presented by Lucas is not strictly applicable to the 
concept of long run monetary neutrality that requires a permanent unexpected change in the 
level of money supply and the ultimate impact of such a change. A successful test that 
incorporates this concept was first introduced in Fish and Seater (1993) paper. 
In order to discuss money-output relationship (including monetary neutrality) in a more 
formal manner, it is necessary to start off with the quantity theory of money21, a classical 
tautology that Monetarists have used as their 'workhorse' in presenting their classical 
'monetary' views, including their claim that 'inflation is essentially a monetary 
phenomenon propagated by excessive monetary growth'22. 
There are two main classical verSIOns of the quantity theory formula-one is the 
Cambridge cash-balance (money-demand) approach and the other is the Irving Fisher 
income exchange formula. The Cambridge formula is presented first: 
21 Often shortened to just 'quantity theory' . 
22 Discussed in Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 159). 
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Md =kPY 
Where Md = nominal money demand 
k = proportion of annual national income that firms and households wish to hold 
PY = national money income (or nominal output) 
(2.1) 
What this formula says is that, assuming k is fixed, money demand is always proportional 
to nominal output, i.e., there is no mechanism here for money to cause price to increase 
because money is never in excess-it responds only to the demand force of the economy23. 
So in order to see how price can increase in the model, money supply eMs) is introduced, 
and in equilibrium, supply equals demand: 
Ms = Md (2.2) 
So substituting into (2.1), we get 
Ms = kP Y (2.3) 
With the assumption that k and Y are fixed, then any increase in money supply will be 
matched by a one-to-one increase in price level (P). In the words of Snowdon, et al. (1994, 
p. 57), "With k and Y constant, M determines P". In this formulation, money is said to be 
exogenous, i.e. the monetary authority can control its supply, whereas in the first 
formulation, Equation (2.1), money is endogenous. The question of whether money is 
endogenous or exogenous is a contentious issue and no consensus has been reached on this. 
In fact this issue is very much related to the ongoing debate of whether monetary policy has 
any real effect and there is extensive literature on this. This topic will be explored further in 
the monetary transmission theory section. For now we will carryon discussing the second 
version of the quantity theory, called Fisher's exchange versiop: 
MV= PY 
or P = (MV)/y 
where M = money supply 
V = velocity of money (represents average number of times unit 
money changes hands in final transactions) 
P= price 
Y = real output 
PY = nominal output 
23 In the words of Arestis and Sawyer (2002), "The stock of money is determined by the demandfor 
money, and as such it acts essentially as a residual in the sense that it does feed back anywhere to the 
economy". 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
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It is quite clear from Equation (2.5) that price (P) is dependent on nominal money supply 
(M) if we assume velocity (V) is an institutional factor that takes time to change and real 
output (Y) is fixed. Further demonstration of how this classical model works, in terms of 
how price is set while real variables do not change can be seen in Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 
58). However it should be pointed out here that in terms of the monetary transmission 
subject, which is the objective of this study, the prediction of the classical quantity theory 
just described seems to focus on price increase only, i.e. the two formulations of the 
quantity theory above simply try to explain how the increase in money supply can cause 
price to increase proportionally-which is simply the statement of the monetary neutrality 
. proposition. In other words, how money can influence real output is not explained. 
Friedman (1995), on the other hand, largely in response to Keynes revolutionary attack on 
classical economics, tried to re-establish the importance of monetary economics using the 
same quantity theory but with a slightly different form and explanation. This is summarised 
below and is interesting in that it tries to explain how real variables can be affected by 
monetary changes, i.e. we are now seeing a shift to real output. 
Md _ f( p e) 
--- Y,r,TC,U 
P 
Md 
where -- = real money balance 
P 
yP = permanent income or wealth 
r = return on financial assets 
TC e = expected inflation rate 
u = individual's tastes and preferences 
(2.6) 
As shown in the above equation, Milton Friedman stresses the demand for real money 
. balance rather than nominal money24. The variables that influence the demand include 
income, expected inflation, return on other assets, and some other factors25 . So unlike 
equations (2.1) and (2.4), where the variables refer to the country as a whole (i.e. national 
aggregates), Equation (2.6) refers to individuals whose wealth is divided among money, 
other financial assets and real assets. The basic assumption here is that individuals want to 
maximize their wealth among different assets, meaning that they constantly monitor the 
rates of return on each type of assets, including money asset. So when the central bank 
increases money supply to the public by purchasing government securities in the open 
24 Walters (1973) also argues that what gives money importance is the amount of goods and services it 
can buy, i.e. it is the real money balance that matters. 
25 The actual specification and the definitions of his money demand model can be seen in Friedman (1995). 
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market, individuals will accordingly react to this by reducing their money holdings, say by 
purchasing real assets in order to retain their initial and 'preferred' wealth equilibrium26 . 
This asset portfolio adjustment, in the words of Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 139); " .... is 
central to the monetarist specification of the transmission mechanism whereby changes in 
the stock of money affect the real sector". 
So with respect to the discussion above on the quantity theory, one gets the impression that 
one can come up with totally different conclusions from basically the same formula by 
using different assumptions. In fact as Friedman (1995) says in his closing remark: One 
thing is certain: the quantity theory of money will continue to generate agreement, 
controversy, repudiation, and scientific analysis, and will continue to play a role in 
government policy during the next century as it has for the past three. 
Now having discussed the basis of the monetarist school and the neutrality proposition-
namely the quantity theory of money, the next task is to look at the other theories that 
attempt to explain the relationship between money and real output. In fact what Sidrauski 
(1967) said about the lack of growth models that incorporate monetary factors is still very 
true today as there are still not many models that link nominal money directly to real 
output-apart from Tobin (1965) framework that tries to link monetary factors with capital 
intensity. 
Our next discussion is on the Keynesian IS-LM framework that shows how interest rate can 
affect real output. There is some irony here because despite Keynes anti-monetary stance, 
arguing that only autonomous fluctuations in investment and consumption that cause 
changes in output, his IS-LM framework27 has been used in most macroeconomic standard 
texts to explain how a monetary factor, like interest rate, can affect aggregate demand or 
output-this process is called the Keynes effect28. Keynes even introduced two situations 
that he was certain money would be useless even to affect investment-these are the 
liquidity and investment traps. In the former any increase in money would only end up as 
26 This is because an increase in money supply will drive down interest rate which in turn will cause 
prices of other assets to rise. 
27 Actually it was Hicks (1937) who formulated the IS-LM framework based on Keynes's ideas (as cited 
in HilIier, 1991). 
28 See, for example, Mankiw (1998, p. 411). 
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idle/speculative balances while in the latter, investment is insensitive to interest rate (i.e. 
completely interest-inelastic). However this extreme position of Keynes has been strongly 
contested by Monetarists and later researchers (see for example, Levacic and Rebmann, 
1982). To briefly explain the transmission based on the IS-LM framework, Fig 2.1 is 
presented below to facilitate the exposition (the numbers are just to facilitate the 
exposition). 
5 
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Fig 2.1: IS-LM Model 
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According to the IS-LM model above, when there is an exogenous increase in money 
supply, say when the government purchases securities in the open market, the LM curve 
shifts to the right causing interest rate to decrease to 2 per cent while output increases to 12. 
If money supply decreases, the opposite occurs, i.e. interest rate increases but output 
declines. How good this model is in explaining real world phenomena is an empirical issue 
but so far there has been some evidence to support the model's prediction. For instance, 
Blanchard (1997, p. 123), in reference to the impulse response graphs of real output, 
inflation, and a few other variables to an increase in federal funds rate, says, "Figure 6-13 is 
comforting. It shows that the implications of the IS-LM model are consistent with what we 
observe in the economy". However he cautioned though that this does not prove that the 
IS-LM model is right, but it shows that there is potential for the IS-LM model to explain 
the linkages between monetary impulses and real output. 
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Having explained the Monetarists and the Keynesian approaches in linking money to real 
output, we will next look at the New Classicals approach. There are three basic underlying 
assumptions of this approach: agents are rational; there is continuous market clearing and 
output fluctuations (from the natural level) result from unexpected or surprise inflation-
otherwise output will remain at its natural level. This last assumption can be represented as: 
where Y = actual or observed output 
YII = natural level of output 
P = actual price level 
pe = expected price level 
y - Y" = a(P - pe) (2.7) 
As Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 197) point out, there are several implications of these 
. assumptions but for our purposes we will focus only on those that involve money and real 
output, one of which is the policy ineffectiveness29 implication _ (see Fig 2.2). This 
proposition states that given that agents are rational, they will try to do some 'rational' 
reaction following government new policy that will return them to their original (natural) 
equilibrium production level. In Fig 2.2, for instance, when the government wants to 
increase output (or lower unemployment) by expanding money supply, the lower interest 
rate will cause greater investment spending, i.e. the aggregate demand curve (ADO) will 
shift to the right (arrow 1) but the rational agents, having anticipated the change, would 
have raised money wages to counter the higher price, leaving the level of output as before. 
In this instance, money is superneutral. This is shown by arrow 2 moving to the left to 
counter the shift in aggregate demand. In fact because of the continuous market clearing 
and the rationality assumptions, the change in price is instantaneous, i.e. the price just 
moved from PO to P2 along the long run supply curve (LRAS) leaving output unchanged at 
Yn-hence the term 'policy ineffectiveness'. 
So we see that if the market knows what the government plans to do, it can prepare and 
react accordingly to the change thus negating any intended effect. Now suppose there is a 
sudden unexpected policy change, i.e. people are not made aware of this policy change. In 
this case, when aggregate demand increases (i.e. shifts to ADI in Fig 2.2) because of 
'unexpected' increase in money supply, the market will produce at higher level (Yl) 
29 In the literature it is sometimes referred to as Sargent-Wallace policy ineffectiveness proposition. 
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thinking there is genuine increase in relative prices. However, the New Classicals argue 
that this is a temporary phenomenon because once the market knows that there is no change 
in relative prices, i.e. all prices (including wage rates) increase proportionally, then they 
will revert to their natural production level at Yn (i.e. by shifting the aggregate supply 
function to SRAl). 
Fig 2.2 Policy ineffectiveness proposition 
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In summary the New Classical approach implies that if the government increases money 
supply and the market had known earlier of this policy, then there will be no change to real 
output though the price will increase to P2 in equal proportion to money increase-as 
hypothesized in the quantity theory long run result. An unanticipated (or shock) increase in 
money however will have a short run effect on real output-unlike the Monetarist case that 
does not distinguish between anticipated or unanticipated increases in money supply. 
It is clear that the policy implication of the New Classical approach could be quite serious 
in terms of monetary policy, i.e. it implies that a well-planned monetary policy could be 
ineffective in terms of raising output. Putting it another way, only an 'unexpected' inflation 
could cause a short run Phillips curve. 
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It is important however to point out here that despite the appeal of the New Classical 
approach, some serious criticisms were made against it. One is the 'rationality' assumption 
and the other is the use of the 'continuous market clearing' assumption that effectively rules 
out the introduction of 'sticky' prices in the model. Another challenge to the model came 
about when results of some empirical tests did show that anticipated changes in money 
supply (or monetary policy) have real effect as weleo. To counter or overcome these 
criticisms, the real business cycle theory is developed by Edward Prescott, Finn Kydland, 
among others31 , in which there is no role for monetary shocks in the business cycle. As 
pointed out by Brunner and Meltzer (1990), "Others, most recently real business cycle 
theorists, claim that money has no systematic relation .to any real variable at any time". 
Basically this theory argues that only supply-side shocks in the form of random changes in 
technology accounts for the business (output) cycle. And in order to account for the high 
correlation between money and output as observed in many economies, King and Plosser 
(1984)32 attributed it to the endogenous response of money to output-obviously 
contradicting the Monetarists assertion that money supply is exogenous. In terms of the 
quantity theory, this would mean reading Equation (2.4) from right to left, i.e. the causal 
direction is from output to money-this is often known as 'reverse-causality'. 
One of the fundamental problems faced by the different schools of macroeconomics is in 
trying to give an explanation as to why money is not neutral. The New Keynesian model 
takes this into account and considers the non-neutrality of money as arising from 'sticky' 
prices, i.e. prices adjust slowly after disturbances-unlike the continuous market clearing 
assumption of the New Classicals which effectively rules out the slow 'adjusting' price 
process. And as to the reason for sticky prices, the New Keynesians suggest real market 
imperfections as the cause of it. It is useful to note also that this New Keynesian model 
does not consider the source of shock as important-instead it considers the response of the 
economy to the shocks as more important. 
There are several theories proposed by the New Keynesians to support the 'sticky price' 
assumption, but basically it all comes down to the slow adjustment of the economy to 
30 See, for example, Mishkin (1980) and Jha and Donde (2001) . 
31 The names of other people involved in the development of the real business cycle theory can be seen in 
Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 237). 
32 As cited in Snowdon (1994, p. 254). 
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disturbances, i.e. there is rigidity or friction in the economy. Unlike the earlier Keynesian 
IS-LM model that has no firm micro-foundations, this time the New Keynesians tried to 
correct this by relating the price sluggishness to the behavior and decisions of the firms. For 
instance, they talk of long-term wage contracts of the firms that could cause the wages to 
adjust slowly to distur"Qances thus enabling the government to influence the economy 
through demand management, such as expanding money supply. They also blame the cost 
of price adjustments (i.e. menu cost) as causing price rigidity. Here they consider the 
'imperfect' markee3 as operating rather than the competitive perfect market assumption of 
the Classicals. However, as with all other macroeconomic models, there are criticisms 
made against this new Keynesian approach. These include the vast array of theories 
intended to explain wage and price rigidities; the costs of price adjustments is not that large 
to account for major contractions or expansions of output; the acceptance of the rational 
expectations hypothesis; and so forth. Despite these criticisms, supporters of the New 
Keynesian model insist their model is able to adapt to both the theoretical innovations and 
new empirical findings, but as Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 330) say, "It remains to be seen 
how successful the rehabilitation of Keynesian economics will be". 
Another important contribution to monetary theory is that of the Post-Keynesians who 
insist that in the modern credit-economy, money supply is endogenous, i.e. the banking 
sector is seen as responding to the needs of the economy by supplying the required 
liquiditl4. In other words, money supply is fully elastic-a feature which Guttmann (1994) 
argues as providing the economic system of the United States with greater flexibility and 
stability. The implication of elastic money is that it responds to inflation rather than the 
cause of inflation-an assertion that obviously contradicts the Monetarists basic contention 
that money leads inflation. Another interesting implication of this approach is that it is 
possible to obtain full employment with an appropriate and sustained income policy. 
33 When interviewed in February 1993, Gregory Mankiw said, "A large part of new Keynesian economics 
is trying to explain why firms set the prices that they do. Firms that have some ability to set their prices 
are those firms with market power: they are imperfectly competitive. Imperfect competition is 
therefore central to new Keynesian economics (see Snowdon et al.,1994, p. 336). 
34 This should in general mean that there will be no excessive money in the economy therefore money in 
this instance is not the cause of inflation-however Dalziel (2001) proposes a model in which credit-
money can create inflationary pressure. Another interesting feature of Dalziel's model is the possibility 
of the central bank to manipulate the interest rate in order to promote growth without sacrificing price 
stability. 
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Obviously the assertions of the Post-Keynesians are interesting and given the extensive use 
of credit-money these days, it is fair to say that they have an important role to play in 
monetary policy formulation. As a matter of fact, as discussed in Section 2.4, recent 
empirical studies have shown that the bank credit channel is an important transmission 
channel in addition to the traditional interest rate and the exchange rate channels. 
Having discussed the main views of the different macroeconomic schools on how money 
could affect real output (and inflation), the next section will cover the monetary 
transmission channels and their theoretical underpinnings. Obviously the focus now has 
shifted from: 'Does money have any real effect' to 'How does money affect real output '-as 
implied by the word 'transmission' . 
. 2.4 Monetary transmission mechanisms 
As indicated above the focus now is on the process by which a monetary impulse can affect 
real outpue5, i.e. on the transmission channels. This is very important because as Mishkin 
(1995) puts it, "Monetary policy is a powerful tool, but one that sometimes has unexpected 
or unwarranted consequences. To be successful in conducting monetary policy, the 
monetary authourities must have accurate assessment of the timing and effect of their 
polices on the economy, thus requiring an understanding of the mechanisms through which 
monetary policy affects the economy." In other words, despite the long history of monetary 
theory, including the extensive debate just discussed above, there is still uncertainty as to 
the actual details of the monetary transmission mechanisms. Questions like: Is money 
endogenous or exogenous, or is monetary aggregate a better policy tool than interest rate, or 
how does the monetary impulse is transmitted-is it through the exchange rate or through 
the credit channel, and many more-are still not yet fully resolved or understood. This 
situation is echoed by Dalziel (1991) who said: 
The survey (i.e. of monetary effects on inflation and unemployment) is all the more 
important because in fact no clear consensus has emerged about the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary restraint, to the extent that it is possible to speak of four 
different frameworks-Monetarist, Neo-Keynesian, New Classical, and Post-Keynesian. 
In spite of the uncertainty surrounding monetary transmission mechanisms, there are 
several transmission channels that have been proposed in order to explain how monetary 
35 In the literature some focus on inflation but in this study the main focus is on real output. 
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policy affects real output or inflation. According to Mishkin (1995) there are basically four 
transmission channels found in the literature, viz., interest rate channel, exchange rate 
channel, 'other asset price effects' channel and the credit channee6. However within these 
four basic models it is possible to use different variables or aggregates in which case there 
are actually more than four monetary transmission channels. Kuttner and Mosser (2002) 
also provide a very useful summary of the transmission channels but instead of four they 
explicitly described six channels. Their channels are basically the same as described in 
Mishkin (1995) however they separated the credit channel into two, and included one extra 
channel they call the 'monetarist' channel. This 'monetarist' channel does not depend 
directly on the interest rate-instead it depends on the relative prices of assets (with interest 
rate as one of the prices). That is, when monetary policy changes the composition of the 
assets, the relative prices of these assets will change and this will have real effects. The 
'important assumption here is that the various assets are imperfect substitutes. As Mosser 
and Kuttner (2002) pointed out, this channel is important in countries where the interest 
rate is so low that it does not have any more impact on the economl7 • 
A useful summary of the monetary transmission mechanisms is provided in Fig 2.3. This 
provides a convenient starting and reference point for the subsequent discussions of the 
four transmission channels. There may be however slight differences between the variables 
or flows shown in Fig 2.3 and the subsequent schematic diagrams of the four transmission 
models but these differences should not affect the substance of the discussions. For 
instance, investment and exports that are parts of the interest rate channel and the exchange 
rate channel, respectively, are not shown in Fig 2.3 but .this is because both variables are 
parts of aggregate demand38 . Also the presence of the real interest rate in Fig 2.3 does not 
alter the fact that the nominal interest rate set by the monetary authourities affects 
investment/exchange rate, especially if inflation does not respond immediately. However 
before discussing the individual transmission channels, it is useful to understand how the 
36 Other interesting papers on the monetary transmission channels include that of Bemanke (1988), 
Brunner and Meltzer (1988), Meltzer (1995), Norrbin (2000), Rabin and Yeager (1997), among others. 
37 An example of this case is Japan in the late 1990s when it had a serious recession (see, for example, Ueda 
(2002)). 
38 Aggregate demand is final expenditure on output and in theory they should be the same. 
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central or reserve bank controls the money supply-the starting point of the monetary 
transmission mechanisms. 
In order to control the money supply, the central bank has generally three means to do it: 
engage in open market operations, selling or purchasing government securities; set the 
reserve ratio of the commercial banks so as to limit their loans; or set the overnight cash 
rate which effectively sets other interest rates39 . The overnight cash rate40 refers to the rate 
charged between financial intermediaries (includes commercial banks) on the settlement 
39 See, for example, Friedman (1990). 
40 In the US this is known as the Federal fund's rate. 
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funds (or reserves) that the intermediaries use to settle their inter-bank claims. How the 
overnight cash rate is actually set differs from country to country-some countries use the 
standard open market operations to influence this, such as the United States and Australia4\ 
while others use the 'official cash rate' system that allows the central bank to set an upper 
limit for borrowing and a lower limit for depositing. This is called a channel or corridor 
approach and is used in New Zealand42. 
Now that we have shown and explained how the central bank controls the money supply we 
will now discuss the different transmission mechanisms starting with the traditional interest 
rate channel. 
2.4.1 Interest rate channel 
'This channel is really Keynesian in origin, i.e. comes from the IS-LM framework43. This 
model posits that when money supply is increased (i.e. by an expansionary monetary 
policy), interest rate will decline44 in line with the standard principle of supply and demand 
thus lowering the cost of capital45 . The lower interest rate would attract and encourage 
businesses (or individuals) to borrow more from the banks and invest in buildings and 
machinery46, i.e. this will cause investment to rise which in turn will cause output to rise. 
The schematic representation of the model is shown below with the vertical arrOws 
indicating expansion (i) and contraction (J- ) while the 'double' horizontal arrows show 
the 'causal' direction. 
where M = money supply; I = investment 
i = real interest rate Y = real output 
41 See, for example, Reserve Bank of Australia (2003, p. 3). 
42 Discussed by Archer et al. (1999). 
(2.8) 
43 As pointed out by Cecchetti (1999), "The traditional view, which is largely the foundation for textbook 
IS-LM models, is based on the 'notion that reductions in the quantity of outside money raise real interest 
rates of return". Note this traditional channel makes no mention of the loan supply, as noted by Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1996). 
44 This is known in the literature as the 'liquidity' effect (see, for instance, Norrbin (2000)). Another way of 
interpreting this opposite movements is that the interest rate is simply the opportunity cost of holding 
money (see, for instance, Meltzer (1995)). 
45 The Jorgensonian formula for the neoclassical cost of capital is (r+d)pk where r is the required real return to 
lenders, d is the depreciation rate and Pk is the price of new capital (Bemanke and Gertler, 1995). 
46 Mishkin (1995) stresses that investment includes also household investment on dwellings and other fixed 
assets. 
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The interpretation ofthe 'sequential' equation (2.8) goes like this: increase in money causes 
interest rate to decline; interest rate decline causes investment to increase; and investment 
increase causes output to rise. This causal ordering will be used when constructing an 
empirical representatiou ofthe model. 
Unlike the other demand aggregates such as consumption or exports that generally have 
immediate impact on output, investment spending has both an instantaneous and a delayed 
impact on total output, at least in principle. For instance, when there is spending on 
investment, output naturally goes up immediately if it involves domestic production-say 
when there is local construction using local inputs. And from standard economic theory we 
know that investment is meant to generate future income (or value-added) hence the 
delayed impact. 
2.4.2 Exchange rate channel 
This channel is quite important for open economies, but in particular for small countries 
that are well-connected to the rest of the world in terms of trade, [mance, tourism, and so 
forth. This framework, like the interest rate channel, is generally considered as a traditional 
transmission channel and does not assign an important role to the banking sector. It starts 
off with the money supply influencing the interest rate. This is then followed by the interest 
rate affecting the exchange rate which in turn affects the trade activity. For example, when 
money supply decreases (as when the government tightens up its monetary policy), interest 
rate will increase as extra demand on the 'smaller' supply of money mounts. Capital inflow 
may follow given the high interest rate in the country and this will cause the exchange rate 
to appreciate. As Taylor (1995) points out, (fa high degree of international financial capital 
mobility currently exists around the world and there is a very simple relationship between 
short-term interest rate and exchange rate-the interest rate parity relationship. This 
currency appreciation will make exports more expensive to foreigners but make imports 
cheaper to residents. The net result is lower net exports value (as export declines and import 
rises), and consequently a lower national output. This channel is summarised below: 
M ,J, ~ i t ~ E t ~ NX ,J, ~ y,J, (2.9) 
where M, i and Yare the same as in Equation (2.8); E = exchange rate; NX = net exports 
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Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) discuss the costs and the benefits of a 'fixed' exchange rate 
regime. The two argued that the government that fixes its currency's exchange rate would 
lose control of the domestic money supply. So obviously the exchange rate model (2.9), 
with the money supply at the starting point of the transmission, assumes that the 
government exchange rate is not fixed, i.e. it is flexible. 
2.4.3 Other asset price effects channel 
As shown in Mishkin's (1995) paper, there are several versions of this transmission channel 
but the essential feature here is that instead of the interest rate or the exchange rate, prices 
of other assets (Pe), say price of equities, are included with the Tobin's q measure which 
equals the market value of the firms divided by the replacement cost (or depreciation). This 
'q' measure affects investment that in tum affects output. One representation of this 
channel is given below. 
(2.10) 
The contraction of the money supply implies less money in the hands of people so they 
would probably reduce their spending, including their spending in the stock market thus 
bringing down the price of equities. This reduction in equity prices will mean the market 
value of the firms will decline relative to their depreciation and the Tobin 'q' measure will 
therefore decline. This will discourage businesses from spending more on investment 
knowing that their market value has gone down--consequently output will also decline. 
Another version is where instead of the firms, people, as consumers, are considered. That 
is, following a monetary contraction, and the subsequent drop in equity prices, the wealth 
of people (particularly investors) would likely go down as well and so they may have to cut 
back on their consumption expenditure. This decline in consumption will also affect output 
adversely. This channel "is also known as the 'consumption wealth' channel-for obvious 
reasons of course. 
M .,l.. ~ p. .,l.. ~ wealth.,l.. ~ consumption.,l.. ~ Y .,l.. (2.11) 
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Meltzer (1995) also explains this channel but starts off with how open market operations 
influence the base money and how this subsequently affects interest rates and equity price 
levels. 
2.4.4 Credit channel 
This is another important theoretical channel that can be used to explain how monetary 
effects can reach output. It basically has two versions: one is the bank-lending (or narrow 
credit) channel and the other is the balance-sheet (or broad credit) channel47. The bank 
lending channel is not affected by the market interest rates because it depends only on the 
loan capacity of the commercial banks that in turn are affected directly by the reserves and 
the official cash rate controlled by the central or reserve bank48 . For instance, a tightening 
in monetary policy will reduce bank reserves which in turn will cause bank deposits to 
·decline. This decline in deposits will mean the source of loans is reduced and therefore 
bank loans will decline and consequently investment spendi~g49. The schematic 
representation of this channel is shown below. 
M J, =:} bank deposits J, =:} bank loans J, =:} I J, =:} y J, (2.12) 
The balance-sheet channel, on the other hand, depends on the market interest rates because 
the balance sheets of both the lenders and the borrowers are affected by the movements in 
interest rates via the changes in the asset price levels. For instance, when the interest rate 
increases the prices of the other assets or securities will go down as people shift their 
wealth portfolio to money asset. This would mean that people or businesses, including 
lenders, that hold securities would have capital loss on their balance sheet, i.e. their net 
worth would decline and this would result in reduction of lending because either lenders 
have now lower collateral for their loans or that borrowers could not be given more credit 
47 Hall (2001) provides a useful description of the two credit channels. In particular he describes how . 
financial stability considerations (i.e. financial position of lenders and borrowers) may affect monetary 
stability considerations (i.e. how interest rate changes affect spending and inflation). 
48 Two important criteria for this channel to exist is that banks must not insulate their loan supply after a 
shock to reserves by simply rearranging their portfolio of other assets and liabilities, and ii), some firms 
cannot castles sly replace losses of bank credit with other types of finance, but rather must curtail their 
investment spending (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). 
49 This assumes that investment depends on domestic bank loans. In some cases, firms may use their own 
retained earnings for investment purposes or may rely on external funds, in which case domestic bank loans 
may not be needed. 
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because of their lower net worth. This decline in lending will cause investment and output 
to decline as well. This channel is summarised below but note the inclusion of the terms 
'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard'. These are included because they reflect the 
behaviour of people or businesses when their net worth declines or increases. Naturally a 
decline in net worth increases adverse selection and moral hazard. However in this study 
these will not be included in the V AR models because it is difficult to find their empirical 
representations. 
M J, => P
e 
J, => adverse selection t & moral hazard t lending J, => I J, => Y J, (2.13) 
Another slightly different version of the credit model is where private consumption is used 
.instead of investment (see, for example, Bondt (1999)). 
While the transmission models described above all start from money supply, the new 
Keynesian models and most central banks use the interest rate as the monetary policy 
too15o. In view of this it may be necessary in the empirical analysis to run two versions of 
the models-one with money supply as the starting point of the monetary transmission and 
the other with the interest rate replacing the money supply variable. 
2.5 Summary 
What we have looked at in this chapter is a brief evolution of the monetary theory starting 
off with the nature and definition of money, then moved on to see how the banking system 
creates money, and finally we examined the different theories of monetary transmission. As 
noted in the review, the controversy and the ensuing debate between different 
macroeconomic schools started off because the different theories could not be reconciled 
with each other and some with empirical evidence. But despite the heated debate and the 
extensive research there is still no unified theory or consensus on how money actually 
affects real output. As pointed out by Blanchard (1990), "Much of the research on 
economic fluctuations has focused on the effect of money-not because money is a major 
50 As noted by Meyer (2001): Monetarism is about money, but money plays no explicit role in today's 
consensus macro model. It plays virtually no role in the conduct of monetary policy, at least in the 
United States. The conclusion appeared to be, therefore, that monetarism has had no influence on either 
macroeconomics or monetary policy. 
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source of movements in output but because economic theory does not lead us to expect such 
effects". In the literature this 'mysterious' process is accordingly dubbed the 'black box'. 
Bernanke (1988) likens the situation to an aspirin tablet that is effective yet doctors do not 
completely understand how it works. There are, however, theoretical channels that attempt 
to describe how mQnetary impulse gets transmitted to real output, four of which have been 
explained above. Although the traditional interest rate channel and the credit channel are 
discussed separately and treated like two distinct channels, some researchers insist that they 
are complementary to each other in terms of the monetary transmission process. In Brunner 
and Meltzer (1988) words, " ... the analysis of the transmission process is incomplete 
without both the money and credit markets and their interactions". 
This study will investigate this money-output issue starting first with the monetary 
neutrality proposition and then move on to the monetary transmission mechanisms. The 
general framework for the empirical analysis is the vector autoregression method first 
proposed by Sims (1980). For the neutrality test, the Fish and Seater (1993) long run test 
will be used. The empirical methodology and modelling strategy will be explained in 
Chapter 5. The next chapter reviews past empirical studies related to neutrality and the 
monetary transmission mechanisms. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
This chapter will review past empirical studies! that have been conducted on monetary 
neutrality and monetary transmission mechanisms. These two related fields have spawned 
numerous studies hrrgely because of the long standing problem of reconciling theoretical 
propositions with empirical data as well as the emerging importance of monetary policy as 
an essential management tool by governments around the world, in particular after the 
demise of the orthodox Keynesians prescriptions in the 1970s2. Although there is fair 
amount of empirical work done in these two areas, most have been carried out using the 
pnited States (US) data and more recently using European data, i.e. very few studies have 
been undertaken using New Zealand or Australian data. In view of this the following 
review will contain a lot of 'international,3 studies. 
3.2 Monetary neutrality studies 
On the monetary neutrality empirical studies, the Fish and Seater (1993) paper provides a 
convenient and important starting point because it formalises a framework for testing the 
long-run monetary neutrality hypothesis based on the reduced form of the vector 
autoregression system. This is an important development because before then some 
prominent economists, such as Lucas, Sargent, McCallum among others, provided 
examples in which reduced-form econometric methods cannot be used to test long-run 
neutrality (see, for example, Boschen and Otrbk, 1994; Bullard, 1999; and King and 
Watson, 1997). 
Fish and Seater (1993) method relies basically on the integration (or unit root) property of 
the data4. The unit-root property provides the theoretical basis for the variable to depict a 
'permanent' change after it has been 'shocked' or disturbed. It is this 'permanent change' 
1 Most of the related developments in monetary theory have been covered in Chapter 2. 
2 In particular the so-called demand management approach of promoting growth or in stabilizing the 
economy. The acceleration of inflation and the rising unemployment and low economic growth (or 
stagflation) in the 1970s was attributed to Keynes expansionary policy (see Snowdon et al., 1994, p. 11). 
3 This refers to countries other than New Zealand or Australia. 
4 Most of the past neutrality tests disregard the nonstationary conditions and hence has to be disregarded 
(Serletis and Koustas, 1988). The unit-root property is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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feature that allows the test to proceed because it accommodates the concept of having a 
variable (say money supply) value changed to a different level and remaining there for a 
long time. As we know this is very difficult to observe in real life, i.e. variables, in 
particular time series data, rarely make this kind of once-off change and remaining in the 
new level for a long time. An integrated series therefore gives researchers the opportunity 
of studying situations or conditions which in real life could be very difficult-if not totally 
impossible-to obtain. 
The Fish and Seater (1993) framework is a bivariate V AR model that includes money 
supply and output. This is reproduced below simply to facilitate the exposition of the test 
and for ease of reference. 
a(L)Lj imt = b(L)Ljj Yt + Ut 
d(L)Lj jYt = c(L)L1 imt + Wt 
where mt = money supply and Yt= real output 
a( L), b( L), c( L) and d( L) are lagged polynomials in L 
The disturbance vector (ut> Wt) is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with mean zero and covariance L, 
the elements of which are Dim, O'uw, and O'ww. 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
Constants and trends are suppressed; and if a variable is stationary around a deterministic 
trend, it is treated as 1(0), i.e. stationary. Let Xt = L1 i mt and Zt = L1 j Yt with i, j = 0 or 1 (i.e. 
orders of integration) and L1 == (1- L) is the difference operator. The sequence of lagged 
polynomials in L gives the model a dynamic structure in the sense that the endogenous 
variables are related to their own past values, i.e. there is a direct link now between 
contemporaneous and historical data. Generally ao and do are normalized to one while bo 
and Co are left unrestricted, at least in the 'initial' set Up5. The number of lags will be 
determined empirically with the discrimination criteria6 and LR tests-the intention is to 
obtain the number of lags that ensures the disturbance term is stationary or a 'white noise' 
process. Note that the covariance matrix L with its nonzero elements imply there is cross-
equation correlation in the model. This has implications on the estimation procedure in 
particular certain restrictions will have to be imposed on some of the model's parameters in 
5 In the 'unrestricted' V AR format these coefficients are not restricted however in the structural V AR, at 
least one of these will be restricted in order to identify the structural shocks. 
6 Such as the multivariate versions of the Akaike Information Criterion (AlC) or the Schwartz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC)-these are described in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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order to identify the system. In order to estimate their model, Fish and Seater imposed two 
identifying assumptions: (i) money supply is exogenous (i.e. bo = 0), and (ii) the covariance 
O"u.w = 0, i.e. there is no cross-equation correlation. This latter restriction is based on the 
assumption that shocks originate from different sources, i.e., independent of each other. 
In terms of testing for the long run neutrality (LRN) and long run superneutrality (LRSN) 
propositions, Fish and Seater employ a concept of a long run derivative (LRD) whose 
values imply the existence of LRNILRSN or otherwise. For instance, if output is in nominal 
terms, then LRD should equal to one (i.e. LRD = 1) for long run neutrality to hold. If 
output is in real terms, then LRN implies LRD.= O. This long run derivative is formally 
defined as: 
LRD z.x == lim k-->':' 
ox t-k/ 
where tjout * 0 
(3.3) 
In order to simplify the exposition Fish and Seater use 'xr' to denote f).i mt and 'zr' to denote 
f).J Yt • It is useful to note that Ut is the money supply disturbance therefore the partial 
derivatives shown above denote the changes of the variables with respect to money supply 
shock. In the literature, these partial derivatives are known as impulse responses or simply 
period multipliers. A series of these constitute. the impulse response function and in a 
bivariate VAR model there are four of these functions. When the impulse responses are 
added period by period we get the cumulative multipliers and eventually when the series is 
infinite, as depicted in the LRD formula, we get the long run multipliers. The existence of 
these long run multipliers however hinges on whether the V AR system meets the stability 
condition7 . If this is the case, then convergence is possible and the original VAR model can 
be fully transformed to the vector moving average form. This is an important form of the 
V AR because it shows the direct relationship between the endogenous variables and the 
shocks. 
7 The stability condition is explained in Chapter 4. 
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One important aspect that Fish and Seater discussed in their paper and which has been 
highlighted above, is the need to know the orders of integration of the variables at the early 
stage of the analysis. This is important because the orders of integration determine how the 
LRD test statisti~s are defined. They cited four different cases and these are given below. 
Case 1: i < 1 (i.e. money supply is not integrated). Here LRD is not defined because 
money supply has not undergone any 'permanent' change. 
Case 2: i ~ j + 1 ~ 1. Here LRD = 0 because while money supply has undergone a 
'permanent' change, output has not, i.e. this is not very informative. 
Case 3: i = j ~ 1. This case is the most useful in terms of the LRD test because both 
variables now have undergone the required 'permanent' change, and for neutrality to hold, 
LRD should equal to zero (if real output is used) and LRD should eq~al to one (if output is 
in nominal values). 
Case 4: i = j -1 ~ 1. This is more complicated because it implies a situation where money 
supply order of integration is less than output order of integration. For example if money 
supply is integrated of order one [1] then output is integrated of order two [2], i.e., it is like 
comparing a change in money level to a change in growth rate of output. 
Having defined long-run neutrality in terms of their long-run derivative (LRD) construct, 
Fish and Seater then analysed previous works and found that most are consistent with long-
run neutrality proposition. However, for the US data, they find long-run monetary 
neutrality fails when they use real output and money but not when they use nominal output. 
This is rather surprising given that most monetary theories endorse the neutrality 
hypothesis and because of this, Boschen and Otrok (1994) conducted similar tests but they 
split the US data into two periods: 1869-1929 and 1940-92. The break coincides with the 
financial crisis that was experienced by the US in the 1930-33 period. Their findings 
support the neutrality proposition-even when they use the whole period but with the 
dummy variable added to account for the financial crisis. Consequently they postulate that 
the Great Depression of the 1930s caused widespread bank failures and associated financial 
disruptions that may involve real effects. Haug and Lucas (1997) carry out similar tests 
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using Canadian data and find that indeed neutrality hypothesis holds, in other words, they 
endorse the Boschen and Otrok findings. 
A cross-country study by Bullard and Keating (1995) finds that most of the sixteen 
countries8 included in their analysis show evidence in favour of supemeutrality. There are a 
few however that shows some evidence of non-supemeutrality, particularly the low 
inflation countries. The long-run response of output to inflation shock in these countries is 
positive. Argentina is the only country that shows negative output response. The study uses 
a bivariate model comprised of annual inflation rate and real output in first-difference-
quite similar to Fish and Seater (1993) model but the difference lies in the identification 
scheme. For instance, whereas Fish and Seater restricted the value of the contemporaneous 
coefficient bo to zero (i.e. money supply is exogenous), Bullard and Keating restricted the 
iong-run multiplier of output shock on inflation to zer09. 
Another important extension to Fish and Seater framework is a study by King and Watson 
(1997). This study on US data10 also uses the bivariate V AR as their model but approaches 
the identification problem in a rather different but interesting manner. They also use 
slightly different terms. For instance, instead of the long run derivative (LRD) they talk 
about the long-run elasticity. Their formula is given below. 
where () ym (1) = ~ () ym = long-run multiplier of output with respect to money shock 
(}mm (1) = ~(}mm = long-run mUltiplier of money with respect to money shock 
(3.4) 
It should be quite obvious that the above formula is exactly the same as the Fish and Seater 
LRD formula (see Equation (3.3» but now LRD is being replaced by Yym and the limiting 
partial derivatives ·by the ratio of the long-run multipliers. The interesting thing about King 
and Watson approach however is the use of different identifying assumptions unlike Fish 
and Seater single restriction approach, i.e. instead of using the single contemporaneous 
8 Includes Australia and New Zealand. 
9 In terms of the symbols used in King and Watson (1997) method, this restriction is: e 1lY (1) = 0 . 
10 Comprised of 40 years of quarterly observations. 
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restriction bo = 0, they use different values for both the contemporaneous coefficients (bo, 
and co) and the long run derivatives or elasticities (y ym and Y my)' As they put it, "their 
approach is more eclectic and potentially more informative". 
As in the standard VAR practice, King and Watson assumed that cov (£;Z £t) = O. This 
means that the shocks to money supply are independent of the shocks to the output. This 
assumption is made in order to reduce the number of structural parameters that needs to be 
computed, i.e. it is done for identification purposes. However, there is still one more 
restriction that is required in order to exactly identify the system and as explained above, 
instead of using a single restriction, they use several restrictions which implies the 
estimation of a wide range of observationally equivalent models. 
King and Watson investigate four different long run neutrality propositions, viz., neutrality 
of money (money and output), superneutrality of money (money growth and output), the 
Fisherian theory of inflation and interest rate and the long-run Phillips curve (inflation and 
unemployment). Their conclusion is that the data contain little evidence against the long-
run neutrality of money and suggest a very steep long-run Phillips curve, i.e. there is almost 
no trade-off between inflation and unemploymentll . As to the long-run Fisher effect and the 
superneutrality of money they find the results are not robust to the particular identifying 
assumption. Over a fairly broad range of identifying restrictions, the data suggest that 
nominal interest rate do not move one-for-one with permanent shifts in inflation. As to the 
superneutrality test, the sign and the magnitude of the estimated long-run effect of money 
growth on the level of output depends critically on the specific identifying restriction 
employed. 
Serletis and Koustas (1998) study on monetary neutrality and superneutrality covers ten 
countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). They use the bivariate method of Fish 
and Seater (1993) however in their identification they adopt the more eclectic approach of 
King and Watson (1992). They use annual data on money supply and real GDP and their 
au 
11 This may be represented by __ I "" 0, where u
1 
is unemployment rate and Irl is inflation rate. 
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results generally support monetary neutrality except the evidence from Italy that violates 
the superneutrality proposition. The long run of response of output in this case is negative. 
Another interesting comparative study between the US and UK is by Coe and Nason 
(1999) who also use the Fish and Seater bivariate method. For the US they reject the LRN 
proposition when they employ broad money stock but when they use monetary base, they 
can no longer reject the proposition. For the UK their test results do not reject the LRN 
proposition. 
One interesting aspect of the Coe and Nason work is the use of an inverse power function 
to investigate the alternative hypothesis. What they find is that at a reasonable level of Type 
II error 12 , the upper bound they computed yields evidence that long-run non-neutrality of 
money remains a persistent fact for the US. What this means is that while the LRN is not 
rejected, the alternative hypothesis (i.e. money is non-neutral) is also not falsified by the 
data at some reasonable level of Type II error. Based on this they conclude that Fish and 
Seater test has low power against the alternative hypothesis of monetary non-neutrality. 
Whilst most authors cited so far concentrate on long-run neutrality of money, Rapach 
(1999) focuses his study on the long-run superneutrality of money. His approach is slightly 
different from the others because he uses a trivariate vector autoregressive model rather 
than the more common bivariate model. He uses annual data on inflation rate13 , interest rate 
and real output from fourteen industrialized countries, including Australia and New 
Zealand. His results indicate that a perman~nt increase in inflation significantly increases 
the long-run real output level in a number of countries. He also finds that a permanent 
increase in the inflation rate lowers the long-run real interest rate 14 in all the fourteen 
countries and based on these evidences, he concludes that the long-run superneutrality 
proposition is not supported. 
12 Type II error is the probability of not rejecting a null hypothesis when in fact it is wrong (see, for 
example, Sheskin, (2000». 
13 Rapach' s use of inflation rate is based on the notion that "permanent changes in inflation arise solely 
from equal permanent changes in money growth". 
14 This is Fisher's long run relationship between inflation rate and interest rate. 
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Crosby and Otto (2000) study on the rate of inflation and capital stock provides another 
interesting and useful dimension of superneutrality. Interestingly they found that there is no 
statistically significant long-run effect of interest on the capital stock. They suggested two 
possible explanations: their data include both the government and private capital and the 
positive corr~lation between the public capital spending and the inflation rate could lead to 
the insignificant response of capital to inflation rate shock. The second reason is that the 
different treatments of depreciation and normal interest rate by the taxation authourities 
could lead to cross-country differences in the relationship between inflation and the capital 
stock. 
A very useful summary of past empirical studies on neutrality and superneutrality is 
provided in Bullard (1999) paper. This paper surveys earlier works including that of 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) study on money and output in the United States as well as 
that of Sargent (1971) and Lucas (1972) who argued against the reduced form econometric 
evidence of neutrality. On the evidence of long run neutrality which Lucas (1996) referred 
tol5 , Bullard made a point that the evidence is different to the 'story of a long-run impact of 
a permanent, unexpected change in the level of money on real output'. Bullard concludes 
his paper by stating that while there is not much evidence against long run neutrality, there 
is mixed evidence for long run supemeutraIity-as he puts it, "This is perhaps not too 
surprising since, as was stressed in the introduction, it is a relatively simple matter to write 
down neoclassical, market clearing, rational expectations theories in which superneutrality 
does not hold. In addition, since inflation is generally regarded as a distortionary force in 
macroeconomic systems, we might reasonably expect real variables to be altered in the 
face of permanent shocks to money growth and inflation". 
It is quite clear from the literature cited above that that there is hardly any empirical study 
on monetary neutrality that have been done particularly in New Zealand and this study 
therefore has a contribution to make in this respect. 
15 Which consists of the plots of the average rates of monetary growth against average rates of inflation 
for 110 countries taken over 30 years. 
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3.3 Monetary transmission studies 
As described in Chapter 2 the term 'monetary transmission' is a fairly recent addition to the 
mainstream monetary literature16 . In the 'older' literaturel ? the term monetary effect or 
influence or propagation were more common but since the 1990s the term 'monetary 
transmission' is becoming a fashionable term (see, for instance, Meltzer,. 1995). This may 
have coincided with the resurgence of monetary policy in the 1970s after fiscal policy was 
blamed for the double-digit inflation (Mishkin, 1995). It might also have been prompted by 
other side-effects or unwanted outcomes of monetary policies. For instance, in the mid-
1980s Paul Volcker, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, 
tightened up monetary policy to slow down inflation but ended up causing a deep recession. 
It was reported also that the high interest rate caused the rise in exchange rate that eroded 
away the competitiveness of American industry (Mishkin, 1995). It would be probably 
these kind of multiple and uncertain effects on the economy of monetary policy actions that 
prompted serious studies on the so-called transmission mechanisms. As Kuttner and 
Mosser (2002) report, "The overall conclusion drawn from the research presented is that 
monetary policy appears to have less of an impact on real activity than it once had-but the 
cause of that change remains an open issue". Indeed the uncertainty and the complexity of 
the process had led some researchers to dub it as the 'black box' (see Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995; Morsink and Bayoumi, 2001) or 'one of the great mysteries in economics' (see Lown 
and Morgan, 2002). 
In the case of Europe, the interest in monetary transmission is more recent and is most 
likely driven by the formation of the European Monetary Union in 199918. This is echoed 
by Mojon and Peersman (2001) introductory sentence: Understanding the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area is of primary importance for the 
implementation of the Eurosystem' s monetary policy strategy. And in the words of 
Chatelain et al. (2002), "Since the beginning of monetary union in Europe, a large body of 
empirical analysis has been devoted to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy". 
16 This may be attested by the absence of the term 'monetary transmission' in many standard macroeconomic 
textbooks like that of Mankiw (1998), Blanchard (1997), among others. 
17 This refers in particular to the earlier works of Patinkin (1987), Sidrauski (1967), Sims (1972), 
Tobin (1965), among others. 
18 As noted by Norrbin (2000), "Most studies of the transmission effects of monetary policy have been 
done for the U.S., but more recently studies of other countries have been performed to verify the 
robustness of the results for the u.S." 
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Some empirical studies investigate monetary transmission across different countries (such 
that of Angeloni et al., 2002; Britton and Whitley, 1997; Cecchetti, 1999; Chatelain et al. 
2002; Bondt, 1999; McCoy and McMahon, 2000; Peersman and Smets, 2001; among 
others) whjle others focus on individual country's data (see, for example, Aron and 
Muellbauer, 2002; Berument, 2001; Bredin and O'Reilly, 2001; Erden, 2002; Holtemoller, 
2002; Hubrich and Vlaar, 2000; Lawn and Morgan, 2002; Ludvigson et aI., 2002; and 
Lutkepohl and Wolters, 2001). There are also some studies that examine and compare 
different transmission channels, such as Angeloni et al. (2002), Bean et al. (2002), 
Bemanke and Gertler (1995), Deutsche Bundesbank (2002), Mauskopf (1990), Rabin and 
Yeager (1997), among others. And while some studies use aggregate data, other studies use 
industry or firm-level data (such as Chatelain et aI., 2002; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; and 
Peersman and Smets, 2002). 
Obviously the list of empirical works on monetary transmission has grown quite 
substantially in recent years. The scope and focus of the studies are also quite wide-ranging 
and so to make some reasonable flow in the following review it is necessary to adopt some 
systematic approach to the review process. In view of the main objective of this thesis, 
which is to evaluate alternative monetary transmission mechanisms, it is logical to split the 
empirical literature into the four main transmission channels: interest rate channel, the 
exchange rate channel, the other asset price effects channel and the credit channel. In doing 
this it should be easier to see and appreciate the differences or similarities among the 
different transmission mechanisms as well as getting useful insight as to what 
methodological approaches and techniques were used to evaluate each transmission 
mechanism in the past. 
3.3.1 Interest rate channel 
Although the interest rate channel IS often referred to as the traditional transmission 
channel, there seems to be more focus and more empirical works carried out on the credit 
channel-at least in recent years. As pointed out by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), "In 
recent theoretical and empirical research, interest has been rekindled in a credit channel 
for the transmission of monetary shocks to real output". Perhaps one reason for this is the 
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difficulty (as noted by Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) in explaining the magnitude, timing and 
composition of the economy's response to monetary policy shocks solely in terms of 
conventional interest rate (neo-classical cost of capital) effects-as they put it: the 
mechanisms collectively known as the credit channel help fill in the gaps in the traditional 
story. Chirinko (1993) also noted that only a few authors have applied vector 
autoregression approach to investment spending; a principal component of the interest rate 
channel. Some of the VAR studies that look at the interest rate channel include Angeloni et 
al. (2002), Chatelain et al. (2002), McCarthy and Peach (2002), Mojon et aI. (2001), 
Peersman and Smets (2001), among others. 
McCarthy and Peach (2002) use US data on real GDP, the GDP deflator, commodity 
prices, residential investment in single-unit structures, single-family home prices relative to 
the GDP deflator, federal funds rate and mortgage rates to study the impact of monetary 
policy on investment. To identify the shocks they use the Cholesky decomposition with the 
variables ordered as listed above 19 . They find that following an increase in the funds rate, 
investment declines by 3 per cent after two quarters while output declines by 0.3 per cent. 
However for more recent data (i.e. after 1986) the impact is much delayed and they cite the 
persistent of the funds rate increase in this period and the positive mortgage response later 
in the period as possible reasons for such delay. But according to Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) the lagged response of inventories and non-residential investment can be explained 
by the variation in the external finance premium. For instance, when monetary policy 
tightens up, the balance-sheet of firms deteriorates as interest rate increases and cash flow 
declines. This will cause the premium for external finance to increase which in tum will 
cause 'financial pressure' to build up hence the delayed but sharp response of investment 
following monetary policy tightening. 
Peersman and Smets (2001) using data on Europe find that the response of investment to 
monetary policy shock is three times as large as output response to the same shock. They 
also find that investment response is higher than consumption response. Another interesting 
study by Mojon et aI. (2001) on Germany, France, Italy and Spain, finds that the user cost 
19 By putting the interest rate last means that the policy tool is the most endogenous of the variables, i.e. 
it is affected contemporaneously by other variables but its effect on other variables occurs after a lag. 
This ordering would be the exact opposite of the transmission models that Mishkin (1995) discussed, 
i.e. this ordering will be different to the ordering used in this study. 
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of capital, which is affected by the interest rate, has a statistically and an economically 
significant effect on investment. The study uses finn level data from 17 industries in each 
country and the long run elasticities were estimated using the error correction fonn of the 
autoregressive-distributed equation with investment as the dependent variable and the 
interest r~te and the user cost of capital as the explanatory variables. Their hypothesis is: 
Smaller firms are subject to greater informational problems and are thus affected more 
strongly by a monetary policy tightening. 
Angeloni et al. (2002) study, like Bernanke and Gertler (1995), focuses on the question: 
Can the classic interest rate channel alone, without capital market imperfections, explain 
the stylisedfacts of monetary transmission? They draw on the empirical results of previous 
studies20 and their conclusion is that in some countries (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, Italy, and Spain) the interest rate transmission channel completely characterizes the 
monetary transmission process. In countries where the interest rate channel is not dominant 
they find direct evidence supporting the presence of the bank-lending channel (or other 
financial transmission channel). The studies are based on the VAR and the structural 
models. The authors also pointed out one interesting difference with the US evidence: 
whereas investment in Europe is a significant driving force behind output, in the US, 
consumption is more significant. 
One interesting aspect of Angeloni et al. (2002) study is their approach in trying to assess 
the dominance of the interest rate channel. Their testing strategy is sequential and they 
considered three parameters: the elasticity of output with respect to monetary policy; the 
elasticity of investment with respect to the same shock; and finally the elasticity of 
investment with respect to the interest rate. This last parameter is calculated as to exclude 
the other effects of monetary policy. And the condition for the interest rate channel to be 
significant is for the investment movement to have a large impact on output movement. 
Another condition is for the interest rate elasticity to account largely for the overall 
elasticity of investment with respect to monetary policy. If the outcome does not support 
the interest rate channel, then they look for evidence of financial factors (such as cash 
flows). 
20 Such as Ehrman et al. (2001), Mojon and Peersman (2001), Peersman and Smets (2001), among 
others. 
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Chatelain et al. (2002) study on the monetary transmission channels on firm investment for 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain find evidence to support the interest rate channel. They 
use micro datasets for each country containing over 215,000 observations from 1985 to 
1999. They use an auto-regressive distributed lag model based .on the neo-classical 
investment relationship with investment as the dependent variable and the user cost, sales 
and the cash flow as .the explanatory variables. 
3.3.2 Credit channel 
As indicated in the previous section, the credit channel is further split into two channels: 
one is the balance-sheet (or broad credit channel) and the other is the bank-lending (or 
~arrow credit channel), Some of the empirical studies on the balance-sheet approach 
include, Bandt (1999), Morsink and Bayoumi (2001), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) among 
others. As to the bank-lending channel, some studies include that of Cecchetti (1999), 
Estrella (1999), Kasyap and Stein (2000), and Heuvel (2002). Other studies estimate and 
examine both credit channels, such that of Bemanke and Gertler (1995), Chrystal and 
Mizen (2002), Holtemoller (2002), and Lawn and Morgan (2002). Fackler and Rogers 
(1993) study is slightly different with the others because he incorporates the exchange rate 
in his credit model. As they put it, "We are unaware of any credit-view models which 
explicitly analyse the role of the exchange rate, although such a role is often 
hypothesised ... ". 
Bemanke and Gertler (1995) study is one of the earlier works on transmission channels and 
is often cited by more recent empirical studies21 • They use US data to observe what happens 
after monetary policy tightening. The stylised facts they observe include: sustained declines 
in output and price level; final demand falls relatively fast after monetary shock whereas 
stock of inventories initially rises but ultimately declines; the earliest and sharpest declines 
in final demand occur in the residential investment followed by consumer spending; fixed 
business investment eventually declines but after residential investment and consumer 
spending. As to the actual pattern of output response, it starts to decline in the 1st quarter 
after the monetary shock and bottoms out after two years. In their estimation, the demand 
21 Such as Azali and Mathews (1999), Holtemoller (2002), Meltzer (1999), Warner and Georges (2001), 
among others. 
42 
components of output, such as business investment or consumer spending, are added one at 
a time to the V AR model, i.e. they are not estimated in one go. However there are three 
empirical puzzles that they observed: monetary policy shocks affect the real economy 
significantly (unlike previous empirical study findings); the timing of the interest rate 
moveme!lts seems odd in the sense that it quickly returns to its trend after eight to nine 
months while the other variables are just starting to respond; the third puzzle is that out of 
the demand spending components, residential investment seems to be the most responsive 
variable to monetary policy shock-contrary to what is expected which is that residential 
investment should react not to short term interest rates but to long term rates. 
In view of the puzzles (which they claim as the shortcomings of the conventional analysis 
of the monetary transmission) Bernanke and Gertler went on to investigate the balance-
sheet and the bank-lending channels. In particular they concentrated on the 'external 
finance premium' which is essentially a wedge or cost between the lender and the 
borrower. This cost depends on the net worth of the borrower, i.e. if the borrower has lower 
net worth then the external finance premium will be high, and vice versa. An increased net 
worth in the balance sheet would therefore result in lower external finance premium that in 
tum may encourage the firm (or individual) to borrow more for investment purposes. This 
is the balance-sheet explanation. In terms of the bank-lending channel, the external finance 
premium is affected by the monetary policy because the reserves is reduced after monetary 
policy tightening which in turn affects the ability of the banks to extend more loans to 
borrowers. The key assumption here is that the banks cannot easily replace lost deposits 
with other sources of fund, such as certificates of deposit or new equity issues. Bernanke 
and Gertler argued that the two credit channels and the external finance premium are able 
to explain the puzzles noted. However they do note great difficulty in carrying out an 
empirical test that would conclusively separate the bank-lending channel from the balance-
sheet channel. 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) study finds support for the broad credit or balance-sheet 
channel. They use a single equation model with fixed investment as the dependent variable 
and the 'sales' and 'cash flow' as the explanatory variables. Lags of the explanatory 
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variables as well as the dependent variables are included to reflect the dynamics involved as 
well as to reduce the problems of simultaneity. The equation is given below22: 
where KF = gross investment 
LlS = change in net sales 
Ll cac = change in cost of capital 
CF = cash-flow 
i = 1, ... ,4 and j = 0, 1, .... ,8. 
2 
U t - N (0, (1' ) 
(3.5) 
Ohner and Rudebusch approach is interesting in that they use three different definitions of 
'monetary tightening' in the US. The first definition follows that of Romer and Romer 
(1989, 1994)23 narrative approach; the second is based on large increases in the nominal 
federal funds rate and the third corresponds to the dates when the term spread (defined as 
the funds rate minus the rate on the lO-year Treasury note) is at least 65 basis points. These 
dates are included in the regression equation as dummy variables, i.e. four quarters 
following the date of monetary tightening are assigned unity, and the rest zero. After 
monetary tightening the coefficients of the dummy variables for the smaller firms are found 
to be significant suggesting the importance of cash flow tQ investment spending. However 
when monetary easing is modelled the coefficients are no longer significant. According to 
Oliner and Rudebusch this provides evidence of the broad credit channel. 
An interesting study by Morsink and Bayoumi (2001) using Japanese data shows that banks 
do playa crucial part in transmitting monetary shocks to economic activity. This may not 
be too surprising given that they also found evidence that corporations and households have 
not been able to substitute borrowing from other sources for a shortfall in bank borrowing, 
i.e. corporations and households in Japan strongly depend on the banking sector. They also 
found that business investment is especially sensitive to monetary shocks. Their modelling 
strategy was to start off with a 'basic' V AR and then progressively adding on other 
variables· like bank loans, securities, other components of investment, and noting the 
changes in the response functions and the variance decompositions. Their 'basic' V AR 
22 Although the symbols and the subscripts here are slightly different to that in the' original' equation 
in the paper, the two equations are exactly the same. 
23 As cited in Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), 
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model is comprised of real private demand, prices (CPI), interest rate (overnight call rate24) 
and broad money. They include also a constant term, a time trend and two dummy variables 
to account for the introduction of the consumption tax in April 1989 and its increase in 
April 1997. They use quarterly seasonally data from 1980:1 to 1998:3 and for identification 
purpos~s, they use the Cholesky decomposition with the ordering of the variables as listed 
above. The implication in this ordering is that money aggregate is the most endogenous 
while private demand is the most exogenous. The assumption behind this ordering is that 
real variables take time to react to changes in financial variables. However they noted that 
reversing the ordering of the variables gave similar results, i.e. their results seem to be 
robust to the ordering of the variables. 
The cross-country study by Bondt (1999) found that there is an accelerator effect of the 
external finance premium on consumption for Germany, Italy and the Netherlands but not 
for France, United Kingdom and Belgium. For the external finance premium, Bondt uses 
different measures for different countries however one common measure is the difference 
between the mortgage rate and the savings deposits rate. He uses the mortgage rate because 
he considered the rate to be related to the net worth of consumers. His model is a 
consumption equation with real interest rate, real income, and external finance premium as 
the main explanatory variables. The lags are also added because of the dynamics involved. 
The equation is given below: 
t1ct = u + e r;-I + (AI + ,.1.2 )t1Yt + a; MFPt_1 + a~ MF~_I • bCt_1 + ct (3.6) 
where Ct = consumption 
rl _l = real interest rate 
Yt = real disposal income 
EFPt_l = external finance premium 
bCt_l = business cycle 
,1.1 = proportion of consumers consuming a constant fraction of income 
,1.2 = proportion of consumers consuming constant fraction of both income and the available 
supply external finance 
u = (I-AI -A2 )U * +A2aO' () = (1-~ -A2 )0" , a; =A2al ,a~ = A2a2 
Ct = error term that is orthogonal to all variables at time t-l 
From Equation 3.6 he derives three variants of the consumption equation. His first equation 
is for liquidity-constrained consumers that he got by setting ,.1.2 = O. For the second 
24 Same as the federal funds rate (in the case of the U.S.) or the official cash rate (in the case of New 
Zealand). 
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category he assumes no financial accelerator effect, i.e. he sets a2 = O. And for the last 
consumption equation he did not put any parameter restrictions. 
Bondt consumption equation is the result of a utility maximization exercise. His utility or 
objective function is given below: 
t = O,l, ....... T (3.7) 
And his wealth constraint function: 
t = O,l, ........ T (3.8) 
where U( *) = utility, strict concavity and double differential; C, = real per capita consumption; 
p = individual rate of time preference; E, = expectation operator conditional on information at 
time t; A, = net real asset; r;a = real labour income; r, = real interest rate 
After maximizing (3.7) subject to the wealth constraint given in (3.8), which involves 
solving first order conditions for the utility equation, and after appropriate substitutions, the 
main consumption equation (3.6) is obtained. 
On the bank-lending channel, Kashyap and Stein (2000) study on US banks provides 
evidence that the impact of monetary policy on lending is stronger for banks with less 
liquid balance sheets-these banks are generally smaller, i.e. in the bottom 95 per cent of 
the size distribution. This implies that open-market operations can actually shift the loan 
supply schedule, a situation that would mean a failure of Modigliani-Miller proposition25 . 
The study stresses the problem of id~ntification, in particular in identifying whether or not 
the loan supply schedule actually shifted. This problem arises because there are other 
possible explanations for the observed change in bank lending-i.e., it could be that the 
demand for loans actually declined following a decline in activity as a result of monetary 
tightening, or it could be that the monetary tightening weakens the creditworthiness of 
small firms thus reducing their ability to obtain loans from banks and other lenders (i.e. 
balance-sheet approach). To resolve the issue Kashyap and Stein focuses on individual 
bank behaviour and their approach rests on the assumption that banks cannot easily use 
25 The Modigliani-Miller proposition is that banks are indifferent at the margin because they can easily 
substitute loans with other securities, hence shocks to bank loans will not affect the bank lending 
channel (this is well illustrated in Romer and Romer, 1990). 
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other securities for loan purposes when the reserve bank reduces their insured deposits by 
tightening its monetary stance. If the assumption is true, they reckon the effect of monetary 
policy on lending should be more pronounced for some banks than others. The criteria they 
use is the liquidity status26 of the banks and their hypothesis is that smaller banks, because 
of t~eir inability to raise uninsured finance, would be affected more by monetary policy 
tightening than larger banks. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) did raise a very relevant and important question on the choice of 
variable or construct that could be used for monetary policy stance. They discussed three 
possible candidates: the Boschen-Mills (1995) index (based on readings of FOMe 
documents); the federal funds rate; and the Bemanke-Mihov indicator. They decided to use 
the last construct because even if the contraction in policy is partially anticipated by banks, 
it should still have the cross-sectional effects that they hypothesized. Their model involves 
a two-step regression. The regression equations are given below. 
4 U 
L~.log(Lit)= Latj.0..log(Lit_l)+/3tBiI_l + L'f'ktFRBik + Cit 
j~l k=1 
where Lit = bank loans 
B;t-l = bank liquidity (securities/assets) 
FRB;k = Federal Reserve-district dummy variable (i.e. geographic control) 
4 
/3t = rt + L¢/~.Mt-j + 8I'IMEt + Ut j=O 
where Mt_j = monetary policy measure 
TIMEt = time trend 
4 4 
/3t = rt + L¢j.0..Mt- j + LYj.0..GD~_j +8I'IMEt + Ut 
j~O j=O 
where GDP = real GDP growth 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
The key parameter in the above equations is /3t as it reflects the 'intensity' of liquidity 
constraints in a given size class at time t. Equations (3.10) and (3)1) are just two variants 
of the pure time series regression of /3 t on monetary stance. To test their hypothesis the 
4 
important term is the sum of the coefficients of the monetary policy measure, i.e. L ¢j in 
j=O 
26 Defined as ratio of securities to assets. 
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(3.10) or (3.11). For robustness check on their results, they ran a one-step regression that 
essentially combines (3.9) and (3.10), or with (3.11). Another robust test they did was to 
replace PI with the residuals obtained by regressing f31 on the ratio of commercial and 
industrial loans to total loans; the ratio of real estate loans to total loans; the ratio of 
individual loans to total loans; and a time trend. 
Cecchetti (1999) study is quite interesting in that it brings in the legal structure dimension 
to the monetary transmission subject. He argues that the differences in the financial 
structure across the countries of Europe are a consequence of their dissimilar legal 
structures. His hypothesis is: Countries with poor shareholder and creditor protections and 
poor law enforcement will have less developed financial systems and greater sensitivity of 
output and inflation to interest rate changes. His study concentrates on the 'lending' 
channel across countries, and as he puts it: Overall, this analysis allows me to evaluate the 
likely strength of the lending channel across countries. His data include the size and 
concentration of the banking system in each country; measures of the banking system 
health; the importance of bank financing; and the size of the finns. Cecchetti also 
constructed an index of the probable strength of the monetary transmission mechanism 
based on the balance sheets of banks and on the development of equity and debt markets in 
the various European countries. His main finding is that the impact of interest rates on 
output and prices differ across the countries as a result of differences in the size, 
concentration, and health of the banking system as well as in the availability of alternatives 
to bank financing. More important though, he finds that the differences are due to the 
differences in the countries legal structures. 
The importance of bank capital (or equity) to the bank lending channel is also investigated 
by Heuvel (2002). His finding is that: Monetary policy affects the supply of bank loans 
through its effects on bank equity. This dynamic effect-the bank capital channel-
amplifies the standard interest rate channel of monetary policy. 
Fackler and Rogers (1993) study finds evidence that the credit transmission channel, 
incorporating international factors, is an important transmission channel. More specifically, 
movements in the exchange rate are found to have significant effects on domestic credit, 
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and that changes in credit are important in explaining movements in output, prices and 
interest rates. They use a seven-variable VAR model with the following variables: 
government expenditure; GNP deflator; trade-weighted value of the US dollar; money 
supply (M2); total domestic debt; real GNP; and the federal funds rate. All the variables are 
tes.ted for unit root and cointegration27 . They did not, however, find any evidence of 
cointegration so they just used the standard V AR with variables in first difference. They 
also carried out a multi-variate Chow test on the reduced-form VAR for stability. A 
breakpoint 1980:4 was tested using the likelihood ratio test. Their finding is that there was 
no significant structural break in the period so they used the entire period 1973:2 to 1989:1. 
To obtain the impulse response functions and the variance decompositions, they used the 
structural VAR approach calling the residuals the 'structural' or 'fundamental' shocks. 
An interesting study by Warner and Georges (2001) focuses on the credit view of the 
monetary transmission mechanism using stock market returns. They identify the Fed policy 
shocks using newspaper accounts and track daily stock prices immediately following the 
shocks. Their hypothesis is: If the credit channel is important, then the firms that are 
dependent on bank credit and internal funds should receive a relatively greater benefit from 
a Fed easing than firms with access to non-bank credit at favourable terms. They identified 
ten policy shocks during the 1991-94 period but find little evidence supportive of an 
operative credit channel. 
3.3.3 Other asset price effects (or consumption wealth) channel 
There seems not to be many empirical studies done on this particular channel. This may be 
due to the absence of the interest rate and the banking sector in the model. Besides, 
statistics on household wealth are rarely compiled. That is, in many countries, time series 
statistics on household or private consumption are difficult to compile and typically are 
estimated as residuals, i.e. obtained indirectly from other statistical aggregates28 . In spite of 
this, the wealth channel has deep roots in the literature on monetary policy and economic 
stabilization, reaching back to Pigou, Haberler, Keynes, Modigliani and Patinkin (see 
27 For the cointegration test they used the Durbin-Watson (CRDW) approach. 
28 Of all the national accounts macro aggregates, the derivation of household consumption is the most 
subjective in the sense that it involves regular and ongoing household surveys otherwise it is simply 
estimated as a residue. 
49 
Ludvigson et aI., 2002). Meltzer (1999) also noted the importance of this channel when he 
discussed the shortcomings of the interest rate channel as the sole transmission channel. 
The recent study by Ludvigson et al. (2002) finds scant evidence of the importance of the 
wealth channel for monetary policy. They use two econometric approaches in evaluating 
the impact of the wealth channel. First they use a large-scale econometric model and in the 
second they use a small structural V AR. In the former they find there is some role for the 
wealth channel but in the VAR approach they find little or no sign at all. In the VAR 
approach they first estimate a 'baseline' model with the following variables: consumption 
(c), labour income (Y), asset wealth (household net worth compiled from Flow of Funds 
data) (a), federal funds rate (ff), and inflation rate (1£). But instead of using the Cholesky 
decomposition to identify the structural shocks, they use a more 'structural' approach in the 
sense that they base their restrictions on several theoretical assumptions. First they assume 
that the federal funds rate responds contemporaneously to consumption and to labour 
income, but changes in these two variables affect the funds rate with a one-period lag, so 
they set /335 = O. The second assumption is that asset wealth is not contemporaneously 
influenced by consumption, and so they restrict /335 = O. The last assumption is where the 
funds rate has contemporaneous impact on asset but asset does not have the 
contemporaneous impact on the funds rate (i.e. /354 = 0). The resulting endogenous 
coefficient matrix is given below: 
Baseline V AR model 
1£ y c a ff 
1£ 1 0 0 0 0 
y /321 1 0 0 0 
Bo= C /33 /332 1 /334 0 (3.12) 
a /341 /342 0 1 /345 
If /351 /352 /353 0 1 
Note that this is a just-identified model given there are ten restrictions imposed29 , 
29 This is consistent with the formula (n2 - n)12 --see, for example, Enders (1995), 
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In order to gauge the effect of the wealth channel, Ludvigson et al. did a counterfactual 
simulation with the wealth effect 'shut off'. To carry out the counterfactual experiment the 
contemporaneous response of consumption to asset wealth shock (/334) is restricted to zero. 
The same restriction is done also on the lagged coefficient matrices but as the authors 
nQted, in practice, shutting off the lagged effect of asset wealth on consumption has little 
impacts on the results. To illustrate this procedure the contemporaneous relations matrix 
(BoJ is shown below with the appropriate restrictions. 
'Shutting-off wealth channel model 
7r y c a ff 
7r 1 0 0 0 0 
Y /321 1 0 0 0 
Eo= C /33 /332 1 0 0 (3.13) 
a /341 /342 0 1 /345 
ff /351 /352 /353 0 1 
By companng the responses emanating from the two V AR models, they managed to 
measure the contribution of the wealth-channel to the transmission of monetary policy. 
3.3.4 Exchange rate channel 
Although the exchange rate has been a central feature of open-economies, and continues to 
be a an issue of great importance to economic planners, including monetary policy makers, 
not many empirical studies have been conducted that trace the monetary policy 
transmission from its source, say from changes in money supply right through to output via 
the interest rate, the exchange rate and exports. It seems most studies undertaken so far are 
either partial or incomplete as far as the full exchange rate transmission channel is 
concerned. For instance, some empirical studies just examine how monetary policy affects 
exchange rate (Ahn, 1994; Dalziel, 2002; Faust et al., 2002; Kumah, 1996; among others) 
while others focus more on the 'direct' impact of exchange rate on output or inflation 
(Fackler and Rogers, 1993; Kamin and Klau, 1997; Odusola and Akinlo, 2001; Smets and 
Wouters, 1999; among others). In fact there is a vast empirical literature that considers 
exchange rate in its various forms and roles however for the purpose of this study only 
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those that are more closely related to the monetary transmission concept will be reviewed 
here. 
Smets and Wouters (1999) use the V AR approach to study the role of exchange rate in the 
monetary transmission in Germany. Their VAR is comprised of real GDP, consumer price 
index, day-to-day rate, the real effective DM exchange rate, real net exports, import prices, 
export prices, the US real GDP, and the US federal funds rate. They use a recursive 
identification scheme with the variables ordered as listed (except the US variables which 
are put in front in order not to be affected contemporaneously by the local variables). For 
the monetary policy stance30,. they use a weighted average of the interest rate and the 
exchange rate, i.e. their policy shock is defined as: 
£P = (1- co)u i +0) US I I I (3.14) 
where E / = is the weighted policy shock 
0) = is the weight employed by the central bank 
ui = is the interest rate shock 
ut
S 
= is the exchange rate shock 
However unlike Canada and New Zealand3l where the weight 0) is known (because they 
use the monetary conditions indices (MCl)), in Germany there is no MCl therefore they 
estimated the weight by running a regression of interest rate innovation on exchange rate 
innovation. The estimated value of the weight is over 0.2 and so they decided to use 0.25. 
In fact by changing the value of the weight the authors are able to examine different 
impulse response scenarios. Their main finding is that a tightening in monetary policy 
causes a strong and prolonged exchange rate appreciation. This in turn causes the prices of 
imported goods to decline that in turn cause the consumer price index to decrease. They 
also find the decline in import prices is more significant than the increase in export prices 
so overall the terms of trade improves after monetary tightening. 
3D Deciding on what is the structural monetary policy shock is often a contentious issue, especially in the 
case of an open-economy where there are contemporaneous relationships between interest rates and 
exchange rate (see, for example, Christiano et aI., 1998; Faust and Rogers, 2002; Faust et aI., 2002). 
31 Review of the Mer application in New Zealand can be seen in Engelbrecht and Loomes (2002), 
Guender and Matheson (2002), among others. 
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Kamin and Klau (1997) using an error correction model find no evidence that devaluations 
are contractionary in the long run. They use a panel data of 27 countries from Latin 
America, Asia and from the industrial countries. On the other hand, Odusola and Akinlo 
(2001), using Nigerian data, produce mixed results. In the medium to long term, exchange 
.rate depreciation causes output to expand but in the short term, output contracts. They use a 
VAR model with six variables: nominal exchange rate; interest rate; parallel exchange rate 
(i.e. black-market exchange rate); output; price; money supply. Their identification 
approach is non-recursive, i.e. structural-as they put it, "We specify the identification 
restrictions adopted to best capture the joint behaviour of the market fundamentals in the 
Nigerian economy". The use of the parallel exchange rate is fairly unique but they consider· 
it relevant because the 'official' exchange rate is 'administratively managed', i.e. not left to 
free market forces. 
Having reviewed some of the monetary transmission studies undertaken in the rest of the 
world, we will now look at some of the empirical studies undertaken in New Zealand and 
Australia. 
3.4 Studies in New Zealand and in Australia 
It should be obvious that virtually all the studies cited above refer to studies in the United 
States or in Europe. This is because not many studies have been undertaken in New 
Zealand or Australia on monetary transmission-apart from the few that will be cited 
below. In view of this, the following review may include studies that are not strictly 
transmission channel studies but are nevertheless considered important and relevant to the' 
conduct of monetary policies. We will look first at studies done for New Zealand. 
Guender (1998) study on the bank-lending channel of monetary policy is one the few 
transmission studies undertaken in New Zealand. He finds no evidence for the bank-lending 
channel32 , and as he puts it: Overall, our empirical finding~ show that the systematic 
relationship between economic activity and various quantity-or price based measures of 
credit conditions observed in other countries, particularly the United States, is absent from 
New Zealand data. He uses a single regression and bivariate Granger-causal models to 
32 Meltzer (1995) also noted the lack of empirical evidence for the bank lending channel-as he puts it: 
However, the academic evidence for the importance of a bank lending channel is relatively weak. 
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investigate the relationships. These include the relationship between the finance variable 
mix (that he defined as the ratio of bank loans to the sum of commercial bills and bank 
loans) and economic activity; the movements between the interest rate spread and the real 
economy; and the relationships between these variables and the various indications of the 
monetary policy. For the monetary policy instrument he use.s the discount rate, saying, "We 
choose the discount rate primarily for its importance as a signalling device before the 
reforms of the mid-1980s but also because it is the only policy instrument for which data 
spanning the 1975-1994 period exists". 
Another interesting study is .that of Taylor (1997) who examined the causal relationship 
between output and monetary policy variables. He uses the vector error correction model 
with the following variables: money supply, interest rate, price, exchange rate and output. 
His main finding, based on the Granger-causality test, is that real output Granger-causes 
money supply and other three variables, i.e. money supply and the other three variables 
seem to be more endogenous than exogenous-as in the real business cycle theory. He also 
finds that money expansion is likely to be dissipated through higher prices and exchange 
rates. 
Conway (1998) studied the macroeconomic variability in New Zealand using a structural 
VAR approach. His finding is that a considerable share of variability in New Zealand 
macroeconomy is due to external or foreign shocks-especially in the long run. His 
variables include output (real GDP), employment (total employment hours), real interest 
rate, terms of trade, and two .foreign variables-US real GDP and US real interest rate. He 
uses two methods to remove the stochastic trend in his data-by taking the first-difference, 
which is the more common method, and by using the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter. He also 
uses two periods-one starting from 1977:2 to 1996:1 and the other starting from 1985:2 to 
1996:1. This latter period coincides with the time the control over interest rate and the 
exchange rate was removed. Because the shocks are defined as one standard deviation of 
the values of the variables Conway refers to the magnitude of the responses as some 
proportion of the standard deviation unit. 
A more recent transmission study using New Zealand data is that of Wongsaart (2002) who 
uses the structural VAR approach to analyse monetary policy impact on the 
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macroeconomy. Using Kim and Roubini (1999) structural VAR format as a basis, 
Wongsaart then went on to include one cointegration equation of money demand after 
finding evidence of one cointegration relationship among the variables. In fact, he 
estimated two models-one that follows basically Kim and Roubini (1999) and Brischetto 
and Voss (1999) approach, and the other (of his own design) that uses the variables in first-
difference with the money demand cointegration relationship, i.e. a vector error correction 
model (VEe). He uses output (nominal GDP), domestic price level (consumer price index), 
narrow money aggregate, interest rate (short-term interest rate), exchange rate (US$INZ$), 
US interest rate, and the domestic oil price index. In his conclusion Wongsaart claimed that 
his 'modified' model is more satisfactory in the sense that "its results are free of the 
empirical anomalies often found in the previous studies". 
Two interesting and related papers by Buckle et al. (2002) and Buckle et al. (2003) discuss 
an open economy structural V AR model for New Zealand that follow the techniques 
introduced by Cushman and Zha (1997) and Dungey and Pagan (2000)33. Their model 
includes international variables and an expanded list of domestic variables including a 
climate variable to capture the impact of climatic conditions on the business cycle34_a 
total of fourteen variables altogether. Their data enter the V AR model as deviations from 
the long run trend obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. They also use a forward-
looking Taylor rule to identify the monetary policl5 . On the estimation issue they use the 
'seemingly umelated regression' or SUR rather than the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
because some lagged values are restricted to zeroes. The key results in the first paper are: 
the significant influence of international variables on New Zealand business cycle; the 
importance of separately identifying import price and export price shocks; and the 
significant influence of climate on the economy. In the second paper the authors were 
trying to address three questions: whether inflation-targeting in New Zealand has resulted 
in monetary policy accentuating or dampening business cycles; what was the impact of 
monetary policy on the variability of inflation; and the third one is whether monetary policy 
affects the trade-off between output and inflation variability. One interesting technique they 
use to gauge the impact of monetary policy on detrended GDP is the method used earlier by 
33 As cited in Buckle et al. (2002). 
34 Defined as the percentage deviation ofreal GDP from its trend level (also known as the growth cycle). 
35 Because the official cash rate (OCR) was introduced recently, the authors use the 90-day rate as a proxy 
for the monetary policy instrument. 
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Dungey and Pagan (2000). They started off with the moving average representation of the 
V AR that shows detrended output as the summation of thirteen impulse responses due to 
the thirteen unique shocks in the entire model. This is represented as: 
t-I 13 
Y t = initial conditions + L L Biju j,t-I 
1=0 j=1 
where YI is the detrended output, e ij is the ith impulse response associated with the jth shock. 
(3.15) 
The authors claim that the detrended output is in fact affected by the direct impact (non-
systematic) of interest rate ~s well as from the induced (systematic) impact. The latter arises 
when the central bank changes the interest rate in response to changes in the domestic 
economic environment, and this is captured by the reaction function, Therefore in order to 
estimate the induced impact they restricted the coefficients of domestic demand and 
domestic price to zero in the reaction function. The resulting equation is exactly like 
Equation 3.15 except now the impulse responses and the detrended output are slightly 
altered because of the restrictions imposed on the reaction function. Now to get the total 
effect of the monetary policy effect on detrended output they formulate the following 
equation, 
I-I I-I 13 
MPlt = Lel~IOUIO'I-1 + LL(eij -e;)uj,t_1 (3,16) 
1=0 1=0 j=I 
where MPI = monetary policy index 
e; = impulse response functions when the reaction function is suppressed 
The first term on the right hand side measures the direct (non-systematic) reaction of 
monetary policy and the second component captures the systematic reaction of monetary 
policy to the different shocks. Therefore to get the profile for detrended GDP in the absence 
of a monetary policy response one needs to subtract Equation 3.16 from detrended GDP 
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Buckle et al. (2003) findings are: under inflation-targeting monetary policy has tended to be 
countercyclical on New Zealand growth cycles and has tended to reduce inflation and 
output variability36. 
We will look next at some of the monetary transmission studies that have been done in 
Australia. Like New Zealand, not many empirical studies have been undertaken on the 
monetary transmission channels in Australia. There may be several reasons for this but as 
noted by Brischetto and Voss (1999) the use of the VAR models in Australia is fairly recent 
and this could be one reason why not many empirical studies have been undertaken in the 
past. One paper that looks specifically at the lending channel is that of Suzuki (2001). Other 
useful and interesting papers include that of Brischetto and Voss (1999), Dungey (2001), 
Dungey and Pagan (2000), Gruen et al. (1999) and Orden and Fisher (1993). These are 
summarised below. 
Suzuki (2001) study looks at how a tightening monetary policy affects the bank loans. His 
approach is interesting in that he tries to separate the lending view from the conventional 
money view (or the interest rate channel). His claim is that the decline in aggregate demand 
following a tightening of monetary policy can be explained by either transmission view. 
This can be translated to a test of whether the shift in the Australian bank loan market 
following monetary tightening is in the demand or the supply schedule. To carry out the 
test, Suzuki includes the price and the quantity of bank loans in his V AR model. The 
intuition behind his test is fairly straightforward: if the supply curve shifts to the left, then 
the quantity of loans demanded will fall but its price will rise; but if the demand schedQle 
for the loans shifts, then both the quantity and the price of the loans will decline. His V AR 
model includes eight variables: world price index (non-fuel commodity price index), price 
(CPI), output (real GDP), money supply (base money), interest rate (cash rate), exchange 
rate (US$/ AUS$), loan price and bank loans. Of all the variables listed, the loan price 
measurement is the most complicated-this is because it is difficult to get data on interest 
rate on new loans. In view of the difficulty, Suzuki decided to use the 'diffusion index'. He 
estimated his V AR model over the period 1985: 1 to 2000:2 using the recursive (or the 
Cholesky) decomposition to identify the structural shocks and the ordering of the variables 
36 An interesting and useful explanation of the benefit of countercyclical policy is provided by Chatterjee 
(2001). 
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is as listed. His finding is that the price and the quantity of loans initially increase but after 
a few quarters they both decline. This implies that the demand schedule for loans actually 
shifted-hence the lending channel view is not supported. 
Orden and Fisher (1993) study is one of the earlier empirical works that utilizes the V AR 
framework to study the dynamic relationships between money, prices and output. In fact 
they use the error correction V AR form (i.e. VEC) because they found some significant 
cointegrating relationships prior to the financial liberalizations in the 1980s. It is also one 
of the few studies that compare Australia and New Zealand economies. Their principle 
findings are that shocks to money have very little effect on real output, while money and 
prices tend to move proportionally in the long run. 
The paper by Brischetto and Voss (1999) examines the effects of monetary policy in 
Australia using an open economy structural V AR model that was first developed by Kim 
and Roubini (1999). Their impulse responses do not show the price and exchange rate 
puzzles typically encountered in other V AR studies and they claim the reason is because of 
the inclusion of the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate. They also claim that their 
model is satisfactory in terms of producing results that are consistent with existing 
structural V AR literature and with previous empirical work for Australia. Another related 
paper is by Dungey and Pagan (2000) who formulated a II-variable structural V AR model 
of the Australian economy. The number of variables here is more than the seven variables 
of Brischetto and Voss (1999) model. Another difference in the two studies is the use of 
variables in level by Brisc:hetto and Voss while Dungey and Pagan use a detrended37 series. 
Also the focus of the two papers is slightly different. Brischetto and Voss study focuses 
more specifically on the effects of monetary policy while Dungey and Pagan study is more 
general in the sense that they try to formulate a model that captures most of the observed 
features of the real economy over time and behaves broadly as expected in response to 
various shocks. One of their important findings is that both foreign output and asset price 
effects playa major role in the Australian growth cycle. They also noted that the influence 
of monetary policy on the economy is seen to contribute to stabilizing activity but the 
effects are not large. 
37 By regressing on a constant and a deterministic trend. 
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A paper by Gruen et al. (1999) is unique and important in that it tries to estimate the length 
of the transmission lags from monetary policy to output. They use a single equation to 
estimate the effect of a one-percentage change in the short-term real interest rate on output 
growth over the subsequent three years. Their equation is given below. 
6 I 
flYr =,a+ "2J3j r,_j + [Y2 fl!,_2 + Y4!lfr-4] + Oyr-l + %Wr-1 + L,tPjflwr_j +cr 
j=O j=o 
where Y = non-farm output; W = US output; r = short-term real interest rate 
f = farm output; c1 = mean zero error term 
(3.17) 
They estimated two versions of the Equation 3.17. In the first version they use the real 
interest rate that is derived by subtracting the underlying CPI from the overnight cash rate 
and in the second version, they use the headline CPI. They included the US output because 
many studies in the past have documented the importance of the US economy and financial 
status on the Australian economy-they cited the works of McTaggart and Hall (1993), 
Gruen and Shuetrim (1994), de Roos and Russel (1996), Kortian and O'Regan (1996), 
Debelle and Preston (1995), de Brouwer and Romalis (1996). In their results, they reported 
the mean of the coefficients of the interest rate (fJ's) as negative and significant. More 
importantly they estimated the average monetary policy lag length as 6.4 quarters for the 
underlying CPI model and 5.8 quarters for the headline CPI model. In order to estimate 
these averages they use the following formula: 
j=l (3,18) 
where m = is the effect on non-farm output growth in quarter 'i' 
While the authors managed to estimate the lags of the monetary policy38 they did emphasise 
the problems associated with the technique, like the enddgeneity of interest rate to output 
changes or the sensitivity of their test to the type of inflation rate they use. As they pointed 
out in their conclusion, "All these estimates are, however, subject to considerable 
uncertainty" . 
38 An interesting nonparametric analysis of the monetary policy lags is presented by Uselton (1974). 
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3.5 Summary 
From the literature review it is quite clear that the list of empirical studies both in monetary 
neutrality and in the transmission field in New Zealand and in Australia is fairly limited. It 
is also quite obvious from the neutrality studies reviewed that virtually no study has been 
conducted on the short run responses-i.e. most studies just concentrate on the long-run 
analysis, despite the availability of suitable techniques and the importance of such evidence 
in economic theories. Furthermore, the review on the monetary transmission studies shows 
that virtually no study has been undertaken that looked at the monetary transmission 
channels as a whole, i.e. starting from the money supply, then moving on to interest rate, 
investment and finally output. Most of the studies either take a 'short-cut' by examining the 
4irect impact of monetary policy on output (or inflation), without actually spending time on 
the intermediate or 'inner' workings of the system (the part the literature usually refers to as 
the 'black box') or they simply look at partial or incomplete parts of the transmission 
system-as in studies that look exclusively at the impact of interest rate on exchange rate or 
the effect of interest rate on investment, and so forth. Comparative studies among the 
different transmission channels and among different countries is very limited also. This 
thesis is meant to address some of the shortcomings just described, in particular it will 
incorporate short run analysis in the neutrality tests; will try to systematically analyse and 
understand each transmission mechanism, starting from the money supply and moving 
sequentially through the relevant variables until the last variable, output-at least in 
accordance with the known theoretical models that Mishkin (1995) and Kuttner and Mosser 
(2002) have discussed; and finally will compare the effectiveness or responsiveness of the 
monetary transmission between Australia and New Zealand. Central to the analysis is the 
idea of presenting numerical and graphical results to facilitate the discussion as well as 
providing quantitative measurements that could be of use to policy-makers who need more 
than just the 'qualitative' conclusions from empirical studies. 
Aside from the shortcomings or the gaps in the literature summarised above, the following 
will briefly highlight some of the prevalent and important themes emerging from the 
review. First, the interest on studying the monetary transmission is evidently growing 
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among many nations, in particular in Europe following the creation of the Eurosystem39 in 
1999. And among the monetary transmission channels, the credit channel seems to be 
attracting a lot of empirical researches in recent years. Secondly, many researchers are 
using the V AR (or VEC) framework as their analytical model but while some studies are 
adopting the structural identification approach, many studies are still using the Cholesky or 
recursive identification scheme. Some recent researches have noted the importance of the 
international factors, both in producing consistent responses as well as in eliminating 
previous empirical puzzles, such as the price or exchange rate puzzles. Finally it is quite 
evident that there are still many questions left unresolved and which may be summarised in 
Norrbin (2000) concluding statement: The reviewed literature indicates that we have. so far 
learned very little about the empirical transmission effects of money. Although the 
literature is voluminous, little agreement exists on the exact variables that cause the 
transmission mechanism. As hinted above, this thesis is meant to provide empirical 
evidence on the workings of the different transmission mechanisms with particular focus on 
the bivariate relationships within each monetary transmission channel. 
39 See, for example, Cecchetti (1999). 
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Chapter 4 
ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
Because the empirical analysis is based mainly on the vector autoregression (or VAR) 
framework, it is important that the econometric issues and specialized constructs associated 
with this analytical framework are described/explained in order for one to be appreciative 
of the methods/techniques involved; how the results are obtained; what are the 
lirnitations/shortcomin~s; and generally to follow the analysis and interpretations made. 
With the ever increasing power and 'friendliness' of computer packages these days, one can 
easily get econometric results virtually with a single press on the computer keyboard, but 
the results would be meaningless if one is not fully conversant with the econometric issues 
involved, such as non stationarity, cointegration, variance decomposition, stability, and so 
forth. The aim of this chapter therefore is tei explain some of the econometric issues or 
constructs that are considered pertinent to the V AR analysis intended for this study. It is 
important however to emphasise that some of the issues/constructs are fairly complex and 
their description or explanation here may not be adequate to give a complete insight into 
the subject, in which case relevant econometric text books should be consulted. 
4.2 Unit root (nonstationary) issue 
One very important reason why the presence of a unit root needs to be determined in the 
early part of a V AR analysis is because the response of a variable having a unit root (i.e. a 
nonstationary variable) to exogenous shocks is very different to the response of a stationary 
series to the same shocks. That is, the effect of a shock on the nonstationary variable is 
sustained, i.e. permanent, while the effect on the stationary variable quickly dies away. This 
is possible because the variable with a unit-root can be inverted to an infinite moving 
average (VMA) representation, i.e. a sequence of error terms that virtually goes to 
infinity-hence a shock, or change to the error term, will always be reflected in the value of 
the variable in principle 1. This is demonstrated below using a simple autoregressive process 
(AR)-such as an AR(1) process. 
I In sample data the effect will eventually dies out-in the literature, processes exhibiting this 
characteristic are often referred to as having 'long' memory. 
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(4.1) 
and since Yt-l = ao + a1Yt-2 + cl-1 
we can substitute Yt-l in equation (4.1) and get 
Y/ = a o + a 1 (ao + a 1Yt-2 + cl-1) + Ct 
2 . 
=ao +a1a O +a1 Y/-2 +a1Ct_1 +c/ 
and if we continue substituting Y Zags we get 
Y/ = Laoa; + La;cH ( 4.2) 
;=0 ;=0 
so if a1 =1, i.e. unit root process, then we get 
~ 
Yt = aon + L ct_; = canst + c/ + c/_l + c/_2 + c/_3 + .......... . ( 4.3) 
;=0 
The AR(l) process is shown in (4.1) while (4.3) is an infinite moving average 
representation. What is important here is that when there is an exogenous shock to the 
series, then the current disturbance (ct ) will change and this change will be reflected in all 
subsequent values of the Yt series because the shock will constitute part of the summation 
and will never disappear, i.e. the series is said to have undergone a 'permanent' change2• If 
a 1 is less than one, then any change in the shock term will disappear over time because the 
coefficient a; will go to zero as i --7 00, i.e. the impact of the shock will gradually 
disappear over time. When this occurs, the series is said to be stationary or has no unit root. 
Testing for a unit-root is not very straightforward because of the possibility that the series 
in question may have a trend, a constant or both, in which case the appropriate testing 
procedure is required, i.e. one that takes into account the presence of these deterministic 
regressors. Dickey and Fuller (1979)3 consider three formulations or regressions that can be 
used to test unit root in a time series data. The first is where the regression includes a 'time 
trend and a constant'; the second is where only a 'constant' is included; and the third where 
2 In real situations, a 'permanent' change is very difficult to observe because most of the economic 
variables will keep changing from period to period so the possibility of a getting a 'permanent' change in 
a series is a very useful concept and in fact provides the basis for Fish and Seater (1993) long run 
neutrality test. 
3 As cited in Enders (1995, p. 221). 
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none of these deterministic regressors is incorporated. The general testing approach is to 
start with the most unrestricted formulation (i.e. one with the 'trend and the constant') and 
then move to the next equation with only the 'constant' included, and finally ending up 
with the most restricted form which has neither the trend nor the constant regressor4. At any 
time the null hypothesis of nonstationary is rejected, the test will stop and the conclusion is 
that the series has no unit root, i.e. stationary. The three regressions are shown in (4.4) to 
(4.6). Note when the -lags of the differenced-variable are added in order to absorb any serial 
correlation, the testing procedure is known as the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
The critical values for the test regressions are often denoted as'r'-r ,'r'p and 'r', respectively, 
and are dependent on whether a constant (or intercept) and/or time trend are included, i.e. 
using 'r'-r when the model has no trend could give wrong conclusions, likewise 'r' should be 
used when there is no constant and time trend in the equation. 
Obviously there are several hypotheses that can be tested from the three equations (4.4)-
(4.6) but the most important one is the unit root hypothesis: y = 0 5. The other testable 
hypotheses include testing for the significance of the trend term under the null hypothesis 
or testing the signifiGance of the constant term. 
There are several unit root tests that are currently used but for this study the following three 
tests will be used: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) , the Phillips-Perron (PP) and the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests6 . The ADF and PP tests both use the null 
hypothesis of nonstationary (or y = 0) however the ADF test assumes the errors are 
statistically independent and have constant variance while the PP test assumes a more 
4 In line with Hendry general-to-specific approach. 
5 Actually y = a l -1 after subtracting Yl-I from both sides of Equation (4.1), i.e. y = 0 means a l = 1 
(i.e. nonstationary). 
6 Using several tests, in particular a mix of tests, some with the null of nonstationary and others with the 
stationary null, is known as 'confirmatory' analysis (Maddala, 2001). 
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flexible distribution for the error tenns (see Enders (1995, p. 239)). It is also useful to 
mention here that under the null hypothesis (i.e., y = 0), the series is assumed nonstationary 
hence the distribution of the parameter y does not follow the standard t-distribution, nor 
the asymptotically nonnal distribution N(O,1)7. Dickey and Fuller, however, have generated 
relevant critical statistics using Monte Carlo simulation. The KPPS test, on the other hand, 
uses the null of 'stationary'. This test relies on the following equation: 
Y, =/3t+x, +c, 
where E, is a stationary process 
and x, = xt-l +U" where u, - iid(O,cr~) 
And the null hypothesis of stationary is formulated as: 
Ho: cr ~ = 0 or x, is a constant (because it does not vary), against the 
alternative hypothesis Ha: cr ~ > ° 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
This is a test of parameter constancy against the alternative that the parameters follow a 
random walk, i.e. if we reject the null hypothesis then the parameters follow a random walk 
(or unit root process). 
To finish off the discussion on the unit root tests, it is important to note that the 'power' of 
these unit root tests is generally low, meaning that they often do not reject the null 
hypothesis when it is wrongS, i.e. these tests do not have the power to distinguish unit root 
processes and near unit-root processes. Moreover they have little power to distinguish 
between trend stationary and drifting processes9. 
4.3 Seasonal unit root 
As pointed out by Enders (1995, p. 229) seasonality is a key feature of many economic 
series. This means that there is a regular pattern in the series that occur or follow some 
regular time period, say every month, quarter or once a year. In view of this, it may not be 
possible to get a stationary series by simply taking first-differences, i.e., for quarterly data it 
may be necessary to subtract the value of Yt not by Yt-l but by Yt-4 to get a stationary series. 
One method for testing seasonal unit root will be illustrated here. This test is attributed to 
7 Discussed in Johnston and Dinardo (1997, p. 224) and in Enders (1995, p. 212) 
8 According to Keating (1992) because of the their low power, the existence of unit roots is controversial. 
9 Drifting process is a difference-stationary process, i.e. a random walk with a constant (or drift term). 
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Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (1990) as cited in Enders (1995, p. 232) and in 
Maddala and Kim (1998, p. 367). 
4 k 
~4Yt = LasDst + rr + 7i1Yl,t-l + 7i2Y2,t-l +7i3 Y3,t-2 +7i4Y3,t-l + L¢i.1 4Yt-i + ct (4.9) 
s=1 i=1 
where Dst are seasonal dummies, T is the trend and 
~4Yt = Y t - Y t-4 
YI.t-1 = Yt-I + Y t-2 + Yt-3 + Y t-4 
Y2,t-l = Yt-I - Y t-2 + Yt-3 - Yt-4 
h,t-I = Yt-I - Y t-3 
Y3,t-2 = Y t-2 - Y t-4 
Note: if the constant is included then only three seasonal dummies will be used; these dummies are used 
to take care of the 'deterministic' seasonal factors. 
The above formulation tests for unit roots at various frequencies, namely, zero frequency, 
semiannual frequency, and annual frequency. If 7i1 = 0, the series contains a unit root at 
zero frequency, i.e., the series contains a nonseasonal unit root. If 7i 2 = 0, there is seasonal 
unit root at semiannual frequency, and if 7i3 = 0 and 7i 4 = 0 then there is a seasonal unit 
root at annual frequency. If 7i1 = 0 , then the appropriate filter is (1 - L), and if 7r 2 = 0, then 
the filter is (1 + L), and if 7i3 = 0 and 7i 4 = 0, then the filter is (1 + L2). 
4.4 Stability 
The issue of stability is related to stationary, and is crucial for the Fish and Seater (1993) 
long-run neutrality test (LRD) because a V AR that is stable converges, meaning that it is 
possible to get the long-run multipliers that the test requires. In a univariate system, to be 
stationary the essential criteria is for the coefficient of the lagged variable to be less than 
unity-otherwise the series is said to have a unit root or is non-stationary. In the V AR 
context, the principle still holds though the expression is getting a bit more complicated 
because instead of a single scalar coefficient, we are now dealing with a matrix and 
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characteristic roots. In order to illustrate this we will use the first order bivariate V ARlO. 
We start off with the reduced fonn VAR. 
Using lag operators (L), we get: 
Yt = alO + allLYt + al2 Lmt + elt 
mt = a20 + a21 LYt + a22 Lmt + e2t 
And rearranging as to put the same variables together: 
(1- all L) Yt = a lO + a12 Lmt + elt 
(1-a22 L)mt =a20 +a21 LYt +e2t 
And using equation 4.13 to get mt, 
a20 + a21 LYt + e2t m = ~'-----"'''----'-----'::.:.... 
t (1- a 22L) . 
So substituting mt into (4.12), in order to solve for Yt: 
So the explicit solution of Yt is: 
a lO (1- a22 ) + al2 a20 + al2e2t_1 + elt (1- a22 L) Yt = 2 (1- a22L)(I- all L) - al2 a21 L 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
( 4.12) 
( 4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.21) 
The solution for mt can be detennined in the same way as for Yt. In tenns of the stability 
condition, the polynomial in the denominator in (4.21), known as the characteristic 
equation, should have roots that are greater than one, or should lie outside the unit circle. 
The inverse of these roots are called the characteristic roots of the solutions for the series (Yt 
10 This basically follows the approach in Enders (1995, p. 298) but the illustration here has been extended 
further with more algebraic expressions included as to show more clearly the steps involved. Note also 
that this illustration can be generalized to higher order V ARs though the algebra may get a bit more 
'messy' . 
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and mt), and logically must be less than unity for the system to be stable or convergent. In 
most empirical studies, the characteristic roots are calculated by computer packages 
because of the extensive and tedious algebraic manipulations involvedll . 
4.5 Structural breaks 
Structural breaks are important because they may coincide with major events, like major 
policy shift, interna~ional crisis, or natural catastrophes, thus raising the possibility of 
changing the stylised facts of a country12. Furthermore, these breaks may affect model 
estimation and forecasting-as pointed out by Mahadeva and Sinclair (2002, p.7), "The 
presence of structural breaks implies a model passing all these test/3 on past data need not 
necessarily forecast the future well". In other words, forecast may be inaccurate if there are 
structural breaks in the data. Another important reason for checking for structural breaks is 
that the presence of one or more will bias the results of unit root tests towards non-rejection 
of stochastic nonstationary (or unit root) null hypothesis14. There are several tests for 
structural breaks, such as the Chow's Breakpoint test and the CUSUM test of Brown, 
Durbin and Evans (1975) but in this study, Perron's test will be applied because the series 
are nonstationary. Perron (1989) suggests three hypothesis formulations which he labels as: 
model A, Band C, however the approach here will use the composite equation that 
combines all the different hypotheses-as is done in Sanyal and Ward (1995). The 
combined equation is shown below. 
k 
r; =u+a}';_l +!3t+YIDUP+Y2DUL+Y3DUS+ L.17I~(YI-l)+el 
1 
(4.22) 
where DUP, DUL and DDS are the dummy variables, 
DUP= pulse dummy variable=1 when t=Tb+l (and 0 otherwise) 
DUL=level dummy variable=1 when t> Tb (and 0 otherwise) 
DDS= slope dummy variable=t-Tb if t>Tb (and 0 otherwise) 
et is assumed to be independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
and Tb is the structural break point, and the lagged first difference term is included in order to 
absorb any serial correlation (see Enders, 1994, p.247). 
11 Some of these can be seen in A 7.2.1 in the appendix. 
12 Sanyal and Ward (1995) investigate this topic using New Zealand data. 
13 Referring to the three criteria for a 'good' model, viz., accurate forecast; immune to the Lucas critique; 
and to be based on reliable data. 
14 Perron (1989) paper gives a strong argument against the view that most economic variables have unit 
root, in particular counters the finding of Nelson and Plosser (1982) and insists that most variables are 
stationary around a deterministic trend if allowance is made for the structural breaks within the data 
series. This topic is also discussed in Enders (1995) and Maddala and Kim (1998). 
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Note that the break point (Tb) can be exogenously provided, as is done in the original 
Perron (1989) study and more recently in Donganlar (1998). Some studies, however, like 
that of Sanyal and Ward (1995), Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron (1997), Debs (2001), 
among others, use endogenously determ~ned break points. 
Equation (4.22) is a very general expression for a process that is stationary around a trend 
function with a break in (i) both in level and slope if y 2 1= 0; Y3 1= 0; (J 1= 0; and 
a < 1 and y, ::::: 0 , (ii) in just its level if Y3 = 0; a < 1 and y, ::::: 0, and just its slope when 
Y 2 = 0; and a < 1 and y, ::::: O. The null hypothesis, on the other hand, can be written as: 
k 
1'; = U + a1';_, + y, DUP + L.1J/ L1(1';_,) + e/ 
, 
where a = 1 and y, 1= 0 . 
( 4.23) 
The above equation should be estimated using OLS and the null hypothesis Ho: a = 1 (i.e. 
unit root) should be tested against the alternative hypothesis, Ha: a < 1 (i.e. no unit root). 
Now under the null hypothesis, the distribution of a does not follow the standard t-
distribution but its asymptotic critical values, designated as t(a) , has been tabulated by 
Perron (1989). If we reject the null hypothesis, it means that the series has no stochastic 
trend and consequently the three coefficients of the trend, the level dummy and the slope 
dummy, i.e. {J, Y2 and Y3' can be tested for their significance using the standard 't' test. 
4.6 Cointegration 
Cointegration is said to occur between non stationary variables when their linear 
combinations are stationary. Although the concept of cointegration was introduced 
sometime ago by Granger (1980)15 its application and use is relatively new. Enders (1995, 
p.355) reports, "This chapte/6 explores an exciting new development in econometrics: the 
estimation of a structural equation or VAR containing nonstationary variables" and 
Thomas (1993, p.171) says, "Cointegration analysis, its relationships to ECMs and its use 
15 As cited in Maddalla and Kim (1998, p. 26). 
16 Referring to the 'Cointegration and Error Correction Model" chapter. 
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in conjunction with the Hendry-type testing down procedure is a relatively new but exciting 
development in econometrics". 
When there is evidence of cointegration between the variables, the V AR model should 
incorporate the 'error correction term' in order to specify correctly the ,model. This error 
correction tenn is stationary (by definition) and so the classical assumption for linear 
regression is not violated. Therefore before the V AR model is estimated the variables 
should be tested first for cointegration. If there is no cointegration relationship detected, the 
error correction term should not be included and the model is a straightforward traditional 
VAR. It should be emphasised that cointegration analysis is only applicable when variables 
are nonstationary in level and also when they are of the same order of integration. 
Two common tests for cointegration relationships are the Engle-Granger methodology and 
that of Johansen. In this analysis the latter approach will be used. This is because the Engle-
Granger method has several defects, namely the detennination of the residuals is not 
invariant to the way the nonnalisation is done and secondly it relies on a two-step 
estimator17. Also it does not distinguish between the existence of one or more cointegrating 
vectors (Hafer and Jansen, 1991). The Johansen test, on the other hand, relies on the 
relationship between the rank of a matrix and its characteristics roots and generally 
overcomes most of the problems associated with the Engle-Granger test procedure. Some 
of these features will be elaborated below with the aid of a simple bivariate V AR model. 
Now to apply the Johansen testI8 , we ne,ed to find first the order of integration of the 
variables (say Yt and mt in our example). Once we are satisfied that all variables are 
integrated of the same orderI9 , we then proceed to test for the lag length. The important 
criteria for this lag test is to ensure that the residuals of the equations (4.24 or 4.25) are 
serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic. 
17 See Enders (1995, p. 385) for more discussion on this. 
18 This depends on the maximum likelihood estimation procedure--as opposed to the Engle-Granger test 
that uses the OLS method. 
19 This can be done using the normal unit root tests, such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller or the PhiIlips-
Perron test. 
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or in more compact form: 
XI = An + B1X t_1 +B2 X t_ 2 +B3 X t_3 + ............. +cl (4.25) 
where X, is vector of endogenous variables, and generally are in level. 
There are several versions of the lag test. One approach is where we estimate a V AR with 
many lags, say 8 lags, and then estimate the same V AR but with a smaller number of lags, 
say 4 lags, and then compare these two models. In this instance we refer to the larger V AR 
as the 'unrestricted' model while the smaller VAR is the 'restricted' version because the 
test statistic that we will use is the likelihood ratio test that requires both estimates of the 
'unrestricted' and the 'restricted' model. The underlying philosophy of this test is simply to 
see whether the restrictions imposed when we use the shorter V AR has changed the 
maximized likelihood function significantly, i.e. the null hypothesis under valid restrictions 
is that the maximized likelihood of the unrestricted and the restricted models should be very 
similar. The test statistic formula is given below: 
(4.26) 
where T = number of observations 
c = number of parameters in the unrestricted system 
L i = variance-covariance matrix of the residuals 
log I L i 1= natural logarithm of the determinant of L i . 
The likelihood ratio test statistic has the asymptotic X 2 distribution with the degrees of 
freedom equals to the number of restrictions in the system, which in our example will be 
4n2 or 4(2)2 = 16. The other two common tests are the multivariate versions of the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC) tests, calculated as: 
AIC= Tiogi L 1+2 N 
SBC =T log I L I + N 10g(T) 
where I L I = determinant of the variance/covariance matrix of the residuals 
N = total number of parameters estimated in all equations 
T = total number of usable infonnation 
(4.27) 
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The two important criteria underlying the tests above are: the residual sum of squares 
should be minimal and the model should be as parsimonious as possible2o. In other words, 
the model with the lowest AIC or SBC should be selected. 
Once the ,number of lags is determined the next important step in the Johansen method is to 
estimate the 'error correction' or VEC model and then determine the rank of the n matrix. 
The model to be estimated is given in (4.28) below, Note here that OLS cannot be used 
because of the contemporaneous relationships (or restrictions) that can be imposed on the 
n matrix. 
where XI is vector of nonstationary variables 
n =a,8= AI -l 
and ci is a vector of 'white noise' residuals which may be cross-correlated' 
(4.28) 
In order to have a more clear idea of what constitutes the different terms shown in (4.28), it 
is useful to have an expanded representation of (4.28) so that it is easier to comprehend 
what is being discussed. Again, in order to make the exposition simple, a bivariate model is 
used. This is shown below, and because of space constraint, only one lag is used. 
(4.29) 
where the cointegrating vector is (,81,,82) and the speed of adjustments are a y and am 
Once the model has been estimated, the next task is to calculate the characteristic roots (or 
eigenvalues) of the n matrix. This is achieved by equating the determinant21 of the n 
matrix to zero22 and solving for the roots, Al andA2 23. The number of these nonzero 
characteristic roots is equal to the rank of the matrix that in tum is equal to the number of 
cointegrating vectors. The key feature of Johansen test is the relationship between the rank 
20 It is important however that the residuals are normally distributed, non-serially correlated and 
homoscedastic , i.e. white noise process. 
21 A well-illustrated exposition of the relevant matrix algebra, including determinants, is 
provided in the first chapter of Greene (1993). 
22 Like this: I A - IJI=O. 
23 For higher order V ARs, there will more roots. 
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of IT matrix and its characteristics roots so to understand this relationship a numerical 
example will be given below-again using our bivariate example. Let us assume the IT 
matrix has been estimated: 
IT = [0.5 - 0.2] 
-0.2 0.5 
Our next task now isto find the characteristic roots of the above coefficient matrix. In order 
to do this we need to modify first the IT matrix by introducing theA scalar. We then equate 
the determinant of this modified IT matrix to zero in order to solve for A (which is in fact 
the characteristic root or eigenvalue). 
0.5-..1 -0.2 
=0 
-0.2 0.5-..1 
To solve for A we derive the characteristic equation. 
(0.5 - ..1)(0.5 - A) - 0.04 = 0 
or 
0.25 - 0.5..1 - 0.5..1 + ..12 - 0.04 = 0 
or 
..12 - A + 0.21 = 0 (4.30) 
Solving the above equation using the quadratic rule or simple factorization yields the two 
roots: Al = 0.7 andA2 = 0.3
24
. 
Now that we have determined the values of the two characteristic roots, the next question 
is: are they significantly different to zero or not? This is important because the number of 
nonzero roots is equal to the rank of the matrix, and the rank of the matrix is equal to the 
number of cointegrating vectors in the model. The Johansen test allows us to determine the 
number of roots that are significantly different from zero. To check this number, the two 
tests commonly used are the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test. These are given 
below. 
24 Note that 0.7 x 0.3 = 0.21 which is equal to the constant in the characteristic equation (4.30). This number 
n 
is also equal to the determinant of the II matrix, i.e. I IT 1= II Ai = ~x~x .... An· 
i=1 
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Alrace (r) = -TL,ln(l- i;) (4.31) 
(4.32) 
where 'r' = the number of cointegrating vectors, 
X = the estimated values of the characteristic roots (eigenvalues) obtained from 
I 
the estimated IT matrix 
T = the number of observations 
In both tests, testing the null hypothesis is carried out in a sequential fashion. For instance, 
in the trace test, the first null hypothesis to be tested is r = 0 (i.e. no cointegration) against 
the alternative that r > 0 (i.e. there is cointegration). If we reject the null of no cointegration 
we move to the 'next' null of r ::; 1 (i.e. there is at the most one cointegration relationship) 
against the alternative of more than one cointegrating relationship. Now with regard to the 
maximum eigenvalue test, both the null and the alternative hypotheses are more specific. 
For instance, the null hypothesis says r = k whereas the alternative says, r = k+l. Using a 
numerical example, when the null is r = 0 (i.e. no cointegration relationship), the alternative 
says, r = 1 (there is one cointegrating relationship). So when we reject the null of no 
cointegration (r = 0) we move up to the next null of r = 1, but if we reject this null again, 
we move up to the null of r = 2. We keep doing this until we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis any more-in practice though the number of cointegrating vectors is quite small 
so we do not need to keep repeating this process many times. 
Now going back to our example with the two characteristic roots, Al = 0.7 and A2 = 0.3 , 
we need now to apply the trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests in order to determine the 
number of cointegrating vectors. We assume T = 40 just for illustrative purposes. 
Trace test: 
A lrace (0) = -T[ln(1- AI) + In(l- A 2 )] 
=- 40[ln(1- 0.7) + In(1- 0.3)] 
= 62.4 
A lmce (1) = -T[ln(l- A 2 )] 
= 40[ln(1- 0.3)] 
=14.3 
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Maximum eigenvalue test: 
Amax (0) = -T In(1- AI) 
= 40In(1- 0.7) 
=48.2 
Amax (1) = -Tln(l- ,1,2) 
= 40In(1- 0.3) 
=14.3 
So comparing the trqce test statistics above with the critical values25 of 17.844 and 8.083 
from the model 'without trend and constant' at the 95 per cent confidence level, we reject 
the null hypothesis of r:::; 1 and conclude that there are more than one cointegrating 
relationship. If we look at the maximum eigenvalue critical values 'of 14.595 and 8.083, we 
do reject the null hypothesis r = 1 and accept the alternative that r = 2, i.e. there are two 
cointegrating vectors which is consistent with the finding of the trace test. Now that we 
h'ave tested and confirmed the presence of two cointegration relation~hips between the two 
variables, we can go ahead and re-estimate the model as a vector error correction model 
(VEC) with two cointegrating vectors rather than a straightforward V AR model. 
Another useful representation of the estimated VEe model is gIven below. Note the 
constant in the error-correction term is suppressed because of space consideration. 
i=l 
!1mt = a02 + am (Yt-l - /32mt-l) + L. a21 (i)L1Yt-i + L. a22 (i)L1m(-i + emt 
i=1 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
The normalisation of the cointegrating vector is made with respect to Yt-I (i.e. /31 is set to 
unity) -but this can be done on mt - 1 as well. One interesting and useful feature of the 
Johansen approach is that restrictions can be imposed (and tested) on the cointegrating 
vectors. These restrictions might relate to economic long run economic relationships. In 
view of this important and useful feature, some researchers might spent more time on 
analysing the cointegrating vectors and their speed of adjustments-and testing different 
restrictions, while others may wish to continue onto the innovation accounting techniques 
such as the impUlse response function, forecast error decomposition and Granger-causality 
analysis. In this study, the focus is more on the innovation accounting techniques rather 
25 Using Table B in Enders (1995, p. 420) 
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than on the cointegration relationships hence no restrictions will be imposed on the 
cointegrating vectors and no analysis made on the speed of adjustment parameters. 
4.7 Impulse Response Function 
This is an important toolkit within the V AR framework and shows the direct relationships 
between endogenous variables and reduced 0r structural shocks. To see how these 
functions are derived we start off with the reduced form V AR with a lag of one26. 
where x t = vector of endogenous variables 
Ao = matrix of constants, Al = coefficient matrix of the lagged variables 
e l = vector of residuals which are not serially correlated, though they may be 
cross-correlated 
And since x t _1 = An +AI xt- 2 + et_l , we can substitute this in (4.35) and"get: 
or 
XI = (l + AI)An + AI2 x t - 2 + Ale t _1 + et 
(4.35) 
And if we continue this backward substitution, there will be no more values for the vector 
of lagged variables (At x t - n ) left-i.e. only the vector of residuals will remain with the 
vector of the constants, as shown below: 
xt = (I + Al + AI2 + A( + ... + At )Ao + Aln et - n + Atl et - n-I + ...... " + Alet_1 + et 
or using the summation sign, we get 
~ 
xt = (l + AI + AI2 + A( + ... + Aln)Ao + LA;et - i 
i=O 
And if we assume the stability condition is met27 , then the solution is given by: 
~ 
XI =!-l + LA;et - i 
i=O 
(4.36) 
(4.37) 
Now the above equation expresses the relationship between the vector of endogenous 
variables Xt and the reduced form residuals et. The problem with this is that the error terms 
26 In actual fact there could be more lags but to simplify the exposition only one lag will be used. Also 
whether the variable is in level or in first-difference is not important at this stage. The expositions here and 
that of the variance decomposition are based on Enders (1995). 
27 See sub-Chapter 4.4 for the conditions for stability. 
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are correlated across the equations so in order to get independent or structural shocks, 
which are obviously of more interest, we need to transform these reduced form error terms 
into independent or orthogonal shocks. The process of transforming these reduced form 
errors is naturally called orthogonalisation but the system needs to be identified28 . 
To make the transformation recall the structural (or primitive) V AR format 
Bxc = Co + CI X C_ l + Cc 
And when we premultiply each side by B-1 we get, 
B -IC B-IC B-1 XC = 0 + 1 X C- l + Cc 
This is the reduced form and can be rewritten as 
So we can rewrite Equation (4.37) as: 
~ 
XI = f.J, 4- I. A; B-1 c/-i 
;=0 
(4.38) 
(4.39) 
(4.40) 
So now we have structural shocks cl ' s instead of reduced form residuals as explanatory 
variables for the endogenous variables. The impulse response parameters are 'hidden' in 
~ 
the term I. A; B-1 • Furthermore, it is important to remember that obtaining structural or 
;=0 
independent shocks from the reduced form is not possible unless the system is identified. 
One of the popular solutions is to restrict the B matrix, say by using the Cholesky 
~ecomposition or other methods of identification. In any case, once the identification 
problem is resolved the standard V AR tools such as the impulse response function, the 
error variance decomposition and the Granger-causality test can be undertaken. 
To probe further Equation (4.40) to see how the individual impulse response functions look 
like, we need to convert the equation into a vector form. We will use the bivariate form 
again to illustrate this, and our starting point is the reduced form (see Equation (4.41». 
28 This implies that there is enough restrictions on the structural parameters so that the system is solvable (see 
Enders (1995, p. 323) for more detailed discussion on this). 
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[y,] = [y]+ t [all m, m ;=0 a21 (4.41) 
where y and m are the unconditional mean of y, and m" i.e. if we 
take the expectation of (4.40), we are left the unconditi~:mal mean vector u 
--[mY-] 
And using e, = B-1 C, ' where B is the normalized coefficient matrix of the endogenous 
matrix, which is equal to [1 b!2] , 
b21 1 
A d·, 29 (. B-l) . 1 [1 n Its Inverse I.e. IS ---
I- bl2b21 - b21 
So in terms of the structural shocks, (4.41) becomes 
To simplify the notation, we create a 2 x 2 matrix ¢; = ( A: )[ 1 - b112 ] 
1- b12b21 - b21 
Equation (4.40) can then be rewritten as 
[ Yt ]=[Y]+ t [¢llC? ¢12(i)][CY'-i] m m ;=0 ¢21 (z) ¢22 (i) cmt-i 
And in a more concise form, 
~ 
x, = f.l + L. ¢;c'_i 
;=0 
(4.42) 
(4.43) 
(4.44) 
The four terms, ¢11 (i) , ¢12 (i) ; ¢21 (i) and ¢22 (i) are the impulse response functions and 
represent the responses of the endogenous variables to the two structural shocks: C Y' and 
Cm, . To interpret these, ¢11 (0) is the impact response of output (yr) to its own shock and 
¢21 (2) is the impulse response of money (mt) due to output shock in the second period. 
These impulse responses can be added period by period and if we carryon to infinity we 
get the long-run multipliers-provided the variable is stationary. If the variable is not 
IC··I 
29 The ijth element of an inverse of a matrix (say B) = __ 1'_ (see Greene, 1993, p. 25) 
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stationary, i.e. has a unit root, then the cumulative sum of the impulse responses will keep 
increasing. 
It is important to note here that the way the variables are ordered could affect the numerical 
values of the impulse responses. This is more pronounced if the correlation between the. 
variables concerned is high. Consequently this is one drawback of the V AR framework, i.e. 
the responses are not unique-they depend on the ordering of the variables. 
4.8 Forecast error variance decomposition: 
This is basically an approach to measure how much of a variable's forecast error variance is 
due to each particular shock in the VAR system-including its own shock. As implied in 
the name of this technique, the essential idea revolves around the forecast error. This is 
given as: 
(4.45) 
This is the one-step ahead forecast error of the reduced form V AR where 
E/xt+i = Ao + Aixt is the variable forecast and XI+] is the realized value of the variable. And 
as explained in the impulse response function section, we can interchange the reduce form 
residual with the structural disturbance term. Furthermore, since the structural V AR can be 
represented as a vector moving average (VMA) form, we can use the format of Equation 
(4.44)-but this time generalizing the period to (t+n) in order to get the appropriate 
forecast expression: 
~ 
xt+n = fJ, + L ¢;c/+n _; 
;=0 
And the corresponding forecast error is 
n-i 
xt+n - E/x/+n = L ¢;c/+n_; 
;=0 
(4.46) 
(4.47) 
Given the forecast error expression above, all we need to do now is to determine its 
variance but more importantly, how much of this variance is due to the different structural 
shocks in the system. This decomposition is not very obvious from Equation (4.47) so to 
make this more apparent, we will resort to our bivariate example of output and money again 
and try to explain this issue in a more explicit manner. We will use money variable as an 
example. The forecast error is given below 
79 
ml+n - E1ml+n = ¢21 (O)c yl+n + ¢21 (1)c yl+n-l + .... + ¢21 (n -1)c yl+l 
+ ¢22 (O)Cml+n + ¢22 (1)Cml+n-1 + ...... + ¢22 (n -1)cml+i 
Now let us suppose the forecast error variance of money is am (n) 2 , then 
am (ni = a~[¢21 (0)2 + ¢21 (1)2 + ....... + ¢21 (n _1)2] 
+ a;' [¢22 (0)2 + ¢22 (1)2 + ..... + ¢22 (n _1)2] 
So the proportion of money variance due to output shock is 
a~ [¢21 (Oi + ¢21 (1)2 + ...... + ¢21 (n _1)2] 
am (n)2 
And the proportion due to the money shock 
a;' [¢22 (0)2 + ¢22 (1)2 + ...... + ¢22 (n _1)2] 
am (n)2 
(4.48) 
(4.49) 
(4.50) 
(4.51) 
One implication of this decomposition is that if the proportion of the.money forecast error 
variance due to output shock is almost zero, then money supply can be considered as 
exogenous. On the other hand, if output shock explains all the forecast error variance of 
money, then money would be considered as entirely endogenous. 
As in the case of the impulse response function, the ordering of the variables is important 
here as well. That is, when the ordering is changed, the proportions may change as weIl-
and the difference will be more pronounced when the correlations between the variables are 
strong, which is often the case in time series data. 
4.9 Granger-causality test 
Although causality may seem a simple word with a fairly straightforward meaning, like 
gravity causes things to fall down instead of flying up, or the storm causes the cancellation 
of flight to Kiribati, in empirical analysis this may be not be so straightforward as it seems. 
In the words of Pearl (1998): It is an embarrassing yet inescapable fact that probability 
theory, the official mathematical language of many empirical sciences, does not permit us 
to express sentences such as: Mud does not cause rain; all we can say is that the two events 
are mutually correlated, or dependent-meaning that if we find one, we can expect to 
encounter the other. In other words, probability theory can only give measures of 
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correlations or independence but not of causal effect. In view of this, it is important that the 
meaning or explanation of Granger-causality as used in this study is clearly explained. 
Basically Granger-causality is related to the idea that if past values of one variable (say 
money supply) can explain well the present value of another variable (say output), then we 
say: money Granger-causes outpueo. In terms of empirical analysis, money Granger-causes 
output if the coefficients of the lags of money variable are significantly different from zero. 
Another way of saying this is: money does not Granger-cause output if and only if all the 
coefficients of the lags of money are equal to zero. Let us illustrate this idea using the 
bivariate example of money and output again. 
Y r = a IO + aUYr-l + a 12 Y r-2 + ..... + f3l1mr- I + f312m t-2 + .... + eyr 
m t = a20 + a21 Y r-l + a22 Yr-2 + .... + f32I m r-I + f322 m r-2 + .... + e mt 
(4.52) 
So to test the null hypothesis that money does not Granger-cause output, we need to test the 
following restriction: f31l = /312 = 1313 = ........... = 0, using the standard F-tese 1• If we reject 
the null hypothesis, then we can say that there is evidence, based on the available data, that 
money Granger-causes output. 
Now if we compare the concept of exogeneity with Granger-causality there is some 
similarity but in the exogeneity case the contemporaneous values of the variables are 
included also so the necessary condition for exogeneity32 is 'stronger' than that of Granger-
causality. 
Another important application of the Granger-causality approach is to test whether a 
particular variable should be included in the V AR model or not. This will involve 
restricting the coefficients of a particular variable and its lags to zero in all the equations 
within a multivariate model and applying the likelihood ratio tese3. The degrees of freedom 
here is equal to the total number of restrictions (i.e. the total number of coefficients that are 
30 The details of Granger-causality test can be seen in Granger (1969). 
31 See Enders (1995, p. 315) for more discussion on this. 
32 Different definitions of 'exogeneity' is given in Engle et al. (1983). Another interesting paper on 
exogeneity and policy analysis is provided by Ericsson et al (1998). And Perez (2002) empirical study of 
on 'superexogeneity' between the federal funds rate and real output provides another interesting dimension 
of exogeneity. 
33 The likelihood ratio test statistic formula is given in Equation (4.26). 
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equated to zero in the entire model). Because the lag of a particular variable is set to zero in 
other equations within the model (i.e. there is cross-equation restriction), this test is 
sometimes known as block-causality test. Note also that the application of the cross-
equation restriction necessitates the use of the likelihood ratio test rather than the more 
straightforward F-test. This is the test that is used in this study. 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter has briefly outlined some econometric issues and tool kits that are commonly 
used in the V AR application. The intended use and advantages of these as well as their 
limitations are also indicated, For example, the unit root tests are shown to have low power 
and likewise the impulse responses and the variance decompositions are known to depend 
on the ordering of the variables, i.e. not unique. And the Granger-causality test is basically 
aN inter-temporal correlation device that may lack the 'richer' causal meaning that many 
researchers prefer34. But despite the shortcomings listed, the tools have been used by many 
empirical researchers and have provided· useful information and insight of the 
interrelationships between variables. As noted by Stock and Watson (2001), "Developing 
and melding good theory and institutional detail with flexible statistical methods like VARs 
should keep macroeconomists busy well into the new century". 
34 According to Cooley and LeRoy (1985), the concept of causality or exogeneity that is tested by the Granger 
and Sims tests is not closely related to the causality of the Cowles Commission economists (which is more 
structural in nature). 
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Chapter 5 
METHODOLOGY and MODELING STRATEGY 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to evaluate and understand monetary transmission mechanisms, the approach 
considered in this study is to subdivide the analysis into three main sections. The first 
section focuses on the monetary neutrality aspect; the second will examine, evaluate and 
compare the different monetary transmission mechanisms, and the last section will compare 
the transmission mechanisms in New Zealand and Australia. However as in most empirical 
studies, these analyses will be preceded by visual examination of the time plots of the series 
and some preliminary tests on the nature and properties of the data. 
The first analysis on monetary neutrality involves' testing a classkal proposition that has 
caused so many debates and controversy between different macroeconomic schools of 
thought1. This test is relevant to the current study because it is meant to provide empirical 
evidence of the impact of money on real output2 . The fundamental question here is: Does 
money affect real output? This first analysis can be considered as setting the scene for the 
next analysis which is basically an attempt to answer the question: How does money affect 
real output? In this second analysis the focus is more on the evaluation and understanding 
of the various monetary transmission models that have been proposed. This will involve 
examining and comparing the impulse responses, variance decompositions and Granger-
causalities across different transmission models. Summary measures reflecting the total 
responsiveness/effectiveness of each model will also be formulated and used. The last 
analysis is a comparative analysis between New Zealand and Australia to see whether there 
is any significant difference in the way monetary impulses are being transmitted to real 
output in the two countries. This is particularly important because of the divergence in 
output paths of the two countries in the mid 1980s when New Zealand started its economic 
reform policies. The question here is: Can the monetary transmission mechanism explain 
this divergence in output paths of the two countries? 
1 Discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
2 This is seen necessary because despite the accumulated empirical results there is still no definite answer to 
the question as whether money affects output (Cheung and Fujii, 1999). 
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Vector autoregression (V AR) is the main analysis framework for this study3, however other 
simpler statistical techniques, like single equation regressions and correlation analysis are 
also utilized in examining the more straightforward relationships-for instance, when 
carrying out tests for unit root or structural break or for stability. Neutrality and 
supemeutrality tests, as well as the evaluation of different transmission mechanisms, rely 
heavily on the standard V AR tools such as the impulse response function (IRF) , forecast 
error variance decomposition (FEVD) technique4 and the multivariate Granger-causality 
test and consequently these are the main analytical tools in this study. These tests and the 
VAR tools are carried out automatically by many computer packages (e.g. WinRATS, 
Eviews and Microfit); however because of their crucial role in this study their derivations 
and theoretical basis are provided in Chapter 4. Because the VAR systems are generally 
overparameterized the results of the tests and the responses/decompositions observed are 
more informative than the regression coefficients5 themselves-in f~ct in most empirical 
studies these coefficients are never reported (see, for example, Stock and Watson, 2001). In 
this study both Microfit and Eviews will be used in estimating and testing the models 
however in order to be more flexible in manipulating the numerical results in terms of 
normalization, or in constructing new series, or in drawing different graphs, the results will 
be transferred to Excel spreadsheet. Microfit and Eviews have tabulations and graphical 
capabilities, but it is not quite easy to change or manipulate the outputs in these programs 
hence the use of Excel spreadsheet. 
With respect to the monetary transmission issue, this study will introduce two ways. this 
could be viewed and investigated. The concept is borrowed from physics and consists of 
two transmission modes-one is called the 'serial transmission' mode and the other is the 
'parallel' transmission mode. This concept is fairly novel to the monetary transmission 
literature but is considered useful here because it provides a systematic way of examining 
and evaluating the different monetary transmission models. At least according to the 
3 Other monetary transmission studies that have used the V AR framework include that of Bean et al. (2002); 
Faust et al. (2002); Favara and Giordani (2002); Hubrich and Vlaar (2000); Kamas and Joyce (1993), 
among others. 
4 In the words of Keating (1992), "Impulse response functions and variance decompositions, the hallmark of 
VAR analysis, illustrate the dynamic characteristics of empirical models ". 
5 This is unlike the structural equation systems where the coefficients and their statistical significance are 
often reported--these coefficient are sometimes referred to as 'deep structural' parameters (see, for example, 
Summers (1991)). 
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prevailing theoretical transmission models the monetary impulse seems to be transmitted 
from one variable to another6, i.e. along a serial path, somewhat like the serial transmission 
in electrical physics. In contrast, most empirical V AR studies seem to concentrate only on 
the final effects of monetary policy, say on output or inflation, without actually tracing the 
'full' path of the monet~y transmission process. This 'short-cut' approach will be called 
the 'direct transmission' mode in this study and will be discussed in more detail in Section 
5.5.2 below. 
5.1 VAR (and VEe) framework 
Before we go on to the details of how to carry out the neutrality and monetary transmission 
analyses, it is useful to start off with the theoretical model or framework that underlies such 
analyses-the vector autoregression framework. The exposition of this framework will be 
based on a bivariate model for the simple reason that using a single equation with each 
variable in it representing vectors could be confusing given the existence of many single 
equation models in economics. Also the bivariate model is naturally the smallest 
multivariate version of the VAR system and therefore is concise and tractable. More 
importantly, the structure and features of the bivariate model are generally the same with 
those of the higher order (or larger) V ARs. 
The VAR model has generally three representations-a 'structural' (SF) form, a 'reduced' 
form (RF) , and an infinite moving average (VMA) representation. This latter form is only 
possible if the coefficient matrix of the endogenous variables in the SF has full rank or has 
a determinant, i.e., invertible? These three forms are very important because they provide a 
concise but comprehensive description of what constitutes a V AR system. In fact it is a 
very rich framework allowing dynamic relationships and feedback mechanisms and with 
appropriate restrictions, can simulate different economic theories. In the words of Stock and 
Watson (2001), "In data description andforecasting, VARs have proven to be powerful and 
reliable tools that are now, rightly, in everyday use". Although some criticisms8 have been 
made regarding the lack of economic structure, there is actually some means within the 
6 This systematic approach is somewhat captured in Kuttner and Mosser (2002) who said: Monetary 
transmission can be thought of as encompassing the various ways in which monetary shocks propagate 
through the economy. But monetary policy is more than just a source of shocks: the systematic response of 
policy to macroeconomic conditions also affects the propagation of monetary (and other) shocks. 
7 Useful matrix algebra can be cited in the first chapter of Greene (1993). 
8 See, for example, Cooley and LeRoy (1985), Rudebusch (1998), among others. 
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framework that provides for contemporaneous relationships to be made-hence the name 
'structural' VAR9. The three forms of the VAR are given below. 
Structural VAR (SF): 
p p 
LlYt = Aym Llmt + Lajyy LlYt_j + LajymLlmt_j + e; (5.1) j=l j=l 
P P 
Llmt = Amy LlYt + L.ajmy LlYt_j + L.ajmmLlmt_j + etm (5.2) j=l j=l 
Reduced (or standard) VAR (RF): 
p p 
LlYt = L. cP j LlYt_j + L. cP j Llmt_j + e; (5.3) j=l j=l 
p p 
L. cP j LlYt_j + L. cP j Llmt_j + e; (5.4) j=l j=l 
Vector Moving Average (VMA): 
p p 
LlYt =u y + L.lfJyy(i)e~i + LlfJym(i)et: (5.5) 
i=O i=O 
P P 
Llmt = um + L. IfJmy(i) e~i + L IfJmm(iJe;i (5.6) 
i=O i=O 
Notes: The variables Yt and mt can be in first-difference or in levels. 
There is no cointegration, otherwise the error-correction should be included. 
The disturbances (or residuals) are serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic, however 
the RF residuals may be cross-correlated, i.e. var-cov matrix ~ e is non-diagonal, but the 
SF residuals are often assumed to be independent, i.e. the var-cov matrix ~ Ii is diagonal. 
To briefly explain the truee forms of the model, the SF, as mentioned above, is meant to put 
some structure to the system, i.e., the Aym or Amy parameters, for instance, are the 
numerical measures of the contemporaneous relationships between the two variables 10. In 
the derivation of the orthogonal shocks, one of these parameters will be restricted in order 
to identify the structural model. The RF, on the other hand, is useful for estimation 
purposes, i.e., because of the contemporaneous relationship in the SF form, the system 
9 As pointed out by Keating (1992), "In contrast to the atheoretical VAR models developed by Sims (1980), 
the structural approach yields impulse responses and variance decompositions that are derived using 
parameters from an explicit economic model". 
10 In the Cowles Commission approach, there are many of these structural parameters but in the estimation 
process most are restricted to zero hence the introduction of the term 'incredible restrictions' by 
Sims (1980). 
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cannot be directly estimated, hence the need to use the RF which is estimable. It should be 
pointed out however that the error terms (et) of the RF form may be cross correlated in 
which case some restrictions is needed (as is suggested above) in order to get independent 
or orthogonalised shocks. This process is known in the literature as the 'identification' 
problem and there are several approaches ll but the most common method is the Cholesky 
decomposition12- this identification scheme will be used in this study. 
There are two main reasons for using the Cholesky decomposition. The first reason is that 
the serial ordering of the variables in the theoretical transmission models seems to suggest 
that the variables have been more or less arranged according to their degree of exogeneity 
or endogeneity. For instance, the first variable is the money supply and this is supposed to 
be the start of the monetary transmission process, i.e. this would be the most exogenous 
variable. The last variable, real output, would be the most endogenous because it is 
assumed to be affected by all other variables. The Cholesky decomposition provides this 
kind of recursive setup. Another reason is that the objective of this study is to evaluate and 
compare the performance of the different transmission models, i.e. not necessarily to 
identify the most appropriate shock, and so any identification scheme would suit the 
purpose of this study-as long as it is applied consistently. The use of the Cholesky 
decomposition is also inspired from other studies that find qualitatively similar effects of 
monetary policy across a large subset of identification schemes (see, for example, Morsink 
and Bayoumi (2001)). 
The moving average form (VMA) is a fairly important form because this shows the direct 
relationship between the endogenous variables and the disturbances (shocks) 13. For 
instance, the impulse responses and the forecast variance decompositions that will be 
examined and evaluated in this study all emanate from this form. The four impulse 
response functions of the VMA are represented by qJ ym ' qJ yy , qJ my , and qJ mm • These are the 
critical elements of the VAR framework because they constitute the main analytical tools of 
the system. As Runkle (1987) noted, "Although VAR estimation is based on the AR 
11 List of the approaches is given in Enders (1995, p. 227) and in Amisano and Giannini (1997). 
12 Known also as the 'recursive' identification scheme. 
13 In the words of King and Watson (1997), "What is required is the model'sftnalform showing the dynamic 
response of the variables to underlying structural shocks". 
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representation, most interpretations of VAR' s are based on the vector moving average 
(VMA) representation". 
The VEC framework is essentially the same as the V AR except now we add the error 
correction term (Ilxt-l) on the right hand side. This topic is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4, but it may be useful just to show the link here with the V AR. 
(i) VAR 
k 
XI = An + LAixl - i + cl 
i=1 
(in VEe 
k-l 
!1x1 = An + L Ai !1xl_i + IlxI_1 + ct 
i=l 
where XI = vector of endogenous variables 
Ao = vector of constants 
Ai = coefficient vector of lagged variables 
IT = afJ' where fJ is the matrix of cointegrating parameters and a is 
matrix of 'speed of adjustment' parameters 
c i = is an independently and identically distributed vector with zero mean 
and var-cov matrix ~ e 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
So when there is cointegration among the variables, the VEC approach is used, otherwise 
the traditional V AR is used. This implies that whereas the traditional V AR can incorporate 
variables in levels or in first-difference, the VEC models are always in first-difference. The 
essential criteria for the VEC analysis therefore are that the variables must be integrated of 
the same order, and cointegrated. 
5.3 Preliminary data investigation 
As in most time-series analysis, it is always important to examme the properties or 
characteristics of the data. This preliminary investigation will start off with visual 
examination of the time plots of the various series to check for distinct and important 
characteristics such as outliers, structural breaks, seasonality, trends, and generally to get a 
'fee}' of the 'raw' data. Although this could be considered as subjective in the sense that no 
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rigorous formal analysis l4 is involved, this is a vital starting point for most time series 
analysis. As pointed out by Hair et al. (1998, p. 39): 
The tasks involved in examining your data may seem mundane and 
inconsequential but they are an essential part of any multivariate analysis. 
By examining the data before the application of a multivariate technique, the 
researcher gains several critical insights into the characteristics of the data. 
Enders (1995) and Frances (1998), among others, also highlighted the importance of this 
visual analysis as a starting point for time series studies. After visual examination, more 
'formal' tests will be performed on the data, such as tests for unit roots, structural breaks, 
cointegration, and so forth. These characteristics are very important because they determine 
the way the analysis is to proceed and to some extent, the way the interpretations or 
conclusions are drawn. For instance, the impulse response function of nonstationary time 
series is very different to that of the stationary series and consequently what is applicable to 
stationary series may not be appropriate to nonstationary series l5 . Likewise, most unit root 
tests are biased towards nonrejection of unit root hypothesis 16 when the series has structural 
breaks -hence modifications are necessary to the unit root tests to take into account the 
structural breaks, such as that of Perron's test for structural break. In fact, results and 
conclusions from some studies in the past have been considered invalid because they did 
not take into account the nonstationarity character of the data series. 
The more 'formal' tests include unit-root tests, Perron structural break test, Johansen 
cointegration test, and so forth. As part of the overall strategy to get robust results and 
conclusions, three unit root tests will be performed in this study-the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) tests 17. The use of several tests is sometimes known as 'confirmatory' analysis 
however it is useful to keep in mind that all these tests have low power against near-unit 
root alternatives l8 . The intention here, however, is not to get more 'power' by performing 
several tests, but rather to get more empirical evidence or broader confirmation of the 
results. As pointed out by Serletis and Koustas (1998), they used four alternative unit root 
14 Often refers to some form of mathematical analysis. 
15 This is explained in more detail under the 'Nonstationary' section in Chapter 4. 
16 See, for example, Enders (1995) and Maddala and Kim (1998). 
17 These are described in sub-Chapter 4.2. 
18 Several alternative unit root tests are discussed in Maddala and Kim (1998). 
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procedures 19 in order "to deal with the anomalies that arise when the data are not very 
informative about whether or not there is a unit root". 
Seasonal unit root tests will be applied only to series that exhibit a distinct seasonal pattern 
and are not stationary upon first differenci1.lg. This is important because to be able to use 
the standard distributions and inferential statistics, we need to use stationary variables. In 
other words, assuming the series has a seasonal unit root, we then need to difference it 
properly in order to obtain stationary representation-as opposed to the traditional method 
of taking first-difference straightaway to achieve stationarity. 
For the structural break test, this will be carried out only on the real GDP series20 . Perron 
(1989) test will be used here and as to the breakpoint, this will be exogenously provided. 
The reason why the break point is exogenously provided in this study is because the 
structural break seems to be quite obvious from the graph. 
With the completion of the formal tests on the properties of the data series the next task is 
to formulate more specific modelling strategies. For instance, in terms of the long run 
neutrality test, one needs the variables, in particular the money supply, to be integrated 
otherwise the 'permanent' change required in Fish and Seater LRD formula cannot be 
obtained. Likewise, for superneutrality test, the money supply should have a higher order of 
integration than that of real output otherwise the inflation rate may have to be used instead 
of the money growth rate21 . And in the case where the variables are cointegrated, the vector 
error correcti<,>n (VEC) approach may have to be used instead of the standard V AR method. 
The question as whether to use data in level or in first-difference, or more generally 
whether the data needs to be adjusted or not before the analysis, is still an unresolved 
issue22 . In this study the intention is to apply minimal adjustment to the raw data. However 
if the data series has a unit root then its first-difference will be used. The data will not be 
deseasonalised but in case the responses exhibit erratic behaviour or the convergence of the 
19 The ADF, PP, KPSS and the Augmented Weighted Symmetric (WS) tests. 
20 As is done in Sanyal and Ward (1995). 
21 This presumes inflation rate is directly related to money growth rate. 
22 On this, Enders (1995, p.301) said, "The issue a/whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary 
exists ", and then went on to say that "Sims (1980) and others. such as Doan (1992). recommend against 
differencing even if the variables contain a unit root". 
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long run responses seem to be a problem due to seasonal effects, then seasonal dummies 
may be added to the model. In other words, the underlying philosophy in this study is to try 
to capture and understand how the actual data interact with each other-hence the need to 
apply minimum transformation necessary for the analysis to be undertaken. Even the usual 
procedure of taking natural logarithms will not be undertaken unless the. data exhibit 
distinct exponential growth pattern or the numbers are so large and cumbersome to work 
with in which case a more compact logarithmic form would be a more convenient form to 
use. In any case the transformation is simply a monotonic transformation so the basic 
relationships remain unchanged, except the loss of the elasticity (or growth rate) 
coefficients that are generally available when logarithmic data are used. 
The next section will explain the long-run neutrality test framework as formulated by Fish 
and Seater (1993). This is a fairly important development in econometric empirical work 
because before then reduced form econometric tests were considered not robust after Lucas 
(1972) and Sargent (1991) provided examples in which it is impossible to test long run 
neutrality using reduced form methods23 . 
5.4 Neutrality and superneutrality tests 
5.4.1 Neutrality tests 
The LRD test framework of Fish and Seater (1993) will be used in this study to test 
monetary neutrality and other important classical propositions, such as Fisher's 
relationship, the short run Phillips curve, the M<?netarist's long standing claim that inflation 
is a monetary phenomena, etc. As explained above, before the test is undertaken, it is 
important that the order of integration of the variables is detennined. Johansen 
cointegration test will also be carried out to make sure that the model is well specified, i.e. 
if there is cointegration, the VEe format will be used otherwise the standard V AR will be 
used. 
As to the actual variables that will be used in the neutrality test, monetary aggregates (M1 
and M3) and real output (GDPR) will be used as in most other neutrality studies24• Nominal 
23 As cited in King and Watson (1997). 
24 Such as Boschen and Otrok(l994), Fish and Seater (1993), King and Watson (1997), Serletis and 
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output will also be used but this time the neutrality hypothesis requires that LRD = 1, i.e. 
the increase in money supply is fully reflected on a one-to-one basis in nominal output. 
Other variables include the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate (CPI). 
In addition to the computation of the point estimates of the LRD test statistic, a confidence 
band of 68 per cent will be estimated as well. This confidence band will be calculated from 
the standard errors of the two long run multipliers25 provided by Eviews. The computation 
of both the LRD test statistic and its confidence band will be carried out using Excel 
spreadsheet. 
A bivariate VAR is used not only because it is tractable but also because the main aim of 
this study, in particular the focus of the neutrality and supemeutrality tests, is basically to 
study the interrelationship between money and real output, i.e. relationship between two 
variables. Potentially this may give an omitted variable bias result as King and Watson 
(1997) warned against but so far there has been no documented empirical evidence of this 
bias. On the contrary, Bullard (1999) refers to Boschen and Mills (1995) result as providing 
"the best available evidence that omitted variable did not contaminate the previous results 
on this question". Nevertheless in order to see first-hand whether there is indication of 
omitted variable bias, a trivariate V AR will also be estimated in this study and its responses 
and time-Iags26 will be compared to the bivariate model results (this is further elaborated in 
Section 5.4.3 below). 
5.4.2 Superneutrality test 
The proposition of supemeutrality (as mentioned earlier) is very similar to the neutrality 
case except now the growth rate of money is used. Empirical evidence on this is quite 
mixed but as noted by Bullard (1999), "this is not surprising given there are theoretical 
models that support superneutrality and there are others which do not". For instance, 
Rapach (1999) reports, "long-run monetary superneutrality is rejected for all countries, as 
Koustas (1998), among others. 
25 Eviews provides one standard error (68%) for the long run multipliers it computes. Buckle et al. (2002) 
in their study on New Zealand business cycle use the 68% confidence band as well. 
26 Time-lag and lag-period will often be used to denote the period when the maximum or peak response of a 
variable to an exogenous shock is observed. For instance, when output peak response after a 
monetary shock occurs in the 4th quarter, we say that output has a lag-period (or time-lag) offour 
quarters. 
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the results indicate that a permanent increase in inflation lowers the long-run real interest 
rate in each of the 14 countries". King and Watson (1997), on the other hand, argued, "that 
conclusions about the long-run Fisher effect and the superneutrality of money are not 
robust to the particular identifying assumption". 
One likely problem with superneutrality test is that money aggregates and real output are 
usually integrated of order one-meaning that they become stationary upon first 
differencing. This means that money growth rate will be stationary or has no unit-root in 
which case the Fish and Seater LRD test may not be appropriate. That is, we want money 
aggregate to be integrated of order two-at least it should be one order above the 
integration order of real output. It is for this reason that superneutrality tests in the past 
have been undertaken using inflation rate instead of money growth rate (see, for example, 
Rapach, 1999; King and Watson, 1997). In this study inflation rate variable will be used if 
money supply turns out to have order of integration 'of one. 
5.4.3 Robustness test (a trivariate V AR) 
Although the estimation of this model is meant as some form of robustness check on the 
bivariate model results, it is in itself interesting in that the interactions and feedbacks are 
getting more 'richer' with more variables involved and more sources of structural shocks. 
Ideally one would like to include more relevant variables but this would complicate the 
process if it becomes too large-besides, it would defeat the whole purpose of the V AR 
analysis which is to generally work with smaller number of variables. This is in contrast to 
the traditional Cowles Commission structural equations approach which prompted Sims 
(1980) to label the identification process involved as 'incredible.27. 
Another interesting aspect of having more variables in a V AR model is the possibility of 
getting some cointegration relationships, in which case the analysis would be slightly 
different. In particular we would have the option of studying both the short run 
adjustments28 and the long run responses of the variables-something that has traditionally 
been difficult to obtain given the nonstationarity of the data29 . 
27 Referring to the large number of restrictions needed to identify the model. 
28 Represented by the first differences. 
29 According to the classical regression analysis, variables should be stationary (see Thomas, 1993; p. 151). 
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The three variables for the trivariate V AR model will be: real GDP, inflation rate and 
money aggregate MI. Apart from the important economic relationships among these 
variables, these have been estimated in the bivariate models and so it is only logical that 
they are reestimated in a trivariate format for crosschecking and comparison purposes. 
After testing monetary neutrality and other important classical bivariate relationships, the 
next analysis is on the monetary transmission aspect. 
5.5 Monetary transmission mechanisms 
5.5.1 Overview 
This is considered a natural and logical extension of the monetary neutrality tests because 
assuming money had been found to be non-neutral, then the next step would be to 
investigate how this non-neutrality arises,· i.e. what mechanism is responsible for. 
transmitting the monet:;rry effect to real output. This has been a long-standing issue both 
from the theoretical and empirical point of views. The empirical analysis in this study is 
intended to supplement the existing evidence on the issue. The questions that this section 
addresses are: How is the monetary impulse being transmitted? What is the most plausible 
transmission channel? What are the magnitudes of the variable's responses to different 
shocks? How long it takes the monetary impulse to reach the intermediate and the final 
policy targets? These questions are obviously important to economists as well as to policy 
makers. 
In the monetary transmission literature there are several possible channels in which the 
monetary impulse can be transmitted from the monetary policy instrument to real output (or 
inflation) as discussed in Chapter 2. Kuttner and Mosser (2002) identify six channels: 
through interest rate; exchange rate; wealth; other asset prices; broad and narrow credit. 
This study will investigate only four channels which Mishkin (1995) listed and which are 
essentially the subset of the six channels mentioned, namely: interest rate channel; 
exchange rate channel; 'other-asset price effects' channel, and the credit channel. The credit 
channel will be split into two: one incorporating business investment and the other 
household consumption expenditure. So in total there are five transmission channels. 
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The selection of the variables to be included in each model is based on the transmission 
theory underlying each model3o. For instance, in the exchange rate transmission model, the 
theory posits monetary impulse as starting from money supply, then moves to interest rate, 
then to exchange rate, exports, and finally to real output. Accordingly there are five 
variables, viz., money supply, interest rate, exchange rate, exports and real GDP that will be 
used in the analysis of the exchange rate model. In the case where a particular variable or 
construct, like the Tobin's 'q' is very difficult to obtain, then the model will be estimated 
without that construct. This should not affect the analysis substantially given that the major 
components of the models (like monetary aggregate, interest rate, equity price, credit, etc.) 
are available -besides, Tobin's 'q' empirical performance has been generally unsatisfactory 
(see, for example, Chirinko (1993) or Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). 
As mentioned in the overview of this chapter, there will be two modes of transmission that 
will be considered in this study and these will be discussed below. 
5.5.2 Serial and parallel transmission modes 
The two transmission modes that will be considered in this study are: the 'serial' and 
'parallel' transmissions. This is a basic concept in electrical physics31 but one that has not 
been introduced in the monetary transmission literature32. The attractiveness and the 
advantage of this approach is that it gives more logical structure and consistency in the way 
we evaluate and compare different transmission mechanisms. This is not to say that we can 
measure economic phenomena exactly like sci~ntific experiments but at least the systematic 
approach and the underlying philosophy of the transmission in physics could provide an 
objective and meaningful basis for measuring and comparing alternative transmission 
models. 
30 Focusing on the important variables is also suggested by Kake (2000) who said: A more promising strategy 
is tofollow an indirect approach thatfocuses on the so-called transmission variables which are supposed 
to playa crucial role in the transmission of a monetary policy. 
31 The serial and parallel circuits can be cited in standard physics text books, see for example, Hudson and 
Nelson (1982, p. 592-594). 
32 Angeloni et al. (2002) study uses the term 'sequential' to measure the dominance of the interest rate 
channel. Their approach however is different to the one intended for this study. 
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In essence the idea is that in a 'serial' transmission mode the monetary impulse (analogous 
to electricity impulse or current) moves from variable to variable in a serial fashion 
suggesting some kind of straight-line path. In the 'parallel' transmission approach, the 
monetary impulse is assumed to affect all the other variables at the same time, including 
real output. These concepts are illustrated below (the interest rate channel is used only to 
demonstrate the idea, otherwise this is applicable, to other transmission channels as well). 
(i) Serial transmission mode: 
Money supply -. interest rate ---. investment-. real output 
where a monetary shock starts in the monetary supply and subsequently gets transmitted 
to the interest rate, then to investment, and finally to real output-in a serial fashion 
(ii) Parallel transmission mode: 
Money 
supply 
Interest rate 
... 
Investment 
t 
Real output 
where the monetary shock starts from the money supply and then simultaneously affect interest 
rate, investment and output. 
From the illustration (ii) above we see that real output can be affected by several channels 
following a single monetary shock, at least conceptually. This is why this transmission 
mode is called the 'parallel' transmission mode. Unfortunately it is very difficult to trace 
out and quantify these channels separately, and this is why most VAR studies concentrate 
only on the initial shock and the 'final' response of output or inflation. In this study this 
popular 'short-cut' view of the transmission process will be referred to as the 'direct 
transmission'mode. 
While it is easy to conceptualise how the monetary transmission could have taken place, the 
main problem now is how to empirically measure such transmission modes, i.e. the serial, 
parallel, and direct transmissions. This is one great challenge of this study and the next 
section will outline a procedure that this study will use in this aspect. It is useful at this 
early stage to say that the procedure is based mainly on the bivariate relationships and on 
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the theoretical orderings of the variables as stipulated in each monetary transmission 
channel. Even the parallel transmission mode analysis is based on this approach but the 
only difference is that each transmission model is estimated with all its variables in 'one 
gO'-as in most V AR studies. 
5.5.3 Empirical representations of the serial and parallel modes 
To represent the serial mode of transmission in an empirical context, a sequence of 
bivariate models will be estimated. In doing this, the source of the shock comes from only 
one variable with no other external influences-as when a current goes from resistor A to 
resistor B in a single wire. For instance, in the interest rate model we need to estimate three 
bivariate VAR models: the first is money supply and interest rate, the second is interest rate 
and investment, and the last is investment and real output. Once these bivariate models 
have been estimated then the bivariate responses, the variance decompositions, and the 
Granger-causal test statistics can be examined, evaluated and compared. These will provide 
the numerical values of the relative strength of the relationships on which the plausibility of 
the various theoretical models depend on. For instance, if we find that the money supply 
does not Granger-cause the interest rate but the interest rate does Granger-cause money 
supply, then this imply that the model is not empirically supported, i.e. it may be that the 
model needs to be revised taking into account this Granger-causal evidence. Likewise, the 
results from the impulse response and the variance decompositions will be examined and 
interpreted in the same manner. 
As to the 'parallel' transmission mode the empirical representation is that of a standard 
V AR estimation with all the variables concerned included. For instance, for the exchange 
rate model, we will have a single V AR comprised of monetary aggregate, interest rate, 
exchange rate, exports and real output. This single V AR will be estimated and its bivariate 
relationships examined and evaluated as is done for the serial transmission mode. This 
same procedure will be carried out on other transmission models as well. ·What is important 
in both transmission modes is that the analysis will focus on the bivariate relationships and 
on the sequence of the variables as stipulated in each transmission model. 
In the direct transmission approach, the analysis is generally the same as other empirical 
studies which basically involve looking at the response of output to monetary shock, or the 
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decompositions of output due to the shocks of the money supply and other variables present 
in the model. Likewise, the Granger-causality test focuses mainly on output as the 
dependent variable. The difference therefore between this 'traditional' approach and the 
two approaches above is that the analysis in the latter goes from variable to variable with 
real output as the last variable in the tra~smission chain-hence the name 'serial' analysis. 
In order to be consistent, a standard V AR will be used for all the transmission models-
both in the serial and parallel mode approaches. Also the Cholesky decomposition will be 
used in the identification process on all the models. 
5.5.4 Model performance measures 
In order to compare one model with another, there is always a problem of choosing which 
measures or criteria to use. Obviously there are statistical tests of model adequacy (for 
example: AIC, SBC, maximized likelihood function, etc) or the normal tor F tests for the 
model parameters, however in this study the approach focuses on the magnitude of the 
responses, the lag-periods, the variance decompositions and the Granger-causality test 
results. For instance, if we find the responses in the interest rate model to be relatively 
larger than the responses observed in the exchange rate model, we would say that the data 
seems to fit the interest rate model better than the exchange rate model. Likewise, if the 
Granger-causality test results show more plausible results when the credit channel 
framework is used then we would say that the credit channel seems to model the data better 
than the other models. Obviously this means the point estimates will be extensively used 
here. The, standard errors, on the other hand, will not be given much emphasis because the 
point estimates of the impulse responses are relatively small and the differences across the 
different models are even smaller. Besides, as Stock and Watson (2001) point out, "One of 
the VAR limitations is that the standard methods of statistical inference (such as computing 
standard errors for impulse responses) may give misleading results if some of the variables 
are highly persistent". And on this Runkle (1987) says, "The confidence intervals for the 
variance decomposition and impulse response functions are often so large that little useful 
reference can rely on them". In other words, there seems to be some consensus that the 
confidence intervals in the V AR system may not be very reliable. This problem may be 
exacerbated if the number of observations is limited. 
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But while it is easy enough to compare and discuss the responses and other statistical 
relationships among individual variables, as a group (i.e. as a complete transmission 
mode!), this is quite difficult. Ideally some summary measures are needed so that we can 
say transmission model A is more responsive that model B, or that model C has shorter lag-
period than model D, etc. In this study some fairly simple and rather crude summary 
measures will be formulated for comparison purposes-otherwise it will be very difficult to 
compare the different transmission models. 
With respect to the summary response of the models, the idea here is to develop a 
composite measure that is based on the largest (or peak) response of the relevant variables 
within each transmission model. For instance, suppose we are working with the interest rate 
channel, then we would examine the response of interest rate to monetary shock; the 
response of investment to interest rate shock; and finally the response of output to 
investment shock. And suppose we find that the peak responses are: 0.05 units (or 5 per 
cent) in the 4th quarter, 0.15 units in the 5th quarter and 0.20 units in the 3rd quarter, 
respectively. So for this model the composite or summary measure of the responses would 
be: 0.05 x 0.15 x 0.20 = 0.0015 units (or 0.15 per cent). And for the total lags, this is more 
straightforward, i.e. we just add the lag-periods together, e.g. 4 + 5 + 3 = 12 quarters. For 
the variance decomposition summary measure, we would simply multiply the proportions 
together as in the response method. And for the Granger-causality summary measure, we 
would just add the individual p-values together and the smallest p-value total would be the 
most plausible model. Whether or not these composite or summary measures have any 
practical relevance remains to be s~en but at least they provide some quantitative measure 
for comparing the relative responsiveness or effectiveness of the different monetary 
transmission models. 
5.6 Comparative analysis between New Zealand and Australia 
This is the last major section of the analysis and involves a comparative analysis between 
Australian and New Zealand monetary transmission mechanisms. The objective is to see if 
there is any significant difference in the monetary transmission mechanisms, especially in 
terms of the responses, variance decompositions, and the Granger-causal effects. These are 
important because they may reflect the unique structure and institutional setting of each 
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country and which policy makers in each country could use to formulate relevant and 
appropriate macro polices. 
The procedure for estimating and evaluating the V AR models for Australia will follow 
what has been suggested for New Zealand however there will be no separate bivariate 
model estimation this time, i.e. each transmission model will be estimated as a single large 
V AR as is suggested for the 'parallel' transmission approach. From these large V AR 
models the relevant bivariate relationships, in the form of impulse responses, variance 
decompositions and Granger-causal effects, will be 'teased' out and used in the analysis. In 
other words, there will be no 'serial' transmission analysis for Australia. This is basically 
because the 'parallel' transmission mode is the more 'realistic' setting given that in real life 
economies generally contain many variables and disturbances that are constantly interacting 
aJ~d influencing each other. 
Finally, given the apparent divergence in the output paths of the two countries in the 1980s, 
a counterfactual analysis will be carried out to see the different or the 'what-if' scenarios. 
This will basically involve questions like: if New Zealand had followed Australia's interest 
rate policy, how would its output turned out? Alternatively we could say, suppose Australia 
had followed New Zealand's monetary policy, how would its economy performed? The 
counterfactual experiment will involve changing the interest rate of say New Zealand to 
follow that of Australia (and vice versa), especially in the 1985-90 period when the interest 
rates of the two countries seem to diverge from each other. After re-estimating the model, 
the magnitudes of the responses and other test statisti<;:s will be compared to the results 
emanating when actual data are used. The variables for this counterfactual experiment are 
monetary aggregate, interest rate, price and real outpue3 . There will be cointegration test to 
see if there is any cointegration relationship-if there is, then the VEe model will be used, 
otherwise the standard V AR will be used. The number of lags will be set as to minimize the 
problem of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and stability. 
33 According to Runkle (1987) explaining the relationships between these four variables is one ofthe most 
important challenges in macroeconomics. 
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Chapter 6 
MONETARY NEUTRALITY TESTS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter and Chapter 7 contain the empirical analysis. In this chapter the data 
properties are examined and the tests of monetary neutrality and superneutrality undertaken 
using the bivariate V AR models. In Chapter 7 the evaluation of the monetary transmission 
mechanisms is carried out. These two chapters constitute therefore a very crucial part of the 
study because the analysis and the results are meant to provide empirical evidence to the 
theories and the complex issues raised in the previous sections, but in particular to the role 
of money in influencing real output. Needless to say, whether or not the objectives are met, 
or whether the hypotheses stated in this study are rejected or not, depend critically on the 
results obtained from the subsequent set of analyse·s. As pointed out by Tintner (1952), /lIt 
is one thing to develop the theoretical concept of the elasticity of demand, .......... It is 
another thing to state that the estimated price elasticity of demand .......... , on the average 
is -0.123/1. The following analysis takes on the same spirit with the aim of providing 
numerical measures that can be used for inference or surmising purposes1• The importance 
of the quantitative approach is also highlighted by Friedman (2000) when he said, "One of 
the key areas of ongoing research work is the quantitative measurement of whatever 
transmission mechanism is at work". 
Like most forecasting that is based on equations and estimated parameters, whether they are 
single equations or multiple equations, the forecast values (or impulse responses) are 
naturally the reflections of what have taken place or experienced in the past. In view of this, 
the responses that emanate after exogenous shocks (or unexpected changes) have taken 
place are useful not only as measures of the endogenous variables likely future paths, but 
also as records of what were the past relationships among the·variables. This could provide 
some clues as to what policies were undertaken in the past but more importantly, the means 
of evaluating the effectiveness of such policies. For instance, several studies have noted the 
substantial decline in the US output and inflation volatility since the 1980s and have used 
1 As noted by Zellner (1984), "One part of our knowledge is merely description of what we have observed; 
the more important part is generalization or induction", 
101 
: ~ ... ". " 
i,.···.·· .. 
VAR based and structural system responses to study and evaluate these declining 
phenomena2. 
6.2 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
6.2.1 Data: Sources and Characteristics 
The data for New Zealand is obtained from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Statistics 
New Zealand and from the Lincoln University DataStream database. In the case of 
Australia, the data is obtained from the DataStream database and from the internet 
. webpages of the Australian Reserve Bank and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The 
quarterly data start from 1977 and end in March 2002. Some data have been downloaded 
from the respective websites of the two institutions but others have been obtained after 
contacting the two institutions directly. The two institutions also provided useful 
information regarding the scope and compilation methods. However it is important at this 
early stage to say that having different data sources, different base years as well as different 
compilation methods could be a source of confusion when deciding which series to use. 
Moreover, when the series is disjointed, the question and problem of how to link the 
different portions arises. For instance, one series of real GDP figures stops in June quarter 
2000, while another series starts from June quarter 1987. In the case of money aggregates 
series, similar problems arise and as one official of the Reserve Bank reported3, 'iA major 
problem we have with NZ money series is discontinuity in the surveys from which the 
numbers are generated. There are in fact 3 sets of monetary series. Each set comes from a 
. different data collection framework". In view of these differences and discontinuity in 
some series, it is important that caution is exercised when interpreting the results. However 
given that the general trend and rate of changes of the different portions of the series are 
quite similar, the analysis and the conclusions should be reasonably accurate and 
representative. The method by which the data are actually manipulated and joined together 
for the analysis is explained in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Fig 6.2.1 shows graphs of the data (in level) that are used in the first part of the analysis-
i.e. for the neutrality and superneutrality tests, and Fig 6.2.2 shows the rest of the data used 
2 See, for example, Boivin and Giannoni (2002); Kahn et al. (2002); Kuttner and Mosser (2002). 
3 Written reply from one the Reserve Bank's officials when asked about the differences in the series. 
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Fig 6.2.1 Data :1977-2002 sample 
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GDPR = Real GDP; GDPN: Nominal GDP; 
MI : currency + cheque account deposit; M3 : MI + all financial institution deposits; 
CPI = consumer price index; !NT: mortgage housing interest rate 
in the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanisms. The first set of data has a longer 
time span than the second set because compilation of some data in the second set is more 
recent, e.g. exchange rates and share price indices, and so it is necessary to shorten the 
other series as to be consistent with these shorter series. Actually the annual data on these 
are available and they go back further in time but the quarterly data is considered more 
appropriate for the analysis because the impacts of some government polices could be felt 
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Fig 6.2.2 Data: 1985-2002 sample 
.72..----------------, 
.68 
.64 
.60 
.56 
.52 
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 
I-EXCHI 
10000..-----------------, 
9000 
8000 
7000 
6000 
5000 
4000 
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 
[-EXPTI 
4200..-----------------, 
4000 
3800 
3600 
3400 
3200 
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 
[-PCEI 
180.,..---___________ --, 
160 
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 
180000.,..-----------------, 
160000 
140000 
120000 
100000 
80000 
60000 
40000 
20000 -I=fTTTl'""TnTJ"''''''''''''''''''''''''''''fT'"1'"''TnTJ'''''''''''''''''''''''T''TT,-n-rr".,..J 
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 
I-CREDI 
6500.,..-----------------, 
6000 
5500 
5000 
4500 
4000 
3500 
86 88 90. 92 94 96 98 00 
Note: EXCH = trade-weighted exchange rate index (TWI); EQillTY = share price index; 
EXPT = exports of goods and services; CREDIT = domestic credit 
PCE = private consumption expenditure; KF = gross fixed capital formation. 
in less than a year, i.e. have shorter time-lag4 than a year. Another advantage of quarterly 
data is of course the increase in the number of observations. The first data set has about 100 
observations while the second sample has just over 60 observations. This second sample is 
4 This term will be used to denote the period in which a variable shows a significant response to an 
exogenous shock. For example, when we say output has a time-lag of three quarters, we mean that output 
shows a significant response in the 3rd quarter following an exogenous shock. Another equivalent term is 
the lag-period. 
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not so large therefore this may give inflated variance (standard error) or imprecise estimates 
but the point estimates are still unbiased. In the subsequent analysis variable names that 
start with a 'D', e.g. DM1 or DGDPR, etc., means the variables are in first-difference. If the 
variable has a prefix 'DD', this means the variable is in second-difference. 
Data for real output uses the more recent GDP chain-volume series5 that started in June 
1987 so in order to extend this series back to 1977, the starting point of the analysis, the 
'historical' GDP dat~6 movement is used to estimate the corresponding chain volume data. 
Quarterly data for nominal GDP started in June 1982 and so estimates have to be made for 
the earlier period as well. This is done using movements in real GDP and the CPI as .the 
deflator. Both GDP series are actual (unadjusted) data and obtained from Statistics New 
Zealand. 
Fig 6.2.3 Real GDP 
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Money aggregate M3 (see Fig 6.2.4) has its definition changed in 1988 and so there is some 
discontinuity in the series. To join the two portions of the series, i.e. the ongoing series that 
started in 1988 with the historical portion, the ongoing data series is regressed backward for 
five quarters using simple linear regression 7 and then movements from the historical series 
is applied on the last quarter's estimated data and the process repeated on each subsequent 
estimated data until 1977. The resulting series seems reasonable with no distinct breaks or 
abnormal trends. No adjustment is made to money aggregate MI. Both monetary 
5 Production -based and uses the 1995/96 prices-and note that the term 'chain-volume' is the modern 
term for real GDP. 
6 This series ends in June 2000. 
7 This is because there is no data for the whole of 1987. 
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aggregates have been downloaded from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand internet 
webpage. 
Fig 6.2.4. Money M3 
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M30LD = historical M3 series that is used to estimate portion of the ongoing series 
Mortgage rate is used as a proxy for interest nite. Short-term interest rates would have been 
used8 but the series do not go far back enough-besides, all the interest rates movements 
are basically similar (see Fig 6.2.5). This similarity in interest rates is noted also by 
Fig 6.2.5 Interest rates 
20~~---------------------------r~=~~~~~O,~,_,~a,~e==~---------
- -b_lII.rate 
- - - call·tlllte 
- - 6mth.rale 
mort-rate = first mortgage housing rate; base-rate = base lending rate 
call-rate = call deposit rate; 6mth-rate = six month deposit rate 
Friedman (2000) who says, "Although the central bank directly controls only the interest 
rates on short-term instruments, like Treasury bills, the longer-term interest rates 
applicable to borrowing for these purposes mostly move in the same direction as short-term 
8 Most central banks use the short term interest rate in conducting their monetary policies. 
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rates because banks and other investors are able to substitute among different debt 
instruments in their asset portfolios". Moreover, several studies have also found that long 
run relationships between long-term and short-term interest rates are stationar/. 
Price index is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the inflation rate shown below in Fig 
6.2.6 is simply calculated from the percentage change in the quarterly indices, i.e. the 
quarterly inflation rate is used rather the usual annual rate of inflation as to be consistent 
with the other first-differenced data. 
Fig 6.2.6 Inflation and interest rates 
INF = quarterly inflation rate; INT = mortgage interest rate 
For the exchange rate we use the trade-weighted index (TWI). This has very similar 
movements with the New Zealand-US exchange rate (Fig 6.2.7). 
Fig 6.2.7 Exchange rates 
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Note: TWI is divided by 10 in order to have comparable magnitude with the other rates. 
9 As cited in Hubrich and Vlaar (2000). 
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For the equity price data we use the New Zealand share price unadjusted index. This share 
price index movement is very similar to the movement of the industrial share price index so 
using either one should not make much difference in the analysis. The domestic credit data 
series is used in the credit channel analysis, and for real investment data, the gross fixed 
capital formation 10 provided by Statistics New Zealand Statistics is used. For exports data, 
the chain volume series expressed in 1995/96 prices is used-also provided by Statistics 
New Zealand. 
Looking at the time plots of the series, some series, like GDP, exports, money aggregates, 
etc. show distinct upward trending patterns suggesting they have either a stochastic or a 
deterministic trend. The others are more erratic and possibly have stochastic trends. The 
only series that seem to display some form of mean-reversion are the inflation rate, interest 
rate and the exchange rate, however 'formal' unit root tests, such as the ADF, PP and the 
KPPS tests, will determine the stationarity status of these series. 
Before going to the formal unit root tests, it is useful to remark further on the features of the 
major economic variables like GDP and inflation. As can be seen from Fig 6.2.1, both real 
and nominal GDP series show pronounced seasonality pattern in addition to the upward 
trending pattern. Seasonality pattern reflects a stylised fact of the economy, i.e. it shows 
how the economy tends to move in a regular pattern that could be due to weather conditions 
or due to the country's unique spending/production pattern. This poses the question of 
whether the series needs to be deseasonali~ed or not in the analysis. In general, for long run 
analysis the deseasonalised series are more convenient to work with, but in short run 
analysis, the seasonal pattern is better left as it is because it reflects what actually took 
place and should make the analysis and interpretations more realistic. Enders (1995) 
discusses two other problems related to deseasonalised data; the first is that the seasonal 
pattern might.remain even if the data has been seasonally adjusted, and the second is that 
any seasonal adjustment process involves two steps which could give inaccurate 
coefficients if estimation is made separately in each step-and as he puts it, "In such 
circumstances, it is wise to avoid using seasonally adjusted data". 
10 In constant prices. 
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Of the two output series, nominal GDP displays a steeper trend II_in fact, real GDP shows 
some levelling off in the 1984-92 period, followed by a distinct rise that continues until the 
end of the study period. This 'levelling off' period coincides with the period when New 
Zealand government undertook major economic reforms (see Dalziel & Lattimore, 2001; 
Scolly & St John, 2000) and has been the cause and focus of heated debate between those 
who claim the reforms have been too drastic and too rapid resulting in substantial output 
loss, and those who generally supported the changes I2. 
Though trending upwards like other series, price index series (CPI) tends to be more 
concave in shape. This implies that the rate of change (equivalent to inflation rate) is 
getting more subdued towards the end of the study period. This diminishing rate is quite 
obvious when we look at the inflation rate graph in Fig 6.2.6-as of the early 1990s the rate 
has indeed come down to less than 2 per cent. In fact, in some periods the rate is either zero 
or negative. This coincides with the adoption of the Reserve Bank Act 1989 that explicitly 
states 'low inflation' as the sole objective of monetary policy13. Looking at the same graph 
(i.e. Fig 6.2.6) we see a distinct spike in the inflation rate around 1987-again this 
coincides with the time the GST was introduced-this, and other characteristics noted 
above, will be taken into account when carrying out more formal tests on the data or when 
running regressions and making interpretations. 
6.2.2 Unit-root test results 
The upward trending and erratic pattern of some of the time series plots in the figures above 
suggest nonstationarity of the data; however to confirm this visual assessment, .the unit root 
tests are performed14 and the results are summarised in Table A6.2.l (for New Zealand 
variables) and Table A6.2.2 (for Australian variables) in the appendix. Looking at Table 
A6.2.1, we see that indeed, apart from the inflation rate and nominal GDP, the ADF and the 
PP test results do not reject the null of nonstationary for all variables in level. This is 
confirmed by the KPPS test results that reject the null of stationarity for all series-apart 
II This is expected given nominal GDP reflects movement in price as well. 
12 Some interesting papers include that of Evans et al. (1996) which summarises key aspects of the refonns 
and lessons to be learnt; Dalziel (1999) who estimates NZ$210 billion in loss output between 1985 and 
1998 because of the reforms, and Podder and Chatterjee (1998) paper that focuses on income inequality 
resulting from the reform. 
13 See Dalziel & Lattimore (2001). 
14 Using Eviews 4.0. 
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from the two variables indicated. In first-difference all the results indicate stationary 
however for real GDP the results are mixed: The PP and KPSS tests suggest stationary but 
the ADF test indicates nonstationary. 
Inflation rate is .stationary according to all the three unit-root tests, but tests on nominal 
GDP have some mixed results. The ADF, PP and KPSS test results using the 'constant and 
trend' formulation, suggest stationarity, however with only the 'constant' included, the 
results imply nonstationary. Now looking more carefully at the regression results of both 
tests, the time trend is significant implying the presence of a deterministic trend. When 
nominal GDP is in first difference, nonstationarity is still evident thus confirming the 
presence of a deterministic trend so the series is consequently detrended by regressing it on 
a constant and linear time trend variable. The residuals is saved and used as the detrended 
nominal GDp15 . Unit root tests are applied again on this detrended series and this time the 
results show that this series is stationary-as expected, i.e. the series is a trend-stationary 
series and not a difference-stationary series. This could have serious implications for the 
neutrality test methodology proposed by Fish and Seater (1993) that requires difference-
stationary series. 
Checking the ADF and PP test results of the second sample, we see from Table A6.2.1 (b) 
that all variables in level do not reject the null of nonstationary. In the case of the KPPS test 
results, similar conclusion is obtained except for the exchange rate series that does not 
reject the stationary null. This mixed test results often happened in empirical works and this 
is why it is useful to have three (or more) different tests so that one have more evidences to 
consult before deciding whether the variable in question is stationary or nonstationary. 
Looking at the test results in Table A6.2.l (b), all the first-differenced variables are 
stationary except the credit variable that seems to show some mixed results. According to 
the ADF and PP tests, the credit variable in first-difference is stationary but according to 
the KPPS test, it is nonstationary16, however in second-difference, all the tests indicate 
stationary. 
15 Discussed in Enders (1995, p. 179). 
16 This contradictory result is consistent with what Maddala (2001, p. 552) said, "Tests for unit roots with the 
null hypothesis being stationary (no unit root) have also been developed and they often give results 
contrary to those of the unit root tests with the unit root as null ". 
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6.2.3 Seasonal unit roots 
A6.2.3 in the appendix reports the results of the seasonal unit root tests l7 performed on real 
GDP and nominal GDP. For real GDP, the first hypothesis til = 0 is not rejected at both 
the 5 per cent and 1 per cent significance level suggesting the presence of nonseasonal unit 
rootl8 • The other hypotheses, ti 2 = 0 and .ti3 = 7r 4 = 0 , are both rejected implying that 
there is no seasonal unit root either at the semiannual frequency nor at the annual 
frequency. With nominal GDP, the hypotheses are all rejected implying the presence of 
both nonseasonal and seasonal unit roots, however we know from the previous unit-root 
tests that this series has a deterministic trend. 
Seasonal unit root test is carried out only on GDP series because the other series do not 
show distinct seasonal pattern (see Fig 6.2.1). Furthennore, all the series become stationary 
upon first-differencing hence there is no need to seek other detrending methods. 
6.2.4 Structural break test on output 
Perron's test, as explained in the Methodology Chapter, will be used here. For ease of 
reference the alternative equation that will be estimated is reproduced below. 
k 
l't = ao + al~-1 + j3t + yl DUP + Y2 DUL + Y3 DUS + L17t Ll(l't-i) + cSt (6.1) 
i=1 
The estimated results are shown in Table 6.2.1. Note Yt is replaced by GDPR in the table 
below and DUP, DUL and DUS are all dummy variables. 
The diagnostic· test results suggest the residuals of Equation (6.1), with k = 4, are 
independent, serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic so we can now proceed to test the 
null hypothesis of a unit root in real GDP. The test statistic is (0.4827-1)/0.1325 = -3.9. 
Compared to the 5 per cent critical "t' value of _4.2419, we do not reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root process20 , i.e. real GDP series has a unit root. The insignificance of the trend 
function also confinns the presence of a stochastic trend rather than a deterministic trend. 
17 Follows the method of HyUeberg et al. (1990) described in the Methodology Chapter. 
18 This is consistent with the ADF, PP and the KPPS unit root test results. 
19 Extracted from Table VI.B in Perron (1989). 
20 This is different to Sanyal and Ward (1995) result of -6.5686 which rejects the null hypothesis of unit 
root. It is important to note however that Sanyal and Ward study covers 1967 to 1991, and the break 
point, which is endogenously determined, is between 1975 and 1977. 
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Table 6.2.1 Empirical results of Perron test for real GDP series 
(1985:1 to 2001:1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value 
Constant 10305.8100 2610.1630 3.95 0.0002 
GOPR(-1) 0.4827 0.1325 3.64 0.0006 
Trend (t) -2.9277 7.6522 .-0.38 0.7035 
Pulse dummy (OUP) -527.6092 348.7773 -1.51 0.1362 
Level dummy (OUL) 725.0779 201.4192 3.60 0.0007 
Slope dummy (OUS) 89.8462 24.8401 3.62 0.0007 
OGOPR(-1) -0.0455 0.1451 -0.31 0.7552 
OGOPR(-2) -0.1729 0.1277 -1.35 0.1814 
OGOPR(-3) -0.2824 0.1128' -2.50 0.0153 
OGOPR(-4L 0.5338 0.1044 5.11 0.0000 
Residual Diagnostic Tests: 
Breusch-Godfrey LM serial correlation test: F (5,62) =1.82 (0.126) 
ARCH test: F (4, 60) = 1.72 (0.158) 
Jarque-Bera LM nonnality test = 0.169 (0.919) 
Because of the presence of the unit root, the standard t and F-ratio tests cannot be applied 
to the coefficients of the dummy variables. Notwithstanding this, it is interesting to note the 
significance of both the level and slope dummies at the 5 per cent level which implies there 
is significant change in the level and slope of real output around the 199111992 period. 
Because Australian output does not display any obvious break in its graph, the structural 
break test will not be applied to it. 
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6.3 Neutrality and superneutrality tests 
6.3.1 Overview of the tests 
Because most of the series are nonstationary (or have a stochastic trend), their first 
difference will be used21 in the following neutrality tests, but unlike most studies that use 
logarithmic and deseasonalised figures, the data here are generally not adjusted. The 
intention is to be able to read off the coefficients and the responses using the same units as 
the 'raw' data-and which presumably policy makers and laymen alike could easily relate 
to. And with regard to seasonal feature, this is the actual characteristic of the data and 
reflects what actually happened so rather than using a 'smoothed out' version of the data, 
unadjusted data is used here-besides, unit root tests will have more power in this case22• 
However, in the case where the responses show very pronounced seasonal pattern, thus 
making it difficult to read off the numerical values, then seasonal dummies will be added to 
the model to 'smooth' out the fluctuations. But the' application of the dummy variables at 
this stage is considered preferable because it effectively means that all the variables in the 
model are subjected to a uniform deseasonal adjustment process. 
Although the focus in this first part of the analysis is on the long run neutrality tests, 
analysis of the impulse (or short run) responses will also be made because of the general 
and ongoing interest on the short run theories which include the IS-LM curves, Phillips 
curve, the Taylor rule, and so forth. In fact, a lot of assumptions have been made regarding 
short run behaviour of variables in theoretical models leading up to different conclusions, 
which in some cases became the dividing line between the differen,t macroeconomic 
schools. For example, the New Keynesians believe that prices are 'sticky', i.e. slow to 
adjust, whereas the Classicals always believe in a 'continuous market clearing' situation. 
Then there are those of the 'rational expectation' school who insist that only 'unexpected' 
policy that has real effect, i.e. systematic policy has no impact because people are rational 
therefore they will change their operations as to counter any adverse impact of the new 
policy announced by government. Therefore the analysis of the impulse (or short run) 
21 As pointed out by Manchester (1989), "First-differencing .... yields more nearly stationary series, 
enhancing the reliability a/the results", 
22 Discussed in Maddala and Kim (1998, p. 365). 
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responses is considered useful in this respect. As Bullard (1999) observed, "How long such 
a process takes, and what might happen in the meantime, are hotly debated issues". 
The first bivariate combination is between money aggregate Ml and real GDP. This will be 
followe~ by other combinations, such as M1 and nominal GDP, real GDP and M3, Ml and 
price, etc. These combinations are not arbitrarily selected-rather they have important 
theoretical basis as well as important implications for policy formulation. This should 
become apparent when the individual models are estimated and analysed in the subsequent 
sections. 
6.3.2 Money Ml vs Real GDP 
T.he relationship between money supply and real output is one of the more common 
bivariate combinations that has been investigated by many researchers in the past including 
Fish and Seater (1993) who first developed the framework for testing the long run 
neutrality of money. 
Testing the lag length 
The unrestricted bivariate VAR incorporating money aggregate Ml and real GDP in first-
difference is initially estimated with 12 lags. In addition to the constant, the seasonal 
dummies, S 1, S2 and S3 are included in the model in order to smooth out the pronounced 
seasonal fluctuations. The time trend is not included because neither differenced series 
shows any significant trending pattern. The AIC and SBC tests23 , as well as the adjusted 
likelihood ratio (LR) test, select the V AR of order 4. Consequently the model is reestimated 
with 4 lags and looking at the diagnostic test results in Table A6.3.4 and Table A6.3.6 in 
the appendix there is no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the 
individual equations, i.e., the model specification seems adequate and so we choose lag 
length of four quarters. 
23 Results reported in A6.3.1. 
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Cointegration test result 
The next test is for cointegration relationship between real GDP and money M1 in levels. 
The lag length selected by the AIC and SBC tests24 is 5 and the cointegration test results, 
using Johansen ML approach, are presented in Table A6.3.2 in the appendix. Both the 
maximum eigenvalue test and the trace statistic test do not reject the null of no 
cointegration (i.e. r = 0) at the 95 per cent confidence level. As to the model selection tests, 
the three tests, i.e. SBC, HQC and AIC select r = 1. The decision is to assume no 
cointegration because Johansen test is more specific to the cointegration issue whereas the 
model selection criteria are more general-besides, most computer packages, like Eviews, 
use only the eigenvalue (Johansen) cointegration tests. 
With no cointegration relationship found, the model will be a straightforward V AR in first-
difference with 4 lags, a constant, and seasonal dummies. The estimated unrestricted V AR 
equations are shown in Table A6.3.3 and Table A6.3.5 in the appendix. Note that the real 
GDP equation shows significant seasonal effects but not the money supply equation. 
Short run analysis 
From Fig 6.3.1 below we see that the responses all dampen out to zero after the 10th quarter 
Fig 6.3.1 Impulse responses 
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24 Follows testing procedure in Microfit 4.0 manual, p. 291. 
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or so implying the stationarity of the differenced data, whereas the long run responses in 
Fig 6.3.4 remain at some constant value after some initial fluctuations suggesting a 
'permanent' change has occurred. It is this 'permanent' change that Fish and Seater (1993) 
long run neutrality test statistic relies on. 
One problem with Fig 6.3.1 is that it is difficult to compare and comment on the 
contemporaneous responses of real output and money supply to the same shock because the 
responses are not in the same scale and not on the same graph. To overcome this, Fig 6.3.2 
and Fig 6.3.3 are constructed using standardized units25 and they show output and money 
supply responses due to the same exogen9us shock, i.e. Fig 6.3.2 shows the responses due 
to monetary shock and Fig 6.3.3 shows the responses due to real output shock. In order to 
be consistent, the percentage unit will be used throughout the analysis but the tables and the 
figures will still show 'standardized unit'. A unit of 0.2 therefore means 20 per cent of one 
standard deviation-likewise a unit of 0.05 is 5 per cent of one standard deviation. Note 
also that DMIIDMI is the response of money Ml to its own shock and likewise, 
DGDPRlDMl stands for real GDP response to money Ml shock. This applies to all 
subsequent response analysis. Furthermore, for brevity purposes the first-difference term or 
the 'D' prefix may be omitted in the following table headings as well as in the discussion. 
We see from Fig 6.3.2 that in the first quarter after the monetary shock26 output response is 
positive however as the response of money aggregate declined dramatically reaching zero 
level in the 2nd quarter, it seems to drag down with it output, i.e. real output is zero at this 
time also. Output response then gradu~lly rises reaching its peak of 5 per cent (or 
$41milIion) in the 4th quarter -the same time when monetary aggregate reaches its 
minimum. Then as output starts to decline, monetary aggregate starts to rise again, i.e. 
demonstrating clear evidence of countercyclical behaviour. This is consistent with Buckle 
et al. (2003) statement that "Monetary policy has been generally countercyclical, thereby 
reducing business cycles and inflation variability". 
25 Each response is divided by its own standard deviation and because it is in proportions, it can be 
represented as percentages as well. This transformation is known as the 'normalization' process and 
allows the responses to be plotted on a single scale. Note we do not show the confidence band because it 
might obscure the responses-besides, confidence band around the responses of stationary variables are not 
that useful because they generally encompass the horizontal axis. 
26 Of one standard deviation and which is equivalent to $421 million. 
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Fig 6.3.2 Impulse responses of real GDP and money Ml 
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N9W we will examine how output and money respond to a real shock (see Fig 6.3.3). This 
is important because it will show whether or not money is endogenous to output 
movements. 
Fig 6.3.3 Impulse responses of real GDP and Money Ml 
to real GDP shock 
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As can be seen from Fig 6.3.3 above, the responses of output and money supply variables 
are quite different to the responses observed in Fig 6.3.2, i.e. the responses due to monetary 
shock are different to the responses due to real shock. Although not very obvious, the 
responses here seem more procyclical than countercyclical in the sense that as output 
increases so does the money supply. In the 5th quarter, for instance, both reached their 
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peak; output response is 8 per cent (or $72 rnillion)27 and money supply response is 17 per 
cent (or $70 million). In other words, when there is a real shock, the money supply seems to 
be accommodative (or endogenous) in the sense it increases to cater for the extra output 
produced in the economl8. However the pronounced negative response of monetary 
aggreg~te to a real shock is suggestive of the central bank's concern and effort to stoke off 
any inflationary pressure arising from output increase. 
In terms of the relative impact of shocks on output, the real shock invokes a maximum 
response of 8 per cent from output while the monetary shock produces a 5 per cent 
response. Thus we see that a real shock impact on output is about twice that of the impact 
of a monetary shock. But in terms of the lag-period, output response to the monetary shock 
has a shorter lag-period (four quarters) compared to output response to real shock that 
requires five quarters. 
Long run analysis 
Turning our analysis to the long run responses in Fig 6.3.4, we see that the point estimate of 
the long run response of output to a permanent monetary shock is $139 million (16 per 
cent). So while in the short run the peak response of output to monetary shock is just $41 
Fig 6.3.4 Long run responses 
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27 See Table A6.3.7. 
28 This endogeneity of money supply is consistent with the Bemanke et al. (1997) observation that most of 
the observed movement in the instruments of monetary policy is endogenous. 
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million (or 5 per cent), the long run response is actually $139 million. Although this 
magnitude seems relatively high, the 95 per cent confidence band still encompasses the 
zero axis, i.e. the response is not statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent 
significance level. 
Another interesting observation is that of the money supply response to output shock (see 
part (c)). Initially after output shock money supply response is positive but after five to six 
quarters, it returns to equilibrium. This would seem to confirm the notion that money is 
endogenous, at least in the short run. 
To apply the Fish and Seater LRD formula, we need to divide the long run response of 
output due to a monetary shock by the long run response of money supply due to the same 
shock-these are commonly known as the long run multipliers. The result is shown in Fig 
6.3.5 and obviously the LRD statistic29, after some small fluctuations in the first 10 or so 
quarters, stabilises around 0.15. This is not statistically different from zero taking into 
account the 68 per cent confidence interva13o. 
Fig 6.3.5 Computed LRD test statistic 
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It is interesting however to note how the long run responses do not actually die out to zero 
as classical theory predicts. This is a stubborn or persistence feature that has been noted by 
several researchers and which prompted Giodarni (2001) to say, "the output response to 
29 How this is calculated is explained in Chapter 5. 
30 The confidence interval for the LRD is calculated from the confidence intervals of the two long run 
multipliers provided by the Eviews computer program. The Monte-Carlo simulation option is the one used 
in this analysis. 
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monetary shocks remains stubbornly persistent". He argues that the model should 
incorporate output gap as one of the regressors, so in a way we can say that this persistence 
profile is a symptom of variable omission or misspecification. However no attempt is made 
here to correct for this phenomenon because the output gap is a difficult construct to 
measure31-besides, the objective of this study, at least in this first part of the analysis, is 
simply to investigate monetary neutrality and other relevant classical hypotheses. 
By way of summary we conclude that long run monetary neutrality is not rejected when we 
use real GDP and money aggregate M1 but the persistence of output response is still very 
much evident. Also the counter-cyclical impulse responses are consistent with the notion 
that in the short run monetary policy is used to stoke off inflationary pressure. In order to 
see whether there is in fact inflationary pressure when output increased, a trivariate (or 
higher order) VAR model incorporating price or inflation would be appropriate but this will 
be left to the later part of the analysis. There is also evidence that money supply increases 
after real output shock in line with the endogenous theory of money, at least in the short 
run. This endogeneity behaviour of money would lend empirical support to the Post-
Keynesian claim that money supply is seen to accommodate itself to the needs of trade 
(Snowdon et aI., 1994, p. 373). So what we are seeing here is that there is empirical 
evidence that money is exogeneous and endogenous as well, a finding that would be 
consistent with Cagan (1993) results. 
6.3.3. Money Ml vs nominal GDP 
According to Fisher and Seater (1993), "if nominal GDP is not integrated, then 
'permanent'32 changes in money cannot be associated with permanent changes in that 
variable because the latter do not exist". And from the unit root test results33 we see that 
the nominal GDP variable has no unit root. This would have prompted us to skip the test 
however for the sake of completeness, in terms of getting results from the interactions of 
both the integrated and nonintegrated variables, this model will still be estimated and the 
responses examined as done in the previous analysis. Even if we get no response or very 
31 This problem is also raised by Mahadeva and Sinclair (2001, p. 9) in their summary when they say, "The 
authors (referring to Boyd and Smith) suggest that the errors in measuring unobservable variables, such 
as potential output, largely explain why our estimates of the transmission mechanism are so unreliable". 
32 This is a hypothetical concept needed for the LRD test statistic. 
33 See Table A6.2.1. 
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little response from nominal GDP, this information is still useful in offering direct 
empirical evidence to the theory of 'stationarity' widely discussed in many standard 
econometric texts34-namely that stationary or nonintegrated variables cannot sustain or 
propagate shock effects. As pointed out by Kuttner and Mosser (2002), "negative findings 
are often as informative as positive ones". 
The general approach used in testing neutrality in the previous analysis (i.e. between real 
GDP and money M1) will be followed here, except now real GDP is replaced by nominal 
GDP. However, there will be no cointegration test because of the nonintegrated property of 
nominal GDP as well as the different orders of integration of the two variables. 
Testing the lag length 
From Table A6.3.8, AIC selects VAR of order 7 while SBC chooses order of 1. The 
adjusted LR test on the other hand suggests V AR of order of 4. Given the mixed results, 
different orders are tried and the selection is based on the model that gives the optimal 
outcome in terms of no serial correlation and no heteroscedasticity. After running several 
regressions, the model with 6 lags seems to give the best diagnostic test results. The 
estimated regression results, with the time trend35 and seasonal dummies included, are 
presented in Table A6.3.9 and Table A6.3.11 in the appendix. 
Short run analysis 
The impulse responses III Fig 6.3.6a apparently do not die out quickly implying 
nonstationarity of the data. In order to avoid any problem this may have on the analysis the 
series is shortened as to exclude the portion of nominal GDP that has been estimated i.e. the 
model is reestimated with the series starting in 1985. The impulse responses of the 
modified model are shown in Fig 6.3.6b-and as can be seen, the responses die out quite 
quickly suggesting the variables are stationary this time-at least the responses are more 
consistent with the responses in the previous analysis. Consequently the following analysis 
will use a shorter time period, i.e. the series will start in 1985. 
34 See for example, Enders (1995) and Maddala and Kim (1998). 
35 This time trend is added in order to remove the deterministic trend component of the series. 
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Fig 6.3.6a bnpulse responses (1977-2001) 
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Fig 6.3.6b bnpulse responses (1985-2001) 
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The contemporaneous responses following a money shock are shown in Fig 6.3.7 and the 
pattern and the magnitudes are roughly the same as those in Fig 6.3.2. For instance, there is 
evidence of countercyclical movements with nominal output peaking in the 4th quarter, 8th 
quarter, etc., while money supply peaks in the 5th quarter, 9th quarter, and so f~rth. That is, 
when one peaks, the other reaches its trough, and vice versa. The peak response of nominal 
output is 4 per cent which is very close to the real output peak response of 5 per cent noted 
in the previous analysis. 
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As to the responses following an output shock these are shown in Fig 6.3.8. There is some 
evidence of procyclical movements here-again the same as in the previous analysis (see 
Fig 6.3.3). For example, in both figures, both nominal output and money supply peak in the 
5th and 9th quarters. The response of money aggregate this time however is much higher 
Fig 6.3.8 Impulse responses of nominal GDP and money M1 
to nominal output shock 
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than when the shock comes from real output (Fig 6.3.3) or from money supply (Fig 6.3.7) 
above. This would suggest that the money aggregate is responding to both the output and 
the price effect embodied in nominal outpue6 hence the larger response. 
Long run analysis 
Examining the long run responses in Fig 6.3.9, all the four seem to level off to some 
constant value after ten quarters or so-implying that the system converges or is stable. 
This means that it is possible to obtain the values of the long run multipliers and the LRD 
test statistic. In interpreting the results, it is useful to remember however the nonintegrated 
property of the nominal GDP data. 
C9mparing the point estimates of the long run multipliers of real output (see previous 
analysis) and nominal output following a monetary shock3?, we see that the real output 
(DGDPR) multiplier is $139 million (or 15 percent) while nominal output (DGDPN) 
Fig 6.3.9 Long run responses 
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multiplier amounts to $147 miIlion38 (or 9 per cent). This implies that in relative terms, 
monetary shock has more impact on real GDP than on nominal GDP. This evidence is in 
36 Recall nominal output = PY (i.e. price x real GDP). 
37 Equivalent to about $420 million, i.e. equals to one standard deviation of money supply. 
38 See Table A6.3.13 (c). 
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contradiction to what we expece9 but since nominal GDP is not integrated, this is plausible, 
i.e., because nominal GDP has no unit-root, it cannot sustain the impact of any shock-at 
least not as much as a series with a unit root. And as expected, the computed LRD test 
statistic of 0.11 is very close to zero-in fact, the 68 per cent confidence band encompasses 
Fig 6.3.10 Computed LRD test statistic 
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the zero axis hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that LRD = O. If nominal GDP had a 
unit root then we expect the LRD to be close to unity but in this instance, the LRD should 
be close to zero because nominal output has not undergone any 'permanent' change. 
In summary we see from the impulse analysis that movement of money supply is 
countercyclical following a monetary shock but is procyclical when there is output shock. 
This pattern is also observed in the previous analysis when real GDP was used. With 
respect to the long run analysis, the result is consistent with the unit-root .theory which 
stipulates that only integrated variables can sustain or propagate the impact of shocks, at 
least in the long run. This importance of integration is aptly phrased by Bullard (1999) 
when he said, "The nonstationarity in economic variables was viewed as something of a 
headache for much of macroeconometrics. But in a remarkable tum of events, it actually 
was a boon to testing neutrality propositions". Obviously our empirical test results have 
just demonstrated this 'remarkable tum of events: i.e. a nonstationary variable is crucial for 
testing long run hypotheses otherwise the test will be not very useful because no 
'permanent change' has occurred . 
. 39 According to the quantity theory the change in money is to be fully reflected in the change in nominal 
output in the long run, i.e. we expect a relatively higher response from nominal output. 
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6.3.4 Money M3 vs real GDP 
The comparison of this model with the first model (in which money M1 is used), is 
important because of the uncertainty as to which of the monetary aggregates or instrument 
has greater impact on real activity. As Friedman (2000) says, " ... there was never a sound 
theoretical ba~is for knowing which measure of money was the right one to target 
(currency plus checking accounts only? currency plus all bank deposits? other 
combinations ?), and even within anyone country empirical evidence on which measure 
had the closest relationship to income and prices was often mixed". Some studies find that 
long run neutrality holds when narrow money measures (e.g. monetary base or M1) are 
used but not when broader money measures (e.g. M2 or M3) are used while others find the 
opposite4o. This conflicting result is unfortunate because the issue is very important to 
central banks and to monetary policy makers in particular because it provides them with 
more specific policy aggregates or intermediate targets that they can manipulate in order to 
affect real output41 . The evidence provided here is intended to shed more light on the 
issue-at least from the New Zealand context. 
The testing and estimation procedure of the first two models is followed here as well. 
Testing the lag length and cointegration 
The estimated results of the unrestricted VAR incorporating real GDP and money M3 in 
first difference is shown in Table A6.3.14 in the appendix. The AIC, SBC and the adjusted 
LR tests all select the VAR of order 4. However, there was some serial correlation noted 
when 4 lags is used so 5 lags is used and the diagnostic tests results, shown in Table 
A6.3.17 and Table A6.3.19, show no evidence of serial correlation nor heteroscedasticity 
this time, i.e. the model specification with 5 lags seems adequate. 
The cointegration test results are shown in Table A6.3.15 and both the maximum 
eigenvalue and the trace tests do not reject the null of no cointegration (i.e. r = .0). The SBC 
model selection criteria test also has the same result but the AIC test suggests r = 2 and the 
HQC test suggests r = 1. The 'no cointegration' conclusion is adopted because the Johansen 
40 Bullard (1999) reviews some of these studies. 
41 Although many central banks these days focus more on inflation targeting, they are still very conscious 
of their monetary policy's impact on output. 
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tests are more accurate and more specific than the model selection criteria tests, therefore 
the model will be estimated as a straightforward V AR with 5 lags, 3 seasonal dummies and 
a constant. 
Short run analysis 
The impulse responses shown in Fig 6.3.11 do not decay quickly like the impulse responses 
of the first model incorporating real GDP and money Ml. Generally when an impulse 
response behaves like this, it is likely the series concerned has a unit root or a 'near' unit 
root. However as reported in Table A6.2.1, money M3 is integrated of order one therefore 
in first-difference the variable should be stationary. In the literature variables behaving like 
this are said to have a 'long memory' . 
Fig 6.3.11 Impulse responses 
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Now to examine the impact of a monetary shock on real output and money supply, we see 
from Fig 6.3.11 that the latter fluctuates quite significantly whereas output response is more 
muted. Following monetary shock real output increased $37 million (or 4 per cent) in the 
2nd quarter, then $42 million (5 per cent) in the 3rd quarter, but declined fairly dramatically 
by 7 per cent in the 4th quarter. In the 5th quarter, it increased by another 6 per cent. This is 
the largest increase of real output after monetary shock so we see that while the maximum 
response of real output to the M1 shock occurs in the 4th quarter (referring to the previous 
analysis), here it occurs in the 5th quarter. As to the magnitude of the responses, it is 
roughly the same, i.e. around 5-6 per cent. What this suggests is that the short run response 
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of real output to monetary shock, whether it be money MI shock or broader money M3 
shock, is basically the same-around 5-6 per cent, but in terms of the lag-period, real 
output seems to respond slightly faster to changes in MI than to changes in M3. This seems 
plausible given the more 'liquid' nature of MI compared to M3, i.e. any increase in M1 can 
easily be translated to consumption or investment expenditure while the more illiquid M3 
may take time to use for similar spending purposes. 
Looking at Fig 6.3.12, the countercyclical pattern is also evident, in particular it is quite 
clear from the 5th quarter onward that when real GDP peaks, money M3 reaches its 
minimum point, and vice versa. This would be consistent with the responses in Fig 6.3.2. 
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Fig 6.3.12 Impulse responses of real GDP and money M3 
to money M3 shock 
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When there is output shock, the impulse responses of real output and money M3 are shown 
in Fig 6.3.13. This is the counterpart of Fig 6.3.3. 
Following output shock the impulse response of money M3 is generally positive with the 
maximum response of 9 per cent observed in the 3rd quarter. The procyclical response that 
is observed when money MI is used (see Fig 6.3.3) is no longer evident here. This would 
suggest that Ml is more endogenous than M3 in the sense that as output increases MI 
increases, and when it decreases, so does MI. Furthermore, in terms bf the response 
magnitude, the magnitude of 9 per cent observed here is much lower than the 17 per cent 
response observed for money MI in the first analysis. This suggests that when real output 
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Fig 6.3.13 Impulse responses of real GDP and money M3 
to real GDP shock 
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lllcrease, there is more demand for money Ml than for the broader M3. This seems 
plausible given that for investment and consumption purposes the more 'liquid' form of 
money, such as Ml, would be more suitable than the more 'illiquid' M3. 
The magnitude and pattern of output response following a real shock is basically the same 
as in Fig 6.3.3. 
Long run analysis 
Now with respect to the long run responses, all the graphs in Fig 6.3.14 level off after. some 
time suggesting the model is stable. The point estimate of the long run multiplier of real 
GDP to a monetary shock42 is $106 million or 12 per cent (see Table A6.3.20). This implies 
that a one standard deviation shock to money M3 aggregate will cause real output to 
increase by 12 per cent. This is slightly lower than the long run response of output to 
money Ml shock of 15 per cent. This suggests that Ml has greater impact than M3 on real 
. output. 
As to the long run multiplier of money M3 with respect to output shock, the point estimate 
is $565 million or 30 per cent (see Fig 6.3.14 (b) or Table A6.3.20). This positive point 
estimate is very different to the -$10 million point estimate (almost zero in relative terms) 
42 Equivalent to $1835 million or one standard deviation. 
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Fig 6.3.14 Long run responses 
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of money Ml long run multiplier in the previous analysis (see Table A6.3.7 and Fig 
6.3.4c). What this means is that a permanent increase in real output will ultimately raise the 
level of money M3 permanently but not money Ml, i.e. M3 seems to be more endogenous 
to output movements than M143. This would seem to contradict our earlier impulse 
response analysis in which we concluded that Ml is more endogenous than M3. 
Fortunately this is not the case. What happens is that in the short run Ml is more responsive 
to output changes but not in the long run. M3, on the other hand, is permanently affected by 
a permanent increase in output. To rationalise this in the context of the quantity theory 
formula (MY = PY), an increase in output (Y) should be matched by an increase in money 
supply (M)-provided the velocity of money (V) is constant44. The behaviour of money 
M3 therefore seems to follow this theory but not MI. That is, money Ml long run response 
of almost zero means that its velocity must increase following a positive increase in 
output45 . This seems to reflect the more 'fluid' or 'liquid' form, of Ml in contrast to the 
more 'illiquid' M3. Another way of putting it, Ml acts more like a medium for transactions 
(a veil) whereas M3 acts more like a 'store of value'. 
43 The endogeneity of M3 is also reported by Serletis and King (1993) using the Granger-causality test. 
44 This assumes money is endogenous. 
45 Another possibility is for the price to go down following an increase in output but in most cases prices rise 
following output expansion (Le. the short run Phillips curve) hence the velocity has to increase as well. 
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Examining now the LRD statistic, we see from Table A6.3.20 that the point estimate is 
0.07. This is smaller than the LRD statistic computed for money M1 (of 0.12) suggesting 
Fig 6.3.15 Computed LRD statistic 
1.0 ----------------------------, 
0.6 
oa 
0.4 
........ - ... ,..- ............ _--- .. ---- ........ --------
~-:- ' 
0.2 
0.0 _---_ ... _ 
... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... .. .. ... .. ... ... ... .. ... ... 
-0.2 
-004 
-0.6 
·0.8 
·1.0 ---------------------------1 
1 2 :3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 1213 14 15 16 17 18 192021 22 23 24 25 28 27 28 29 30 31 3233 34 35 38 37 38 39 40 
that money M1 aggregate has more influence on real output than M3 aggregate, at least in 
the long run. However, taking into account the confidence interval of 68 per cent, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that LRD = 0, i.e. we cannot reject the long run monetary 
neutrality proposition based on the evidence available. 
So even if we use the broader measure of money, such as M3, we still cannot reject the long 
run neutrality hypothesis. This is in contrast to some results that reject long run neutrality 
when broader money is used46 . And in the context of the question raised at the beginning of 
this analysis as to which monetary aggregate is likely to have more influence on real output, 
the evidence obviously points to the narrower monetary aggregate M147. 
6.3.5 Money Ml versus Price 
Estimation of this model is quite important because of the presumed one-to-one relationship 
between changes in money supply and changes in the price level as embodied in the 
quantity theory. As noted by Gale (1983, p. 85), "In a steady state the price level and the 
money supply grow at the same proportionate rate, so by controlling the rate of growth of 
money supply the government can control the rate of inflation". Furthermore, some 
46 For example, Olekalns (1996) study using Australian data as well as the study by Coe and Nason (1999), 
as cited in Bullard (1999). 
47 This would seem to be consistent with Serletis and King (1993) finding that narrow money, however 
defined, causes real output while the broader aggregates reveal no causality to real income. 
131 
-::.' .. ,-,".', 
studies48 have used inflation rate as a proxy for money growth rate when the latter is not 
available or when its order of integration is not greater than the real output order of 
integration49 . So the basic question here is: Does empirical evidence support this 
equiproportional change in money supply and inflation? Also the question of whether or 
not money supply is endogenous is another contentious issue between the orthodox 
monetarists and the Post-Keynesians5o with the latter advocating the endogeneity of money 
while the former supports the exogeneity idea. Empirical evidence from this analysis 
should therefore be useful not only to the neutrality proposition but should also provide 
useful insight as to which school of thought is being endorsed or validated by the New 
Zealand data. And in a more applied conte;xt, the information should also be useful to 
countries5l that are primarily concerned with price stability for despite its long history and 
substantial evidence, the predicted association between money and inflation remains 
disputed (Dwyer and Hafer, 1999). 
The CPl is used as measure of the price level and from Table A6.2.l, we see that it is 
nonstationary or has a unit root but becomes stationary upon first differencing, i.e. has 
order of integration of 1. Money M1 has also the same nonstationarity property therefore 
we expect both to undergo a 'permanent' change when they are 'shocked'. It should be 
emphasised here that CPI in first-difference (DCPI) is not exactly the same as the inflation 
rate, at least in this study because the data are not in logarithmic value-this is unlike most 
studies that use logarithmic values of the price indices which makes the first differehce a 
good approximation of the growth rate52. Nevertheless the effect or the response of price 
level in first-difference (DCPl) should be fairly similar to that of the inflation rate (lNF). 
Order of the V AR and model specification 
Table A6.3.21 provides results of the selection criteria tests. AlC, SBC and the LR test 
results all select V AR of order 4. However using 4 lags produces serial correlation so the 
48 Such as Rapach (1999). 
49 That is, to test for supemeutraIity, money aggregate should be integrated of order 2 ifreaI output is 
integrated of order 1. 
50 Discussed in Snowdon et al. (1994, p. 373). 
51 For example, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom (see Dalziel, 2001). 
52 As pointed out by Thomas (1993, p. 154), "the approximation [i.e. logY, -JogY,_1 = Yt -If-I ] will 
Y,-I 
hold provided growth rates are small so that Y, = Y,-1 . 
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lag is increased to 5 quarters but still the equations show some evidence of autocorrelation 
so a time trend is added. The diagnostic test results show no more evidence of 
autocorrelation but there is some small evidence of heteroscedasticity in the price equation 
(see Table A6.3.26). Obviously the price variable has undergone major structural changes 
and so we tried adding the dummy variable to account for the introduction of the GST but 
while this solves the heteroscedasticity problem,it introduces serious autocorrelation so we 
decided not to include the GST dummy. 
The cointegration test results are presented in Table A6.3.22 indicating that neither the 
maximum eigenvalue nor the trace test reject null hypothesis of no cointegration. The 
model selection criteria tests, on the other hand, give mixed results-both the Ale and the 
HQC suggest one cointegration relationship but the AIC concurs with the Johansen's test 
results. Because there is no overwhelming evidence of cointegration, the final model 
specification is the straightforward V AR with 5 lags, seasonal dummies, a time trend and a 
constant. The estimation results are shown in Table A6.3.23 and Table A6.3.26. 
Short run analysis 
From the impulse response graph (Fig 6.3.16) below we see quite distinct and interesting 
patterns. First, whilst money supply Ml responses tend to show alternating positive and 
Fig 6.3.16 Impulse Responses 
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negative values, responses of the price variable to either shock are practically all positive. 
This suggests some kind of serial correlation behavior yet according to the Langrange 
Multipler and the F tests (see Table A6.3.26), the price equation is not serially correlated. 
One interpretation of this is that prices are 'sticky', i.e. do not change relatively as fast as 
the other variables, at least in the short term. 
To examine closer the contemporaneous movements of both pnce and money supply 
following an exogenous shock we look at Fig 6.3.17 and Fig 6.3.18. 
Following monetary shock, pnce increases for almost eight quarters (two years). The 
maximum response of 19 per cent (or 1.5 percentage point) occurs however in the 5th 
quarter-the same time as money supply peaks. In the 9th quarter the two variables both 
peak again though the magnitudes are quite small this time. What the evidence here shows 
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is that price will significantly increase and remain positive for several quarters following a 
money supply increase. Furthermore, any other increase in money supply following the 
initial shock will be simultaneously matched by further price increase-as noted in the 5th 
and 9th quarters. This observation concurs well with monetarist's contention that inflation is 
a monetary phenomenon, i.e. when money supply increases, price will also increase. 
Another important conclusion is that price is 'sticky'. This is because price response to 
monetary shock remains positive for almost two years-despite the contemporaneous 
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negative values of money supply in the subsequent quarters, particularly in the 3rd and 6th 
quarters. 
Now let us consider what happens when there is price shock. The responses of the two 
variables are shown in Fig 6.3.18. The response of money supply to price shock is 
generally positive and the two peak responses (14 per cent and 16 per cent) occur in the 4th 
and 6th quarters implying that it takes a year or more for money supply to respond. This 
positive response of money supply to price increase is consistent with the Post-Keynesian 
assumption that money is endogenous (see Snowdon et al., 1994, p. 374) however the 
delayed response would suggest that there is some 'friction' in the money or credit 
market-again in accordance with the Keynesian general view of the economi3. 
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Fig 6.3.18 Impulse responses of money M1 and price 
to price shock 
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To compare the impact of money on output (refer to the first analysis) and on inflation, it is 
interesting to note that real output shows its maximum response in the 4th quarter while 
price peak response is observed in the 6th quarter. So if we assume monetary policy acts 
through money supply Ml, then the impact of monetary policy is much 'slower' on price 
level than on real OUtput54. Another interesting difference is the relatively small response of 
real output (around 5 per cent) to monetary shock compared to price response of almost 20 
per cent. This in a way provides justification for monetary policies that primarily focus on 
53 In contrast the Classicals always maintain a 'market clearing' assumption. 
54 This result is somewhat consistent with Clarida et al. (1999) finding that monetary policy impact on 
inflation takes longer period of time to have the intended effect: they put six to nine months to reach 
output and over a year to reach inflation. 
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inflation rather than on output: firstly, because the time-lag between monetary shock and 
the impact on inflation is more extended and secondly, because monetary impact on real 
output is relatively small. 
Long run analysis 
The long run responses with 95 per cent confidence interval are shown in Fig 6.3.19 below. 
In spite of the inclusion of the zero axis within the 95 per cent confidence band in graphs 
(b) and (c), the responses are generally significant. In fact if we use the 68 per cent 
f 55 con idence, which some studies have used , all the responses would have been 
significantly different from zero implying all the variables have undergone significant 
Fig 6.3.19 Long run responses 
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'permanent' changes following exogenous disturbances. In other words, a permanent 
change in money supply will cause price level to increase significantly, and vice versa. This 
is an interesting revelation because it shows that money supply tan both be exogenous in 
the sense that it causes price to increase and also endogenous to price movements, i.e. it 
seems to accommodate both the Classicals view and the Post-Keynesians stance. It is also 
useful to note that it takes generally less than ten quarters (i.e. just over two years), before 
the new equilibrium levels are reached. 
55 For instance, in their paper on New Zealand business cycle, Buckle et al. (2002, p. 20) said, ''As is 
commonplace in the VAR literature, sixty-eight per cent confidence bands have been estimatedfor the 
impulse response functions using the Monte Carlo bootstrapping approach of Runkle (19879". 
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For the long run neutrality test we need to examine the LRD test statistic. According to 
Table A6.3.27 (c), the LRD point estimate is 0.93. This is fairly close to one, in fact, the 68 
per cent confidence band encompasses the unit horizontal axis 'comfortably'-but not the 
zero axis (see Fig 6.3.20) therefore we do not reject the hypothesis that LRD = 1, but we do 
reject that LRD = O. This provides further evidence of the long run monetary neutrality 
proposition, i.e. changes in money supply is fully reflected in price level increase leaving 
real output unchanged. 
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Fig 6.3.20 Computed LRD test statistic 
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So in answering the question posed at the beginning of this bivariate analysis as to whether 
price responds equiproportionally to increases in money supply, the answer obviously 
would be yes56 • It is also important to note the evidence of price 'stickiness' from the'short 
run analysis--an assumption often made by the New-Keynesians. As to the lag-period 
before the 'peak' effect of money increase is noted on inflation th~ analysis indicates five 
quarters (i.e. just over a year). Another useful insight is the fact that money responds 
positively to price increase--both in the short and long run, i.e. this would support the Post-
Keynesian view that money is endogenous to price movements. Finally the evidence from 
the LRD neutrality test provides further support to the long run monetary neutrality 
hypothesis. 
56 This finding is consistent with Dwyer and Hafer (1999) contention that "inflation and money growth are 
related over time and those who asserted otherwise are misguided at best". 
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6.3.6 Inflation rate and Interest rate (Fisher's relationship) 
Although real output is not used here, the proposition is basically another version of the 
long run neutrality classical hypothesis57 . This is known as Fisher's long run relationship 
between inflation rate and interest rate and in addition to its close relationship to monetary 
neutrality, it is also important in the context of this study because the interest rate has 
become, in recent years, the primary tool of central banks in controlling inflation and 
influencing economic activiti8. In fact, in the monetary transmission literature, interest rate 
is one of the key variables, if not the most important variable. This is easily attested by the 
consistent use of the interest rate in central bank monetary policy models as well as in the 
New Keynesian models59 . 
Fisher's relationship says that a permanent change in inflation rate has no long run effect 
on the real interest rate. However in this study, we will use nominal interest rate so the 
hypothesis changes to: a permanent change in inflation rate will cause an equiproportional 
change in nominal interest rate. 
From Table A6.2.1, we see that the interest rate is integrated of order one while the 
inflation rate is stationary. This may pose some problem in estimation because we need the 
inflation rate to be nonstationary (i.e. have a unit-root) otherwise it would not be able to 
'sustain' the permanent change required for testing the long run hypothesis. Despite this 
problem, the model will still be estimated with the variables in first-difference keeping in 
mind the stationarity property of inflation rate, especially when interpreting the results. 
Order of the V AR 
The results of the first unrestricted VAR model estimated with 12 lags incorporating 
interest rate and inflation rate, both in first-difference, is presented in Table A6.3.28. The 
model selection tests give mixed results, for example, AlC and the LR tests choose lag of 4 
while SBC chooses lag of 1. Lag of 4 is chosen so that any seasonal effect would be 
57 As Blanchard (1997, p. 386) points out, "The second type of evidence is the relationship between the 
nominal interest rate and inflation rate over time in one country. Again, the Fisher hypothesis does not 
suggest that the two should move together from year to year. But it does suggest that the long-run 
movements in inflation should eventually be reflected in similar movements in the nominal interest rate". 
58 Arestis and Sawyer (2002) referred to this as the 'new' approach to monetary policy. 
59 There are however some who still argue that money aggregate has important role in influencing real output 
(or in monetary policy), such as Favara and Giordani (2002), Leeper and Roush (2003), Peterson (1996), 
among others. 
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'smoothed out' and also to minimize the potential effects of serial correlation. The model is 
reestimated with 4 lags and a constant (no seasonal dummies included this time) and the 
diagnostic test results in Table A6.3.30 and Table A6.3.32 show a generally adequate 
specification apart from a small sign of heteroscedasticity in the inflation rate equation. 
There is no cointegration test because inflation rate is not integrated. 
Short run analysis 
The impulse responses of interest rate and inflation rate to exogenous shocks are shown in 
Fig 6.3.21. All the four responses seem to die out quite fast suggesting the variables in first 
difference are stationary-which is of course expected given the variables are already in 
rates. 
Fig 6.3.21 hnpulse Responses 
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Since the Fisher hypothesis refers to the impact of the change in inflation rate on the 
interest rate, we will examine first the responses following an inflation rate shock. These 
are shown in Fig 6.3.22. 
We see from Fig 6.3.22 that after an inflation rate shock the interest rate increased and 
remained positive for five straight quarters. It peaked in the 2nd quarter at 29 per cent (or 
0.24 percentage point) while inflation rate reached its minimum of 40 per cent (or 0.46 
percentage point) below equilibrium. So whilst interest rate displays positive responses in 
the first couple of quarters, inflation rate tends to be negative or zero in this period. This is 
the sort of contemporaneous movements expected between the two variables, i.e. as interest 
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Fig 6.3.22 Impulse responses of interest rate and inflation rate 
to inflation rate shock 
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rate increased, inflation rate should decline. Assuming the interest rate movements reflects 
the monetary policy response to high inflation, then from this analysis it is clear that the 
impact of monetary tightening on inflation occurs fairly rapidly, i.e. within the second 
quarter. The sustained positive response of interest rate certainly holds down inflation as 
shown from the negative or zero response of inflation rate. Given New Zealand's 
commitment to price stability this observation seems quite plausible. 
Now let us examine the contemporaneous movements of the inflation rate and interest rate 
following an interest rate shock. The responses are shown in Fig 6.3.23. 
From Fig 6.3.23 we see that following the interest rate shock, the inflation rate does not 
respond until the 3rd quarter when it increased sharply by 19 per cent (or 0.22 percentage 
point). In the 4th quarter it declined by the same amount and remained negative in the sth 
quarter as well. In the 6th quarter, it returned to the equilibrium position. 
Fig 6.3.23 Impulse responses of interest rate and inflation rate 
to interest rate shock 
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What is interesting here is the positive response60 noted in the 3rd quarter after the initial 
interest rate shock. This is an empirical 'anomaly' that many researchers using the VAR 
framework have observed and have accordingly dubbed -the 'price puzzle'. However the 
claim is that this positive response persists for several quarters, for example Giordani 
(2001a), says, "the response was positive for many quarters", yet as observed here, this is 
not the case-i.e. it is observed only in the 3rd quarter. Mankiw (2000) talks about the 
delayed and gradual response of inflation to monetary policy shock. It is interesting to note 
though that when price in first-difference (DCPI) is used instead of the change in inflation 
rate (DINF), Giordani's observation of the persistence positive response is noted (see Fig 
6.3.24 below). 
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Fig 6.3.24 Impulse responses of price (DePI) and interest rate (DINT) 
to interest rate (DINT) shock 
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This shows that when price in first-difference (DCPI) is used, the 'price puzzle' becomes 
very obvious. This would imply then that previous studies must have used price in first-
difference rather than inflation rate in first-difference61 • 
But regardless of whether DCPI or DINF is used, the positive response noted is worth 
considering. Several studies theorize on variable omission as the cause of the so-called 
'price puzzle' and consequently. include other variables, such as commodity price or 
monetary aggregate, to correct it. Giordani (2001a), on the other hand, argues that the 
60 Kuszczak and Murray (1987) also noted the positive relationship between inflation rate and interest rate and 
suggested a Fisher's effect explanation or a 'cost-push' effect known as the 'Patman effect' . 
61 This may have been caused by the use of logarithmic values which means the price level in first-difference 
is equated to inflation rate-this is not done here, i.e. in this study price level in first difference (DCPI) is 
not the same as inflation rate (lNF). 
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inclusion of output gap in the model is the proper way of eliminating it-at least this is 
consistent with theory (as he puts it). Leeper and Rousch (2003) insisted that adding the 
monetary aggregate to the model would not only eliminate the 'price puzzle' but also the 
'liquidity puzzle'. In spite of these arguments, this study suggests two explanations: one is 
to do with the contemporaneous movement of the interest rate following the initial shock, 
and the other is to be found in the IS-LM framework. In the first case, the dramatic decline 
in the interest rate following the initial shock (see Fig 6.3.23) would surely prompt an 
opposite response from price, which in this instance, is to increase. That is, as interest rate 
declines (or becomes very low) one would expect more people (and businesses) to make 
loans thus driving up the prices-hence the price increase or 'puzzle' observed. With 
respect to the IS-LM framework explanation, this is illustrated in Fig 6.3.25 (the numbers 
are just for illustrative purposes). 
Fig 6.3.25 Demonstrating price increase following interest rate shock 
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From Fig 6.3.25 an interest rate shock (say following monetary policy tightening) would be 
represented by a shift of the LM curve to the left (see top figure). According to the 
aggregate demand theory62 this should cause the aggregate demand curve ADl to shift to 
the left (AD2) in order to maintain the price (of say 10). Now suppose instead of an 
instantaneous shift to AD2! the aggregate demand curve move slowly, say due to friction in 
the economy. In this case the price will initially rise (say to 20) as consumption moves 
along the initial demand curve (ADl) to the left. Then as the aggregate demand schedule 
shifts to the left, i.e. to AD2, price starts to decline until it reaches the original price of 10. 
However if the original aggregate supply AS 1 remains as before, then there is tendency for 
the aggregate demand schedule to move further to the left (to AD3) while price keeps 
falling below the initial price of 10. This would then explain how price tends to rise initially 
following monetary tightening and then after some time it starts to decline, sometimes 
going even below the original price level. Whether the assumption of the slow adjustment 
of the aggregate demand curve following monetary shock is plausible or not is a question 
for empirical testing however it is important to note here the potential use of the IS-LM 
framework in explaining the 'price-puzzle'. 
The long run analysis, which is more appropriate to the Fisher hypothesis, is carried out 
next. 
Long run analysis 
The long run responses shown in Fig 6.3.26 are fairly significant apart from the inflation 
rate response-but even this is significantly different from zero if we use the more standard 
68 per cent confidence interval. 
62 Which says that the aggregate demand curve is drawn holding "other things equal" (see, for example, 
Mankiw, 1998, p. 411 or Hillier, 1991, p. 80-85). 
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Fig 6.3.26 Long Run Responses 
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Looking at Fig 6.2.26 (b) we see that the long run response of interest rate to positive 
permanent change in inflation rate is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5 
per cent significance level. The point estimate is 0.48 percentage point (see Table A6.3.33). 
Interestingly, the inflation rate long run response, to the same inflation shock, is also 0.48 
percentage point. Obviously this implies a one-to-one relationship, which will perfectly 
match Fisher's hypothesis, but this is not quite correct because we need to normalize the 
units by dividing the long run multipliers by their respective standard deviation. The 
resulting value of the division is in fact the LRD test statistic shown in Fig 6.3.27 below. 
Fig 6.3.27 Computed LRD test statistic 
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The point estimate of the LRD test statistic is 1.4 (see Table A6.3.33). This is slightly more 
than the unit value we require for the Fisher hypothesis to hold, however if we look at the 
68 per cent confidence band in Fig 6.3.27, the unit horizontal line is obviously within this 
band hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that LRD = 1. In other words, we do not reject 
the Fisher hypothesis that eventually change in inflation rate will get all reflected in the 
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increase in nominal interest rate. It is useful to note also the time before the LRD levels off 
because this would indicate the period for the effect of inflation change to work itself 
completely into nominal interest rate. According to the above figure, the period would be 
just over ten quarters (i.e. over two years). 
Looking at the inflation rate response to the interest rate shock in part (c) we note the 
positive response in the 3rd quarter followed by a negative response of 0.1 percentage point 
(or 8.6 per cent). This shows that a one standard deviation shock (roughly 0.84 percentage 
point) in the interest rate will cause a permanent decline in the inflation rate by 0.1 
percentage point. Putting it differently, a percentage point increase in the interest rate will 
cause inflation rate to decline permanently by 0.12 percentage point. 
Summarizing the evidence, we see that a permanent increase in inflation rate will cause 
nominal interest rate to increase on a one-to-one basis in the long run-in line with the 
Fisher hypothesis63 . However we see that the point estimate of the relationship is slightly 
more than unity but if we take into account the 68 per cent confidence interval then we 
cannot reject that it is equal to one. The evidence also points to a long period of time before 
the effect of inflation rate shock is entirely reflected in interest rate (over two years)-
however the period noted here is much shorter than the 'couple of decades' that Milton 
Friedman speculated64. On the impact of interest rate on inflation rate, we also observed the 
price 'puzzle' that many researchers have encountered. However when we use the inflation 
rate variable in first-difference (DINF), the puzzle is restricted only to the 3rd quarter, i.e. 
not the extended period that Giordani (2001a) point~ out. Only when we use price in first-
difference (DCPI) that we see the same extended positive response following interest rate 
tightening. As to the reason for the positive response of price following an interest rate 
increase (i.e. the price puzzle), we offer two explanations that are different to previous 
explanations. In brief we suggest that the price increase is not really a puzzle, rather it is 
'explainable' on the basis of the contemporaneous movements of the variables following 
the initial shock and on the basis of the IS-LM framework. 
63 This result is different to King and Watson (1999) finding that show nominal interest rates not adjusting 
fully to inflation shock. Also Rapach (1999) result does not support the Fisher's relationship, i.e. a 
permanent increase in inflation rate lowers the long run real interest rate for the 14 countries he studied. 
64 As cited in Blanchard (1997, p. 349) 
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6.3.7 Inflation vs real GDP (superneutrality test) 
Here the change in the growth rate of money is important, i.e., the hypothesis states that the 
change in the money growth rate has no effect on real output in the long run. This means 
that to test supemeutrality of money, the order of integration of the money aggregate should 
be greater than that of real GDP. However, from the unit root test results65 , we see that both 
money aggregates, Ml and M3, are integrated of order I-the same as that of real GDP. In 
view of this, we cannot use the actual money growth rate here to test for monetary 
supemeutrality using Fish and Seater (1993) LRD test framework. However, in line with 
most past studies on supemeutralitl6, we will use the inflation rate instead. Besides, we 
have seen from our previous analysis that the money aggregate is positively correlated with 
inflation rate-hence there is basis for using inflation rate here. 
It may be useful at this stage to say that the current empirical findings of the supemeutrality 
tests are fairly mixed-i.e. some studies find that the long run response of output to 
inflation shock is positive while others find it to be negative. And while these may be 
incompatible with the classical notion of supemeutrality, there are some theoretical 
models67 that do support either result, and as Rapach (1999) argues, "Given the ample 
cause to question LRS~8 on theoretical grounds, it is important to evaluate its empirical 
relevance". The following analysis, needless to say, has the same objective-i.e., 
evaluating the empirical relevance of the long run supemeutrality hypothesis. 
Another interesting aspect of this particular model is that the relationship involved is in fact 
the famous Phillips relationship between output69 and inflation rate. As pointe.d out in 
Snowdon et al.(1994, p.146), "The Phillips curve is concerned with the controversy over 
the relationship between inflation and unemployment and is one of the most famous 
relationships in macroeconomics". Consequently the importance of the empirical results 
obtained from this analysis is not confined only to the classical supemeutrality proposition 
65 See Table A6.2.1. 
66 Such as Bullard and Keating (1995) and Rapach (1999). 
67 See, for example, Patinkin (1989). 
68 Stands for 'long run supemeutrality' . 
69 In the literature 'unemployment' and 'real output' are interchangeably used, especially when referring to 
the Phillips curve. An interesting articulation of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment is 
provided in Mankiw (2000). 
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but also extends to one of the most debated macroeconomic issues-namely, the Phillips 
reI ati onshi p. 
Selecting the order of the V AR 
From Table A6.3.34 all the model criteria selection tests select VAR of order 4. So the 
V AR model incorporating the change in the inflation rate (DINF) and real GDP (DGDPR) 
is reestimated with four lags, a constant, and seasonal dummies. The results are shown in 
Table A6.3.35 and Table A6.3.37. There is no evidence of serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity in the model. There is no cointegration test because by definition 70 the 
order of integration of the money aggregate should be greater than real GDP's order of 
integration. 
Short run analysis 
Looking at the impulse responses in Fig 6.3.28 below we see that the response of real 
output to an inflation shock (part c) is predominantly negative, while the inflation rate 
response to an output shock (part b) is predominantly positive. Following a real shock, the 
Fig 6.3.28 Impulse Responses 
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inflation rate showed a sharp increase of 0.4 percentage point (or 34 per cent) in the 2nd 
quarter. This positive response is consistent with the aggregate supply curve fonnulation 
where inflation is usually a positive function of output. As to the negative output response 
70 Refers to the definition of 'long run supemeutrality of money' . 
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following inflation shock, there may be several reasons but as explained by Friedman 71, the 
high rate of inflation creates uncertainty and reduces market efficiency leading up to higher 
unemployment (i.e. lower output). 
Having described the general response of inflation rate and output to exogenous shocks, we 
will now examine closer the contemporaneous movements of the two variables. These are 
shown in Fig 6.3.29 and Fig 6.3.30. 
From Fig 6.3.29 it is interesting to note that inflation rate dramatically declined by 42 per 
cent in the 2nd quarter after the shock. This significant decline is matched by a small 
increase in output of 5 per cent (or $41million) but then as the inflation rate returns to 
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Fig 6.3.29 Impulse responses of real GDP and inflation rate 
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equilibrium in the· 3rd quarter, output shows a declining trend reaching its minimum of -$83 
million (or 9 per cent) in the 4th quarter72. This would seem to be consistent with Kuszczak 
and Murray (1987) result that show output decreases in response to higher prices and 
interest rates after two to three quarters. After the 4th quarter, the two variables seem to 
move together. This demonstrates clearly the procyclical nature of inflation rate-at least 
after the initial effect of the exogenous shock has worn off. That is, under normal 
circumstances inflation tends to move with output-the so-called short-run Phillips curve. 
71 As cited in Snowdon el at. (1994, p. 157): note however that Friedman actually uses the term 'positive 
relationship' because he was referring to the 'unemployment rate' . 
72 See Table A6.3.39. 
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Fig 6.3.30 Impulse responses of real GDP and inflation rate 
to real GDP shock 
\ II. \n 
. , 
l' , I' , 
.\ ~ ~ 
.~v ~ .. ~ -
• 
• 1- - - DINFIOGDPR I 
I-DGDPAIOGDPR I 
10 11 12 13 14 16 16 17 18 19 20 
According to Fig 6.3.30, in the 2nd quarter following an output shock the inflation rate 
reached its maximum response of 34 per cent (or 0.39 percentage point) while output 
flattens out at 4 per cent (or $31 million below equilibrium). In the 4th quarter, output starts 
to increase and in the 5th quarter it reached its maximum of 8 per cent or $72 million-the 
same time inflation rate peaks for the second time. So here we see the procyclical nature of 
inflation again, i.e. moving in the same direction as output. 
To summarise the short run results, real output declines by 9 per cent (or $83 million) four 
quarters after the inflation rate shock occurs. This would suggest that high inflation rate has 
an adverse impact on output. In contrast, the inflation rate responds positively (by 34 per 
cent) and more quickly (i.e. in the 2nd quarter) to output shock. This evidence and the 
observation that inflation seems to be procyclical.support the short run Phillips curve which 
essentially predicts a positive correlation between output increase and inflation rate. 
Long run analysis 
Now turning to the long run responses (Fig 6.3.31), we see all the long run responses are 
significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence interval. This implies that the 
variables have undergone significant permanent change after being subjected to exogenous 
shocks. The point estimate of the output long run multiplier due to an inflation rate shock is 
-$126 million73 or 14 per cent (see part c). This means that for one standard deviation (or 
73 See Table A6.3.39. 
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Fig 6.3.31 Long run responses 
(a) Accumulaled Response 01 DINF 10 DINF 
1.2,---___________ ----, 
-0.4 
·0 .• "'--,-~-.-,-.~~-,-~____.-_____r_-,-.,_-.----.--.-,1, 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
(c) Accumulaled Response 01 DGDPR 10 DINF 
500,--____________ ----, 
400 
300 
200 
100 
o 1-... :::: W --------------------------- -------------
·300 \"./- ....... - .. - ... ------------------------------------
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
(b) Accumulated Response of DINF 10 DGDPR 
1.2,-----------------------, 
a,. 
r J"'--............ --------------------------------------
:: ~-- ------------------------ - ----- -- -
, (V 
.0 4 i 
-0 .• "'--,-~_._,_.-__,_,-~~----.-,---~-.----.--.-,1 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
(d) Accumulated Response of DGDPR 10 DGDPR 
500,-----____________ ------, 
400 It ' ............. -.... ------ ------------------------------
300 ~"-..--_____ ------------j 
200 \,/\ ___ ---___ --- ______________________________ _ 
100 
·100 
·200 
·300 "'--,-~-.-,-.-__,_,-~----.----.-,---~-.----.--.-,1 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
1.2 percentage point) increase in inflation rate, we expect real output to decline by $126 
million. The other important long run multiplier is that of the inflation rate with respect to 
the output shock. According to Fig 6.3.31 and Table A6.3.39, the point estimate is 0.3 
percentage point (or 27 per cent) that means for a pennanent increase (of one standard 
deviation) in real output, we expect inflation rate to increase permanently by 0.3 percentage 
point. 
Now to test for long run monetary superneutrality we need to compute the LRD statistic 
using the long run multipliers that have been estimated. The point estimates of these 
multipliers can be seen in Table A6.3.39 (c). The long run point estimate of the LRD 
statistic converges to -0.54 and as shown below (Fig 6.3.32), the 68 per cent confidence 
Fig 6.3.32 Computed LRD test statistic 
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band excludes the zero horizontal axis hence we reject the hypothesis that LRD = O. Based 
on this evidence we reject the proposition that real output is not affected by inflation rate 
(or money growth rate) in the long run, i.e. we reject the long run monetary superneutrality 
proposition. 
The negative bias of outpue4 is consistent with the short run analysis finding. This finding 
provides empirical justification for the reserve bank's commitment to price stability, i.e. 
high inflation will cause a permanent decline in output hence the need to stabilize prices. 
Though not a test of monetary neutrality, the following analysis is important because it tries 
to answer the question: Suppose real output has changed permanently into a higher level, 
would inflation rate change also? This is basically a long run view of the aggregate supply 
equation and will be examined using the LRD framework. The point estimates of the LRD 
statistics are shown in Table A6.3.39 (d) and are being graphed in Fig 6.3.33 below with 
the 68 per cent confidence band. 
Fig 6.3.33 Computed LRD tests statistic 
~~-~~.-------------------------------
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From Fig 6.3.33 above we clearly see that the zero horizontal axis is not included within the 
68 per cent confidence interval so we reject the null hypothesis that LRD = O. In other 
words, the inflation rate has significantly changed following a permanent change in real 
output. 
To reiterate some of the important findings of this analysis we see in both the short run and 
long run analysis that an output shock will cause inflation rate to increase-in line with the 
aggregate supply equation (or the Phillips curve) formulation. And as to the monetary 
74 This is consistent with Serletis and Koustas (1998) result using Italian data but not with Bullard and 
Keating (1995) and Rapach (1999)whose results show a positive bias. 
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supemeutrality proposition, the evidence clearly rejects the hypothesis at the 68 per cent 
confidence level, i.e. the evidence is more in line with the 'reverse' Mundell-Tobin effeces. 
6.3.8 Robustness test Ctrivariate V AR) 
As explained in the Methodology Chapter estimation of a trivariate V AR is basically to 
provide a robustness test on the results obtained from the bivariate models. 
The three variables for this model are: real output (DGDPR), price level (DCPI), and 
money aggregate Ml (DM1). Apart from the important economic relationships among 
these variables, these have been used in the bivariate models of the previous analysis and so 
it is only logical that they are reestimated in a trivariate format for comparison purposes. In 
particular it is interesting to see the contemporaneous movements of the three variables 
given that both price and output have been interchangeably used in the past as the target 
variables of monetary policy. In fact some countries, including New Zealand, have revised 
their central bank primary function several times in the past decades, each time with a 
slightly different emphasis given to output (or employment) and inflation rate76 . The 
empirical evidence here should provide useful insight on this issue. 
Selecting the order of the V AR 
From Table A6.3.40 we see that the AIC, the SBC and the adjusted LR tests all suggest 
VAR order of 4. However when the VAR model with four lags is estimated there is 
evidence of both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. So the number of lags is 
increased incrementally and at six lags, there seems to be no more evidence of serial 
correlation but heteroscedasticity still remains-especially in the price equation, so a GST 
dummy is added. This reduces heteroscedasticity a little but serial correlation starts to 
appear again. In view of this, the GST dummy is removed and a time trend is included. This 
provides a slightly better set of diagnostics results though the heteroscedasticity problem 
still remains . 
75 The reverse Mundell-Tobin effect is that' a permanent increase in inflation will lower capital stock and 
real output level' . Inflation erodes real cash balance and consequently reduces the quantity traded in 
each individual trade. In other words, inflation has a negative 'intensive margin-effect' however inflation 
has a chance of increasing aggregate output only if it somehow increases the frequency of trades. 
76 See Dalziel (1993) for a review of this issue. 
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The cointegration test is carried out with 7 lags77 and the results are shown in Table 
A6.3.41. Both the maximum eigenvalue and the trace test fail to reject the null of no 
cointegration. According to the model selection criteria tests, the SBC test supports the 
finding of the two Johansen tests whereas the AIC and the HQC choose rank of one. The 
evidence therefore is more in favour of no cointegration. The final. model then is a 
straightforward VAR in first-difference with six lags, three seasonal dummies, a time trend 
and a constant. 
Impulse and Cumulative Responses 
In order to compare the results of this trivariate VAR model with the bivariate models we 
need to look at the impulse responses and the cumulative responses. Obviously we cannot 
look at all the responses but we will select the more important responses, such as the 
responses of output and price to a monetary shock, or the responses of money and price to 
an output shock. 
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Fig 6.3.34 Impulse responses of money MI, price and real GDP 
to money MI shock 
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From Fig 6.3.34 above we see that the countercyclical movement of money Ml is still 
evident, in particular in the 3rd , 4th and 9th quarters. This is also observed in the bivariate 
models, see for example Fig 6.3.2. Also the magnitudes of both output and money supply 
are roughly the same. For instance, output maximum response in the bivariate model occurs 
in the 4th quarter and has a magnitude of $41 million (or 5 per cent)--this is basically the 
77 Because the V AR model in first-difference requires 6 lags, we increase the lags by one when we use 
level, as when we test for cointegration. 
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same as observed here in the trivariate model. As to the price response, a very small 
difference is observed, for example in the bivariate model (see Fig 6.3.17) the response in 
the 5th quarter is 19 per cent, but here the response is 17 per cent. We do note however 
slightly stronger responses here than in the bivariate model but generally the response 
pattern and the magnitudes are roughly the same. 
Let us now consider the impact of output shock on the other variables. The responses are 
shown in Fig 6.3.35 below. 
Fig 6.3.35 Impulse responses of money MI, price and real GDP 
to real GDP shock 
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Again we see from Fig 6.3.35 that the pattern of movements and the magnitudes of the 
responses as very similar to the bivariate model responses. For instance, money supply 
minimum response of just over - 20 per cent in the 4th quarter is also noted in the bivariate 
model (see Fig 6.3.3). Also the response pattern shown above is more procyclical than 
countercyclical-just as observed in the bivariate model. With respect to price movements 
following an output shock, there is no counterpart in the bivariate analysis though the 
model consisting of inflation and output in the superneutrality test has been estimated. 
Nevertheless a bivariate model incorporating price and output has been estimated78 and the 
responses are very similar to those shown in Fig 6.3.35 above. 
78 The results are not shown in this study because of space constraint. 
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When we undertook the bivariate analysis of money Ml and real GDP we noted the 
countercyclical movement of money supply, at least in the first couple of quarters, and we 
suggested that it could be a response to some inflationary pressure however we could not 
verify this assertion in a bivariate context. But in a trivariate model, with the price variable 
included, .we can see that indeed there is a significant and sustained increase in price for 
about two years after money or output shock, i.e. it seems that the countercyclical 
movement of money is meant to contain the price increase. However this is a fairly 
complicated process because we note also that money tends to be procycclical when there is 
output shock so maybe this is one reason why the countercyclical pattern is not so obvious 
in later periods. 
We will look next at the long run responses (Fig 6.3.36) and see whether these are similar 
to the corresponding responses in the bivariate models. 
Fig 6.3.36 Long run responses 
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Fig 6.3.37 Long run responses with time variable excluded 
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The long run responses shown in Fig 6.3.36 and the corresponding responses of the 
bivariate model (e.g. Fig 6.3.4) are almost the same except for the response of output to 
monetary shock (part 'g'). In the .bivariate model, the point estimate of 15 per cent is 
positive but is not significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence interval. 
Here the response is about - 2 per cent, i.e. very close to zero. The difference may lie in the 
fact that we include the time trend variable here and the model has six lags whereas in the 
bivariate model there is no time trend and the lag period is only four. To verify this we 
exclude the time trend and reestimate the model and indeed the response now (Fig 6.3.37) 
looks very much like the bivariate response. This would mean that the real GDP series has 
some 'small' detenninistic trend that is 'removed' only when the time trend variable is 
included-thus the zero response noted. 
So we see that there are no significant differences in the responses from the bivariate 
models and the trivariate mode179 . This implies that the concern about the problem of 
79 This is consistent with Bullard (1999) observation that results from larger V AR models generally support 
results of bivariate V ARs. 
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variable omission in bivariate models is not empirically supported and so one can be 
confident in interpreting and generalizing the bivariate model results. However it should be 
cautioned though that the results are very sensitive to the number of lags used and the 
exogenous or deterministic variables included in the model-so to make meaningful 
comparisons, one needs to incorporate the same exogenous or determipistic regressors in 
both models and use the same number of lags. 
6.3.9 Summary 
The evidence from the bivariate analysis is generally in favour of the neutrality and other 
classical propositions but the supemeutrality hypothesis is decidedly rejected. In addition, 
the models are generally well specified in terms of the diagnostic test results, except in the 
case where the price variable is used. The price variable seems to have undergone a major 
downward shift as from the early 1990s after the introduction of the Reserve Bank Act 
1989. Furthermore, the model responses are fairly consistent with macroeconomic theories 
and standard monetary policy practices. For instance, when inflation or price increases, 
following a supply side (real output) shock, the short run response of money supply would 
be a contraction, which is line with the normal 'tightening' practices of central bankers. 
Also the Monetarist's proposition that inflation is a monetary phenomenon is also supported 
by the evidence that shows a one-to-one relationship between changes in money supply and 
changes in price level. 
We also see the persistence response of output to monetary shocks that is consistent with 
empirical findings of other similar studies: And in the case of Fisher's hypothesis, although 
not very clear-cut, the evidence points more to the confirmation of the hypothesis. The so-
called price 'puzzle' is also observed, in particular when the change in price level variable 
(DCPI) is used. There are two explanations given here-one is to do with the 
contemporaneous movements of the variables after the initial shock and the other is based 
on the traditional IS-LM framework. 
Finally the trivariate V AR response analysis shows that there is no substantial difference 
between bivariate model responses and trivariate model responses. In other words, the 
results and conclusions derived from the bivariate models are robust and can be generalised 
to larger systems, however caution should be exercised with the specification of the models 
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because the results are quite sensitive to the types of exogenous regressors included in the 
model and the number of lags used. 
Having established some understanding of the numerical values and patterns of the 
bivariate relationships between real output and nominal variables, such as monetary 
aggregates, interest rates and inflation, the next part of the study is to look into the 
monetary transmission mechanisms, i.e. to see how monetary impulses are transmitted to 
real output in a larger system. This is justified both by the short run dynamics that show 
distinct responses of output to monetary and inflationary shocks and the long run analysis 
that clearly rejects the superneutrality proposition. The transmission mechanism, in fact, is 
becoming a very important topic these days because of the prominent role of monetary 
policy in day-to-day management of the economy. Unfortunately, complete understanding 
of the mechanisms is still not yet possible because of the complex issues involved, 
including the natural differences in the institutions and financial environment of each 
country. In their preface, Mahadeva and Sinclair (2002) say, "]t is vital that central banks 
and their observers, worldwide, understand the transmission mechanism so that they know 
what monetary policy can do and what it should do to stabilize inflation and output". The 
next phase of the study is planned very much in the spirit of this statement-namely the 
quest for understanding monetary transmission mechanisms in a way that could assist 
policy makers to quantify the impact of their decisions and to know the time it takes for the 
effects to be felt. 
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Chapter 7 
EVALUATION OF THE 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the different monetary transmission channels will be estimated, evaluated 
and compared using the two modes of monetary transmission described in the Methodology 
Chapter. One is the 'serial' transmission mode and the other is the 'parallel' transmission. 
To be consistent, the standard V AR will be used for all the transmission models. The 
impulse responses, the variance decompositions and the Granger-causality test. are used as 
the main tools for the analysis. All the models will be tested for stability, serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity using Eviews program. When there is a 'trade-off' question between 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, the former will be considered more important 
because of the need to have independent or exogenous shocks. Also because the sample 
size is not very big, a parsimonious model is very much preferred than an over 
'parameterised' model-in some cases this may be even at the cost of heteroscedasticity. In 
consideration of the thesis size regulation, only the test results for the 'parallel' VAR 
models are reported in Tables A 7.2, A 7.3 and A 7.4 in the appendix, i.e. the bivariate V AR 
test results are not reported in this thesis but they can be made available if required. 
The period of the analysis here is 1984-2002 and in the first two sections the analysis uses 
New Zealand data. In the third section, starting from sub-Chapter 7.3, the Australian data is 
used. The comparison between the two countries starts in the same sub-Chapter 7.3. 
7.2 Monetary transmission mechanisms in New Zealand 
7.2.1 Serial transmission analysis 
This is where a series of bivariate VAR models, representing the bivariate relationships 
within each monetary transmission channel, are estimated and evaluated. The impulse 
response analysis will be undertaken first then followed by the variance decomposition 
analysis and lastly the Granger-causality test. 
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Impulse response analysis 
The numerical values of the impulse responses of the five transmission channels are shown 
in Table 7.2.1. The responses are based on the Cholesky decomposition with the ordering 
of the variables following the ordering in the theoretical transmission models. For example, 
in the interest rate channel, the first bivariate model comprising money and interest rate, 
money leads interest rate, and likewise in the second bivariate model comprising interest 
rate and fixed investment, the former leads. The shaded responses are the maximum (or 
peak) responses that will be used in the analysis]. 
The last two columns, DPEIDINT and DCREDIDINT, represent the impulse responses of 
the equity price and domestic credit to interest rate shock, respectively. These two 
responses will replace DPEIDMI and DCREDIDMI when we consider the impact of 
interest rate shock rather than money supply shock. 
The responses shown in Table 7.2.1 are the responses of the variables following a one 
standard deviation shock of one of the variables. The actual responses from Eviews 
program are expressed in the 'original' units of the individual variables but in order to have 
the same scale and for ease of comparison, the responses have been divided by their 
respective standard deviation-as is done in the neutrality tests. The unit for the responses 
therefore is in 'standard deviation units'. A response of 0.15 therefore means 15 per cent of 
one standard deviation. To give an example, suppose the standard deviation of the interest 
rate variable is 1.5 percentage point, then a response of 0.2 standard deviation unit (or 20 
per ce~t) equals 0.3 percentage point. In order to be consistent and to avoid confusion the 
'per cent' unit will be used throughout the subsequent analysis though the values in the 
tables and graphs will still be in proportions. 
Looking at Table 7.2.1 it is useful to note that the maximum responses seem to be around 
20 per cent except for two or three responses. One is the response of domestic credit to the 
money supply shock in the credit-consumption channel of slightly over 30 per cent that 
occurs in the 3rd quarter and the other is the response of private consumption to credit 
shock of over 40 per cent that occurs in the 4th quarter in the same model. Interestingly, 
1 Note also that the 'lag-period' or the 'time-lag' generally refers to the number of quarters up to the first 
maximum or peak response. 
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Table 7.2.1: Impulse responses based on the serial transmission mode 
Interest rate channel 
Lags DINT/DM1 
1 ;,~~:;::"+: ~O;20Q 
2 0.052 
3 0.166 
DKF/DINT DGDPRlDKF 
0.080 -0.014 
-0.025 0.052 
4 0.054C"t .,," _ ,.: ,-:,:~ :L"-iE,- "-0:1<#1 -0.043 
5 0.132 0.018 0.074 
6 0.065 -0.027 -0.036 
7 0.002 0.010 0.027 
8 -0.027 0.014 -0.011 
9 -0.009 0.010 0.015 
10 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 
Other asset price channel 
Lags DPElDM1 DPCElDPE DGDPRlDPCE 
1 :;:,i~lllii,;;0,j~9 0.002~fI;i~~ifJ~mos~ 
2 0.014 -0.033 -0.067 
3 -0.170 0,103 0.008 
4 -0.023 0.096 0.021 
5t~~'c~;:'&r~j!{il~~o,~~ -0.025 
6 -0.051 -0.051 -0.012 
7 -0.032 -0.063 0.009 
8 
9 
10 
0.030 
0.014 
-0.008 
0.059 
-0.060 
0.008 
-0.004 
0.000 
-0.009 
Credit-consumption channel 
Lags DCRED/DM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
1 0.008 0.21 Oll.4~~'I;o;o~:~ 
2 0.139 0.118 -0.067 
~~i,;.~;t'_~:~~:~~;~~~~~yci~~~i . ~:~~~ 
5 0.186 
6 0.013 
7 0.123 
8 0.027 
9 0.080 
10 0.062 
-0.280 
0.184 
-0.070 
0.088 
0.146 
0.105 
-0.025 
-0.012 
0.009 
-0.004 
0.000 
-0.009 
Exchange rate channel 
DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXP/DEXCH DGDPRIDEXP 
,~?}~fQfgQ'Q 0.138 0.004~~.t~;Wi~,c-~itQro1fQ 
0.052 -0.079 -0.011 0.006 
0.166~/;t;i:~1;:, d_:169 -0.087 -0.012 
0.054 0.104 0.064 -0.038 
0.132 0.055 0.058~~~~;j'g~·~;ff(8;q~Q 
0.065 0.126 0.008 -0.074 
0.002 -0.066,~~~f:X"l;2ci;19.Q 0.017 
-0.027 -0.051 0.044 0.066 
-0.009 
-0.001 
-0.053 
-0.092 
0.012 
0.003 
Credit-investment channel 
DCRED/DM1 DKFIDCRED DGDPRlDKF 
0.186 0.055 0.074 
0.013 -0.058 -0.036 
0.123 -0.039 0.027 
0.027 0.023 -0.011 
0.080 -0.061 0.015 
0.062 0.026 -0.004 
DPE/DINT DCRED/DINT 
0.036 0.055 
-0.148 0.034 
-0,031 0.114 
0.210 0.036 
0.000 0.039 
0.008 0.017 
0.039 -0.004 
-0,078 0.002 
0.014 
-0.019 
Notes: (i) All the variables are in first difference-hence the 'D' prefix. 
(ii) To read the table, DINTIDMI refers to the response of interest rate to money supply shock 
and DKFIDINT refers to the response of fixed capital formation to interest rate shock, etc, 
when the interest rate shock is used (see the last two columns), the response of domestic 
credit is relatively small. This would suggest that domestic credit is more sensitive to 
money supply than to interest rate2. 
2 In terms of the transmission channels, this evidence would seem to support the bank-lending (narrow credit) 
channel rather than the 'traditional' money view-contrary to Guender (1998) who finds no evidence for 
the bank-lending channel in New Zealand. 
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An interesting pattern can be seen in the response of interest rate to money M1 shock 
(DINTIDM1). After the money positive shock the interest rate response of 20 per cent in 
the first quarter is negative-which is what we expect according to the standard supply and 
demand rule, i.e. when there is excess money supply we expect its price (interest rate) to . 
come down3. However in the subsequent six quarters, the interest rate responses are all 
positive (see Fig 7.2.1 below). This phenomenon is known in the literature as the 'liquidity' 
puzzle and it would suggest that the central bank, probably in an effort to ward off any 
inflationary pressure resulting from excess money supply, strongly tightened its monetary 
policy following monetary positive shock. In other words, it. would seem that the interest 
rate is more exogenous than the money supply in the sense that the interest rate is adjusted 
Fig 7.2.1 Impulse responses of interest rate and money M1 
to money M1 shock 
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upward by the central bank as to mitigate any inflationary pressure due to the money supply 
increase. Putting it differently, this implies that money supply is endogenous to interest 
rates set by policy makers. To verify this we need to examine how money supply and 
interest rate respond to interest rate movements. This is provided in Fig 7.2.2. 
From Fig 7.2.2 we see that after the interest rate shock, the, money supply decreases 
reaching its minimum in the 3rd quarter. After the 3rd quarter it starts to rise again whereas 
interest rate continues to decline reaching its minimum point of negative 22 per cent in the 
5th quarter-the same time as money supply reaches its maximum point (of 10 per cent). In 
the 7th quarter, both return to their equilibrium values but in the 8th quarter interest rate 
3 Known also as the 'liquidity' effect. 
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Fig 7.2.2 Impulse responses of money Ml and interest rate 
to interest rate shock 
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starts to rise but money supply starts to decrease. This opposite movements of the variables 
is what theory predicts, i.e. when interest rate increases, we expect money supply to 
decrease and vice versa4 . The evidence therefore shows that interest rate leads money, i.e. 
money supply is endogenous to the movement of interest rate. The "implication of this is 
that the traditional monetary transmission models may be wrong in putting money in front 
of interest rate, i.e. interest rate should come first followed by money supply-at least 
according to the New Zealand data. 
From Table 7.2.1 we see the relatively low response (only 10 per cent) of fixed investment 
to interest rate shock. To see how this important relationship evolves over time we plot 
both fixed investment and interest rate responses in Fig 7.2.3 below. 
o. 
02 
0.' 
0.0 
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Fig 7.2.3 Impulse responses of fixed investment and interest rate 
to interest rate shock 
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4 This shows that when the source of shock is the interest rate, there is no 'liquidity' puzzle observed. 
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From Table 7.2.1 and Fig 7.2.3 above, we see that fixed investment starts to respond to 
interest rate shock from the 3rd quarter but its peak response occurs in the 4th quarter5. We 
also note that the maximum impact of investment shock on output occurs in the 1 st quarter 
therefore we would expect the impact of interest rate shock on output to occur in the 5th 
quarter (i.e. 1 +" 4). In order to verify this we estimate a bivariate model consisting of 
interest rate and output. The responses are shown in Fig 7.2.4. The peak negative response 
of output, as predicted, occurs in the 5th quarter6 and its magnitude of 7 per cent seems 
plausible given that the maximum impact of interest rate shock on investment is 10 per 
cent, i.e. we expect output response to interest rate shock to be less than investment 
Fig 7.2.4 Impulse responses of output and interest rate 
to interest rate shock 
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response to the same shoce. This is because according to the serial transmission 
framework, output is 'further' from the source of monetary shock, i.e., investment comes 
first, then output. In other words, the consistency in the numerical values observed here 
seems to support the idea of the serial transmission mechanism. 
The exchange rate channel shows some delayed responses (see Table 7.2.1). For instance, 
the peak response of exchange rate following the interest rate shock of 17 per cent occurs in 
the 3rd quarter8, but the peak response of exports due to exchange rate shock of 20 per cent 
5 This is within the period of "six and 24 months" reported by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). 
6 This would be consistent with Angeloni et al. (2002) finding that "an unexpected increase in the short-term 
interest rate temporarily reduces output, with the peak effect occurring after roughly one year". 
7 McCarthy and Peach (2002) study finds that following the funds rate increase, residential investment 
declines by 3 per cent while output declines by 0.3 per cent. So the smaller response of output compared to 
investment response here seems to be consistent with our result. 
8 This is slightly different to Buckle et al. (2002) result that shows 'the strongest reaction of the exchange 
rate (after interest rate shock) is after four quarters'. 
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occurs in the 7th quarter9. This would imply therefore that an interest rate shock should 
have its peak impact on exports ten quarters (or over two years) later-at least according to 
our serial transmission concept. To confirm this, we estimate a bivariate model consisting 
of interest rate and export variable. The responses are shown below (Fig 7.2.5), and true 
enough, the peak negative response of exports following the interest rate shock occurs in 
the 10th quarter. This provides further evidence of the serial transmission idea. It is also 
interesting to see a fairly strong response of 22 per cent after such a long time. This would 
suggest that there could be other factors beside interest rate that drives export. 
Fig 7.2.5 Impulse responses of export and interest rate 
to interest rate shock 
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In view of the importance of the monetary policy impact on exchange rate, it is useful to 
trace out the exchange rate response to the interest rate shock. From Table 7.2.1 we see that 
in the first period after the interest rate shock, the exchange rate appreciates by 14 per cent, 
then declines in the subsequent period but in the 3rd quarter it peaks at 17 per cent. In the 
following quarters it starts to decline but still shows positive responses. While there may be 
other factors influencing exchange rate, as argued by Dalziel (2002), the evidence shown 
here seems to support the notion that monetary policy via the interest rate has immediate 
and sustained effect on exchange rate. If we are assume the standard deviation of interest 
rate is 4 percentage points and the exchange rate standard deviation is 5 cents lO, then a unit 
9 According to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2003) forecast, which uses real exchange ;ate, the peak 
effect of exchange rate on exports will occur 18 months (less than five quarters) following a 5 percentage 
points appreciation in the real exchange rate. 
10 In actual fact the TWI is an index number but the 'cents' unit is used here just for illustrative purposes . 
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percentage increase in interest rate will cause exchange rate to increase by 3.5 per cent (or 
0.175 cents) in the first quarter and 4.0 per cent (or 0.2 cents) in the 3rd quarterll . 
Out of the three demand aggregates, viz., fixed investment, private consumption and 
exports, the fixed investment shock has the largest impact on real output-i.e. output 
responded by almost 20 per cent in the 1st quarter. Output response to the shocks of the 
other two aggregates is about 10 per cent-and occurs in the 1st quarter as well. We expect 
output response to occur instantaneously or at least in the first quarter following the shocks 
because the three demand aggregates are simply part of output12 so the evidence here is 
consistent with our expectation. 
Another interesting feature is the relatively higher response of private consumption 
(DPCEIDCRED) than fixed investment to domestic credit changes (DKFIDCRED). For 
. instance, the peak response of private consumption is 42 per cent and occurs in the 4th 
quarter while the peak response of fixed investment is only 9 per cent and occurs in the 1st 
quarter. This would suggest that people borrow more for consumption purposes rather than 
for fixed investment purposes. 
To compare the different transmission models in terms of response magnitude and lag-
periods, we need to use the composite or the summary measures discussed in the 
Methodology Chapter. Table 7.2.2 and Table 7.2.3 contain these summary statistics13: 
Table 7.2.2 follows the 'traditional' ordering o.f the variables with money leading interest 
rate, however as noted in the previous analysis, interest rate seems to lead money supply 
and in view of this, Table 7.2.3 is constructed with the interest rate replacing the money 
supply. This means that the first column DINTIDM1 in the interest rate and exchange rate 
channels (see Table 7.2.1) is no longer used while in the other channels money supply is 
being replaced by interest rate. For instance, DPEIDM1 and DCREDIDM1 are replaced by 
DPEIDINT and DCREDITIDINT, respectively. 
11 According to Dalziel (2002) a 3 percentage point increase in the official cash rate will cause a 6 per cent 
change in exchange rate. 
12 Because of this direct relationship between output and the three demand aggregates, not many studies have 
estimated and examined these relationships, i.e. either output is used or one of the demand aggregates. 
13 These summary statistics are obtained by mUltiplying the peak responses from each bivariate model. 
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Table 7.2.2: Total lags and summary responses 
(traditional channels) 
Transmission Channels No. of lags Summary Response 
Interest rate channel 6 0.0043 (0.43%) 
Exchange rate channel 12 0.0006 (0.06%) 
Other asset price channel 7 0.0042 (0.42%) 
Credit-investment channel 5 0.0060 (0.60%) 
Credit-consumption channel 8 0.012811.28%) 
Table 7.2.3: Total lags and summary responses 
(modified channels) 
Transmission Channels No. of lags SummaI"}' Response 
Interest rate channel (a) 5 0.0216 (2.16%) 
Exchange rate channel (a) 11 0.0030 (0.30%) 
Other asset price channel 8 0.0037 (0.37%) 
Credit-investment channel 4 0.0011 (0.11 %) 
Credit-consumption channel 7 0.0024 (0.24%) 
Note: (a) The DINTIDMI responses not included here. 
The summary results in the two tables above show that if we think of monetary impulse as 
moving from variable to variable in a serial fashion, by the time it gets to real output the 
effect has greatly diminished, i.e: generally less than one per cent. Obviously these 
summary measures are much less than the direct response of output to a money supply 
shock (or interest rate shock) of 5-7 per cent noted in the previous neutrality analyses. The 
discrepancy here highlights the fact that real output is not only affected by a single variable 
or a single monetary transmission channel, i.e., it is more likely there are several channels 
operating simultaneously. In fact, what actually goes on between the initial monetary 
impulse and the final observed effect on output is what most researchers refer to as the 
'black box', i.e. up to now nobody actually knows what goes on in the 'interim' though 
there are several theoretical propositions as to what might have happened. In view of this, 
the summary measures will be used only to provide numerical values that can be used to 
compare the different transmission models on a relative basis, i.e. they should not be 
considered as the estimated response of output for the different transmission models. 
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From Table 7.2.2 it is obvious that the credit-consumption channel has the largest summary 
response (1.28 per cent), followed by the credit-investment channel with 0.6 per cent. Next 
are the interest rate channel and the other asset price effects channel with 0.4 per cent. The 
last is the exchange rate channel with the summary response of 0.06 per cent. However, 
when we replace money by interest rate, the credit channels no longer show the largest 
summary statistics (see Table 7.2.3). Instead, the summary measures of the interest rate and 
the exchange rate channels seem more significant now. In other words, when money supply 
is considered as the starting point of the monetary transmission mechanism, the credit 
channels are significant but when the interest rate is used, the traditional interest rate and 
the exchange rate channels become more significant. There are two important insights 
provided by these observations. First, the empirical evidence shows that the credit channel 
has an important role in monetary transmission channel thus confirming the importance of 
the financial intermediaries and the banking sector. As argued by Claus and Grimes (2003), 
"Financial intermediaries play an important role because they reduce the cost of 
channelling funds between relatively uninformed depositors to uses that are information-
intensive and difficult to evaluate. If banks and other intermediaries provide credit to a 
large fraction of firms, who otherwise would not be able to borrow, the amount of credit 
channelled through the banking system can have significant macroeconomic effects, 
highlighting the importance of public policy in designing policies that ensure the soundness 
of the banking system". Empirical· studies that have found the importance of the credit 
channel include that of Bemanke and Blinder (1992), Bemanke and Gertler (1995), Fackler 
and Rogers (1993), Holtemoller (2002), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), among others. The 
second important insight is that the monetary transmission effectiveness can be affected by 
the source of monetary shock, i.e. the interest rate shock and the money supply shock have 
different impact on the transmission process. 
In terms of the lag-periods, both the credit channel and the interest rate channel have 
shorter lags than the exchange rate channel. The exchange rate channel total lag-period of 
twelve quarters according to Table 7.2.2 and eleven quarters according to Table 7.2.3 
implies that it take quite a while before the impact of interest rate via the exchange rate is 
felt on real output. If we try to trace out where the delay comes from we see from Table 
7.2.1 that it comes from the delayed impact of exchange rate on exports (see the 
DEXPIDEXCH column), i.e. it takes seven quarters (almost two years) before the 
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maximum impact of exchange rate shock is felt on exports. This has important policy 
implications given that New Zealand depends to a large extent on exports. 
Variance decomposition analysis 
The following analysis compares the forecast error variance decompositions of the different 
transmission models. The footnotes to Table 7.2.4 explain how to read the table. 
Table 7.2.4: Variance decompositions (%) 
A.1. Interest rate channel A.2. Exchange rate channel 
Lags DINT/DM1 DKF/DINT DGDPRlDKF DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXP/DEXCH DGDPRIDEXP 
1 4,61 1.76 40.95 4.61 2.84 0.01 
2 4.24 2.71 40.94 4.24 3.69 0.06 
3 6.79 2.61 41.43 6.79 7.12 3.58 
4 7.02 4.29 39.43 7.02 8.21 5.21 
5 8.16 4.28 39.80 8.16 7.86 5.84 
10 8.35 4.45 38.68 8.35 10.92 16.76 
20 8.38 4.45 37.97 8.38 11.12 19.69 
30 8.38 4.45 37.90 8.38 11.13 20.11 
40 8.38 4.45 37.89 8.38 11.13 20.21 
A.3. Other asset price channel A.4i1. Credit-investment channel 
Lags DPE/DM1 DPCElDPE DGDPRlDPCE DCRED/DM1 DKF/DCRED DGDPRlDKF 
1 3.22 0.00 11.01 0.Q1 1.60 40.95 
2 3.21 0.11 15.25 2.29 1.82 40.94 
3 5.86 1.13 15.30 11.45 1.92 41.43 
4 5.51 2.00 15.69 13.94 2.07 39.43 
5 8.08 7.01 12.60 16.67 2.57 39.80 
10 8.27 7.89 12.10 15.61 4.02 38.68 
20 8.28 8.26 11.84 15.95 4.69 37.97 
30 8.27 8.27 11.79 16.13 4.96 37.90 
40 8.27 8.28 11.79 16.20 5.09 37.89 
A.4b. Credit-consumption channel 
Lags DCRED/DM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE DPE/DINT DCRED/DINT 
1 0.01 4.76 11.01 0.20 1.14 
2 2.29 6.00 15.25 2.51 1.38 
3 11.45 6.32 15.30 2.58 1.45 
4 13.94 21.03 15.69 4.27 1.54 
5 16.67 25.91 12.60 4.26 2.56 
10 15.61 29.55 12.10 8.12 2.77 
20 15.95 32.39 11.84 8.24 2.79 
30 16.13 33.09 11.79 8.24 2.79 
40 16.20 33.55 11.79 8.24 2.79 
Notes: (i) All the variables are in first difference-hence the 'D' prefix. 
(ii) To read the table, DINTIDMlstands for the proportion of interest rate variance 
explained by money supply shock, and similarly, DKFIDINT stands for the 
proportion of fixed capital variance explained by interest rate shock . 
10.33 
9.90 
10.05 
11.55 
19.89 
26.49 
30.08 
30.99 
31.17 
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From Table 7.2.4 we see that fixed investment innovation explains quite a sizeable amount 
of output variation-almost 40 per cent. This is followed by exports shock with 31 per cent. 
Private consumption expenditure shock, on the other hand, explains only 12 per cent of 
output variation. This would suggest that changes in fixed investment and exports are major 
factors behind output changes in New Zealand. The significant influence of fixed 
investment, in particular, is consistent with the findings of the response analysis in which 
output responds more to investment shock than to any other shock (see Table 7.2.1). 
Another significant decomposition reported in Table 7.2.4 is that of domestic credit 
innovation on private consumption variation-33.6 per cent. This is much larger than the 
proportion of fixed investment variance (of 5 per cent) explained by the same credit shock. 
This would suggest that domestic credit in New Zealand is largely used for private 
consumption purposes rather than for investment purposes. This result is consistent with the 
finding of the response analysis that shows very little response of fixed investment to 
domestic credit shock. 
Looking at the exchange rate channel in Table 7.2.4 we see that the exchange rate shock 
explains 20 per cent of exports variance. This is a relatively significant proportion and 
reflects the important relationship between exports and exchange rate. This significant 
impact of exchange rate on exports is also observed in the response analysis that shows a 20 
per cent response of exports in the 7th quarter. This strong relationship between the two 
variables may not be too surprising given the 'openness' of the New Zealand economy. As 
to the relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate, 11 per cent of the 
variation in exchange rate is explained by the interest rate shock. 
Another interesting observation is the low decomposition of fixed investment variance 
attributable to interest rate shock, i.e., only 4.5 per cent. This would suggest the 
conventional money view (or interest rate channel) of monetary transmission is either very 
weak or not operating. If this is the case, then what does fixed investment respond to? If we 
look at the credit-investment channel, we also see a very weak impact of domestic credit on 
fixed investment-just 5 per cent. One possibility is that fixed investment in New Zealand, 
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at least a sizable portion of it, may be funded from foreign sources 14. There is evidence to 
confirm this from the work of Enderwick and Akoorie (1994) and Rosenberg (1998). Both 
noted the apparent increase and significance of foreign investment in New Zealand since 
1990. For example, Enderwick and Akoorie (1994) wrote: First it is apparent that inward 
investment levels fluctuated over the period, but apparently took a sharp upturn after 1990. 
Rosenberg, on the other hand, is more specific on the relationship between foreign 
investment and fixed investment when she noted, "A useful indicator as to the importance 
of foreign investment in relation to New Zealand's total capital requirements is the 
proportion offoreign investment to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (fixed investment) .... 
Foreign investment averages just under one-quarter (22.6 per cent) of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation over the period but varies between 5.6 per cent and 35.6 per cent ... For all 
economies for 1993 it averaged 4.3 per cent, for developed economies 3.5 per cent and for 
developing economies 7.1 per cent. New Zealand is easily the developed country most 
dependent onforeign investment by this measure ... " 
Now to evaluate and compare the different models, we need an overall statistic that would 
indicate the effectiveness of each model in explaining the variances of the relevant 
variables within each model. Again, as in the impulse response analysis, we will multiply 
the percentages 15 in each model as to get a single measure that we can use for comparison 
purposes. The results are presented in Table 7.2.5. 
Table 7.2.5 Forecast variance summary statistics 
Transmission channels Period Summary Variance 
A.1 Interest rate channel 40 0.0014 (0.14%) 
A.2 Exchange rate channel 40 0.0006 (0.06%) 
A.2 Exchange rate channel (a) 40 0.0070 (0.70%) 
A.3 Other asset price channel 40 0.0008 (0.08%) 
A. 4a Credit-investment channel 40 0.0031 (0.31%) 
A.4b Credit-consumption channel 40 0.0064 (0.64%) 
(a) In order to have consistent number of decompositions for each model, 
the 'DINTIDMl' decomposition has been left out in this version of the 
exchange rate model. 
14 This could be either in the form of overseas borrowing or foreign investment in New Zealand businesses. 
15 Refers to the 40th period decompositions in Table 7.2.4. 
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Interestingly the 'modified' exchange rate channel has the largest decomposition effect (0.7 
per cent) meaning that the shocks in this model explain much of the variations in the 
variables within the model. This would suggest that this theoretical model is the most 
consistent with the data16 . Both the credit channels come second but the credit-consumption 
channel .has much more explanatory power (of 0.6 per cent) compared to the credit-
investment channel with 0.3 per cent. The lower explanatory power of the credit-investment 
channel is due to the very low explanatory power of domestic credit shock on fixed 
investment variance-as discussed above. Fixed investment shock however explains more 
of the output variance than private consumption. 
The traditional interest rate summary variance figure of 0.14 per cent puts it after the credit 
channel. This low summary figure would have been higher had fixed investment variance 
explained well by the interest rate shock, which is expected given standard economic 
textbook explanation. The fact is, the interest rate shock explains less than 5 per cent of the 
variation of fixed investment. 
The 'other asset price effects' channel is the last in the table implying that the shocks in the 
model have very little impact on the variations of the variables. In other words, the model 
does not seem to fit the data well. This result is consistent with Ludvigson et al. (2002) 
study on US data thatfinds little or no sign of a consumption-wealth channell? 
Granger-causality analysis 
The causality here should be differentiated with the more 'richer philosophical' meaning of 
causality used in other context. Here the causality is in terms of the extent to which one 
variable can be explained by the lagged values18 of the other variables, i.e. more of an inter-
temporal statistical relationship than a structural or behavioural. relationship. As noted in 
Enders (1995, p.316) this test is really a 'block causality' test because we are essentially 
16 This seems to confinn Svensson (1998) claim that: All real-world inflation-targeting economies are quite 
open economies with free capital mobility, where shocks originating in the rest o/the world are important, 
and where the exchange rate plays a prominent role in the transmission mechanism o/monetary policy. 
17 Consumption-wealth channel is the same as the 'other asset price effects' channel. 
18 This is a 'weaker' concept than 'exogeneity' because the latter includes the contemporaneous values of the 
explanatory variable as well. 
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restricting all the lagged values of the relevant explanatory variable to zero. The results are 
presented in Table 7.2.6 below. 
Table 7.2.6: Granger-causality test results (p-values) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
DINT/DM1 DKF/DINT DGDPRlDKF DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXP/DEXCH DGDPRIDEXP 
Normal 0.645 0.426 0.106 0.645 0.455 0.011 0.060 
Reverse 0.467 0.035 0.166 0.467 0.877 0.783 0.095 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
DPElDM1 DPCElDPE DGDPRlDPCE DCRED/DM1 DKF/DCRED DGDPR/DKF 
Normal 0.522 0.242 0.077 0.034 0.920 0.106 
Reverse 0.744 0.061 0.052 0.044 0.084 0.166 
Credit-consumption channel 
DCRED/DM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
Normal 0.034 0.159 0.077 
Reverse 0.044 0.719 0.052 
Notes: To read the table, the entries along the row labelled 'normal' refer to the causal orderings as 
hypothesized in the transmission models. For example, under the 'DINTIDMl' heading, 
in the 'normal' row, we see ap-value of 0.645. This means that there is no significant 
Granger-causal effect of money on interest rate, i.e. the dependent variable is the interest rate 
and the money supply (DMl) is the explanatory variable. The 'reverse' row shows p-values when 
the causal direction is reversed, for instance, 0.467 under the DINTIDMI shows the p-value of the 
Granger-causality effect of the interest rate on the money supply. . 
From Table 7.2.6 we see mixed results-some results support the 'causal' ordering as 
stipulated in the transmission models while others do not. For instance, in the interest rate 
channel, we expect money supply to Granger-cause interest rate yet the p-value (of 0.645) 
shows the causality effect is insignificant, i.e. past values of money supply cannot explain 
the contemporaneous changes in interest rate. More interesting though is the insignificant 
causal-effect of interest rate on fixed investment. In fact, the p-values clearly suggest the 
opposite, i.e. fixed investment Granger-causes interest rate at the 5 per cent significance 
level. This phenomenon is often tenned 'reverse-causality' and implies that monetary 
policy makers react to investment movements rather than investment (or investors) reacting 
to interest rate changes as traditionally conceived. But while this may be inconsistent with 
the traditional IS-LM model, it is consistent with more recent monetary policy and new-
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Keynesian models in which interest rate, in the reaction function, is dependent on output 
and inflation, i.e. interest rate is endogenous to movements in investment (or output). 
The two bivariate relationships that seem to adhere to the theoretical causal ordering are the 
money-credit (DCRED/DMl) and exchange rate-export (DEXP/DEXCH) relationships. 
That is, credit movement is dependent on past values of money supply and likewise, export 
depends on past values of exchange rate movements at the 5 per cent significance level. As 
to the causal relationships between the demand aggregates (fixed investment, exports and 
private consumption) and real output, the evidence suggests that the three aggregates 
Granger-cause output at the 10. per cent significance level. However real output also 
Granger-causes private consumption at the 5 per cent significance level, and exports at the 
10 per cent significance level. This latter phenomenon is known as 'reverse-causality' and 
sometimes casts doubts on the traditional orderings of the variables or on the 
exogeneity/endogeneity assumptions of the different macroeconomic schools. For instance, 
does more investment spending cause increase in output or does the rise in output cause 
businesses to increase their investment spending? This is important because it may require 
reformulations of the existing theoretical models. 
To compare the different transmission models in terms of the p-values, we need to multiply 
the p-values in the 'normal' row for each model in Table 7.2.6 to get a single summary p-
value-obviously the smaller the summary value the more significant or plausible is the 
model. These composite p-values are shown in Table 7.2.7. 
Table 7.2.7: Granger-causality summary statistics 
Transmission channels 
Al Interest rate channel 
A2 Exchange rate channel 
A2 Exchange rate channel (b) 
A3 Other asset price channel 
A. 4a Credit-investment channel 
A4b Credit-consumption channel 
Totalp-value 
0.0291 
0.0002 
0.0003 
0.0097 
0.0023 
0.0004 
Note: (b) In order to have consistent number of responses for 
each model, the 'DINTIDMl' p-value has been left 
out in this version of the exchange rate model. 
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From Table 7.2.7 we see that the exchange rate channel yields the smallest 'composite' p-
value suggesting that its causal ordering matches well with the data, in particular it is clear 
that movements in exports is significantly explained by past values of exchange rate and 
likewise, past values of exports significantly affect output. The exception however is the 
insignificant causal-effect of interest rate on exchange rate. This would go against the 
evidence provided in the response and the variance decomposition analysis that shows 
interest rate shock as having a significant impact on exchange rate. One possible 
explanation is that the contemporaneous correlation between interest rate and exchange rate 
is much higher than the correlation between exchange rate and the lagged values of interest 
rate19. 
As in the previous response and variance decomposition analysis, the credit-consumption 
channel is quite significant and in fact has almost the same summary value as the exchange 
rate model. The 'worst' model, in terms of having the least causal effect, is the interest rate 
channel with a summary p statistic of 0.02. This arises because the money supply does not 
Granger-cause interest rate, and likewise, interest rate does not Granger-cause fixed 
investment (see Table 7.2.6). This finding is somewhat consistent with Bemanke and 
Gertler (1995) who noted the shortcomings of the traditional interest rate channel and 
consequently looked for other possible transmission channels, in particular the credit 
channel. The credit-investment and the 'other asset price effects' channels fall in between 
but the former has more Granger-causal effect than the latter. 
Summary 
It is useful to recall that even though we talk about five transmission models above, the 
bivariate relationships involved are actually from individual bivariate models. This is done 
because in the theoretical models of monetary transmission there is a presumption that 
monetary impulse flows from one variable to another in a kind of serial fashion. For 
instance, in the interest rate channel, the monetary impulse is presumed to start from money 
19 Generally the contemporaneous relationship is very important in the impulse response function and forecast 
error variance decomposition techniques whereas the Granger-causality test depends only on the lagged 
values of the explanatory variable. 
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supply, then moves to interest rate, then to fixed investment, and finally to output. 
Therefore to study this flow, one needs to examine first the responses, decompositions and 
the Granger-causal effects between money supply and interest rate, then interest rate and 
investment, and finally investment and output. The use of a bivariate model has also some 
advantages, such as minimizing the effect of multicollinearity; having more degrees of 
freedom; and totally 'shutting off' the effect of other variables. One major drawback of this 
approach is that in real life, there are always more than two variables present and 
interacting with each other so there is a possibility that the results in this analysis may be 
bias or incorrect. Nevertheless bivariate relationships, whether they are derived from 
bivariate V AR models or from larger V ARs, are often useful and sometimes quite robust. 
Some of the important findings: We note that the maximum impulse responses of the 
variables to exogenous shocks in the models are generally around 20 per cent-the 
exceptions are the response of private consumption to credit shock as well as the response 
of credit to money supply shock. In a way this sets some kind of ceiling or reference point 
for the responses of the economic variables within a monetary transmission framework. For 
instance, if we get a response of 50 per cent or over, then we might suspect something is 
odd or at least it warrants another checking. On the other hand, if we get responses like five 
per cent, we would not be too alarmed given many responses are actually less than 10 per 
cent. Whether the 20 per cent response ceiling is restricted only to a VAR approach, or is 
generally the case in other methods, is not yet known. We also note the summary response 
statistics are generally less than one per cent. These are much lower than the maximum 
impulse response (of about 5 per cent) observed when output and monetary aggregate (or 
interest rate) is estimated directly-as is done in the bivariate neutrality tests. This 
discrepancy or inconsistency is difficult to explain because the process or the processes 
involved from the time the monetary impulse starts in the monetary aggregate (or interest 
rate) to the final policy target (real output or inflation) is still not understood-hence the 
term 'black box'. In fact, there are several theoretical propositions as to how the 
transmission might take place, i.e. how the monetary impulse might get transmitted from 
one variable to another, yet empirical findings sometimes do not support these views. For 
example, according to the traditional IS-LM framework, investment (and hence output) 
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depends on interest rate yet many empirical studies find weak or no evidence of this2o. In 
this study for instance, interest rate does not Granger-cause investment-instead, 
investment Granger-cause interest rate. Furthermore, the response of investment to interest 
rate shock is just 10 per cent. To explain this weak or reverse-causality phenomenon, we 
can think of monetary policy as reacting or responding to investment (or output) 
movements rather than traditionally viewed. In fact, this observed weakness in the 
monetary policy too121 to influence fixed investment is one reason why other transmission 
channels, such as the credit and other banking channels, have been proposed. And indeed 
the importance of the credit channel, in particular the credit-consumption channel, is well 
supported here. 
Despite the extended lag-period, the importance of the exchange rate model is supported by 
the variance decomposition and the Granger-causality test results. The 'other asset price 
effects' channel has the weakest effect according to the variance decomposition and the 
Granger-causality analysis. In terms of the shortest lag-period, the credit-investment and 
interest rate models come first with the lag-period of about 5 quarters. In other words, the 
impulse gets transmitted much faster in the interest-credit-investment framework. In spite 
of some contradictory results observed, such as the weak effect of the interest rate on 
investment, or the significant delay of the exchange rate effect on exports, most of the 
empirical results observed here ·are consistent with the results of other monetary 
transmission studies. 
7.2.2 Parallel transmission analysis 
The following analysis will focus on the 'parallel' transmission mode. This is in fact the 
normal VAR analysis with all the variables in each model included and estimated in 'one 
go' but the use of the 'parallel' term is to differentiate this transmission mode with the 
serial mode in which the monetary impulse is assumed to be transmitted along a straight or 
serial path with no interference from other variables. In other words, in this section real 
output is assumed to be affected by several factors including the direct impact of the 
monetary shock itself. The Cholesky decomposition is also used here to identify the 
20 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Mojon et aI. (2001), among others. 
21 We are assuming here that interest rate is the monetary policy tool. 
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structural shocks and the variables are ordered according to the theoretical orderings in the 
different monetary transmission models. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the 
stability, the serial correlation and the heteroscadasticity test results are shown in Table 
A 7.2 in the Appendix. 
The focus in this section is also on the response pattern and magnitude, the lag-periods, the 
variance decompositions and the Granger-causality test statistics. However in this set-up, it 
is possible now to examine the direct impact of money supply or interest rate on real 
output, unlike the serial bivariate approach in the previous analysis where only the second 
last variable in the transmission model (e.g. investment, exports and private consumption) 
are allowed to influence output. 
Although the V AR models have more variables this time, it is still possible to construct the 
tables with bivariate relationships embedded in them as in the serial analysis approach. In 
fact this will be carried out first in order to see whether the bivariate relationships 
originating from bivariate models are still relevant in the context of larger V ARs. After this, 
we will examine and compare the direct impact of money supply and interest rate shocks on 
real output in the different transmission models. 
Comparison with the serial approach 
Table 7.2.8 is the counterpart of Table 7.2.1 in the serial bivariate analysis. Looking at the 
tables it is quite obvious that the numerical values of the impulse responses and the lag-
periods are generally the same. For instance., the maximum impact of the interest rate shock 
on investment (of 9.7 per cent) occurs in the 4th quarter and in the serial bivariate analysis, 
the corresponding magnitude is 10 per cent and occurs in the same quarter. Even the 
extended lag-period (of seven quarters) of the exchange rate impact on export is also noted 
here. This would suggest that the patterns and characteristics of the bivariate relationships 
are fairly robust to the size of the VARs. There are however some differences that is worth 
commenting on given their importance to macroeconomic policies. One is the response of 
the exchange rate to the interest rate shock. For instance, the peak response here is 28 per 
cent and occurs in the 4th quarter whereas in the serial bivariate analysis, the peak response 
is only 17 per cent and occurs in the 3rd quarter. This means that the response in the larger 
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Table 7.2.8: Impulse responses based on the parallel transmission mode 
Interest rate channel 
Lags DINT/DM1 DKF/DINT 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
: --'~ -0,26tj,~ 
-0.093 
0.192 
0.215 
0.283 
0.320 
0.063 
-0.044 
0.175 
-0.082 
-0.007 
'~~:-"C~O~097';::] 
-0.042 
-0.003 
-0.089 
-6i239J,i;~ 
0.128 
0.002 
0.059 0.049 
Exchange rate channel 
DGDPRlDKF Lags DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXPT/DEXCH DGDPRIDEXP 
:i'~':;d;24i;;,~,,'~ 1 -0.096 0.162 -0.059~'~C;'6:;043'3·,~ 
::r~Oi3%~i~ 0.092 0.001 -0,030 -0.042 2 
0.042 3 
-0.007 4 
0.085 5 
0.053 6 
-0.018 7 
-0.032 8 
0.011 9 
0.026 10 
~: ~~: :;:~i~)J:~tti;H ~iT{~~~~.'~:~;~"i :~:~~~ 
0.241· 
0.290 
i;1~,;~6j?EJXJi~ 
-0,087 
-0.094 
-0.021 
0,072 
0.062 
-0.163 
-0.061 
0.150 
-0.238 
0.037 0.039 
0.008 -0.088 
',;':~~~:~t.ii~;i;f£}~~f~frii~~; 
0.041 0.001 
-0.027 0.003 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
Lags DPE/DM1 DPCE/DPE DGDPRlDPCE Lags DCRED/DM1 DKF/DCRED DGDPRlDKF 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 -0,297 -0.022 
7 0.002 -0.075 
8 0.124 0.007 
9 0.007 -0.081 
10 0.005 -0,142 
Credit-consumption channel 
Lags DCRED/DM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
2 0.170 0.043 -0.076 
3 ?~~9:3~~~;;~i 0.038 -0,059 
4 -0.143 0.233 0.042 
5 0.211 -0.312 -0.023 
6 -0.096 0.135 -0.013 
7 0.170 0.037 0.029 
8 0.080 -0.212 0.009 
9 0.099 ti~~olitaR 0.001 
10 0.074 -0.015 -0.014 
Notes: (i) All the variables are in first difference-hence the 'D' prefix. 
(ii) To read the table, DINTIDMI refers to the response of interest rate to money supply shock, 
and DKFIDINT refers to the response of fixed capital formation to interest rate shock, etc. 
V AR is much higher than in the bivariate setting. One explanation for this is that the 
bivariate model may have omitted a relevant variable but which is now being included in 
the larger V AR model. There are several potential candidates but one likely source is the 
money supply. The reason for choosing this variable is that when we include it in the 
model, the response of the exchange rate increased quite substantially than before. The 
other variables have some impact also but generally less than the impact of the money 
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supply. As to the explanation of the increase in response rather than a decrease, this is 
because of the negative correlation of the money supply and the interest rate and the 
positive linear relationship between exchange rate and the money supply22. That is, in the 
absence of the money supply, the correlation between the interest rate and the disturbance 
is negative and so the OLS estimators are likely to underestimate the effect of the interest 
rate on the exchange rate (see, for instance, Thomas (1993, p. 84, 141)). 
Another notable difference is the decline in the peak response of private consumption to 
credit shock. In the serial bivariate analysis the response is 43 per cent in the 4th quarter but 
here it is only 30 per cent and occurs in the 9th quarter, i.e. the relationship seems to be 
stronger in the serial case than in the larger V AR context. This can be explained on the 
basis of the contemporaneous positive correlation between the domestic credit and the 
money supply (see Table A6.1) and on the positive coefficient of the credit variable in the 
private consumption (DPCE) equation. Because both of these are positive we expect the 
marginal impact of credit on private consumption in the bivariate model to be overstated. 
Again this is a symptom of an omitted variable which in this case is money supply. It is 
useful to note though the difference in the bias here and the bias noted in the case of the 
exchange rate and the interest rate above. This difference is basically due to the different 
signs of the correlations, for example here the correlation between the money supply and 
the domestic variable is positive while the correlation between the interest rate and the 
money supply is negative. 
Also looking at the response of the equity price to money supply shock there is a 
substantial difference in the bivariate model figure and the parallel V AR figure. What this 
means is that the relationship is not very robust to the size of the V AR model. Interestingly, 
when the interest rate is used, the relationship is fairly robust23 . This would suggest that the 
effect of the interest rate on the equity price is more permanent or invariant. 
22 The correlation coefficients are reported in Table A6.1 in the Appendix. For the regression equation of the 
exchange rate see Table A7.3.4. 
23 Unfortunately because of space constraint, the responses of the model with the interest rate is not reported 
here. Another reason is that the intention in this study is to use the standard monetary transmission theories 
which happen to start off with the money supply (see Mishkin, 1995). 
180 
Below is the summary tables based on Table 7.2.8 and is similar to Table 7.2.2 and Table 
7.2.3, i.e. the summary responses are the products of the peak responses from the bivariate 
relationships within each transmission model and the total lags are the sums of the lag-
periods from the same bivariate relationships. 
Table 7.2.9 Total lags and summary responses 
(traditional channels) 
Transmission channels No. of lags Summary response 
Interest rate channel 6 0.0063 (0.63%) 
Exchange rate channel 14 0.0008 (0.08%) 
Other asset price channel 11 0.0039 (0.39%) 
Credit-investment channel 11 0.0068 (0.68%) 
Credit-consumption channel 13 0.0144 (1.44%) 
Table 7.2.10 Total lags and summary responses 
(modified channels) 
Transmission channels No. of lags Summary response 
Interest rate channel (a) 5 0.0239 (2.39%) 
Exchange rate channel (a) 12 0.0025 (0.25%) 
Other asset price channel 8 0.0037 (0.37%) 
Credit-investment channel 6 0.0008 (0.08%) 
Credit-consumption channel 8 0.0054 (0.54%) 
(a) The DINTIDMI response is excluded 
Looking at the tables above, the two credit channels summary responses are very much 
reduced when the monetary source of shock is interest rate. This is noted also in the serial 
bivariate analysis and is an important feature of the New Zealand economy because it 
shows that domestic credit is not very responsive to interest rate. In contrast, both the 
interest rate and the exchange rate channels show more prominence when the source of 
shock is interest rate. 
In view of the similarities in the impulse and summary responses noted here and in the 
serial analysis the comments already made in the previous serial analysis is applicable here 
too. 
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We will examine next the variance decompositions of the different transmission models. 
The decompositions are reported in Table 7.2.11 below. The instruction to read the table is 
provided in the footnote. 
Table 7.2.11: Variance decompositions (%) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Lags DINT/DM1 DKFIDINT DGDPRlDKF DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXP/DEXCH DGDPRIDEXP 
1 10.16 5.24 51.75 1.43 2.81 1.84 
2 10.05 5.49 50.28 12.91 3.48 1.59 
3 13.78 4.75 50.39 13.09 4.56 12.76 
4 15.01 5.84 48.72 14.30 10.52 15.74 
5 17.63 5.88 47.05 14.71 9.58 14.67 
10 21.27 7.96 46.25 17.71 13.05 18.83 
20 22.54 8.11 42.46 16.89 12.66 20.77 
30 22.68 8.32 42.02 17.13 13.72 19.94 
40 22.68 8.35 41.67 17.10 14.07 20.41 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
Lags DPElDM1 DPCE/DPE DGDPRlDPCE DCRED/DM1 DKF/DCRED DGDPRlDKF 
1 0.14 0.78 19.24 0.10 3.25 42.69 
2 0.13 0.91 20.37 2.05 2.98 42.52 
3 1.14 0.81 21.47 14.65 2.70 41.25 
4 1.10 0.82 22.92 14.54 2.70 39.31 
5 2.48 5.13 18.19 15.27 3.05 40.22 
10 9.37 7.32 15.91 13.10 5.67 38.23 
20 9.83 8.32 15.59 12.37 6.32 37.71 
30 9.88 8.49 15.42 12.24 6.38 37.39 
40 9.91 8.55 15.38 12.19 6.40 37.27 
Credit-consumption channel 
Lags DCRED/DM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
1 0.07 0.70 22.41 
2 3.26 0.91 26.28 
3 11.37 0.91 27.28 
4 12.23 6.49 27.93 
5 15.21 13.37 21.79 
10 16.17 21.72 20.30 
20 16.54 21.78 19.42 
30 16.89 21.76 19.21 
40 17.09 21.74 19.10 
Notes: (i) All the variables are in first difference-hence the 'D' prefix. 
(ii) To read the table, DINTIDMI stands for the proportion of interest rate.variance 
explained by money supply shock, and similarly, DKFIDINT stands for the 
proportion of fixed capital variance explained by interest rate shock. 
2.32 
3.21 
2.81 
4.70 
5.46 
9.22 
12.88 
13.28 
13.07 
From Table 7.2.11 we see that the proportions (or percentages) are roughly the same as 
those in Table 7.2.6 except for one or two decompositions-in fact, these differences come 
from the same exchange rate model. One is the decomposition of output variance with 
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respect to export shock (DGDPRJDEXP) and the other is interest rate variance with respect 
to the money supply shock (DINTIDM1). In the serial model analysis, the output variance 
explained by the export shock is about 30 per cent but here it is only 13 per cent, i.e. it 
seems the explanatory power of export shock decreases when more variables are present. 
This would suggest that there may be an omitted variable bias in the bivariate model and 
whose effect has been 'corrected' by the inclusion of more variables this time. In particular, 
the addition of the exchange rate variable seems to have affected the explanatory power of 
the export shock on output substantially. In the case of DINTIDM1, the situation is 
reversed, i.e. the explanatory power of the money supply shock seems to be enhanced going 
from 8 per cent in the bivariate model to 17 per cent in the larger VAR here. However this 
occurs because the number of lags used in the bivariate model is only four whereas in the 
larger V AR we use seven lags24. If the number of lags in both models is the same, the 
decompositions are found to be roughly the same, i.e. about 20 per cent. These two cases 
demonstrate well the potential problem with a V AR approach-that of omitting a relevant 
variable or using a different number of lags. In each case we might get totally different 
responses or variance decompositions. In other words, one should be very careful in 
comparing impulse responses and variance decompositions between V AR models that have 
different specifications. 
As with the analysis of the impulse responses, the similarity of the decompositions 
observed here with the previous serial bivariate analysis means that the comments made 
earlier are applicable to the decompositions reported here too. Because of this similarity 
and the fact that the variance decomposition uses the same structural shocks as the impulse 
response tool, the summary statistics for the variance decompositions are not estimated 
here. 
The Granger-causality test results are reported in Table 7.2.12. This is the counterpart of 
Table 7.2.6, and as with the responses and the variance decompositions we see here again 
strong similarities in the results. The few differences noted will be discussed below. 
24 The longer lag used is necessary in order to remove serious serial correlation in the model. 
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Table 7.2.12: Granger-causality test results (p-values) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
OlNT/OM1 OKF/OINT OGOPR/OKF OlNT/OM1 OEXCH/OINT OEXP/OEXCH OGOPRIOEXP 
Normal 0.616 0.960 0.729 0.324 0.595 0.070 0.026 
Reverse 0.639 0.737 0.947 0.438 0.734 0.586 0.402 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
OPElOM1 OPCE/OPE OGOPRlOPCE OCREO/OM1 OKF/OCREO OGOPRlOKF 
Normal 0.637 0.634 0.002 0.015 0.906 0.211 
Reverse 0.869 0.362 0.071 0.103 0.072 0.389 
Credit-consumption channel 
OCREO/OM1 OPCE/OCREO OGOPRlOPCE 
Normal 0.009 0.161 0.007 
Reverse 0.015 0.126 0.082 
Notes: To read the table, the entries along the row labelled 'normal' refer to the causal orderings as 
hypothesized in the transmission models. For example, under the 'DINTIDM1' heading, 
in the 'normal' row, we see a p-value of 0.616. This means that there is no significant 
Granger-causal effect of money on interest rate, i.e. the dependent variable is interest rate and the 
money supply (DM1) is the explanatory variable. The 'reverse' row shows p-values when the 
causal direction is reversed, for instance, 0.639 under the DINTIDM1 shows the p-value of the 
Granger-causality effect of the interest rate on the money supply. 
The p-value of the reverse-causality of investment on interest rate in the serial bivariate 
model is 0.035 (see Table 7.2.6), i.e., significant at the 5 per cent level, yet we see here 
(Table 7.2.12) above that the p-value (of 0.737) is not significant. What happens here is that 
fixed investment and output are 'highly correlated25 so in the absence of output, investment 
tends to show strong Granger-causal effect on interest rate, i.e. acts a proxy for output. 
When the output variable is present, the Granger-causal effect of investment is greatly 
reduced. 
Another significant difference in the p-values is that of the reverse-causality of output on 
exports. In the serial bivariate model the p-value is 0.095 (i.e. significant at the 10 per cent 
level) but here it is 0.402, i.e. not significant. This occurs because the exchange rate has a 
strong Granger-causal effect on exports so output Granger-causal effect is greatly reduced 
25 In level the correlation coefficient is 92% and in first-difference it is 41 % (see Table A6.1 in the Appendix). 
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when the exchange rate is included. The large p-values of the causal (and reverse-causal) 
effect of price of equity on private consumption here relative to their counterparts in the 
serial analysis is also due to the strong Granger-causal effect of output on price of equity, 
i.e. the Granger-causal effect of private consumption is greatly reduced by the presence of 
output variable. Other than these, the Granger-causal test results of the serial and the 
parallel approaches are basically the same. 
In terms of the summary statistics, the table below is the counterpart of Table 7.2.7. Note 
that even though the statistics used for this table come from the parallel approach, the 
individual p-values used (see Table 7.2.12) still represent bivariate relationship, i.e. not 
multivariate relationships. 
Table 7.2.13: Granger-causality summary statistics 
Transmission channels 
A.l Interest rate channel 
A.2 Exchange rate channel 
A.2 Exchange rate channel (b) 
A. 3 Other asset price channel 
A. 4a Credit-investment channel 
A.4b Credit-consumption channel 
Total p-value 
0.4311 
0.0004 
0.0011 
0.0008 
0.0029 
0.00001 
Note: (b) In order to have consistent number of responses for 
each model, the 'DINTfDMl' p-value has been left 
out in this version of the exchange rate model. 
From Table 7.2.13, it is clear that the credit consumption channel is the most significant 
channel followed by the exchange rate channel and the 'other asset price channels. The 
interest rate channel is not significant. These results are fairly consistent with the results 
presented for the serial analysis in Table 7.2.7. What these results suggest then is that 
despite the size of the V AR used, it is the bivariate relationship among the variables present 
that is quite important. 
Our next analysis will concentrate on the more direct relationship between the monetary 
shock (i.e. the money supply or the interest rate shock) and real output in the different 
transmission models. As explained in the methodology chapter, this is not possible to do in 
the serial transmission framework because the money or interest rate variable are at the 
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'front' of the transmission channel whereas output is at the 'end', i.e. it is the last variable 
in the channel. However in the parallel transmission mode this is possible because all the 
variables are able to affect each other therefore the following 'direct' analysis is actually 
part of the 'parallel' transmission analysis. This approach is in fact the approach adopted by 
most empirical V AR studies on the monetary transmission process. 
7.2.3 Direct transmission analysis 
It is important to stress here that even though we are talking about a single source of 
monetary shock (e.g. money supply or interest rate), the impact or effects observed at some 
later stage, on real output, or any variable for that matter, is in fact the resultant of 
interactions and feedbacks from all the variables within each model26 . This is one of the 
weaknesses of the V AR framework and this is one main reason why the serial and parallel 
transmission ideas are introduced in this study. 
The output responses are shown in Fig 7.2.6 and Fig 7.2.7 and in order not to clatter the 
graph we will have no other responses shown and no confidence band drawn27 • Not 
showing the confidence band is justified because the confidence bands around the 
responses of detrended or stationary variables generally embrace the horizontal axis (see, 
for example, Fig 6.3.1, Fig 6.3.11, etc.) hence it will be of little use to have these drawn. In 
any case, what we are more interested in is the magnitude of the output response and the 
lag-period for each transmission channel so that we can evaluate and compare each other. 
Because of the unresolved issue of whether money aggregate or interest rate is an impoI1ant 
monetary policy tool or intermediate policy target we will look at both28 • Fig 7.2.6 shows 
26 As pointed out by Christiano et al. (1998), "A given policy action and the economic events that follow it 
reflect the effects of all the shocks to the economy". 
27 Other previous studies that do not show the confidence band around impulse responses include that of 
Angeloni et al. (2002); Bemanke and Gertler (1995); McCarthy and Peach (2002); Morsink and Bayoumi 
(2001), among others. Mojon and Peersman (2001) also noted the large confidence bands around the 
responses in a VAR model making it difficultfor meaningful conclusions to be made. And Hayo (1999) 
argued that 'statistical significance does not say a lot about economic significance'. 
28 As noted by Brunner and Meltzer (1990), "An often contentious issue about monetary control concerns the 
central's bank use of an interest rate or a monetary aggregate as a target or control variable". And 
according to Leeper et al. (1996), "There is a long tradition in monetary economics of searching for a 
single policy variable-perhaps a monetary aggregate, perhaps an interest rate-that is more or less 
controlled by policy and stably related to economic activity". 
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output response to monetary aggregate shock for the five transmission channels while Fig 
7.2.7 shows output response to interest rate shock. 
From Fig 7.2.6 we see that generally the responses of output to money supply shock in all 
the five transmission models are less than 10 per cent-the average would be around 5 per 
cent. This magnitude is also observed in the bivariate models. Another interesting feature is 
the different patterns of the responses across the models, both in terms of the peaking 
periods and magnitudes. This would suggest that in the real economy, with so many 
variables and transmission channels present, the response of output would be extremely 
difficult to predict. 
Comparing the magnitudes of the responses, the largest response seems to come from the 
traditional interest rate channel. We see, for instance, that the first large response of 9.4 per 
cent occurs in the first quarter after the money supply shock while the second one (of 7.8 
per cent) occurs in the 13th quarter (about three years later). This is quite an interesting 
observation but it is consistent with the notion that investment spending can affect the 
economy instantly (in the 1st quarter) and also at some later time when the investment 
projects start to generate income or value added. Another interesting observation is that of 
output response in the exchange rate channel. It shows several siginificant responses: one in 
the 2nd quarter of 3.7 per cent; another in the 7 th quarter of 4.7 per cent; and one in the 18 th 
quarter (over four years later) of 4.7 per cent. This delayed but sustained response of output 
to money supply shock is also noted in the serial analysis. One possible reason for this 
multiple and extended set of significant responses is the fact that the exchange rate model 
contains variables that are bound to be affected by overseas influences as well (see, for 
example, Buckle et aI., 2002). As to the 'other asset price effects' channel, the maximum 
response of output of 6.5 per cent occurs in the 3rd quarter. Another significant peak (of 5 
per cent) occurs in the 11 th quarter, i.e. about two years later. Out of the two credit 
channels, the credit-consumption channel seems to show more significant response (of 4.6 
per cent)-this result is consistent with the serial approach findings. 
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To reiterate the main results observed, the maximum response of output comes from the 
interest rate channel-one in the 1st quarter and the second in the 13 th quarter (about three 
years later). Following the interest rate channel is the 'other asset price effects' channel 
with a maximum response occurring in the 3rd quarter. The exchange rate channel exhibits 
several peak responses but the more significant responses occur much later in the i h and 
18th quarters. The smallest output responses are observed from the two credit channels. 
Clearly the results obtained here are different to the predictions of the serial and parallel 
transmission approaches summarised in Table 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.9 and 7.2.10. This provides 
the evidence that output response to a monetary policy shock is extremely difficult to 
predict or discern from any particular monetary transmission model. 
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We will now examine output response following interest rate shock for the different 
transmission channels. These are shown in Fig 7.2.7 below. Note however that the 
maximum responses of output refer to the negative peak values because of the negative 
correlation between interest rate and output. 
Looking at the interest rate channel in Fig 7.2.7 we see the peak response of output of 6 per 
cent occurs in the 5th quarter29 while in the exchange rate channel the peak response of 10 
per cent occurs in the 6th quarter-this seems to be the opposite of what happens when 
29 This is broadly consistent with Bemanke et al. (1997) finding that indicates "eighteen to twenty-four 
months (or 4.5 to 6 quarters)for output to reach its trough after the interest rate shock". Also it is 
consistent with Angeloni et al. (2002) who reported: In the VARs, an unexpected increase in the short-term 
interest rate temporarily reduces output, with the peak effects occurring after roughly one year. Mojon and 
Peersman (2001) also reported four quarters for the GDP peak response to a contractionary monetary 
policy. 
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money supply shock is used. This would suggest that in New Zealand the exchange rate 
model seems to propagate monetary impulse more effectively if the source of shock is 
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interest rate, however if the source of monetary shock is money supply, then the traditional 
interest rate channel would be a more efficient 'mechanism' in the sense that higher output 
response would result. The 'other asset price effects' channel shows a fairly distinct peak 
response (of 5.6 per cent) in the 3rd quarter after which it seems to level off. As to the other 
two credit channels they both seem to show significant and sustained responses in the first 
couple of quarters but after six quarters or so they levelled off. These responses are also 
slightly higher than the responses following the money supply shock. 
In summary we see that all the transmission channels seem to depict significant responses 
in the first few quarters (at least up to the 6th quarter) before they die out. In the previous 
analysis, when the money supply shock is used, some significant responses occur in the 8th 
and 13th quarters. It is also noted that the absolute values of the responses are slightly 
higher here compared to the responses when the money supply shock is used so an 
interesting question now is: Does the evidence suggest that interest rate shock has more 
impact on real output than money supply shock? In order to address this question it may be 
useful to look at an encompassing model3o that incorporates all the variables used so far and 
see how output responds to both the interest rate shock and the money supply shock. These 
responses are shown in Fig 7.2.8 below. 
Fig 7.2.8 Output response to money supply and interest rate shocks 
The encompassing model 
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30 Morsink and Bayoumi (2001) also set up and estimated a 'summary' model after estimating and evaluating 
smaller and more specific models. 
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Looking at the encompassing model the response of output to the money supply shock in 
the first quarter is almost 10 per cent while the corresponding response following the 
interest rate shock is 4 per cent. The next output peak response following the money supply 
shock is in the 4th quarter whereas the peak response following the interest rate shock 
occurs in the 3rd quarter. These two peaks have roughly the same magnitude of about 6 per 
cent but the response due to interest rate shock is more sustained-at least up to the 6th 
quarter. Also from the 5th quarter onwards, both responses seem to follow the same trend-
which is that of output response due to interest rate shock, i.e. interest rate effect seems to 
be dominating the money supply effect-as reflected in the predominantly negative 
responses. So the evidence provided by this encompassing model would suggest that while 
output responds immediately and significantly to money supply increase, the effect seems 
to die out quickly. In contrast the effect of the interest rate shock comes later in the 3rd 
quarter but remains significant for the next couple of quarters, i.e. more sustained. 
Now as to which of the monetary transmission models closely resembles the encompassing 
model's response this is difficult to say by looking at the responses in Fig 7.2.6 and Fig 
7.2.7. That is, it seems the response patterns observed from the transmission models are all 
different. This provides further evidence of the difficulty in identifying exactly how the 
monetary impulse gets transmitted to real output. 
Variance decomposition analysis of output 
Here we will look at how much of the variation in output is being explained by the different 
shocks within each model. The larger the proportion that is explained by the shocks other 
than output shock itself, the more plausible is the model. The decompositions are shown in 
Table 7.2.14. 
Out of the transmission channels in Table 7.2.14, the traditional interest rate channel and 
the exchange rate channel explain more than 60 per cent of output variation-in contrast, 
the 'other asset price effects' and the credit-consumption channels can only explain less 
than 40 per cent. 
In the case of the interest rate channel it is the significant explanatory power of fixed 
investment shock on output variance (42 per cent) that gives the whole channel its 
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Table 7.2.14: Output (DGDPR) variance decomposition (%) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
DMl DINT DKF DGDPR DMl DINT DEXCH DEXPDGDPR 
1 7.56 0.52 51.75 40.17 0.25 0.76 6.35 2.32 90.32 
2 10.25 1.10 50.28 38.36 1.85 3.04 6.04 3.21 85.86 
3 10.10 1.79 50.39 37.72 1.93 6.73 9.12 2.81 79.41 
4 11.05 1.89 48.72 38.34 1.80 6.44 13.19 4.70 73.86 
5 9.78 3.68 47.05 39.49 2.06 7.22 12.93 5.46 72.32 
10 10.63 4.27 46.25 38.84 4.95 15.69 15.11 9.22 55.02 
20 15.18 4.68 42.46 37.69 6.50 18.65 17.50 12.88 44.48 
30 15.55 4.69 42.02 37.74 7.19 21.52 17.55 13.28 40.46 
40 15.79 4.74 41.67 37.80 7.59 23.05 18.19 13.07 38.10 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
DMl DPE DPCE DGDPR DMl DCRED DKF DGDPR 
1 2.87 0.26 19.24 77.62 0.37 0.00 42.69 56.94 
2 4.12 0.55 20.37 74.97 1.40 0.25 42.52 55.82 
3 7.85 0.50 21.47 70.18 2.32 3.66 41.25 52.77 
4 7.93 1.64 22.92 67.51 2.23 3.88 39.31 54.58 
5 6.48 2.82 18.19 72.51 2.04 3.85 40.22 53.89 
10 7.17 11.28 15.91 65.64 2.55 5.15 38.23 54.07 
20 9.22 12.05 15.59 63.15 2.58 5.52 37.71 54.19 
30 9.55 12.14 15.42 62.89 2.63 5.68 37.39 54.30 
40 9.62 12.26 15.38 62.74 2.65 5.73 37.27 54.35 
Credit-consumption channel 
DMl DCRED DPCE DGDPR 
1 0.08 0.13 22.41 77.37 
2 0.68 0.14 26.28 72.90 
3 2.43 1.86 27.28 68.43 
4 3.00 2.21 27.93 66.86 
5 3.54 1.75 21.79 72.92 
10 4.23 5.38 20.30 70.09 
20 5.69 5.63 19.42 69.26 
30 5.88 5.76 19.21 69.15 
40 5.95 5.85 19.10 69.10 
importance. And as to the exchange rate channel, it is the combination of exchange rate and 
exports explanatory power that raises the explanatory power of the channel. This provides 
evidence that the variables, i.e., fixed investment, exchange rate, and exports, have 
significant influence on real output changes. This seems plausible given the classical role of 
fixed investment in promoting economic growth. And in the case of the exchange rate and 
the export variables, these are very important variables for small open economies like New 
Zealand which rely heavily on external trade. 
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Focusing on the individual variables we see that the single most influential variable is fixed 
investment (DKF) with explanatory power of about 40 per cent. The other two demand 
aggregates, viz., private consumption (DPCE) and exports (DEXP) can only explain less 
than 20 per cent. In terms of the money supply shock, it is from the interest rate channel 
that we see its largest explanatory power of 16 per cent-interest rate shock, on the other, 
explains less than five per cent. And the weakest money supply shock comes from the 
credit-investment channel with less than 3 per cent explanatory power31. When we look at 
exchange rate channel we see that the explanatory power of money supply and interest rate 
shocks seem to be reversed (compared to the interest rate channel) with the latter showing 
more influence this time, i.e. 23 per cent against 7 per cent for money supply shock32. This 
highlights the sensitivity of the VAR results to the specification of the model and the 
number of lags used. 
Granger-causality test for output 
The results of the Granger-causality test are presented in Table 7.2.15. What the test does is 
to exclude the entire lags of a particular variable, say money supply, or whatever the 
variable in question, and then test whether the exclusion of these lags makes any significant 
impact on the model-if not, then the variable whose lags have been excluded is considered 
as not having any Granger-causal effect, otherwise it is significant. The significance or 
otherwise of the variable is indicated by the 'Prob' or p-value shown on the right-hand side 
of the table. The 'All' p-value in the last row of each model stands for the model as a 
whole. 
From the table we see that the 'other asset price effects' channel has the minimum overall 
p-value (of 0.006) followed by the exchange rate channel (with 0.102) and the credit-
consumption channel with 0.113. On the other hand, the traditional interest rate channel and 
the credit investment channel have very large p-values, i.e. they do not Granger-cause 
31 This is consistent with Runkle (1987) who finds that only 4 per cent of the variance in output is explained 
by innovations in money-as he puts it, "These results suggest that money has little effect on output". 
32 Sims (1980) result also shows that including interest rate reduces the explanatory power of money 
innovation on output to less than 10 per cent. 
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Table 7.2.15 Granger-causality test 
dependent variable: Real output (DGDPR) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. Exclude Chi-sq df 
DM1 3.513 7 0.834 DM1 3.057 7 
DINT 3.394 7 0.846 DINT 7.408 7 
DKF 4.431 7 0.729 DEXCH .11.106 7 
DEXP 15.860 7 
All 11.899 21 0.942 All 37.794 28 
Prob. 
0.880 
0.388 
0.134 
0.026 
0.102 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
DM1 4.459 5 0.485 DM1 1.809 5 0.875 
DPE 9.311 5 0.097 DCRED 1.983 5 0.852 
DPCE 18.768 5 0.002 DKF 7.129 5 0.211 
All 32.230 15 0.006 All 12.131 15 0.669 
Credit-consumption channel 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
DM1 1.950 5 0.856 
DCRED 2.239 5 0.815 
DPCE 15.855 5 0.007 
All 21.803 15 0.113 
output. This provides another empirical justification for researchers dissatisfaction with the 
traditional interest rate channel, i.e. it seems that past values of investment cannot explain 
changes in output while private consumption and exports show very significant Granger-
causal effect. This result is quite the opposite of the finding of the previous variance 
decomposition analysis that shows fixed investment shock as the most significant shock in 
explaining the variance of output. This is likely caused by the fact that the 
contemporaneous correlation between investment and outpue3 (which the impulse response 
function and the forecast error variance decomposition depend on) is much higher than the 
correlations between output and past (or lagged) values of investment-which the Granger-
causality test depends on. In other words, because of the exclusion of the contemporaneous 
values of the explanatory variables in the Granger-causality test its results and conclusions 
may be different to that of the variance decomposition analysis. 
33 The contemporaneous correlation is 0.41 whereas the correlation between output and the first lagged values 
of investment is 0.23, and the second lagged values is just 0.14. 
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On an individual basis, the two variables showing the most significant Granger-causal 
effect on output are: private consumption and exports. The money supply and the interest 
rate, on the other hand, do not Granger-cause outpue4. This finding is consistent with that 
of Taylor (1997) who finds output Granger-causing money supply and other variables. 
~ummary 
As in the previous neutrality test analysis where the results of the bivariate models were 
found to be generally the same as those in the trivariate V AR model, we see here the same 
pattern, i.e. the results of the bivariate models are generally repeated in the larger V AR 
models35 . The exceptions occur however when the 'extra' variables have high correlations 
with the other variables in the models or if the number of lags used in the models are 
significantly different. We also note the empirical support for the concept of the serial 
transmission mode when we tested it on a few variables. However when we compare the 
responses of the direct transmission approach with that of the serial and parallel approaches 
we find there is great discrepancy in both the magnitude and the lag-periods, i.e. there 
seems to be no single transmission model that fits well with that of the 'encompassing' 
model. This provides further empirical evidence that the process in-between the monetary 
policy implementation and the response of output is very much a 'debatable' issue. It is 
quite clear also that interest rate leads money supply-at least there is no' liquidity 'puzzle' 
when the source of shock comes from interest rate. One puzzling observation is the 
relatively small impact of interest rate shock on fixed investment but as explained 'in the 
analysis, foreign investment seems to provide an explanation to this-at least the studies 
cited report great importance of fo~eign investment on fixed capital formation in New 
Zealand since 1990. Using the response summary statistics, the credit channels are found to 
be very important conduit of monetary impulse, in particular the credit-consumption 
channel. However, when the source of shock is interest rate, both the traditional interest 
rate channel and the exchringe rate channel become more significant. In the analysis of the 
response and variance decomposition, fixed investment is found to be the most influential 
variable on output, however according to the Granger-causality test, export and private 
34 Hayo (1999) in his cross-country study finds evidence that support Granger-causality running from 
output to money and vice versa. As he puts it: But more general statements about money-output causality 
cannot really be supported. 
35 In their robustness test, Favara and Giordani (2002) added extra variables to their original V AR model but 
they found no significant difference in the results--as they put it: No appreciable differences in the results. 
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consumption are more important. In fact the traditional interest rate has the lowest Granger-
causal effect on output. The exchange rate and the credit-consumption channels, on the 
other hand, have the largest Granger-causal effect. The discrepancy in the conclusions of 
the impulse response analysis and the Granger-causality test is due to the fact that while 
there is contemporaneous relationship in the former, in the latter the dependent variable 
depends only on the lagged values of the explanatory variables. The fact that fixed 
investment has a relatively large influence on output, and that most of it is funded from 
abroad, would imply that external shocks could have significant effect on New Zealand 
output. This would seem to be consistent with Conway (1988) who finds that a 
considerable share of variability in New Zealand macroeconomy is due to external or 
foreign shocks. In terms of the lag-period, i.e. the time it takes for the monetary impulse to 
reach output, the interest rate channel and the credit-investment channel have the shortest 
lag-period of about five quarters and the longest lag is that of the exchange rate channel 
with a lag-period of ten quarters (over 2 years). This extended lag-period is largely due to 
the extended impact of exchange rate shock on export (about 7 quarters). In times of high 
exchange rate this may be unfavourable to New Zealand exports and this is why New 
Zealand exporters usually hedge their exports36• In analysing the responses of output from 
the different transmission channels, as well as from the encompassing model, the pattern 
and the magnitude of the responses are quite different. The difference is also observed 
when the source of shock is different (i.e. money supply or the interest rate). In the 
encompassing model, for instance, output shows quite a large immediate response to money 
supply shock-the first significant response is in the 15t quarter after the shock and is about 
10 per cent and another one in the 4th quarter-around 6 per cen~. Output response to 
interest rate shock on the other hand starts in the 3rd quarter (just over 6 per cent) but 
remains relatively significant for the next three or so quarters. After the 5th quarter, output 
responses from the two shocks seem to converge with the interest effect dominating the 
money supply effece7 . This shows that money supply increase has a very immediate impact 
on output but in the longer term, the interest rate effect seems to dominate. Apart from the 
response in the first quarter, the peak response of output to both shocks is about the same-
roughly 6 per cent. 
36 As noted by Armstrong, "Hedging by a lot of companies (particularly Fonterra) has sheltered New 
Zealand from the worst effect of the currency's rise". 
37 Runkle (1987) also noted that innovations in nominal interest rates rather money are the driving force 
behind movements in both money and industrial production (output). 
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What this section reveals is that the different channels are quite unique in their response 
and variance decomposition pattern. The results also demonstrate that the Granger-causality 
results are not always consistent with the innovation accounting (impulse response and the 
variance decomposition) findings. 
The question as to whether the results obtained in this analysis hold across other countries38 
will be addressed in our next analysis that will look at the monetary transmission 
mechanisms in Australia. 
38 As aptly put by Hayo (1999): One important lesson to draw from this conclusion is that concentrating 
research on one country, here the US, does not help very much in assessing general questions connected 
with Granger-causality. For instance, the specific claim that made by Davis and Tanner (1997) that money 
still causes economic activity when appropriately adjusting the time period is likely to be correct only in 
the context of the US economy. 
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7.3 Comparison between Australia and New Zealand transmission mechanisms 
7.3.1 Brief overview 
This chapter compares the monetary transmission channels in Australia and New Zealand. 
One motivating factor behind this is the fact that New Zealand's real output levelled off 
since the mid 1980s for almost a decade-unlike Australia's output that continued to grow 
almost uninterrupted in the same period. The question is: Can the monetary transmission 
process explain this difference? 
Fig 7.3.1 GDP growth rates of Australia and New Zealand: 1978-2001 
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Note: These are the cumulative growth rates of real GDP with the same starting date and 
the lines drawn are meant to highlight the different trends-they are simple 
approximations, i.e. not based on rigorous statistical analysis. 
In order to carry out meaningful comparison between the two countries, we need to employ 
the same analytical techniques we used in the previous analysis. These techniques include 
VAR impulse response functions, variance decompositions and the Granger-causality tese9• 
However before carrying out the analysis, it is useful to see how the two monetary policy 
tools (money supply and interest rate) move in both countries. These are shown in Figure 
7.3.2.and Figure 7.3.3. 
39 The approach here is slightly to that of Britton and Whitley (1997) who compared the monetary 
transmission mechanisms in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, to see whether the 'structural' 
differences in the countries have important implications for the transmission of monetary policy onto 
output and inflation. 
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Fig 7.3.2 Interest rates in Australia and New Zealand 
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Notes: These are the nominal interest rates; the vertical lines are just 
to mark the period where the interest paths seem to diverge; 
For Australia, the interest rate is the interest on the 90-day bill 
whereas the New Zealand interest rate is the mortgage rate. 
Fig 7.3.3 Monetary aggregates (M1) in Australia and New Zealand 
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Note: Australian actual data has been divided by 10 in order to show the two 
series on the same scale. 
From the two figures above it is obvious that the variables from the two countries tend to 
move together except for the period (of almost a decade) starting in the mid 1980s. In 
particular the interest rates of the two countries in this period seem to move opposite to 
each other. If we assume the monetary policy to be conducted through interest rate then the 
difference observed implies that the monetary policy in the two countries became very 
different in the mid 1980s with New Zealand maintaining a very tight monetary policy 
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while Australia did actually the opposite4o. This is quite an important and revealing 
observation but the comparison is based on historical pattern and therefore is open to any 
kind of interpretation41 . To address this issue we need some kind of dynamic simulation 
that could reproduce or show the alternative scenario had interest rates in both countries 
followed the same trend throughout the period of study. This simulation will be conducted 
in the latter part of the analysis. First we need to compare the transmission models in both 
countries to see whether there is any important difference in the way monetary impulse is 
being transmitted to real output. The transmission channels for New Zealand have been 
estimated in the previous analysis so the following impulse responses, variance 
decompositions and the Granger-causality test results pertain to Australia only. 
7.3.2 Comparison of the impulse responses 
Table 7.3.1 shows the responses of the bivariate relationships within each transmission 
model and is the counterpart of Table 7.2.8 in the previous analysis. Note there is no 
bivariate model estimated this time-i.e., all the bivariate relationships in this section come 
from the 'parallel' V AR models. This is because the impulse responses and the 
decompositions are generally the same in the two transmission modes. 
Looking at the response of interest rate to money supply shock (DINTIDMl) in the first 
column of both the interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel we see all positive 
responses except for the two small negative responses in the 9th and 10th quarters ih the 
interest rate channel. The positive responses are known in the literature as the 'liquidity' 
puzzle. In New Zealand the corresponding responses in the .first two quarters are negative, 
then positive for five quarters before becoming negative again (see Table 7.2.8). What this 
suggests is that following a monetary expansion, policy makers in Australia immediately 
raise the interest rate as to reduce possible inflationary pressure42 but in New Zealand the 
policy makers seem to wait for some time (two quarters) before they raise their interest rate. 
40 It is interesting to recall here the monetary deflationary policy of Reagan (US) and Thatcher (UK) around 
the same period which resulted in deep recessions in both countries (see Snowdon et al., 1994, p. 203). 
41 Cagan (1993) in fact refers to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) finding that money causes activity as 
not very conclusive because they based their analysis on historical patterns of the variables comovements. 
42 Note the assumption here is that monetary expansion is related to increase in inflation rate. 
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Table 7.3.1 Aust: Impulse responses based on the parallel transmission mode 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
LaQs DINT/DMl DKF/DINT DGDPRlDKF Lags DINT/DMl DEXCH/DINTDEXPIDEXCH DGDPRJDEXP 
1 0.122 0.0110L'c::~~il0' 6.Qt~ 1 0.1 03;'g~{~1!,:~t~i;:i6W3~~~;'~;'I::~h,!&orMcl -0.003 
2 0.116 0.046 0.185 0.048 0.119 -0.017 0.002 2 
3 0.203~c ~,,',;~'\~'~;6:ri4 0.156 0.021 0.123 0.001 0.033 3 
4 0.037 
5 0.111 
6 0.094 
7 0.007 
8 0.030 
9;~~!,;-h;,;;o'.O)a 
10 -0.008 
0.052 
-0.071 
-0.073 
0.009 
0.005 
0.025 
0.027 
0.004 
0.014 
-0.025 
-0.002 
-0.023 
-0.002 
-0.017 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0.048 
0.121 
0.114 
0.101 
0.067 
0.035 
0.080 
-0.126 0.101 0.008 
-0.061 :~:~::;1f~~:&~?i -0.046 
0.009 O.021f~~~~~t~~i19Kz 
-0.009 0.009 0.005 
0.065 0.067;·'lE'l~;;QYlil] 
-0.006 0.042 -0.002 
-0.014 -0.041 0.012 
Other asset price effects channel Credit-Investment channel 
Lags DPElDMl DPCElDPE DGDPRlDPCE LaQs DCRED/DMl DKF/DCRED DGDPRlDKF 
1 0.114 0.115 -0.001 0.107 0.140j;;:31¥#ii~~!li~Q~Q 
2 -0.140 -0.031 -0.022 
!i~~~~~;\'~~:~~!~;;:!"1j~!~~:W:6;~4~rmrtJ,~~~~~:~!~ 
5 0.058 -0.032 -0.030 
6 -0.035 
7 0.096 
0.165 
0.119 
0.032 
-0.012 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 -0.137 0.026 -0.002 8 
9 0.106 0.132 0.020 9 
10 -0.091 0.097 -0.010 10 
Credit-consumption channel 
Lags DCRED/DMl DPCEIDCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
2 0.102 0.106 -0.Q18 
3 0.156 0.064_1l;QSjJ 
4 0.123 0.074 -0.035 
5 0.144 0.231 -0.032 
6 0.208 0.047 0.043 
7 0.195 0.114 -0.022 
8 0.219 0.125 0.008 
9~~~pt24~ 0.054 0.020 
10 0.226 0.080 -0.018 
0.115 
0.220 
0.145 
0.151 
0.219 
0.215 
0.229 
0.206 
Notes: (i) All the variables are in first difference-hence the D' prefix. 
0.097 
-0.168 
0.003 
0.Q16 
-0.060 
-0.068 
0.021 
0.044 
0.026 
0.029 
0.013 
-0.008 
0.002 
-0.009 
-0.018 
-0.009 
-0.015 
(ii) To read the table, DINTIDMI refers to the response of interest rate to money supply shock, 
and DKFIDINT refers to the response of fixed capital formation to interest rate shock, etc. 
There is also some difference in the magnitude of the responses-for example, in New 
Zealand the peak response is 32 per cent and occurs in the 6th quarter but in Australia it is 
20 per cent and occurs in the 3rd quarter. In short, policy makers in New Zealand tend to 
203 
.. ··:·"'·::<i 
• --- I 
react belatedly to inflationary pressure but their response is fairly strong and short-lived43 
whereas policy makers in Australia tend to act more quickly but in a more mild and 
sustained fashion. Interestingly, this assertion about the reaction in New Zealand seems to 
collaborate well with Armstrong (2004) recent comment on the belated response of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand in increasing the interest rate. To quote his words: "The 
chance that the optimists (in the housing sector particularly) might proven right was 
destroyed last week when Bollard (The Reserve Bank Governor) unexpectedly raised the 
interest rate. Close watches of the Reserve Bank believe Bollard regretted not raising the 
rates in December and that he will increase interest rates two times before June as he tries 
to make up for the lost time". 
Another interesting observation is the significant response of fixed investment to both the 
interest rate (of 16 per cent) and the credit shock (of 18 per cent) in Australia-unlike the 
weak response noted in New Zealand of less than 10 per cent. This would suggest that 
investment in Australia depends to a great extent on domestic borrowings44 while New 
Zealand's investment is more likely to be funded from open market bonds or by overseas 
investors-which is not unusual for small open economies like New Zealand. 
In terms of the demand aggregates (e.g. investment and private consumption) impact on 
output, figures for Australia show lower magnitude than the corresponding figures in New 
Zealand. For example, from Table 7.3.1 output peak response to fixed investment shock is 
7 per cent whereas in New Zealand the corresponding figure is over 20 per cent (see Table 
7.2.8). With respect to private consumption impact on output, the maximum response in 
Australia is 5 per cent and occurs in the 3rd quarter but in New Zealand it is 15 per cent and 
occurs in the 1st quarter. This clearly indicates that investment and private consumption in 
New Zealand have immediate and more significant impact on output than in Australia . 
43 Friedman (1968) refers to this kind of belated but strong response as ''Too late too much". He continued on 
and said: The reason for the propensity to overreact seems clear: the failure of monetary authourities to 
allow for the delay between their actions and the subsequent effects on the economy. 
44 This is somewhat confirmed by Suzuki (2001) who reports, "The Australian corporate sector makes little 
use of direct forms offinancing. At the end of September 2000, the ratio of outstanding short-term 
securities issued by the private non- financial corporate sector ...... to outstanding bank loans to the same 
sector is 16.9%. As such there are many bank dependent borrowers in Australia". 
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Unlike other channels, the exchange rate channel seems to have several quarters that show 
quite significant responses. For instance, in Australia the significant responses of exports 
following exchange rate shock occur in the 1st quarter (- 24 per cent) and in the 5th quarter 
(-25 per cent) while in New Zealand the corresponding responses occur in the 3rd quarter (-
17 per cent) and in the i h quarter (-21 per cent). This multiple-peak response of exports to 
exchange rate shock may be explained by the fact that 'international competitiveness' does 
not depend on just exchange rate devaluation alone-other important factors affecting 
exports include domestic and overseas inflation rates, output, as well as monetary policy 
itself. These economic variables could have different timing patterns or cycles hence their 
impact on exports may be varied. 
The more immediate impact of the exchange rate shock on exports in Australia would seem 
to suggest that exporters would easily cut back their exports when the exchange rate is 
unfavourable to them. Another interpretation is that Australian export markets elasticity of 
demand with respect to exchange rate for Australian goods is highly elastic45 . This is unlike 
New Zealand where exporters keep on exporting for some time (say for six quarters) after 
currency appreciation, i.e. exports seem to be more inelastic to exchange rate increase in 
New Zealand. This would imply that New Zealand is more prone to adverse impact of 
exchange rate appreciation than Australia, at least in terms of exports46. This may be 
explained by the relative smallness of New Zealand compared to Australia both in terms of 
the economy and the population, i.e. the larger Australian domestic economy is aole to 
absorb the 'unwanted' exports47 whereas New Zealand could not. The New Zealand 
exporters however would be 'shielded' by their fixed price contracts or by their foreign 
exchange hedging strategy but if the exchange rate remains long enough at a relatively high 
rate, then exporters may face serious problems eventually48. How long this duration would 
be? Well, according to Table 7.2.1 and Table 7.2.8, the impact could be felt in the 3rd 
45 Roos (2000) also reported the high output elasticities of demand of the US and Japan for Australia's 
exports. 
46 One way New Zealand exporters mitigate the adverse impact of high exchange rate is to have contracts that 
fix the price of their exports in New Zealand dollars or by using foreign exchange 'hedging' 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2003). 
47 This refers to the production that is generally earmarked for exports but because of high exchange rate is 
now locally consumed. 
48 This situation is echoed by Armstrong (2004) who said, "With hedges running out and the dollar still 
rising, there will be likely huge hardship in the export sector next year. 
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quarter or in the i h quarter. The impact of the latter is much more severe, i.e. the exports 
would decline by 21 per cent compared to the decline of 17 per cent in the 3rd quarter. 
The response of nominal exchange rate to interest rate shock in New Zealand is much 
higher than the corresponding figure for Australia. For example, in New Zealand the peak 
response of 28 per cent is observed in the 4th quarter whereas in Australia the peak response 
of just 14 per cent is noted in the 1st quarter49 . This would suggest that New Zealand's 
economy is more 'open' to capital movements from abroad than that of Australia following 
a change in interest rate. Obviously the downside of this high exchange rate elasticity is that 
any monetary tightening in New Zealand will mean an immediate rise in exchange rate 
which could make New Zealand 'international competitiveness' worse off if the domestic 
inflation either remains constant or does not decrease5o. This is an important issue for New 
Zealand and other countries that focus exclusively on low inflation-targeting because by 
their very act of tightening monetary policy to contain inflation, they probably end up 
having high real exchange rate and unfavourable international competitiveness, not 
mentioning the more direct adverse effect of high interest rate on investment spending. 
The probable reason for the weaker impact of the interest rate shock on the exchange rate in 
the case of Australia is that there are other factors other than the interest rate that might be 
influencing the exchange rate, such as the current account deficit, the inflation rate, the 
investment environment and the speculative activities (see, for example, Blundell-Wignall 
et al. (1993)). 
Looking at the response of private consumption and fixed investment to the domestic credit 
shock, in New Zealand the peak responses occur in the 9th and 7th quarters (see Table 
7.2.8), respectively. In contrast, in Australia the peak response are noted much earlier. For 
instance, in the case of the fixed investment response to credit shock, in the 1st quarter the 
response is 14 per cent and the next peak response of 18 per cent is noted in the i h quarter. 
And the peak response of private consumption to credit shock (of 26 per cent) is seen in the 
1 st quarter. This would suggest that if there is a credit crunch then New Zealand would not 
be greatly affected as much as Australia. Putting it differently, a recession in New Zealand 
49 The immediate impact of the change in the cash rate on exchange rate is also noted by Dungey (2001). 
50 This could be serious in the case of New Zealand which already has very low inflation rates. 
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will hardly be caused by any credit crunch whereas in Australia it could spell the beginning 
of a recession. 
In order to see which transmission channel, as a whole, is more effective in terms of the 
larger summary response and shorter lag-period, Table 7.3.2 and Table 7.3.3 are 
constructed like Table 7.2.9 and Table 7.2.10 in the previous analysis. 
Table 7.3.2 Aust: Total lags and summary responses 
(traditional channels) 
Transmission channels No.of Lags Summary response 
Interest rate channel 13 0.0002 (0.02%) 
Exchange rate channel (a) 8 0.0006 (0.06%) 
Other asset price channel 10 0.0035 (0.35%) 
Credit-investment channel 15 0.0022 (0.22%) 
Credit-consumption channel 13 0.0032 (0.32%) 
<a) This excludes the 'DINTIDMl' column -because there is 
no negative value. 
Table 7.3.3 Aust: Total lags and summary responses 
(modified channels) 
Transmission channels No. of Lags 
Interest rate channel (b) 4 
Exchange rate channel<b} 8 
Other asset price channel 13 
Credit-Investment channel 11 
Credit-consu~tion channel 13 
Summary response 
0.0116 (1.16%) 
0.0006 (0.06%) 
0.0042 (0.42%) 
0.0006 (0.06%) 
0.0020 (0.20%) 
Note: Table 7.3.2 refers to the 'traditional' channels 
(i.e. with money supply as the starting point of the 
monetary impulse) and Table 7.3.3 uses interest 
rate as the starting point for the monetary impulse. 
(b) The DINTIDMlcolumn is ignored. 
Looking at the numerical values of the summary responses in the tables there is some broad 
consistency in the magnitudes and the relative positions of the different transmission 
channels between the two countries. However there are a few notable differences. The first 
is the smaller summary response of the credit-consumption channel in Australia of 0.32 per 
cent compared to New Zealand figure of 1.44 per cent51 . Another difference is the summary 
response of the exchange rate channel-for example, in New Zealand (see Table 7.2.10) the 
51 This seems to be consistent with Suzuki (2001) finding that the 'lending channel' of monetary policy in 
Australia is not supported by empirical analysis. 
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value is 0.25 per cent but in Australia the corresponding figure is only 0.06 per cent. In 
other words, there is potential for the exchange rate channel in New Zealand to be more 
effective than in Australia in transmitting interest rate shock to output. However the lag-
period in New Zealand seems to be more extended than in Australia. 
Among the transmission channels in Australia, the 'other asset price effects' channel shows 
the largest summary response of about 0.4 per cent52. The interest rate channel on the other 
hand shows relatively low summary response when money supply is the source of shock 
but when the source is the interest rate the channel shows the largest response (of 1.16 per 
cent) and the shortest lag-period of four. This is consistent with the evidence from New 
Zealand that shows a relatively large summary response of 2.39 per cent and the lag period 
of five. 
In terms of the lag periods, most transmission channels in Australia; except the exchange 
rate channel, have longer lags than the channels in New Zealand. This longer lag could 
pose some problems to monetary policy makers in Australia because as Uselton (1974) 
noted "a long or highly variable lag might imply that discretionary stabilization policy is 
ineffective or, at worse, counterproductive". However, looking at Table 7.3.1 we see that 
the two credit channels have several large responses that are almost the same and so it is 
quite difficult to decide which is the. peak or maximum response. It is also important to note 
that when the source of shock is the interest rate, both the interest rate channel and the 
exchange rate channel from Australia have shorter lag-period. In view of these problems 
and inconsistencies, any comparison or interpretation with respect to the lags of the 
transmission channels across the two countries should be done with great caution. 
7.3.3 Comparison of the variance decompositions 
The variance decompositions of the five monetary transmission models for Australia are 
shown in Table 7.3.4. This is the counterpart of Table 7.2.11 that shows New Zealand 
variance decomposition results. 
52 This is roughly the same as the summary response for New Zealand but the individual components (see 
Table 7.2.8 and Table 7.3.1) are quite different. 
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Table 7.3.4 Aust: Variance decompositions (%) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
lags DINT/DM1 DKF/DINT DGDPRJDKF DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXP/DEXCH DGDPRJDEXP 
1 1.96 0.01 16.81 11.85 1.57 2.97 
2 3.37 0.20 13.94 34.05 1.24 3.60 
3 6.89 2.46 14.40 26.75 1.55 4.11 
4 6.87 2.56 14.35 27.88 1.52 5.37 
5 7.23 2.83 13.81 25.40 1.47 8.37 
10 7.72 3.10 15.06 23.70 1.55 14.77 
20 7.88 3.14 14.99 23.95 1.70 15.34 
30 7.96 3.13 15.18 23.95 1.71 15.37 
40 8.02 3.13 15.35 23.95 1.71 15.37 
Other asset price channel Credit investment channel 
Lags DPElOM1 OPCEIDPE DGDPRlDPCE DCRED/DM1 DKF/OCRED DGDPRJDKF 
1 1.29 1.74 0.00 4.15 2.65 8.90 
2 2.98 1.85 1.63 6.31 2.65 8.46 
3 8.34 4.59 9.64 13.79 4.69 8.99 
4 9.91 8.98 10.65 14.56 4.52 8.77 
5 9.73 8.74 12.03 15.79 4.22 8.41 
10 12.48 11.12 13.31 28.59 6.50 8.9'0 
20 13.98 11.79 14.03 36.19 6.96 9.53 
30 14.88 12.10 13.64 37.32 7.31 9.66 
40 15.22 12.27 13.52 38.16 7.53 9.80 
Credit-consumption channel 
LaQs DCRED/OM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
1 6.31 9.00 0.38 
2 6.98 9.79 1.47 
3 10.23 10.19 9.16 
4 10.63 9.34 11.97 
5 11.80 13.31 13.50 
10 27.93 13.29 17.05 
20 47.61 13.24 18.03 
30 54.24 13.17 17.29 
40 57.91 13.35 16.91 
Notes: (i) All the variables are in first difference-hence the 'D' prefix. 
(ii) To read the table, DINTIDMI stands for the proportion of interest rate variance 
explained by money supply shock, and similarly, DKFIDINT stands for the 
proportion of fixed capital variance explained by interest rate shock. 
2.34 
2.15 
2.54 
3.22 
9.97 
13.28 
14.91 
14.89 
14.89 
In Australia the three demand aggregates (investment, exports, and private consumption) 
shocks explain less than 20 per cent of output variance whereas in New Zealand fixed 
investment shock explains over 40 per cent of output variance-the other two aggregates 
(i.e. private consumption and exports) have similar explanatory power as the aggregates in 
Australia. This clearly highlights the relative importance of fixed investment in New 
Zealand as the main driving factor behind output variability while in Australia all the three 
demand aggregates seem to have roughly the same influence on output variability. 
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Another notable difference in the variance decompositions between the two countries is the 
relatively large proportion of credit variance that is explained by money supply shock in 
Australia compared to New Zealand. For instance, in the credit-investment channel the 
proportion of credit variance explained by money supply shock is 38 per cent compared to 
12 per cent in New Zealand. Likewise, in the credit-consumption channel the figure for 
Australia is 58 per cent and for New Zealand it is only 17 per cent. The interest rate, on the 
other hand, can explain only 9 per cent of the credit variance in Australia and only 2 per 
cent in New Zealand (note these are not reported in the tables because the models use the 
money supply rather than the interest rate as the starting point of the transmission process). 
This would suggest that if we want to investigate the credit channel impact on real output 
(or inflation), the source of shock should be the money supply because the interest rate 
changes would not have much impact on the credit aggregate. 
Comparing the effect of interest rate shock on exchange rate variance we see that in New 
Zealand it is 14 per cent but in Australia it is less than 2 per cent. This result is consistent 
with the result of the response analysis that shows higher response of exchange rate to 
interest rate shock in New Zealand compared to the corresponding response in Australia. 
7.3.4 Comparison of Granger-causality test results 
Table 7.3.5 shows the Granger-causality test results for Australia, i.e. the counterp·art of 
Table 7.2.12 in the previous analysis. 
As noted in the analysis of New Zealand data, most of the causal orderings as postulated in 
each transmission channel are not significant, i.e. the past values of the explanatory 
variables do not seem to Granger-cause the dependent variables. In some cases there is 
evidence of reverse-causality. This pattern seems to be the same for Australia as well. For 
instance, from Table 7.3.5 we see that interest rate does not Granger-cause fixed 
investment-instead fixed investment Granger-causes interest rate. Reverse causality is 
also observed for the interest rate-exchange rate (DEXCHIDINT) relationship, i.e., instead 
of interest rate Granger-causing exchange rate, it is the exchange rate that is actually 
Granger-causing interest rate. This is different though in New Zealand where the interest 
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Table 7.3.5 Aust: Granger-causality test results (p-values) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
DINT/DM1 DKF/DINT DGDPRlDKF DINT/DM1 DEXCH/DINT DEXP/DEXCH DGDPRIDEXP 
Normal 0.431 0.734 0.367 0.074 0.904 0.199 0.326 
Reverse 0.563 0.013 0.918 0.158 0.004 0.408 0.780 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
DPElDM1 DPCE/DPE DGDPRlDPCE DCRED/DM1 DKF/DCRED DGDPRlDKF 
Normal 0.234 0.490 0.109 0.596 0.090 0.286 
Reverse 0.359 0.439 0.276 0.052 0.699 0.808 
Credit-consumption channel 
DCRED/DM1 DPCE/DCRED DGDPRlDPCE 
Normal 0.810 0.180 0.125 
Reverse 0.544 0.088 0.644 
Notes: To read the table, the entries along the row labelled 'normal' refer to the causal orderings as 
hypothesized in the transmission models. For example, under the 'DINTIDMl' heading, in 
the 'normal' row, we see ap-value of 0.431. This means that there is no significant 
Granger-causal effect of money on interest rate, i.e. the dependent variable is interest rate 
and the money supply (DMl) is the explanatory variable. The 'reverse' row shows p-values 
when the causal direction is reversed, for instance, 0.563 under DINTIDMlshows the p-value 
of the Granger-causality effect of interest rate on money supply. 
rate does not Granger-cause the exchange rate nor the exchange rate Granger-causes the 
interest rate. This would suggest that in Australia the monetary policy via the interest rate 
responds to past exchange rates, i.e. it is endogenous to exchange rate movements, but in 
New Zealand the relationship is more likely to be contemporaneous. 
Another important Granger-causal relationship is between that of fixed investment and 
credit in the credit-investment channel. From the table above we see that the credit variable 
Granger-causes investment at the 10 per cent significance level but in New Zealand (see 
Table 7.2.12) this is not significant. This confirms Australia's reliance on credit to finance 
fixed investment-unlike New Zealand whose investment seems not to depend on domestic 
interest rate nor on credit availability. 
As to the credit-consumption channel, the results in Table 7.3.5 show that the channel is 
generally not significant. In contrast, the results from the New Zealand data (see Table 
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7.2.12) show that this channel is significant. In particular there is a very significant 
Granger-causal effect of money supply on domestic credit and of private consumption on 
output. 
7.3.5 Direct transmission analysis 
Our analysis so far has focused on the sequential framework of the monetary transmission 
mechanisms, i.e. we have tried to follow the ordering of the variables as stipulated in each 
transmission mechanism. Our next analysis will focus on the direct impact of monetary 
shock on real output. This would be more in line with most V AR studies that simply look at 
the response of output (or inflation) following money supply or interest rate shock without 
investigating the 'intermediate' steps as done in this study. The results and data from the 
'parallel' VAR models used in the previous analysis will be used here as well. 
Impulse response analysis 
The output responses following money supply shock of the different transmission channels 
are shown in Fig 7.3.4 and Fig 7.3.5. The corresponding figures for New Zealand are 
shown in Fig 7.2.6. The responses here are grouped together because of their similarity-
unlike the responses for New Zealand whose patterns are fairly unique. 
From Fig 7.3.4 and Fig 7.3.5 we see that output movements following money supply shock 
has generally the same pattern peaking in the 1 Slquarter, 3rd quarter, and every two quarters 
thereafter-unlike output responses in New Zealand which peak in different quarters and 
having no regular or systematic pattern. 
The output peak response in the interest rate channel is 7 per cent. In the other channels the 
peak responses are around 5 per cent and most occur in the 1 st and 3rd quarter except the 
credit-consumption channel in which the peak response occurs in the 9th quarter. In New 
Zealand, the maximum responses are also less than 10 per cent with the interest rate 
channel showing the highest response (of over 8 per cent) followed"by the 'other asset price 
effects' channel response with 6 per cent. 
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Fig 7.3.4 Aust: Output response to money supply shock 
(interest rate and exchange rate channels) 
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Fig 7.3.5 Aust: Output response to money supply shock 
(other asset price, credit-investment and credit-consumption channels) 
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The next set of graphs (Fig 7.3.6) shows output response to interest rate shock for each of 
the different transmission model. Because of the negative correlation between interest rate 
and output, we will focus on the negative responses of output 'to interest rate shock, so 
when we refer to a peak response, we are generally referring to the negative peak response. 
From Fig 7.3.6 we see that output response following interest rate shock has a more 
distinctive or unique response pattern. We also note the relatively small responses this time, 
i.e. most responses are 2 per cent or less. However, this magnitude is slightly higher than 
most responses that have been reported by other studies. For example, Brischetto and Voss 
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(1999) find that a contraction of monetary policy results in 0.2 per cent decline in output 
between 5 and 15 quarters. Gruen et al. (1999), on the other hand, find that a one 
percentage point rise in interest rate causes output to decline by 'one third per cent each 
year' i.e. about 0.33 per cent, and the lag-period is 5-6 quarters. Gruen regressed output on 
short-term real interest rate, US output, and on its own lags. And Suzuki (2001), using a 
VAR model with eight variables, reports only 0.02 per cent as the impact of cash rate 
innovation (of 0.47 percentage point) on output in the 16 quarters. 
From the interest rate channel, Fig 7.3.6(a), we see output declines initially in the first 
quarter by almost 4 per cent after interest rate shock but then in the 2nd quarter it starts to 
rise and remains positive for the next two or three quarters. By the 6th quarter it declines by 
about 2 per cent after which it returns to equilibrium. The initial decline in output would 
suggest that output is fairly responsive to interest rate but only temporarily because it is not 
sustained. The pattern observed here is quite different to the pattern observed for New 
Zealand that shows quite significant and sustained negative responses in the first few 
quarters (see Fig 7.2.7(a)). 
As to the exchange rate channel we see negative responses in the first two quarters, then a 
relatively significant but positive one in the 3rd quarter followed by another negative 
response. The positive response in the 3rd quarter coincides with the peak response 
following money supply shock (see Fig 7.3.4). Thus it would seem the positive impact of 
money supply shock on output is fairly robust and dominating. In New Zealand the peak 
responses are mostly negative ~nd significant (see Fig 7.2.7(b)) implying a stronger effect 
of interest rate on output. 
Of the two credit channels, the credit-consumption channel shows slightly higher output 
response than the credit-investment channel, in particular two distinct peak responses (of 
roughly 2 per cent) can be seen in the 3rd and 7th quarter in the fonner whereas in the latter 
only one peak response is noted in the first quarter. The 'other asset price effects' channel 
also shows some significant response especially in the 9th and 11th quarters. All the 
responses however are generally 2 per cent or less, i.e. less than the responses due to money 
supply shock. 
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Fig 7.3.6 Aust: Output response to interest rate shock 
(a) Interest rate channel 
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(d) Credit-investment channel 
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(e) Credit-consumption channel 
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To see how output reacts to money supply shock and to interest rate shock in a more 
realistic setting, a larger V AR incorporating all the variables is estimated. Impulse 
responses of output due to money supply and interest rate shocks are shown in Fig 7.3.7 
below. This is the counterpart of Fig 7.2.8 that shows the impulse responses for New 
Zealand. 
The responses in Fig 7.3.7 are indeed very interesting. First, it is quite obvious that the 
response of output to interest rate shock is now larger than the corresponding responses in 
the individual transmission models shown in Fig 6.5.5-in fact, it is almost the same (in 
absolute value) as the response due to the money supply shock. This would seem to suggest 
that the presence of the money supply enhances the influence of the interest rate on output, 
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Fig 7.3.7 Output response to money supply and interest rate shocks 
The encompassing model 
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a result that would collaborate well with Leeper and Roush (2003) assertion that "the 
money stock and the interest rate jointly transmit monetary policy", and also with Meltzer 
(1999) contention that "both transmission processes (referring to the interest rate and 
money balances) are at work, so it is more difficult to reliably separate their relative 
impo rtance ". 
The effect of the interest rate shock however on output seems to occur very late, i.e. the 
peak effect occurs in the 9th quarter (over two years later) whereas output response ~o the 
money supply shock starts from in 3rd quarter. Again this shows the dominant impact of 
money supply on output rather than the interest rate, at least in the initial periods after the 
exogenous shock. 
Another very interesting pattern observed in Fig 7.3.7 above is the simultaneous peaking of 
the two output responses in the 9th quarter and the 15th quarter53 • The magnitudes of the 
responses are also very similar, though of opposite signs. This implies that in the long run 
both the monetary aggregate and the interest rate changes have equal lag effects on output, 
both in terms of magnitude and timing. This is somewhat different to the evidence from 
53 According to Lown and Morgan (2002) the output response to the funds rate shock starts offwith no 
response for three quarters, peak response at six-to-eight quarters, persisting effects for ten quarters. 
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New Zealand that shows a fairly dominating influence of interest rate over money supply in 
the long run. 
Summary 
In summary we see that output response to interest rate shock in Australia is generally 
lower than the corresponding response in New Zealand. This lower magnitude in Australia 
is supported by other empirical studies that find small or negligible impact of monetary 
policy innovations54 on output (see, for example, Brischetto and Voss, 1999; Gruen te al., 
1999; Orden and Fisher, 1993, among others). However as noted in the encompassing 
model, the effect of interest rate on output in Australia seems to be enhanced by the 
presence of monetary aggregate-in fact, the lag-effects of both are basically the same. 
This provides direct empirical support to the claim that "money matters,,55. With reference 
to the different transmission channels there are important specific differences that are worth 
noting. For instance, in New Zealand the significance of the interest rate shock on output is 
more evident in the exchange rate channel whereas the money supply shock largest impact 
comes from the traditional interest rate channel. In the case of Australia, the money supply 
shock maximum impact on output is noted particularly in the interest rate and the exchange 
rate channels. The interest rate shock effect, as noted above, is quite negligible. To extend 
the comparison to other countries, the significance of fixed investment as a determinant of 
output growth in New Zealand would be consistent with the evidence from Europe while 
the Australian situation would be more similar to the US case56. 
Output variance decomposition 
Here we are interested in the proportions of output variance explained by the different 
shocks within each transmission model. These proportions are shown in Table 7.3.6 
below-this is the counterpart of Table 7.2.13 that shows New Zealand decompositions. 
Out of the transmission models shown in Table 7.3.6 the interest rate channel explanatory 
power (other than output itself) of 57 per cent is the highest, but this is slightly less than the 
54 This generally refers to short-tenn interest rate innovation. 
55 Other studies that find the importance of money supply in the transmission process include Beckitti and 
Morris (1992), Favara and Giordani (2002), Leeper and Roush (2003), Meltzer (1999), Meyer (2001), 
Morsink and Bayourni (2001), Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2001), among others. 
56 The comparison of Europe and the US transmission mechanisms can be cited in Angeloni et al. (2002). 
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Table 7.3.6 Aust: Output (DODPR) variance decompositions (%) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Lags DM1 DINT DKFDGDPR DM1 DINT DEXCH DEXPDGDPR 
1 18.67 3.96 16.81 60.56 1O.l4 0.32 1.76 2.34 85.44 
2 20.58 3.62 13.94 61.85 13.74 0.84 1.64 2.15 81.63 
3 29.75 3.59 14.40 52.27 25.13 2.15 1.50 2.54 68.68 
4 30.01 3.58 14.35 52.06 24.85 2.59 1.83 3.22 67.50 
5 32.41 4.03 13.81 49.75 22.42 2.55 4.02 9.97 61.04 
10 35.64 3.96 15.06 45.34 23.47 2.56 7.22 l3.28 53.48 
20 37.78 3.84 14.99 43.39 22.89 2.58 8.77 14.91 50.85 
30 38.20 3.80 15.18 42.82 22.85 2.58 9.05 14.89 50.63 
40 38.34 3.78 15.35 42.54 22.85 2.58 9.06 14.89 50.62 
Other asset price channel Credit investment channel 
Lags DMI DPE DPCEDGDPR DM1DCRED DKFDGDPR 
1 1.92 1.74 0.00 96.33 15.66 0.70 8.90 74.74 
2 2.63 1.59 1.63 94.15 15.64 3.43 8.46 72.46 
3 8.05 3.72 9.64 78.59 20.49 8.54 8.99 61.99 
4 7.87 3.65 10.65 77.82 19.58 12.57 8.77 59.07 
5 9.92 3.92 12.03 74.14 20.97 12.24 8.41 58.37 
10 15.53 4.54 13.31 66.63 23.09 12.99 8.90 55.02 
20 20.28 5.04 14.03 60.66 24.48 13.87 9.53 52.12 
30 22.84 5.32 13.64 58.19 25.l0 14.38 9.66 50.86 
40 23.90 5.45 13.52 57.12 25.45 14.72 9.80 50.03 
Credit consumption channel 
Lags DMIDCRED DPCEDGDPR 
1 1.76 3.56 0.38 94.29 
2 1.69 3.59 1.47 93.25 
3 4.63 4.61 9.16 81.60 
4 4.35 5.57 11.97 78.12 
5 6.60 5.20 13.50 74.69 
10 13.00 5.47 17.05 64.49 
20 17.22 5.98 18.03 58.77 
30 19.95 6.39 17.29 56.37 
40 21.41 6.57 16.91 55.10 
corresponding figure for New Zealand of 62 per cent. But whereas in New Zealand the 
most influential variable is fixed investment, explaining 42 per cent of the output variance, 
in Australia it is money supply shock with explanatory power of 38 per cent. In fact, money 
supply explanatory power in all the five transmission channels in Australia is well over 20 
per cent, i.e. quite significant compared to the explanatory power of other variables. The 
interest rate shock, on the other hand, explains less than 4 per cent of output variance both 
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III the interest rate and the exchange rate channeI5? In New Zealand the money supply 
explanatory power in the different transmission channels, apart from the interest rate 
channel, is less than 10 per cent. This would suggest that money supply in New Zealand 
does not have the same influence over output and the other variables as in Australia. 
Granger-causality analysis 
The Granger or block causality test results for Australia are shown in Table 7.3.7 and its 
counterpart showing New Zealand test results is Table 7.2.14. 
Table 7.3.7 Granger-causality test results 
dependent variable: output (DGDPR) 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. Exclude Chi-sq 
DM1 4.471 4 0.346 DM1 7.633 
DINT 1.576 4 0.813 DINT 2.816 
DKF 4.303 4 0.367 DEXCH 6.875 
DEXP 5.806 
All 13.323 12 0.346 All 20.499 
df 
5 
5 
5 
5 
20 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. Exclude Chi-sq df 
DM1 6.774 4 0.148 DM1 2.947 5 
OPE 1.286 4 0.864 DCRED 4.856 5 
DPCE 7.553 4 0.109 DKF 6.210 5 
All 18.659 12 0.097 All 17.904 15 
Credit consumption channel 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
DM1 7.419 4 0.115 
OCR ED 3.517 4 0.475 
DPCE 7.223 4 0.125 
All 21.745 12 0.041 
Prob. 
0.178 
0.728 
0.230 
0.326 
0.427 
Prob. 
0.708 
0.434 
0.286 
0.268 
From Table 7.3.7 the two most significant channels in terms of the Granger-causal effect on 
output are the credit-consumption and the 'other asset price effect~' channels. The former is 
57 For comparison, Boivin and Giannoni (2002) study using US data finds that 20 per cent of output variance 
is attributable to monetary policy shocks in the pre-1980 sample, but in the post-1984 sample, the 
proportion has fallen to just 3 per cent. This is quite interesting because the data for Australia starts from 
mid 1980s as well and so it would seem output variance in both countries may have gone down since the 
1980s. This low figure have prompted some researchers to conclude that monetary policy does not matter 
much. In New Zealand the corresponding figure is 5 per cent in the interest rate channel but 23 per cent 
in the exchange rate channel. Manchester (1989) study on the US data also reports very similar results as 
that of Australia, i.e. showing a decomposition of just 3.5 per cent. Ibrahim (2003) study also finds only 
2.99 per cent for money and 1.26 per cent, as he puts it: Both MYIP (money) and MITE (interest rate) 
innovations explain only minimal fractions o/variations in Malaysian real economic activity. 
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significant at the 5 per cent significant level and the latter at the 10 per cent significant 
level. In New Zealand (see Table 7.2.14) these two channels, plus the exchange rate 
channel, also show quite significant Granger-causal effect but in particular the 'other asset 
price effects' channel which is significant even at the 1 per cent significant level. Both the 
credit-consumption and the exchange rate channel are significant at the 12 per cent level. In 
both countries therefore the most significant transmission channel in terms of overall 
Granger-causal effect on output is the 'other asset price effects' or (consumption wealth) 
channel. 
In terms of individual variables, private consumption seems to have the most Granger-
causal effect on output both in Australia and New Zealand. One possible explanation for 
this is that private consumption is generally a very large proportion of national income (or 
output) hence it would most likely to have a greater causal impact on output than exports or 
fixed investment. Furthermore, unlike exports or fixed investment, which are generally 
more volatile, private consumption is generally constant or fixed in relation to output hence 
we expect the causal relationship between the two to be more significant and robust. The 
other two significant variables are exports and equity price-but only in New Zealand. 
7.4 Counterfactual analysis 
Now that we have seen that there are indeed differences in the transmission features 
between the two countries the next important question is: what if New Zealand monetary 
policy, in terms of interest rate movements, had followed that of Australia-in particular in 
the period of the radical reforms? 
The approach to the above question is to estimate aVEC model58 comprising of money 
aggregate (M1), nominal interest rate (INT) , price level (CPI) and real output (GDPR). 
These are generally the standard variables in V AR analysis59 and although we could add 
more variables, the limited number of observations may give inflated standard errors. 
Besides, as we have seen in the previous analyses, the responses do not change much with 
the size of the V ARs. The results of the cointegration test and the diagnostic tests are 
58 The use of the VEe model here is appropriate given the existence of cointegration relationship among the 
four variables. 
59 As Runkle (2002) noted, "Explaining the relationships among money, interest rate, prices, and output is 
one o/the most important challenges in macroeconomics". 
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shown in the appendix. The estimated model will be referred to as the 'original' model 
because to set up a counterfactual experiment we will reestimate the same VEe model but 
this time using interest rate series that has been modified. The modification involves 
replacing the interest rates in the period 1985:3 to 1990:4 by the set of interest rates that has 
been estimated based on the movements of the Australian interest rates in the same period. 
This model will be referred to as the 'modified' model. The output and price responses 
from the two models will be analysed and compared to see if indeed output would have 
been higher had interest rates in New Zealand followed that of Australia. Responses 
pertaining to New Zealand are shown in Fig 7.4.1 and Fig 7.4.2. 
Looking at the responses in Fig 7.4.1 and Fig 7.4.2 we see that the responses are generally 
consistent with theory, i.e. we expect output and price to decline after monetary tightening. 
There is also a small positive response of price immediately after monetary policy shock 
that has come to be known as the 'price puzzle' in the literature-this shows our result is 
consistent with other empirical findings. 
Focusing now on just output response, it is quite obvious that the modified model (Fig 
7.4.2) shows a larger output response compared to the 'original' model (Fig 7.4.1) 
response. In fact, output response in the 'original' model seems to go to zero in the long 
run whereas output in the 'modified' model definitely shows a long run value of around 6 
per cent. Interestingly, price response seems not to change much around a value of) per 
cent in both figures-this could be considered as an indication that the parameters of the 
model did not change much after modifying the interest rate values6o. This implies therefore 
that had New Ze"aland adopted the same kind of interest rate movements as the Australian 
interest rate movements, especially during the period 1985:3 to 1990:3, then output in New 
Zealand would have been much higher than actually reported. 
Now to get a rough idea of how much output New Zealand would have got had it followed 
Australian monetary policy, we note from Fig 7.4.2 that the long run value of output is 
close to 6 per cent. And from Fig 7.4.1, the corresponding value is 1 per cent, so the 
difference therefore is about 5 per cent. If one standard deviation of real GDP (in level) is 
$2,696 million, then 5 per cent represents $134 million. Thus output would have been 
60 This could be considered as providing some evidence that the model is not subject to the Lucas critique. 
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higher by this much had New Zealand adopted the same monetary policy stance as 
Australia in the period indicated. 
Fig 7.4.1 NZ: Output and price responses 
(of the original model) 
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Fig 7.4.2 NZ: Output and price responses 
(of the modified model) 
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To conduct a robustness test on the result we estimate a similar VEe model for Australia. 
The 'modified' interest rates are calculated as for New Zealand but now we are reversing 
the roles, i.e. we use New Zealand interest rate movements to modify the Australian interest 
rates for the same period indicated. The idea here is that by doing this we expect Australian 
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output to decline relative to its 'original' level-at least it should not increase. The 
responses are shown in Fig 7.4.3 and Fig 7.4.4. 
From Fig 7.4.4 we see Australian output does not decline as we hypothesized but at the 
same time, it does not increase as in the New Zealand case. So the evidence here seems to 
be in support of the hypothesis that monetary policy via the interest rate movements in New 
Zealand contributed to the decline in output observed since 1984. 
Fig 7.4.3 NZ: Output responses 
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Fig 7.4.4 Aust: Output responses 
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7.5 Summary 
On the basis of the 'liquidity' puzzle observed in both countries, with Australia showing 
more pronounced effect, we surmised that monetary policy makers in Australia tend to 
react 'faster' to inflationary pressure but in a more 'moderate' and sustained fashion, 
whereas policy makers in New Zealand tend to react a 'little bit slower' but their response 
is stronger and short-lived. Another interesting difference is the relatively high dependency 
of fixed investment on foreign funding sources in New Zealand whereas in Australia fixed 
capital formation depends to a large extent on domestic borrowings. And while exchange 
rate in New Zealand responds more to interest rate shock than in Australia, exports in 
Australia reacts immediately and more profoundly to exchange rate changes. This would 
suggest that Australia could absorb adverse shocks on exports better than New Zealand in 
the sense that when exchange rate appreciates, Australia would straightaway cut down its 
exports61 but New Zealand would tend to carryon for the next two quarters before cutting 
down its export62 . It is very apparent also, especially from the analysis on Australia data, 
that money supply has very significant impact on output. In New Zealand, money supply 
does have significant impact in the short run but in the long run it seems to give way to 
interest rate effect. And as to the question posed at the beginning of this section of whether 
monetary transmission (or monetary policy for that matter) can explain the divergence of 
output path of the two countries since the 1980s, the answer seems to be 'yes'. That is, the 
monetary tightening in New Zealand around the period 1985-1990 seems to be the cause of 
output dismal growth, at least the analysis shows that had New Zealand followed the 
interest rate movements of Australia then its output would have been higher. Despite this 
finding it is important to keep in mind that the analysis is fairly crude in the sense that it did 
not consider changes that would have had occurred to other variables should there be in fact 
changes to the interest rate in the period indicated, nevertheless, the result is interesting. 
61 There may be different ways or channels in which exports may be re-directed but according to Roos (2000), 
in Australia 'higher domestic activity serves to reduce exports'. 
62 Another possible way of 'cushioning' the effect of high exchange rate on exports is to undertake currency 
hedging or using fixed price contracts. 
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Chapter 8 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This last chapter discusses the policy implications of the results, the limitations of the study 
and offers some suggestions for future research. Obviously the empirical analysis has 
covered a fairly wide ground and while some results may have policy implications, others 
are likely to be more academic. In view of this, the following discussions will focus only on 
those results that seem to have important policy implications. Note that this chapter is not 
meant to summarise the results given that this has been done at the end of each major 
analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Before the policy implications are discussed, it may be useful to give a brief review of the 
main thrust of the study, re-emphasising where necessary the important considerations and 
the general underlying philosophy. Hopefully this should give more perspective to the 
analysis and to the study as a whole. 
8.2 Brief review of the methodological approach 
We started off by empirically testing the classical monetary neutrality and other related 
hypotheses, then moved on to exainine and evaluate the different monetary transmission 
mechanisms and finally, we extended our analysis to Australia to see if there are significant 
and important differences in the monetary transmission mechanisms between the two 
countries. The two fundamental questions we wish to explore are: Does money affect real 
output? And, ii) How does the monetary impulse gets transmitted to real output? As 
discussed in the introduction and in the theory chapters this is a long standing issue that has 
intrigued economists since David Hume in the 18th Century first conceived the notion of 
the Quantity Theory in his essays of Interest and Money. But whereas in the past the focus 
was more on developing theoretical explanations of the money-output relationship, in 
recent years the interest is more on monetary policy and its transmission process to output 
or (inflation). 
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In reviewing the methodology adopted in this study it is worthwhile to stress the overriding 
philosophy which is to 'let the data speak'. In practical terms, this involves using 
unadjusted data and the vector autoregression framework. This might be labelled as 
'measurement without theory' but like Bemanke and his colleagues who take the V AR 
evidence seriouslyl, this study considers the results of the VAR analysis as representing 
important and useful relationships between the variables and consequently the entire 
analysis is based on the numerical values of the impulse response functions, the variance 
decompositions, and the Granger-Causality test results. While these numbers represent or 
reflect past events, they do also provide useful indicators of future events provided there are 
no major regime or structural changes in the subsequent periods. 
In the analysis the emphasis is placed on the bivariate relationships and the sequential 
ordering as depicted in each theoretical monetary transmission model. This is unlike most 
V AR studies that tend to focus only on the response of output or inflation following an 
interest rate or money supply shock without actually tracing out the intermediate paths2. 
Obviously this 'direct' approach would miss out important and useful dynamics within the 
transmission models and in fact this drawback led to the introduction of the 'serial' 
transmission and 'parallel' transmission mode in this study. That is, the introduction of 
these transmission concepts is an attempt to systematically measure the responses, the 
decompositions and the Granger-causal effects, within and across the different monetary 
transmission mechanisms in accordance with the proposed theoretical models. 
In order to simplify the analysis and the discussions, the structural shocks are given very 
straightforward names. For example, instead of using the terms such as technological 
shocks, fiscal shock, mark-up shocks, etc., (as done by Siregar, 2001; Siregar and Siregar, 
2000; among others) the terms used here for the shocks simply come from the equation 
from which the shock originates. For example, real output shock comes from the output 
equation-likewise, money supply shock comes from the money supply equation, and so 
forth. 
1 See Bernanke et al. (1997). 
2 This kind of approach is referred to in this study as the 'direct transmission' approach. 
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Because all the variables are in first-difference3 the analysis and the discussions refer only 
to the names of the variables without specifying first-differences. Also it is important to 
note that because of the inherent inflated standard errors in a V AR framework, the 
emphasis in this study is more on the point estimates. In view of this, the word 'significant' 
may have been used in some instances more on a 'relative' basis than an absolute or 
statistical sense. 
8.3 Policy implications 
In order to present a coherent statement of the policy implications of the results, the 
following discussions are grouped under each major analysis section as in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This should clearly show where the results come from for ease of referencing and cross 
checking purposes. 
Neutrality and superneutrality tests 
Although the bivariate models used in the neutrality and superneutrality tests are not strictly 
monetary transmission channels, the bivariate relationships obtained from these tests do 
provide useful insight of how money supply, interest rate, inflation, output, etc., respond to 
each other. In fact, some of these bivariate relationships constitute the elements of the 
broader transmission channels like the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, etc. 
Furthermore, some of the bivariate relationships by themselves have important policy 
implications-i.e. even without referring to the particular transmission model' they 
represent. This should become apparent in the following discussions. 
With respect to the relationship between money supply and real output, the empirical 
evidence is in favour of the monetary long run neutrality proposition, however there is 
persistence in the output response that other researchers have noted as well. Furthermore, 
the impulse response analysis indicates a peak response of output of 4-5 per cent to money 
supply shock in the 4th quarter. To put this figure in perspective, we note that output 
response to its own shock is around 8 per cent in the 5th quarter hence the effect of money 
supply shock is fairly substantial if we go by the general rule that variation in each variable 
is explained mostly by its own shock (see, for instance, Kuszczak and Murray (1986, p. 
3 The exception being the VEe model which uses the variables in level. 
228 
87)). The policy implication of this evidence therefore is that monetary policy makers 
should pay heed to the movements of money supply, i.e. not to totally ignore it as reflected 
in recent monetary models of several central banks and that of the New Keynesians. That 
is, the evidence clearly shows that 'money matters'. 
Another useful observation is that of the tendency of money supply (M1) to follow output 
movements following an output shock. However in the long run this reverts back to its 
equilibrium level. This suggests that an increase in output may induce inflationary pressure 
because of the increase in money supply but the effect would be temporary. So if there is a 
tightening of monetary policy to counter the inflationary pressure caused by an aggregate 
supply shock, then this tightening should be temporary because the effect will diminish 
over time, i.e. an extended tightening policy may adversely affect real output and other 
important economic variables. 
When money M3 is used in place of Ml an interesting result is that a permanent output 
shock raises the level of M3 permanently-in contrast to the zero long run response of Ml. 
Another interesting observation is that the money (M1) shock has higher impact on real 
output compared to the impact of M3 shock. These evidences clearly suggest that M1 is 
more exogenous and more influential than M3 hence if monetary policy is to be conducted 
through monetary aggregate, then M1 should be a more appropriate aggregate to use. 
In terms of the relationship between money supply and price level, the analysis shows that 
price responds equiproportionally to money supply increases. This provides empirical 
support to the Monetarist's contention that "inflation is a monetary phenomenon". 
Furthermore, it is important to note the relatively strong and highly persistent price increase 
following a monetary shock (see Fig 6.3.17). For almost eight quarters (i.e. two years) the 
price level remains positive after the initial monetary shock. This clearly highlights the 
need for policy makers to make sure there is no 'dramatic' increase in money supply, even 
a temporary one, for this will cause a significant and persistent rise in price level. 
In comparing the responses of price and output to money supply shock it is seen that 
inflation response is more extended and more pronounced so it makes sense for policy 
makers to focus more on price stability than on real output. 
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Although Fisher's relationship is one of the important classical relationships investigated, 
the more practical relationship, at least from the monetary policy standpoint, is that of 
inflation rate response to the interest rate shock, i.e. the reverse of Fisher's relationship. 
This is because interest rate is often considered as the monetary policy tool, i.e. controllable 
by the central bank whereas the inflation rate is more of a target variable, i.e. an 
endogenous variable. And from the bivariate analysis the inflation rate response following 
the interest rate shock shows a temporary rise in the 3rd quarter followed by a negative 
response. The policy implication of this is that following monetary tightening there may be 
a temporary rise in price 4 in the first few quarters but in the long run, price will decline. 
On the supemeutrality test the evidence shows a negative output bias following a 
permanent change in the level of the inflation rate. That is, the evidence does not support 
the supemeutrality hypothesis. In the context of policy, this evidence lends support to the 
idea that high inflation is detrimental to output growth, i.e. the pol,icy of price stabilization 
is a sound policy. 
The next section will discuss the policy implications of the results of the evaluation of the 
monetary transmissions using New Zealand data. 
Evaluation of the monetary transmission mechanisms 
In the analysis we looked at basically three transmission approaches: the serial bivariate 
transmiss~on approach; the parallel transmission approach; and the 'direct' transmission 
approach. In the first two approaches the focus was on tracing out the serial flow of the 
monetary impulse from the source (either the money supply or the interest rate) through the 
'intermediate' variables and finally to real output. This may be considered as a serial flow 
analysis but in the serial bivariate approach a series of bivariate V AR models were actually 
estimated and subsequently ordered according to the orderings in the theoretical 
transmission models. In the parallel transmission approach the same serial analysis was 
undertaken but the bivariate relationships were 'extracted' from the larger VAR 
4 This is known in the literature as the 'price puzzle' , 
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transmission models. These larger models III fact provided the basis for the 'direct' 
transmission approach as well. 
In studying the empirical relationship between money supply and interest rate, the 
conclusion is that the interest rate leads money supply, i.e. the interest rate is more 
exogenous than money supply. The implication of this finding is that the theoretical 
transmission models, like the traditional interest rate channel, or the exchange rate channel, 
should have the interest rate as the starting point of the transmission channel rather than the 
money supply. In terms of policy setting, the interest rate should be a more appropriate 
instrument or tool to manipulate than the monetary aggregate given that it is more 
exogenous. In fact, in the 'direct' transmission analysis, the effect of the interest rate shock 
on output is more sustained than that of the money supply shock. 
Another interesting bivariate relationship is between the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
As Table 7.2.8 shows, the impact of the interest rate shock on the exchange rate is 
immediate and quite significant. In contrast the impact of interest rate shock on fixed 
investment is relatively weak. This would suggest that if the country is faced with the 
choice of either restraining fixed investment spending (like housing construction) and 
promoting exports or encouraging fixed investment and depressing exports, then policy 
makers should consider exports promotion as a more reasonable choice given that fixed 
investment is not very responsive to interest rate changes while exchange rate does respond 
strongly to interest rate movements. Furthermore, the Granger-causality test shows that the 
exchange rate affects exports significantly. The only problem here, however, is that the 
export response to the exchange rate change takes some time so if the interest rate is 
lowered the short run cost would be an outflow of capital and possibly some inflationary 
pressure. 
The response analysis also found that out of the demand aggregates studied, fixed 
investment shock affects output the most. This finding is also confirmed from the variance 
decomposition analysis that shows fixed investment shock explaining about 40 per cent of 
the variation in output compared to 31 per cent due to exports shock and just 12 per cent 
due to private consumption shock. In view of these evidences, the government should 
encourage businesses to spend more on fixed investment as this is a major driving force of 
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output growth. One traditional method of encouraging this investment spending is to lower 
the interest rates but given that fixed investment in New Zealand does not respond strongly 
to interest rate changes, the government may opt for higher interest rate as this will 
encourage foreign investors to invest in or bring more capital to New Zealand. The only 
drawback here is the adverse impact this might have on the export sector. One way to 
mitigate this is to have fixed price contract or exchange rate hedging, and as noted in the 
analysis, New Zealand exporters are doing both. So one attractive policy setting is to raise 
the interest rate to a level that is attractive enough for external investors and at the same 
time to encourage exporters to enter into long term fixed price contracts or currency 
hedging. Another benefit from this policy prescription, besides capital inflows, is the 
restraint on inflation rate. The important thing is to keep a close watch on the contracts and 
the hedging periods so when they are about to run out, then the government should consider 
lowering the interest rate. 
Looking at the transmission channels as a whole, the interest rate channel and the exchange 
rate channel have relatively high response summary measures when the source of shock is 
the interest rate. If the source of shock is the money supply, then the credit channels 
become more prominent. This implies that if government should conduct monetary policy 
through the interest rate, then the more relevant channels to consider are the traditional 
interest rate and the exchange rate channels. On the other hand if the government uses the 
monetary aggregate as its policy instrument, then the credit channels are likely to propagate 
the monetary impulse more effectively, in particular the credit-consumption channel. The 
importance of the credit channels also means that the government should give due 
considerations to the role and importance of the banking sector in the management of the 
economy as argued by Claus and Grimes (2003), Dalziel (2001), Guttmann (1994), among 
others. 
In terms of the lag-periods, the exchange rate channel has the longest lag-period (almost 
three years) while the interest rate channel and the credit-consumption have relatively 
shorter lag-periods (less than two years). The delayed impact of the exchange rate shock on 
exports (almost two years) is the main reason why the exchange rate channel has such a 
long lag-period. The policy implication of this is that monetary policy tightening would be 
felt more quickly on private consumption and fixed investment rather than on exports. This 
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implies that while the monetary policy can be used in the short urn to influence 
consumption and investment, in the long run exports could be adversely affected. 
Comparative analysis between Australian and New Zealand 
In the bivariate relationships, fixed investment response to the interest rate shock is 17 per 
cent for Australia and less than 10 per cent for New Zealand. This clearly shows the 
importance of bank loans to investment in Australia and therefore policy makers in 
Australia should be wary of the adverse impact of monetary tightening on investment. The 
lower figure for New Zealand, on the other hand, would mean that given the choice of low 
investment against higher exchange rate, policy makers in New Zealand should consider 
the benefits or the consequences of currency changes rather than the impact of interest rate 
on fixed investments. 
With respect to the impact of the exchange rate shock on exports, in Australia this is more 
immediate than in New Zealand and slightly higher in magnitude. This implies that exports 
from Australia would immediately decline when the exchange rate becomes unfavourable. 
If the 'intended' exports could be redirected for domestic consumption then the income of 
the exporters would not be adversely affected but the question of how long the domestic 
economy could shield the exporters needs to be addressed. In the case of New Zealand, 
where export is critical to the economy, monitoring the exchange rate carefully is very 
important. The delayed and lower response of exports to exchange rate appreciation noted 
in the analysis means that exporters have entered into some kind of fixed price contracts or 
foreign exchange hedging but if the exchange rate keeps rising or persistently remains at a 
high level, this could mean huge hardship for exporters eventually. This clearly shows the 
vulnerability of New Zealand exporters to exchange rate fluctuations so it is only logical for 
policy-makers in New Zealand to take prudent steps, at least those that are within their 
means, in order not to inflate the exchange rate and exacerbate its adverse effects. As 
commonly known, raising the interest rate is one way of increasing the exchange rate 
therefore policy makers need to consider carefully the cost of lower exports against high 
inflation. One possible solution that has been discussed above is simply to encourage 
exporters to enter into long term fixed price contracts for their exports or to undertake 
foreign exchange rate hedging. 
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One very interesting difference in the monetary transmission process between the two 
countries is the dominance of the money supply effect on output (and other variables) in 
Australia whereas in New Zealand the interest rate seems to have more lasting effect on 
output. So in terms of which variable is more effective as a monetary policy tool, the 
evidence suggests that in Australia it would be the money supply but in New Zealand it 
would be the interest rate. However it is important to note that both variables do have 
impact on output and therefore it is wise to monitor constantly the movements of both 
variables. This would be consistent with Meltzer (1999) concluding sentence: Whether 
making a discretionary judgement or following a rule, history suggests that the bank will 
avoid large, costly errors if it does not ignore the role of changes in nominal money and in 
real balances when making its decisions. Meyer (2001) also suggested the importance of 
money supply in his concluding paragraph, " ..... I believe monitoring money growth has 
value, even for central banks that follow a disciplined strategy of adjusting their policy rate 
to ongoing economic developments". 
In comparing the exchange rate channel summary responses across the two countries New 
Zealand has a higher figure of 0.25 per cent (see Table 7.2.10) compared to 0.06 per cent 
for Australia (see Table 7.3.3). In view of this, monetary policy makers in New Zealand 
should try to focus more on the impact of their monetary policies on the exchange rate 
channel while policy makers in Australia should focus on the 'other asset price effects' 
channel. 
Looking at the total l~g periods of the different transmission channels, in general the lag 
periods in Australia are longer than the lag periods in New Zealand-except for the 
exchange rate channel. This would suggest that the effects of monetary policy changes on 
real output in Australia take time to be felt therefore it would be advantageous for policy 
makers in Australia to take earlier actions than their counterparts in New Zealand. Note 
however that this refers to the intended effect on output only as the study focused 
exclusively on real output rather than on inflation. 
On the counterfactual experiment there is clear evidence that the monetary policy, via the 
interest rate, has a significant impact on output and indeed can cause stagnant growth if 
applied too stringently (see Fig 7.4.1 and Fig 7.4.2). The analysis shows that had New 
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Zealand followed a 'looser' monetary policy in the mid 1980s, like Australia, its output 
would have been much higher. 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
As with all studies, in particular the empirical ones, there are shortcomings or limitations 
and this study is no exception. The following are some of the limitations that could have 
important influence on the outcomes of the study. 
The use of the Cholesky or recursive identification scheme may not represent the true 
structural model that we are interested in. In particular the structural shocks that suppose to 
represent, say the monetary policy action, or the supply side shock, may have not been 
properly identified5• 
With respect to the size of the models, the number of variables used here is generally small 
compared to other VAR studies6. In view of this there may be some concern for the 
'omitted' variable bias effect. In fact in the analysis, there is evidence of an 'omitted' 
variable bias in some of the bivariate models. The implication of this is that some responses 
or decompositions may have been overstated or understated depending on the correlation 
coefficient magnitude and sign between the omitted variable and the explanatory variable. 
Because of the time factor and data availability, and to some extent because of the thesis 
guidelines, not all monetary transmissions were covered. Furthermore, some important 
variables or constructs commonly employed in other monetary transmission studies, such 
as the Tobin 'q' measure, the external finance premium, or the real interest rate, have not 
been used here. This would imply that some of the transmission models employed in this 
study may have not been properly formulated-at least not 'sophisticatedly' formulated . 
In the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanisms,' especially in the parallel 
transmission approach where the larger V ARs are used, the analytical framework used is 
5 As noted by Fackler and Rogers (1993), "However, the 'fundamental' or structural shocks to the economic 
system under investigation are unlikely to be represented by such decomposition o/the VAR residuals". The 
authors are referring to the Cholesky decomposition. 
6 For instance, Buckle et aI. (2003) study uses 13 variables while both Siregar (2001) and Wongsaart (1997) 
studies use seven or more variables. 
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the standard VARin first-difference. This is done in order to be consistent as well as to 
facilitate the analysis and the comparison. However if there were any cointegration 
relationship between the variables, then this would mean some of the models might have 
been misspecified. 
The size of the sample, in particular the sample used in the evaluation of the different 
monetary transmission of just over sixty is not long enough and this may give some erratic 
or irregular responses but more importantly the standard errors will be quite large. The 
implication of this is that the empirical confidence intervals for our estimates are rather 
wide, so any reference to the confidence interval may not very meaningful. This is one 
reason why in this study the emphasis is more on the point estimates rather than on the 
confidence intervals, at least the point estimates are still unbiased and provide objective and 
useful measures for comparison. 
In the counterfactual analysis we did not consider the Lucas Critique however as with most 
policy simulation and analysis, there is the prospect of parameter instability, in particular if 
the economy has undergone structural changes or the data is quite extended. While there 
may be criticisms against the Lucas Critique (see, for example, Marcellino and Salmon 
(1999)), the idea of checking whether the parameters have changed after changing the 
interest rates is reasonable, however this has not been done in this study. One reason for 
this is that to assess the Lucas Critique one needs fairly complicated models incorporating 
expectations and alternate policy rules on the economy7. Besides, there are VAR and non-
V AR macroeconomic models without explicit expectations that appear to be fairly stable 
empirically (Rudebusch, 2003) so the Lucas Critique is not that robust or 'formidable' as it 
was once considered. Another empirical study that finds no support for the Lucas Critique 
is that of Perez (2002). 
Another limitation of the analysis, but this is applicable to the V AR framework in general, 
is the fact that it is not possible to isolate the impact or the effect of a single shock on 
another variableS. That is, the response of output, or any variable for that matter, is the 
7 An empirical assessment of the Lucas Critique is given in Rudebusch (2003). 
8 The closest one could get to this ideal situation is to use a bivariate model where only two variables are 
able to influence each other. Another common approach is to 'shut off' the effects of other variables by 
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resultant of several disturbances, including its own lagged values. This would mean that 
when we talk of the impact of a monetary policy shock on output or inflation, we are 
actually referring to a situation where the 'initial' shock or disturbance comes from the 
monetary policy instrument. That is, the initial chain reaction comes from the policy 
instrument but what happens later in the system is always a resultant of several factors. 
8.5 Suggestions for future research 
The following will suggest some areas that could be of interest to future research. 
Obviously most of the suggestions will be related to the limitations discussed above while 
some are just extensions to the present study. 
This study has focussed exclusively on the effects of monetary impulse on real output. 
Another useful approach would be to consider inflation as the final target of the 
transmission process. With many countries around the world focusing on price stability, 
including New Zealand and Australia, this approach would be very relevant and practical. 
In terms of the identification scheme one may try the structural decomposition scheme 
where the contemporaneous restrictions are not strictly recursive, i.e. it is up to the user 
how he or she views the transmission process or the economic structure and accordingly put 
in the required restrictions (as done by Fackler and Rogers, 1993). 
It would be useful also to enlarge the models in order to incorporate more relevant 
variables. This may include 'external' variables such as the US of Japanese output or 
interest rate, i.e. countries that are known to have substantial interactions with New Zealand 
or Australia. Furthermore, it would be interesting to derive and use empirical proxies for 
some of the concepts used in the various transmission channels, such as 'wealth', 'moral 
hazard', 'adverse selection', etc. This should be more representative of the transmission 
process and therefore more useful for policy purposes. One major problem here is the 
subjectivity and ambiguity of such terms as wealth, moral hazards, and so forth. The 
availability of data would be another major obstacle. 
restricting their coefficients to zero, as is done in Ludvigson et al. (2002). 
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In view of the difference in the response of fixed investment to the interest rate shock in the 
two countries, and given the importance of fixed investment to economic growth, it would 
be interesting and useful to extend the analysis using the components of fixed investment9 
or interest rates. These components may include housing, plants and machinery, transport 
equipment or short-term interest rate, real interest rates, and so forth. In splitting fixed 
investment or the interest rate this way, more specific information could be obtained which 
the policy makers could use instead of the very broad category like 'fixed investment' . 
There are only two countries involved in the comparison analysis in this study, yet very 
interesting differences are noted in the monetary transmission processes so to make an even 
more universal and useful comparison more countries should be incorporated in the 
analysis-as is done in Europe (see, for instance, Angeloni et al., 2002; Britton and 
Whitley, 1997; Cecchetti, 1999; among others). This should include countries that are 
known or suspected to have significant interactions with New Zealand or Australia. In 
doing this one may get a more comprehensive understanding of how the monetary 
transmission actually works both within the countries and across the countries-and for 
small open economies like New Zealand and Australia, this is crucial. 
Another interesting challenge is to carry out more elaborate studies on the serial and 
parallel transmission concepts introduced in this study with a view of developing forecasts 
based on the results. Tracing out the serial and parallel impacts of the monetary policy, say 
starting from the time the Governor of the Reserve Bank decided to increase the official 
cash rate right through to the time the effects are seen or felt on output (or inflation) would 
surely help policy makers to understand where the delay comes from or where the 
transmission fails because of the very low response noted, and so forth. These types of 
information are possible to derive from the sort of bivariate relationships that have been 
extensively examined and discussed in this study. The information is crucial not only for 
forecasting purposes but also for making the public understand the uncertainties associated 
with the transmission mechanism. The alternative is simply to look at the direct 
transmission approach that focuses only on the response of output (or inflation) to the 
interest rate or the money supply shocks leaving aside the 'intermediate' steps as an 
9 As done in Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Mauskop (1990), among others. 
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economic 'black box'. Unfortunately most studies up to now have chosen to pursue the 
alternative. 
8.6 Conclusions 
The study has produced very interesting results and useful insights. Some results are 
consistent with existing theories and past empirical studies while others either show 
contradictory results or totally new insights. With respect to the main objective of this study 
which is to try to understand how money affects output through the so-called monetary 
transmission channels, the main finding is that the issue is complex and cannot be 
summarised into a single sentence or in a single paragraph. Essentially the results and the 
analysis show that monetary transmission is possible through many channels, each with its 
own unique pattern and lag-period. Furthermore, when the source of monetary shock is 
changed, say from money supply to interest rate, the responses, the decompositions and the 
Granger-causality test results all changed as well. This really stresses the need to be careful 
of what monetary policy instrument is being used or what monetary transmission 
mechanism is being investigated. For instance, in Australia the money supply effect on 
output is quite significant but in New Zealand the interest rate seems to be more influential. 
There is also evidence that both the interest rate and the money supply are important for the 
conduct of monetary policy. This evidence clearly shows that 'money matters'. The 
analysis also demonstrated that the credit channel is an important transmission channel in 
addition to the traditional interest rate and the exchange rate channels. Another useful 
conclusion is that the monetary transmission process is different from country to country, 
and possibly from period to period depending on the monetary policy regime and financial 
institutional set-up. So to wrap up the discussion we can say that although it is possible to 
'peek' inside the co-called 'black box' using the V AR tools and the serial and parallel 
transmission approaches, it is still not possible to generalize the transmission process 
because there are so many possibilities-and none seems to stand out over the other. In 
practical terms, the formulation of monetary policies needs careful planning taking into 
account not only the direct impact of policy instrument changes on output (or inflation) but 
also the intermediate steps that characterise the different monetary transmission channels-
they too have their own unique' story' to tell. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 6.1 CORRELATION COEFF1CIENTS 
Table A6.1: Correlation coefficients 
a) New Zealand (in level) 
Ml M3 lNT EXCH PE KF EXPT PCE CRED 
Ml 1.000 0.962 -0.809 -0.570 0.795 0.782 0.943 0.901 0.979 
M3 0.962 1.000 -0.838 -0.472 0.852 0.831 0.971 0.895 0.992 
INT -0.809 -0.838 1.000 0.572 -0.578 -0.540 -0.843 -0.573 -0.820 
EXCH 
-0.570 -0.472 0.572 1.000 -0.303 -0.157 -0.494 -0.381 -0.524 
PE 0.795 0.852 -0.578 -0.303 1.000 0.853 0.837 0.855 0.854 
KF 0.782 0.831 -0.540 -0.157 0.853 1.000 0.794 0.856 0.829 
EXPT 0.943 0.971 -0.843 -0.494 0.837 0.794 1.000 0.866 0.971 
PCE 0.901 0.895 -0.573 -0.381 0.855 0.856 0.866 1.000 0.913 
CRED 0.979 0.992 -0.820 -0.524 0.854 0.829 0.971 0.913 1.000 
CPI 0.889 0.910 -0.881 -0.443 0.668 0.655 0.877 0.743 0.887 
ODPR 0.919 0.946 -0.721 -0.401 0.894 0.912 0.929 0.913 0.951 
ODPN 0.959 0.973 -0.840 -0.461 0.816 0.818 0.956 0.876 0.965 
(in first-difference) 
DMI DM3 DINT DEXCH DPE DKF DEXPT DPCE DCRED 
DMI 1.000 0.043 -0.206 0.002 0.171 0.030 0.266 0.097 0.094 
DM3 0.043 1.000 0.127 0.060 -0.044 0.026 0.002 -0.032 0.690 
DINT -0.206 0.127 1.000 0.219 -0.079 0.004 0.015 0.169 0.063 
DEXCH 0.002 0.060 0.219 1.000 0.152 -0.137 0.051 -0.212 0.050 
DPE 0.171 -0.044 -0.079 0.152 1.000 -0.020 0.029 -0.083 -0.058 
DKF 0.030 0.026 0.004 -0.137 -0.020 1.000 -0.286 0.085 -0.065 
DEXPT 0.266 0.002 0.015 0.051 0.029 -0.286 1.000 0.179 0.029 
DPCE 0.097 -0.032 0.169 -0.212 -0.083 0.085 0.179 1.000 -0.005 
DCRED 0.094 0.690 0.063 0.050 -0.058 -0.065 0.029 -0.005 1.000 
DCPI -0.003 0.158 0.153 0.141 0.049 0.032 -0.189 -0.287 0.045 
DODPR 0.419 0.069 -0.132 -0.122 -0.031 0.412 0.015 0.144 0.065 
DODPN 0.459 0.008 -0.108 -0.137 -0.010 0.349 0.338 0.114 -0.007 
b) Australia (in level) 
Ml M3 INT EXCH PE KF EXPT PCE CRED 
Ml 1.000 0.990 -0.780 -0.511 0.952 0.926 0.979 0.981 0.982 
M3 0.990 1.000 -0.800 -0.497 0.938 0.915 0.985 0.997 0.993 
INT -0.780 -0.800 1.000 0.591 -0.702 -0.614 -0.828 -0.821 -0.753 
EXCH -0.511 -0.497 0.591 1.000 -0.470 -0.318 -0.502 -0.515 -0.476 
PE 0.952 0.938 -0.702 -0.470 1.000 0.941 0.942 0.931 0.949 
KF 0.926 0.915 -0.614 -0.318 0.941 1.000 0.910 0.902 0.925 
EXPT 0.979 0.985 -0.828 -0.502 0.942 0.910 1.000 0.984 0.972 
PCE 0.981 0.997 -0.821 -0.515 0.931 0.902 0.984 1.000 0.991 
CREO 0.982 0.993 -0.753 -0.476 0.949 0.925 0.972 0.991 1.000 
CPI 0.913 0.954 -0.843 -0.526 0.842 0.808 0.936 0.970 0.943 
OOPR 0.970 0.971 -0.751 -0.477 0.937 0.925 0.960 0.965 0.966 
(in first-difference) 
DMI OM3 DINT OEXCH OPE DKF DEXPT DPCE DCRED 
OMI 1.000 0.707 0.010 0.102 0.070 0.036 '0.129 0.101 0.112 
OM3 0.707 1.000 0.144 0.099 -0.022 0.188 -0.022 0.267 0.316 
DINT 0.010 0.144 1.000 0.031 -0.100 0.069 -0.064 0.171 0.286 
DEXCH 0.102 0.099 0.031 1.000 0.222 0.196 -0.206 -0.107 0.088 
OPE 0.070 -0.022 -0.100 0.222 1.000 -0.037 -0.013 0.005 -0.047 
OKF 0.036 0.188 0.069 0.196 -0.037 1.000 -0.077 -0.051 0.131 
DEXP -0.129 -0.022 -0.064 -0.206 -0.013 -0.077 1.000 0.061 -0.045 
DPCE 0.101 0.267 0.171 -0.107 0.005 -0.051 0.061 1.000 0.503 
OCREO 0.112 0.316 0.286 0.088 -0.047 0.131 -0.045 0.503 1.000 
DCPI -0.119 0.090 0.093 -0.191 -0.042 -0.394 0.085 0.378 0.223 
OODPR 0.666 0.449 0.083 -0.071 0.017 -0.013 -0.013 -0.070 -0.061 
CPI ODPR ODPN 
0.889 0.919 0.959 
0.910 0.946 0.973 
-0.881 -0.721 -0.840 
-0.443 -0.401 -0.461 
0.668 0.894 0.816 
0.655 0.912 0.818 
0.877 0.929 0.956 
0.743 0.913 0.876 
0.887 0.951 0.965 
1.000 0.789 0.935 
0.789 1.000 0.945 
0.935 0.945 1.000 
DCPI DODPR DODPN 
-0.003 0.419 0.459 
0.158 0.069 0.008 
0.153 -0.132 -0.108 
0.141 -0.122 -0.137 
0.049 -0.031 -0.010 
0.032 0.412 0.349 
-0.189 0.015 0.338 
-0.287 0.144 0.114 
0.045 0.065 -0.007 
1.000 0.026 0.029 
0.026 1.000 0.864 
0.029 0.864 1.000 
CPI ODPR ODPN 
0.913 0.970 0.977 
0.954 0.971 0.991 
-0.843 -0.751 -0.797 
-0.526 -0.477 -0.503 
0.842 0.937 0.929 
0.808 0.925 0.906 
0.936 0.960 0.974 
0.970 0.965 0.991 
0.943 0.966 0.986 
1.000 0.912 0.962 
0.912 1.000 0.987 
DCP! OODPR DODPN 
-0.119 0.666 0.712 
0.090 0.449 0.477 
0.093 0.083 0.072 
-0.191 -0.071 -0.040 
-0.042 0.017 0.056 
-0.394 -0.013 -0.048 
0.085 -0.013 -0.033 
0.378 -0.070 -0.047 
0.223 -0.061 -0.017 
1.000 0.055 0.093 
0.055 1.000 0.983 
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APPENDIX 6.2: UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
Table A6.2.1 Unit root test results 
t-statistics (prob) 
a) 1977-2001 Sample 
Variable ADF test 
(Ho: Nonstationary) 
Const & Const 
linear trend 
'rr 'ru 
OOPR -\.1 (0.928) 0.7(0.992) 
OOPN -3.6(0.035) -0.0(0.953) 
OOpl 
-3.6(0.035) -3.6(0.007) 
Ml 0.9(0.955) 1.6(0.999) 
M3 -1.0(0.942) 2.8(1.000) 
CPI -0.4(0.987) -2.2(0.202) 
INT -2.7(0.262) -1.4(0.586) 
INF -5.6(0.000) -2.7(0.077) 
OOOPR -3.0(0.128) -2.9(0.056) 
DODPN -2.8(0.187) -2.9(0.055) 
DMI -3.9(0.017) -3.3(0.017) 
DM3 -11.5(0.000) -5.3(0.000) 
DCPI -5.7(0.000) -3.6(0.008) 
DINT -6.3(0.000) -6.3(0.000) 
DINF -14(0.000) -14(0.000) 
b) 1985 2001 S - ample 
EXCH -2.1(0.520) -1.7(0.430) 
PE -2.3(0.420) -1.1(0.710) 
EXPT -2.2(0.490) 0.9(1.000) 
CRED 1.5(1.000) 4.7(1.000) 
PCE -2.1(0.510) 0.8(0.810) 
KF -2.6(0.300) -0.5(0.890) 
DEXCH -8.6(0.000) -8.6(0.000) 
DPE -9.0(0.000) -9.1(0.000) 
DEXPT -5.0(0.002) -5.4(0.000) 
DCREO -11(0.000) -3.0(0.061) 
DPCE -10.0.000) -10(0.00) 
DKF -3.7(0.030) -3.6(0.010) 
PP test 
(Ho: Nonstationary) 
None Const & Const None 
linear trend 
'r Tr 'ru 'r 
2.5(0.997) -5.6(0.000) 0.0(0.956) 3.2(0.999) 
1.4(0.955) -7.3(0.000) 0.1(0.960) 3.7(0.999) 
-3.6(0.000) -7.3(0.000) -7.3(0.000) -7.4(0.000) 
2.9(0.999) -0.6(0.975) 6.1(1.000) 13(1.000) 
6.8(1.000) -0.8(0.964) 2.8(1.000) 7.5(1.000) 
1.6(0.973) -0.3(0.990) -2.2(0.197) 3.6(0.999) 
-0.7(0.412) -2.3(0.423) -1.0(0.747) -0.6(0.439) 
-2.1 (0.036) -5.6(0.000) -3.5(0.009) -2.4(0.018) 
-1.6(0.107) -21(0.000) -19(0.000) -13(0.000) 
-0.4(0.532) -29(0.000) -27(0.000) -16(0.000) 
-2.2(0.030) -12(0.000) -12(0.000) -10(0.000) 
-3.5(0.001) -11(0.000) -11(0.000) -9(0.000) 
-2.1(0.034) -6.0(0.000) -5.0(0.000) -3.0(0.004) 
-6.3(0.000) -6.0(0.000) -6.0(0.000) -6.0(0.000) 
-14(0.000) -19(0.000) -19(0.000) -19(0.000) 
-0.6(0.430) -2.3(0.440) -1.8(0.380) 0.6(0.430) 
0.8(0.870) -2.4(0.390) -1.0(0.750) 0.9(0.900) 
3.9(1.000) -6.1(0.000) 0.9(1.000) 4.3(1.000) 
9.4(1.000) 1.7(1.000) 4.5(1.000) 13(1.000) 
1.6(0.970) -2.0(0.600) 0.6(0.860) 1.9(1.000) 
0.9(0.900) -3.1(0.110) -1.8(0.390) 1.0(0.900) 
-8.7(0.000) -8.6(0.000) -8.6(0.000) . -8.7(0.00) 
-9.0(0.000) -9.1(0.000) -9.1(0.000) -9.0(0.00) 
-2.0(0.015) -17(0.000) -15(0.000) -10(0.00) 
0.8(0.880) -11(0.000) -9.0(0.000) -5(0.000) 
-10(0.000) -10(0.000) -10(0.000) -10(0.00) 
-3.5(0.000) -18(0.000) -15(0.000) -12(0.00) 
KPPS test2 
(Ho: Stationary) 
Const& Const 
linear trend 
'rr 'ru 
0.257 1.255 
0.133 1.334 
0.133 0.133 
0.185 1.288 
0.288 1.326 
0.311 1.285 
0.217 0.786 
0.100 1.038 
0.070 0.187 
0.064 0.074 
0.189 0.400 
0.045 0.712 
0.130 0.553 
0.074 0.229 
0.081 0.087 
0.096 0.35 
0.175 0.880 
0.293 1.074 
0.270 1.067 
0.211 0.916 
0.162 0.836 
0.058 0.072 
0.050 0.069 
0.092 0.344 
0.181 0.936 
0.076 0.103 
0.147 0.147 
Notes: I de-trended series; 2 For the KPPS critical values, these are provided in the footnote for Table A6.2.2. 
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Table A6.2.2 Aust: Unit root test results 
( b) t-statzstzcs :pro 
Variable ADF test 
(Ho: Nonstationary) 
Const& Const None 
linear trend 
Tr Til T 
GDPR -1.3(0.883) 1.2(1.000) 3.1(1.000) 
GDPN -1.4(0.838) 0.8(1.000) 2.0(1.000) 
Ml 1.4(1.000) 3.5(1.000) 3.7(1.000) 
M3 0.8(1.000) 3.4(1.000) 11.2( 1.000) 
CPI -2.4(0.387) -1.6(0.480) 2.2(0.992) 
INT -2.3(0.403) -1.3(0.631) -1.6(0.110) 
INF 
-1.6(0.787) -1.6(0.450) -1.4(0.153) 
EXCH -9.1(0.000) -9.1(0.000) -9.1(0.000) 
PE -1.6(0.768) -0.3(0.916) 2.2(0.993) 
EXPT -2.9(0.170) 0.2(0.969) 3.9(1.000) 
CRED -0.99(0.937) 1.0(0.996) 2.1(0.990) 
PCE 1.1(1.000) 2.6(1.000) 17.2(1.0) 
KF -1.9(0.648) -0.3(0.926) 1.6(0.973) 
DGDPR 
-3.5(0.049) -3.1(0.030) -0.7(0.411) 
DGDPN -2.1(0.542) -1.9(0.331) -0.2(0.611) 
DMI -1.4(0.849) -0.2(0.930) 1.0(0.913) 
DM3 -7.4(0.000) -6.5(0.000) 0.34(0.781) 
DCPI -3.4(0.062) -3.3(0.020) -1.9(0.061) 
DINT -7.5(0.000) -7.5(0.000) -7.4(0.000) 
DINF 
-4.8(0.001) -4.8(0.000) -4.8(0.000) 
DPE -11(0.000) -11(0.000) -11(0.000) 
DEXPT -8.6(0.00) -8.6(0.000) -8.6(0.000) 
DCRED -2.4(0.367) -2.1(0.251) -0.7(0.414) 
DPCE -2.6(0.294) -2.0(0.278) 0.6(0.838) 
DKF -6.0(0.00) -6.0(0.000) -5.7(0.000) 
DDMI -16(0.000) -16(0.000) -16(0.000) 
DDCRED -9.9(0.000) -9.9(0.000) -9.9(0.000) 
DDPCE -6.5(0.000) -6.4(0.000) -6.4(0.000) 
Note: 2 KPPS critical values: Tr Tu 
1 % 0.216 0.739 
5% 0.146 0.463 
10% 0.119 0.347 
PP test KPPS test2 
(Ho: Nonstationary) (Ho: Stationary) 
Const& Const None Const& Const 
linear trend linear trend 
Tr Tu T Tr Tu 
-7.2(0.000) -1.3(0.638) 2.9(1.000) 1.070 0.299 
-6.2(0.000) -0.4(0.902) 4.7(1.000) 1.080 0.201 
2.2(1.000) 13(1.000) 26(1.000) 1.068 0.267 
0.8(1.000) 3.3(1.000) 11(1.000) 1.081 0.225 
-2.3(0.441 ) -2.3(0.180) 4.8(1.000) 1.050 0.220 
-2.3(0.454) -1.3(0.634) -1.4(0.135) 0.882 0.132 
-2.5(0.338) -1.6(0.459) -1.0(0.268) 0.632 0.154 
-9.2(0.000) -9.2(0.000) -9.2(0.000) 0.118 0.072 
-2.1 (0.546) -0.4(0.901) 2.3(0.99) 0.980 0.220 
-2.8(0.195) 0.5(0.986) 5.1(1.0) 1.074 0.214 
-0.15(0.993) 1.7(1.000) 7.2(1.0) 1.048 0.200 
0.62(1.000) 2.1(1.000) 12A( 1.0) 1.086 0.170 
-1.9(0.659) -.08(0.947) 1.8(0.981) 0.926 0.182 
-32(0.000) -30(0.000) -14(0.000) 0.082 0.085 
-24(0.000) -23(0.000) -13(0.000) 0.089 0.089 
-10.9(0.000) -8.8(0.000) -6.3(0.000) 0.963 0.205 
-704(0.000) -6.5(0.000) -3.2(0.000) 0.703 0.141 
-6.2(0.000) -5.8(0.000) -2.9(0.000) 0.388 0.1~6 
-7.6(0.000) -7.6(0.000) -7.6(0.000) 0.060 0.054 
-7.2(0.000) -7.3(0.000) -7.3(0.000) 0.083 0.087 
-12(0.000) -12(0.000) -11(0.000) 0.106 0.082 
-8.8(0.000) -8.7(0.000) -7.0(0.000) 0.149 0.096 
-2.3(0.431) -2.1 (0.251) -0.4(0.532) 0.374 0.158 
-7.9(0.000) -7.5(0.000) -1.3(0.193) 0.442 0.202 
-6.1 (0.000) -6.1(0.000) -5.8(0.000) 0.133 0.055 
-47(0.000) -47(0.000) -43(0.000) 0.146 0.114 
-10(0.000) -10(0.000) -10(0.000) 0.084 0.066 
-17(0.000) -17(0.00QL -17{O.000) 0.140 0.053 
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Table A6.2.3 Seasonal unit root test results 
a) Dependent variable is real GDP b) Dependent variable is nom GDP 
Variables Coeff t-stat Prob. Variables 
Const 170 0.26 0.794 const 
D2 293 0.89 0.372 D2 
D3 363 1.27 0.208 D3 
D4 1416 4.83 0.000 D4 
r 5.97 1.39 0.166 r 
Jr] 
-0.011 -1.06 0.292 Jr j 
Jr2 0.376 -3.13 0.002 Jr 2 
Jr3 0.172 -1.72 0.089 Jr3 
Jr4 0.398 -4.00 0.000 Jr4 
c) Dependent variable is detrended nominal GDP 
Variables Coeff t-stat Prob. 
Const 28 0.14 0.889 
D2 -192 -0.71 0.479 
D3 -476 -1.74 0.085 
D4 494 1.79 0.076 
r 0.589 0.29 0.769 
Jr j 
-0.042 -2.39 0.019 
Jr 2 0.1 -2.12 0.037 
Jr3 
-0.023 -0.27 0.789 
Jr4 0.268 -3.06 0.003 
Note: For a): Ho : Jr3 = Jr 4 = 0, F stat= 10.2 df(2,82) 
For b): Ho: Jr3 = Jr 4 = 0, F stat= 4.75 df(2,82) 
For c): Ho : Jr3 = Jr 4 = 0, F stat= 4.75 df(2,82) 
Coeff t-stat Prob. 
645 2.53 0.013 
-192 -0.71 0.479 
-476 -1.74 0.085 
494 1.79 0.076 
47.7 2.42 0.Q18 
-0.042 -2.39 0.019 
0.1 -2.12 0.037 
-0.023 -0.27 0.789 
0.268 -3.06 0.003 
255 
APPENDIX 6.3 ESTIMATION OF NEUTRALITY AND SUPERNEUTRALITY 
BIVARIATE VAR MODELS 
Table A6.3.1 Selecting the order of the bivariate model: 
Money (DMI vs real output (DGDPR) 
Lag Order AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -1268.4 -1329.7 ------ ------
11 -1269.5 -1326.0 CHSQ( 4)= 10.2696[.036] 7.2842[.122] 
10 -1267.1 -1318.6 CHSQ( 8)= 13.3719[.100] 9.4847[.303] 
9 -1263.6 -1310.2 CHSQ( 12)= 14.4487[.273] 10.2485[.594] 
8 -1261.8 -1303.5 CHSQ( 16)= 18.8281[.278] 13.3548[.647] 
7 -1265.5 -1302.3 CHSQ( 20)= 34.1345[.025] 24.2117[.233] 
6 -1268.8 -1300.7 CHSQ( 24)= 48.9081[.002] 34.6906[.073] 
5 -1265.8 -1292.8 CHSQ( 28)= 50.9007[.005] 36.1040[.140] 
4 -1262.5 -1284.6 CHSQ( 32)= 52.2949[.013] 37.0929[.246] 
3 -1292.0 -1309.2 CHSQ( 36)= 119.2897[.000] 84.6125[.000] 
2 -1325.8 -1338.1 CHSQ( 40)= 194.7978[.000] 138.1705[.000] 
1 -1333.0 -1340.4 CHSQ( 44)= 217.2675[.000] 154.1084[.000] 
0 -1341.0 -1343.5 CHSQ( 48)= 241.2158[.000] 171.0949[.000] 
Note: AlC= Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Table A6.3.2 Cointegration test results 
(ofGDPR and Ml) 
(with unrestricted intercepts and no trends; VAR=5) 
(i) Maximal Eigenvalue test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Crit. Value 90% Crit. Value 
r= 0 r = 1 14.5522 14.8800 12.9800 
r<= 1 r=2 1.0677 8.0700 6.5000 
(ii) Trace test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Crit. Value 90% Crit. Value 
r= 0 r>= 1 15.6199 17.8600 15.7500 
r<= 1 r=2 1.0677 8.0700 6.5000 
(iii) Using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AlC SBC HQC 
r=O -1335.6 -1359.6 -1390.2 -1372.0 
r=1 -1328.4 -1355.4 -1389.7 -1369.2 
r=2 -1327.8 -1355.8 -1391.4 -1370.2 
Notes: HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion (AIC and SBC defined in A6.3.1) 
Eigenvalues in descending order: 0.14342, 0.011294 
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Table A6.3.3 OLS estimation of real output (DGDPR) equation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[probl 
DGDPR(-l) -.09318 .10815 -.86161[.391] 
DGDPR(-2) -.14953 .11041 -1.35430[ .179] 
DGDPR(-3) .03859 .11031 .34984[ .727] 
DGDPR(-4) .22428 .11090 2.02240[ .046] 
DMI(-I) -.00397 .09471 -.04197[.967] 
DMl(-2) .06679 .09301 .71810[.475] 
DMl(-3) .12012 .09313 1.28970[.201] 
DMl(-4) .01042 .09539 .10928[.9l3] 
CONST 1048.70000 175.65160 5.97010[.000] 
Sl -1616.10000 285.81070 -5.65450[.000] 
S2 -1129.00000 270.66700 -4.17100[.000] 
S3 -1096.60000 277.14240 -3.95670[.000] 
R-Squared = .89700 R-Bar-Squared= .88318 
S.E. of Regression= 300.3573 F( 11, 82)= 64.9198[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable: 119.3511 S.D= 878.7908 
Residual Sum of Squares=7397592 Equation Log-likelihood= -663.2286 
AIC= -675.2286 SBC= -690.4884 
DW -statistic= 2.0015 System Log-likelihood= -1335.6 
Table A6.3.4 Real output (DGDPR) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * FVersion 
* A:Serial Correlation * CHSQ(4) = 3.0087[.556] *F(4,78)= .64478[.632] 
* B :Functional Form *CHSQ(l) = 2.8881[.089] *F(l,81)= 2.5676[.113] 
* C:Normality *CHSQ(2)= .4195[.811] * Not applicable 
* D:Heteroscedasticity *CHSQ(l) = 1.9136[.167] *F(l,92)= 1.9118[.170] 
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
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Table A6.3.5 OLS estimation money (DMl) equation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
DGDPR(-l) .12593 .12088 1.0417[.301] 
DGDPR(-2) -.08974 .12341 -.7271[.469] 
DGDPR(-3) -.36160 .12329 -2.9329[.004] 
DGDPR(-4) .12254 .12395 .9885[.326] 
DM1(-1) -.04231 .10586 -.3997[.690] 
DM1(-2) .10935 .10397 1.0518[.296] 
DM1(-3) -.03359 .10410 -.3227[.748] 
DM1(-4) .28050 .10662 2.6308[.010] 
CONST -154.53390 196.32690 -.7871[.433] 
Sl 112.28470 319.45250 .3514[.726] 
S2 514.83980 302.52630 1.7018[.093] 
S3 562.89760 309.76390 1.8172r.0731 
R-Squared= .43904 R-Bar-Squared= .36379 
S.E. of Regression= 335.7114 F( 11, 82)= 5.8343[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable = 173.4681 S.D= 420.8868 
Residual Sum of Squares= 9241574 Equation Log-likelihood= -673.6888 
AIC= -685.6888 SBC= -700.9486 
DW -statistic= 2.0212 System Log-likelihood= -1335.6 
Table A6.3.6 Money (DMl) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Form 
* C:Norrnality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 2.9772[.562] 
*CHSQ(1)= .0168[.897] 
*CHSQ(2)=19.7597[.000] 
*CHSQ(l)= .5741[.449] 
FVersion 
*F(4,78)= .63782[.637] 
*F(1,81)= .01450[.904] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1,92)= .56542[.454] 
258 
Table A6.3.7 Impulse and cumulative responses: 
Money (DMl) vs real output (DGDPR) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(a) to money shock (b) to output shock 
DGDPR DM1 IRD DGDPR DM1 IRD 
1 49.194 335.708 0.070 300.000 55.000 0.383 
2 -5.920 -8.007 0.354 -28.200 35.500 -2.628 
3 15.666 31.880 0.235 -38.700 -26.000 1.403 
4 40.973 -28.786 -0.682 28.450 -107.800 -7.911 
5 9.421 111.063 0.041 72.900 70.000 2.005 
6 -6.344 -20.043 0.152 -29.100 l3.240 -0.950 
7 8.650 8.354 0.496 -24.400 -21.800 1.865 
8 21.363 -11.073 -0.924 24.100 -53.600 -4.644 
9 -2.063 38.751 -0.025 17.720 43.800 5.161 
10 -4.188 -14.828 0.135 -18.900 2.050 -0.226 
11 4.854 0.549 4.235 -9.200 -15.290 3.470 
12 8.410 -1.692 -2.381 14.660 -18.500 -2.635 
13 -3.469 13.333 -0.125 3.000 23.000 16.007 
14 -1.940 -8.387 0.111 -10.200 1.854 -0.380 
15 2.838 -0.356 -3.818 -1.800 -9.058 10.507 
20 0.722 1.148 0.301 3.460 0.020 0.012 
25 -0.644 0.168 -1.836 -0.960 1.8l3 -3.943 
30 0.129 -0.355 -0.174 -0.210 -0.741 7.367 
35 0.051 0.114 0.214 0.200 -0.004 -0.042 
40 -0.035 0.010 -1.676 -0.030 0.105 -7.308 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
(c) to money shock (d) to output shock 
DGDPR DM1 LRD DGDPR DM1 LRD 
1 49 336 0.069 300 55.00 0.383 
2 43 327 0.063 272 90.00 0.691 
3 59 360 0.078 233 64.00 0.573 
4 100 331 0.145 262 -43.00 -0.343 
5 109 442 0.118 334 27.00 0.169 
6 103 422 0.117 306 40.00 0.273 
7 112 430 0.125 281 18.00 0.l34 
8 l33 419 0.152 305 -35.00 -0.240 
9 l31 458 0.l37 323 8.00 0.052 
10 127 443 0.137 304 10.00 0.069 
11 l32 443 0.143 295 -5.00 -0.035 
12 140 442 0.152 309 -23.00 -0.155 
l3 l37 455 0.143 313 -0.46 -0.003 
14 l35 447 0.145 302 -2.32 -0.016 
15 l37 446 0.147 300 -11.40 -0.079 
20 140 449 0.148 306 -12.00 -0.082 
25 l38 449 0.149 305 -8.60 -0.059 
30 l39 448 0.149 304 -10.10 -0.069 
35 l39 448 0.149 304 -10.10 -0.069 
40 l39 448 0.149 305 -10.00 -0.068 
Notes: The responses are in original units, but the IRD and LRD values are in standardized units. 
IRD = Impulse responses derivative 
LRD = Long run derivative (Fish and Seater LRD test statistic) 
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Table A6.3.8 Selecting the order of the bivariate model: 
Money (DMI) vs nominal output (DGDPN) 
Lag order AlC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -1307.6 -1378.8 ------ ------
11 -1305.6 -1371.9 CHSQ( 4)= 3.9630[.411] 2.6266[.622] 
10 -1308.2 -1369.6 CHSQ( 8)= 17.2201[.028] 11.4133[.179] 
9 -1305.7 -1362.1 CHSQ( 12)= 20.0969[.065] 13.3201[.346] 
8 -1304.8 -1356.3 CHSQ( 16)= 26.3219[.050] 17 .4459[ .357] 
7 -1303.4 -1350.1 CHSQ( 20)= 31.6166[.048] 20.9552[.400] 
6 -1304.4 -1346.1 CHSQ( 24)= 41.5797[.014] 27.5587[.279] 
5 -1306.5 -1343.3 CHSQ( 28)= 53.7594[.002] 35.6313[.152] 
4 -1305.1 -1337.0 CHSQ( 32)= 59.0034[.003] 39.1069[.181] 
3 -1309.6 -1336.6 CHSQ( 36)= 76.0401[.000] 50.3987[ .056] 
2 -1316.5 -1338.6 CHSQ( 40)= 97.7787[.000] 64.8068[.008] 
1 -1314.2 -1331.4 CHSQ( 44)= 101.1762[.000] 67.0586[.014] 
0 -1331.7 -1343.9 CHSQ( 48)= 144.0861[.000] 95 .4989[ .000] 
Table A6.3.9 OLS estimation of nominal output (DGDPN) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
DGDPN(-1) -.72838 .10928 
DGDPN(-2) -.42680 .13104 
DGDPN(-3) -.10233 .12519 
DGDPN(-4) .56394 .12483 
DGDPN(-5) .42517 .13256 
DGDPN(-6) .33623 .11203 
DM1(-1) .19193 .17453 
DM1(-2) .15773 .17919 
DM1(-3) .17813 .17531 
DM1(-4) .06023 .17794 
DM1(-5) -.14030 .20237 
DM1(-6) -.27780 .20356 
CONST 836.84750 236.08940 
T -.43433 2.44900 
Sl -572.27210 303.14070 
S2 -747.50370 295.49240 
S3 -919.29110 280.36710 
R-Squared = .88240 R-Bar-Squared = .85731 
-6.6652[.000] 
-3.2570[.002] 
-.8174[.416] 
4.5178[.000] 
3.2073 [.002] 
3.0013[.004] 
1.0997[.275] 
.8802[.382] 
1.0161[.313] 
.3385[.736] 
-.6932[.490] 
-1.3647[.176] 
3.5446[.001] 
-.1773[.860] 
-1.8878[.063] 
-2.5297[.014] 
-3.2789f .0021 
S.E. of Regression= 514.2807 F( 16, 75)= 35.1723[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable: 288.1304 S.D= 1361.5 
Residual Sum of Squares= 1.98E+07 Equation Log-likelihood= -695.4793 
AlC= -712.4793 SBC= -733.9145 
DW-statistic = 1.8468 System Log-likelihood = -1353.9 
Table A6.3.10 Nominal output (DGDPN) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test n. . . ~s * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B : Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
*CHSQ(4)= 7.1516[.128] *F(4,71)= 1.4961[.213] 
*CHSQ(1)=12.7370[.000] *F(1,74)=11.8913[.001] 
*CHSQ(2)= 5.5495[.062] * Not applicable 
*CHSQ(1)= 1.1002[.294] *F(1,90)= 1.0893[.299] 
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Table A6.3.11 OLS estimation of money (DMl) equation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor 
DGDPN(-l) 
DGDPN(-2) 
DGDPN(-3) 
DGDPN(-4) 
DGDPN(-5) 
DGDPN(-6) 
DM1(-1) 
DM1(-2) 
DM1(-3) 
DM1(-4) 
DM1(-5) 
DM1(-6) 
CONST 
T 
Sl 
S2 
S3 
Coefficient 
.08003 
.04561 
-.7364E-3 
.14754 
.05873 
-.05122 
-.10385 
-.00638 
-.15455 
.19723 
-.13941 
-.06826 
13.28950 
3.79290 
-220.34740 
-34.05520 
-67.31320 
Standard Error 
.07384 
.08854 
.08459 
.08435 
.08957 
.07570 
.11794 
.12108 
.11846 
.12024 
.13675 
.13755 
159.53600 
1.65490 
204.84540· 
199.67710 
189.45630 
R-Squared= .44549 R-Bar-Squared= .32719 
T-Ratio[prob] 
1.0838[.282] 
.51511[.608] 
-.0087046[.993] 
1.7491[.084] 
.65573[.514] 
-.67663[.501] 
-.88057[.381] 
-.052730[.958] 
-1.3046[.196] 
1.6403[.105] 
-1.0 194[.311] 
-.49628[.621] 
.083301[.934] 
2.2919[.025] 
-1.0757[.286] 
-.17055[.865] 
-.35530[.723] 
S.E. of Regression= 347.5220 F( 16,75)=3.7659[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable= 175.0435 S.D= 423.6781 
Residual Sum of Squares= 9057865 Equation Log-likelihood= -659.4207 
AlC= -676.4207 SBC= -697.8559 
DW-statistic= 1.9310 System Log-likelihood= -1353.9 
Table A6.3.12 Money (DMl) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 6.5544[.161] 
*CHSQ(l)= .2540[.614] 
*CHSQ(2)=1 0.5794[ .005] 
*CHSQ(l)= 1.7258[.189] 
* FVersion 
*F(4,71)= 1.3616[.256] 
*F(1,74)= .2049[.652] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1,90)= 1.7206[.193] 
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Table A6.3.13 Impulse and cumulative responses: 
Money (DMl) vs nominal output (DGDPN) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(c) to money shock (d) to output shock 
DGDPN DM1 IRD DGDPN DM1 IRD 
1 119.9 417.5 0.08 499.4 100.2 0.69 
2 -20.3 -13.2 0.45 -360.4 19.4 -0.19 
3 9.3 15.8 0.17 143.2 -5.0 -0.12 
4 52.2 -79.4 -0.19 64.7 -46.2 -2.46 
5 16.5 95.2 0.05 120.2 152.6 4.37 
6 -64.7 -37.1 0.51 -83.1 -49.9 2.07 
7 1.9 -2.9 -0.19 72.3 -21.8 -1.04 
8 46.2 -17.7 -0.76 -13.8 7.5 -1.87 
9 -2.7 40.2 -0.02 112.2 63.9 l.96 
10 -26.6 -27.3 0.28 -68.1 -26.8 1.36 
11 -5.4 -5.2 0.30 37.2 0.7 0.06 
12 27.1 4.7 1.68 22.4 -6.0 -0.92 
13 -2.1 17.7 -0.03 35.3 40.0 3.91 
14 -13.3 -14.1 0.27 -32.5 -15.7 l.65 
15 -1.8 -5.2 0.10 32.3 -2.4 -0.26 
20 8.0 4.4 0.52 6.9 2.2 1.11 
25 -2.9 0.8 -1.12 3.8 4.8 4.33 
30 -0.3 -1.1 0.08 -1.5 -2.0 4.50 
35 0.4 0.0 8.05 2.0 0.6 1.08 
40 0.2 0.3 0.17 0.3 0.3 3.60 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
(c) to money shock (d) to output shock 
DGDPN DM1 LRD DGDPN DM1 LRD 
1 120 417 0.08 499 100 0.69 
2 100 404 0.07 l39 120 2.96 
3 109 420 0.08 282 115 1.40 
4 161 341 0.14 347 68 0.68 
5 178 436 0.12 467 221 1.63 
6 113 399 0.08 384 171 1.53 
7 115 396 0.08 456 149 1.13 
8 161 378 0.12 443 157 1.22 
9 158 418 O.ll 555 221 1.37 
10 132 391 0.10 487 194 1.37 
11 126 386 0.10 524 195 1.28 
12 153 391 0.11 546 189 1.19 
13 151 408 0.11 582 229 1.35 
14 138 394 0.10 549 213 1.33 
15 136 389 0.10 581 210 1.25 
20 150 396 0.11 613 226 1.27 
25 146 398 0.11 632 238 1.29 
30 146 396 0.11 637 237 1.28 
35 146 396 O.ll 644 239 1.28 
40 147 397 0.11 646 240 1.28 
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Table A6.3.14 Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
Money (DM3) vs realoutput (DGDPR) 
Lag Order AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -1403.6 -1464.9 ------ ------
11 -1406.1 -1462.6 CHSQ( 4)= 13.1943[.010] 9.3587[.053] 
10 -1403.1 -1454.7 CHSQ( 8)= 15.1708[.056] 10.7606[.216] 
9 -1400.5 -1447.2 CHSQ( 12)= 17.9797[.116J 12.7531[.387] 
8 -1398.8 -1440.5 CHSQ( 16)= 22.5290[.127] 15.9799[.454J 
7 -1400.2 -1437.0 CHSQ( 20)= 33.3114[.031] 23.6279[.259J 
6 -1403.2 -1435.1 CHSQ( 24)= 47.3682[.003] 33.5984[.092] 
5 -1403.0 -1430.0 CHSQ( 28)= 54.9570[.002] 38.9811[.081] 
4 -1402.0 -1424.1 CHSQ( 32)= 60.8780[.002] 43.1809[.090] 
3 -1429.1 -1446.3 CHSQ( 36)= 123.1357[.000] 87 .3404[ .OOOJ 
2 -1460.8 -1473.1 CHSQ( 40)= 194.5904[.000] 138.0235[.000] 
1 -1473.9 -1481.2 CHSQ( 44)= 228.6487[.000] 162.1811[.000] 
0 -1476.5 -1479.0 CHSQ( 48)= 241.9480[.000] 171.6143[.000J 
Table A6.3.15 Cointegration test results 
(of GDPR and M3) 
(with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR, order= 5) 
(i) Maximal Eigenvalue test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Crit.Value 90% Crit.Value 
r= 0 r=1 15.0931 19.2200 17.1800 
r<= 1 r=2 4.4331 12.3900 10.5500 
(ii) Trace test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Crit. Value 90% Crit.Value 
r=O r>= 1 19.5262 25.7700 23.0800 
r<= 1 r=2 4.4331 12.3900 10.5500 
(iii) Using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AlC SBC HQC 
r=O -1490.2 -1514.2 -1544.8 -1526.6 
r= 1 -1482.7 -1510.7 -1546.3 -1525.1 
r= 2 -1480.5 -1510.5 -1548.6 -1525.9 
Note: List of eigenvalues in descending order: 0.14834, 0.046066, 
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Table A6.3.16 OLS estimation of real output (DGDPR) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
DGDPR(-1) -.06216 .11189 -.5556[.580] 
DGDPR(-2) -.16605 .11067 -1.5004[.137] 
DGDPR(-3) .09030 .1l01O .8201[.415] 
DGDPR(-4) .24629 .10805 2.2794[.025] 
DGDPR(-5) -.04752 .10710 -.4437[.658] 
DM3(-1) .02189 .01958 1.1179[.267] 
DM3(-2) .02900 .02051 1.4143[.161] 
DM3(-3) -.03482 .02346 -1.4844[.142] 
DM3(-4) .01747 .02380 .7337[.465] 
DM3(-5) -.00208 .02507 -.0832[.934] 
CONST 983.86830 178.00540 5.5272[.000] 
Sl -1499.30000 296.19760 -5.0617[.000] 
S2 -1079.40000 280.88350 -3.8430[.000] 
S3 -1062.70000 273.05670 -3 .8920[ .000] 
R-Squared = .90099 R-Bar-Squared= .88469 
S.E. of Regression = 296.7340 F( 13, 79)= 55.2975[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable = 105.9570 S.D= 873.8538 
Residual Sum of Squares = 6956036 Equation Log-likelihood= -653.8085 
AIC= -667.8085 SBC= -685.5367 
DW-statistic = 2.0110 System Log-likelihood= -1471.2 
Table A6.3.17 Real output (DGDPR) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functional Form 
C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 4.4994[.343] 
*CHSQ(l)= 5.1777[.023] 
*CHSQ(2)= .5757[.750] 
*CHSQ(l)= .3663[.545] 
* F Version 
*F(4,75)= .9532[.438] 
*F(1,78)=4.5986[.035] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1,91)= .359[.550] 
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Table A6.3.18 OLS estimation of money (DM3) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T -Ratio[Prob] 
DGDPR(-I) -.08459 .64977 -.13019[.897] 
DGDPR(-2) .51032 .64269 .79403[.430] 
DGDPR(-3) .26066 .63941 .40765[.685] 
DGDPR(-4) .18924 .62750 .30159[.764] 
DGDPR(-5) .07022 .62198 .11291[.910] 
DM3(-1) -.11102 .11372 -.97634[.332] 
DM3(-2) .34657 .11912 2.90950[.005] 
DM3(-3) .03515 .13624 .25799[.797] 
DM3(-4) -.21555 .13827 -1.55890[.123] 
DM3(-5) .34374 .14564 2.36010[.021] 
CONST 1130.80000 1033.80000 1.09390[.277] 
Sl -1201.60000 1720.20000 -.69851[.487] 
S2 -510.18000 1631.20000 -.31276[.755] 
S3 -140.76990 1585.80000 -.08877[.929] 
R-Squared = .24241 R-Bar-Squared = .11774 
S.E. of Regression = 1723.3 F( 13, 79)= 1.9444[.037] 
Mean of Dependent Variable= 1217.4 S.D= 1834.7 
Residual Sum of Squares= 2.35E+08 Equation Log~likelihood=-817.4091 
AIC= -831.4091 SBC= -849.1373 
DW-statistic = 2.0822 System Log-likelihood = -1471.2 
Table A6.3.19 Money (DM3) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:FunctionaI Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 8.1607[.086] 
*CHSQ(1)=12.1753[.000] 
*CHSQ(2)=36.1464[.000] 
*CHSQ(l)= 1.8791[.170] 
F Version 
*F(4,75)= 1.8036[.137] 
*F(l,78)= 11.7498[.001] 
* Not applicable 
*F(l,91)= 1.8766[.174] 
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Table A6.3.20 Impulse and cumulative responses: 
Money (DM3) vs real output (DGDPR) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
Ca) to money shock (b) to output shock 
DGDPR DM3 IRD DGDPR DM3 
1 3.96 1723.29 0.00 296.69 23.00 
2 37.48 -191.66 -0.41 -17.94 -27.72 
3 42.79 617.35 0.15 -48.05 163.89 
4 -60.59 -57.86 2.20 34.72 45.24 
5 54.43 -120.34 -0.95 84.39 70.03 
6 -l3.16 631.72 -0.04 -37.24 43.01 
7 18.61 -288.99 -0.14 -15.23 21.10 
8 2.88 468.87 0.01 25.30 69.11 
9 -10.27 -112.05 0.19 18.49 0.45 
10 28.51 -4.25 -14.08 -18.01 45.67 
11 -20.63 253.27 -0.17 -2.76 19.80 
12 l3.56 -218.47 -0.l3 14.69 5.60 
13 2.27 291.22 0.02 0.24 29.44 
14 -5.37 -l30.71 0.09 -7.10 -5.69 
15 12.37 54.93 0.47 2.69 25.23 
20 6.54 66.08 0.21 1.28 13.12 
25 2.44 57.16 0.09 -0.70 7.53 
30 0.43 42.49 0.02 -0.04 4.02 
35 -0.32 28.45 -0.02 -0.11 1.99 
40 -0.54 17.44 -0.07 -0.11 0.88 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
(a) to money shock (b) to output shock 
DGDPR DM3 LRD DGDPR DM3 
1 4.0 1723 0.005 297 23 
2 41.4 1532 0.057 279 -5 
3 84.2 2149 0.082· 231 159 
4 23.6 2091 0.024 265 204 
5 78.1 1971 0.083 350 274 
6 64.9 2602 0.052 313 317 
7 83.5 2314 0.076 297 339 
8 86.4 2782 0.065 323 408 
9 76.1 2670 0.060 341 408 
10 104.6 2666 0.082 323 454 
11 84.0 2919 0.060 320 474 
12 97.6 2701 0.076 335 479 
13 99.8 2992 0.070 335 509 
14 94.5 2861 0.069 328 503 
15 106.8 2916 0.077 331 528 
20 107.5 3007 0.075 335 553 
25 106.9 3037 0.074 334 562 
30 106.2 3045 0.073 335 565 
35 105.8 3044 0.073 335 566 
40 105.7 3041 0.073 335 565 
IRD 
0.04 
0.74 
-1.62 
0.62 
0.40 
-0.55 
-0.66 
1.30 
om 
-1.21 
-3.41 
0.18 
57.25 
0.38 
4.47 
4.87 
-5.15 
-43.22 
-8.81 
-3.96 
LRD 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.33 
0.37 
0.37 
0.48 
0.54 
0.60 
0.57 
0.67 
0.70 
0.68 
0.72 
.0.73 
0.76 
0.79 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
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Table A6.3.21 Selecting the order of the V AR: 
Money (DMl) vs Price (DCPI) 
Lag Order AlC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -941.1478 -1002.5 ------ ------
11 -939.4140 -995.8640 CHSQ( 4)= 4.5323[.339] 3.2148[.523] 
10 -938.0202 -989.5615 CHSQ( 8)= 9.7448[.283] 6.9120[.546] 
9 -935.1845 -981.8171 CHSQ( 12)= 12.0735[.440] 8.5637[.740] 
8 -934.9650 -976.6889 CHSQ( 16)= 19.6345[.237] l3.9268[.604] 
7 -935.8314 -972.6466 CHSQ( 20)= 29.3671[.081] 20.8302[.407] 
6 -935.2591 -967.1656 CHSQ( 24)= 36.2225[.052] 25.6927[.369] 
5 -932.6841 -959.6819 CHSQ( 28)= 39.0726[.080] 27.7143[.480] 
4 -931.0066 -953.0957 CHSQ( 32)= 43.7176[.081] 31.0090[ .517] 
3 -938.4730 -955.6534 CHSQ( 36)= 66.6504[.001] 47.2753[.099] 
2 -935.7552 -948.0269 CHSQ( 40)= 69.2147[.003] 49 .0942[ .153] 
1 -934.93l3 -942.2944 CHSQ( 44)= 75.5671[.002] 53.5999[.152] 
0 -948.9045 -951.3589 CHSQ( 48)= 111.5l34[.000] 79.0967[.003] 
Table A6.3.22 Cointegration test results: 
(of CPI and money Ml) 
(with unrestricted intercepts and no trends, VAR=5) 
(i) Maximal Eigenvalue test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Crit. Value 90% Crit. Value 
r= 0 r=l 11.8671 14.8800 12.9800 
r<= 1 r=2 .0570 8.0700 6.5000 
(ii) Trace stattstIc test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Crit. Value 90% Crit.Value 
r= 0 r>= 1 11.9242 17.8600 15.7500 
r<= 1 r=2 .0571 8.0700 6.5000 
(iii) Using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AlC SBC HQC 
r= 0 -990.7558 -1008.8 -1031.6 -1018.0 
r=l -984.8223 -1005.8 -1032.5 -1016.6 
r= 2 -984.7938 -1006.8 -1034.8 -1018.1 
Note: List of eigenvalues in descending order: 0.11860 0.0006068 
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Table A6.3.23 OLS estimation of money (DMl) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
DMl(-I) -.0966 .11260 -.8584[.393] 
DMl(-2) 
-.1289 .11323 -1.1385[.258] 
DMl(-3) -.1077 .10867 -.9917[.324] 
DMl(-4) .2625 .11204 2.3437[.022] 
DMl(-5) -.2147 .13638 -1.5746[.119] 
DCPI(-l) 1.5594 6.13610 .2541[.800] 
DCPI(-2) -1.1906 6.39720 -.1861[.853] 
DCPI(-3) 8.8482 6.51090 l.3590[ .178] 
DCPI(-4) -4.7038 6.49480 -.7242[.471] 
DCPI(-5) 9.4028 6.08400 1.5455[.126] 
CONST 33.0364 163.78630 .2017[.841] 
T 5.4402 1.90560 2.8549[.006] 
SI -272.7504 132.84780 -2.0531[.043] 
S2 -310.0653 128.20770 -2.4185[.018] 
S3 -337.5280 124.72450 -2.7062[.008] 
R-Squared = .43557 R-Bar-Squared = .33426 
S.E. of Regression= 344.9250 F( 14,78)= 4.2995[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable: 171.5161 S.D.= 422.7400 
Residual Sum of Squares = 9279912 Equation Log-Iikelihood= -667.2118 
AIC = -682.2118 SBC = -701.2063 
DW-statistic = 1.9623 System Log-likelihood = -962.7010 
Table A6.3.24 Money (DMl) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LM Version 
*CHSQ(4)= 5-4814[.241] 
*CHSQ(l)= .0101[.920] 
*CHSQ(2)=20.2349[.000] 
*CHSQ(1)= .6498[.420] 
* F Version 
* F(4,74)= 1.1587[.336] 
*F(I,77)= .0083[.927] 
* Not applicable 
*F(I,91)= .6403[.426] 
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Table A6.3.25 OLS estimation of price (DCPI) equation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T -Ratio[Prob] 
DM1(-1) .0018 .0020 .9002[.371] 
DMl(-2) .0025 .0020 1.2445[.217] 
DM1(-3) .7422E-3 .0019 .3711[.712] 
DM1(-4) .0037 .0020 1.8074[.075] 
DM1(-5) .0011 .0025 .4597[.647] 
DCPI(-I) .3667 .1129 3.2476[.002] 
DCPI(-2) .2098 .1177 1.7820[.079] 
DCPI(-3) .0024 .1198 .0205[.984] 
DCPI(-4) -.1235 .1195 -1.0335[.305] 
DCPI(-5) .0385 .1119 .3446[.731] 
CONST 8.0381 3.0142 2.6667[.009] 
T -.0979 .0350 -2.7930[.007] 
Sl -3.1534 2.4449 -1.2898[.201] 
S2 1.1576 2.3595 .4906[.625] 
S3 2.0781 2.2954 .9053[.368] 
R-Squared = .46501 R-Bar-Squared = .36899 
S.E. of Regression= 6.3478 F( 14, 78)= 4.8427[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable = 8.8925 S.D = 7.9911 
Residual Sum of Squares = 3143.0 Equation Log-likelihood = -295.6568 
AlC = -310.6568 SBC = -329.6513 
DW-statistic = 2.0228 System Log-likelihood = -962.7010 
Table A6.3.26 Price (DCPI) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 3.8640[.425] 
*CHSQ(1)= .0430[.836] 
*CHSQ(2)=1065.80[.000] 
*CHSQ(I)= 5.7847[.016] 
* F Version 
*F(4,74)= .8019[.528] 
*F(1,77)= .0356[.851] 
* Not applicable 
*F( 1 ,91)=6.0357[ .016] 
269 
Table A6.3.27 Impulse and cumulative responses: 
Price (DCPI) vs money (DMl) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(a) to monetary shock (b) to price shock 
DePI DM1 IRD DePI DM1 IRD 
1 -0.381 344.93 -0.058 6.348 -20.692 -0.062 
2 0.504 -33.93 -0.785 2.289 11.899 0.098 
3 0.936 -39.95 -1.240 2.140 -2.470 -0.022 
4 0.542 -31.45 -0.911 1.292 57.713 0.845 
5 1.541 108.40 0.752 0.177 -22.111 -2.360 
6 0.967 -81.01 -0.631 0.430 69.123 3.036 
7 0.502 -1.16 -22.938 0.141 10.095 l.352 
8 0.065 18.71 0.183 0.459 23.502 0.967 
9 0.301 48.19 0.331 0.333 -13.554 -0.770 
10 0.026 -36.72 -0.038 0.448 20.952 0.885 
11 0.021 19.40 0.057 0.373 -7.254 -0.368 
12 0.070 9.91 0.376 0.310 5.622 0.343 
13 0.238 8.64 1.459 0.154 -3.717 -0.457 
14 0.086 -21.01 -0.215 0.145 13.022 1.703 
15 0.100 13.45 0.395 0.073 -2.548 -0.658 
20 0.023 -1.45 -0.843 0.053 2.280 0.807 
25 0.013 0.23 2.982 0.010 -0.133 -0.247 
30 0.001 0.09 0.504 0.007 0.314 0.807 
35 0.003 0.12 1.240 0.001 -0.074 -1.265 
40 0.000 -0.09 0.105 0.001 0.078 1.442 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
( c) to monetary shock (d) to price shock 
DePI DMI LRD DePI DMI LRD 
1 -0.381 344.93 -0.058 . 6.348 -20.692 -0.062 
2 0.123 310.99 0.021 8.637 -8.793 -0.019 
3 1.059 271.05 0.207 10.777 -11.264 -0.020 
4 1.601 239.60 0.353 12.069 46.449 0.073 
5 3.142 347.99 0.478 12.246 24.338 0.038 
6 4.109 266.98 0.814 12.676 93.461 0.139 
7 4.610 265.83 0.918 12.817 103.556 0.153 
8 4.675 284.54 0.869 13.277 127.058 0.181 
9 4.976 332.73 0.791 13.610 113.504 0.158 
10 5.002 296.01 0.894 14.057 134.457 0.181 
11 5.023 315.41 0.843 14.430 127.203 0.167 
12 5.094 325.32 0.828 14.740 132.825 0.170 
13 5.332 333.96 0.845 14.894 129.108 0.164 
14 5.417 312.95 0.916 15.039 142.129 0.179 
15 5.518 326.39 0.894 15.112 139.581 0.175 
20 5.735 329.91 0.920 15.404 149.367 0.183 
25 5.818 330.50 0.931 15.522 151.072 0.184 
30 5.839 331.36 0.932 15.565 152.272 0.185 
35 5.853 331.71 0.933 15.579 152.399 0.185 
40 5.855 331.61 0.934 15.585 152.622 0.185 
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Table A6.3.28 Selecting the order of the bivariate model: 
Interest rate (DINT) vs inflation rate (DINF) 
Lag Order AlC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -243.6793 -305.0380 ------ ------
11 -241.7429 -298.1929 CHSQ( 4)= 4.1272[.389] 2.9274[.570] 
10 -242.2486 -293.7899 CHSQ( 8)= 13.1385[.107] 9.3191[.316] 
9 -241.4669 -288.0995 CHSQ( 12)= 19.5751[.076] l3.8847[.308] 
8 -239.1621 -280.8860 CHSQ( 16)= 22.9654[.115] 16.2894[.433] 
7 -236.0771 -272.8923 CHSQ( 20)= 24.7955[.209] 17.5875[.615] 
6 -233.5270 -265.4335 CHSQ( 24)= 27.6953[.273] 19.6444[.717] 
5 -231.1102 -258.1080 CHSQ( 28)= 30.8617[.323] 21.8903[.786] 
4 -230.7895 -252.8787 CHSQ( 32)= 38.2204[.208] 27.1098[.7l3] 
3 -232.9963 -250.1767 CHSQ( 36)= 50.6339[.054] 35.9147[.473] 
2 -233.8329 -246.1046 CHSQ( 40)= 60.3071[.021] 42.7760[.353] 
1 -234.4071 -241.7701 CHSQ( 44)= 69.4555[.009] 49.2649[.271] 
0 -246.8119 -249.2662 CHSQ( 48)= 102.2651[.000] 72.5369[.0l3] 
Table A6.3.29 OLS estimation of interest rate (DINT) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T -Ratio [Prob ] 
DINT(-l) .42089 .10330 4.0744[.000] 
DINT(-2) -.21577 .11320 -1.9061[.060] 
DINT(-3) .03346 .11241 .29770[.767] 
DINT(-4) -.07231 .10317 -.70087[.485] 
DINF(-l) .22405 .071431 3.1366[.002] 
DINF(-2) .21908 .076811 2.8522[.005] 
DINF(-3) .15773 .077977 2.0228[.046] 
DINF(-4) .20518 .072020. 2.8489[.006] 
CONST -.01536 .072784 -.21103[.833] 
R-Squared = .35940 R-Bar-Squared = .29910 
S.E.ofRegression= .70214 F( 8, 85)= 5.9609[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable= -.047447 S.D= .83868 
Residual Sum of Squares= 41.9046 Equation Log-likelihood= -95.4090 
AlC= -104.4090 SBC= -115.8538 
DW-statistic= 2.0793 System Log-likelihood= -228.5864 
Table A6.3.30 Interest rate (DINT) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 7.4802[.113] 
*CHSQ(I)= .0012451[.972] 
*CHSQ(2)= 26.4437[.000] 
*CHSQ(l)= .031009[.860] 
* FVersion 
*F(4,81)= 1.75070[.147] 
*F(1,84)= .0011[.973] 
* Not applicable 
*F(l,92)= .03036[.862] 
271 
Table A6.3.31 OLS estimation of inflation rate (DINF) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
DINT(-l) -.09119 .15444 -.59053[.556] 
DINT(-2) .30474 .16924 1.8007[.075] 
DINT(-3) -.31585 .16805 -1.8794[.064] 
DINT(-4) -.18951 .15424 -1.2286[ .223] 
DINF(-l) -.44010 .10679 -4.1212[.000] 
DINF(-2) -.12974 .11483 -1.l298[ .262] 
DINF(-3) -.20697 .11658 -1.7754[.079] 
DINF(-4) -.13555 .10767 -1.2589[.212] 
CONST -.05319 .10881 -.48885[.626] 
R-Squared= .24896 R-Bar-Squared= .17827 
S.E. of Regression= 1.0497 F( 8, 85)= 3.5220[.001] 
Mean of Dependent Variable= -.021596 S.D= 1.1580 
Residual Sum of Squares= 93.6578 Equation Log-likelihood = -133.2088 
AIC= -142.2088 SBC= -153.6536 
DW-statistic= 2.0412 System Log-likelihood= -228.5864 
Table A6.3.32 Inflation rate (DINF) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 2.6072[.626] 
*CHSQ(l)= 20.8668[.000] 
*CHSQ(2)=304.1619[.000] 
*CHSQ(l)= 5.9380[.015] 
* FVersion 
*F(4,81)= .57768[.680] 
*F(l,84)=23.9673[.000] 
* Not applicable 
*F(I,92)= 6.2036[.015] 
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Table A6.3.33 Impulse and cumulative responses: 
Inflation rate (DINF) vs interest rate (DINT) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(a) to inflation rate shock (b) to interst rate shock 
DINT DINF IRD DINT DINF IRD 
1 0.0179 1.0500 0.02 0.7021 0.0268 0.03 
2 0.2430 -0.4638 -0.72 0.3018 -0.0752 -0.18 
3 0.2245 0.0508 6.11 -0.0355 0.2157 -4.39 
4 0.1177 -0.1316 -1.24 -0.0206 -0.2174 7.65 
5 0.1321 -0.0175 -10.45 -0.0494 -0.1576 2.31 
6 -0.0998 -0.0158 8.70 -0.1038 0.0155 -0.11 
7 -0.1005 -0.0008 167.30 -0.0521 0.0371 -0.52 
8 -0.0583 -0.0613 1.31 -0.0574 0.0364 -0.46 
9 -0.0357 0.0139 -3.54 -0.0265 0.0287 -0.79 
10 -0.0123 0.0403 -0.42 0.0304 -0.0061 -0.15 
11 0.0101 0.0210 0.67 0.0387 0.0036 0.07 
12 0.0131 0.0086 2.09 0.0244 0.0133 0.39 
13 0.0212 -0.0042 -6.94 0.0136 -0.0040 -0.21 
14 0.0199 -0.0079 -3.48 0.0009 -0.0117 -9.86 
15 0.0065 -0.0020 -4.48 -0.0052 -0.0086 1.19 
20 -0.0019 0.0022 -1.18 0.0010 0.0012 0.95 
25 0.0009 -0.0003 -4.49 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.08 
30 -0.0003 0.0002 -2.36 0.0001 0.0000 0.07 
35 0.0001 0.0000 -5.95 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.17 
40 0.0000 0.0000 -4.58 0.0000 0.0000 -0.39 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
(c) to inflation rate shock (d) to interest rate shock 
DINT DINF LRD DINT DINF LRD 
1 0.018 1.0500 0.02 0.702 0.027 0.03 
2 0.261 0.5863 0.62 1.004 -0.048 -0.03 
3 0.485 0.6370 1.05 0.968 0.167 0.l3 
4 0.603 0.5054 1.65 0.948 -0.050 -0.04 
5 0.735 0.4879 2.08 0.898 -0.208 -0.17 
6 0.635 0.4721 1.86 0.795 -0.192 -0.18 
7 0.535 0.4713 1.57 0.742 -0.155 -0.15 
8 0.477 0.4099 1.61 0.685 -0.119 -0.l3 
9 0.441 0.4239 1.44 0.659 -0.090 -0.10 
10 0.429 0.4642 1.28 0.689 -0.096 -0.10 
11 0.439 0.4851 1.25 0.728 -0.092 -0.09 
12 0.452 0.4937 1.26 0.752 -0.079 -0.08 
13 0.473 0.4895 1.34 0.766 -0.083 -0.08 
14 0.493 0.4816 1.41 0.766 -0.095 -0.09 
15 0.499 0.4797 1.44 0.761 -0.103 -0.10 
20 0.473 0.4734 1.38 0.740 -0.100 -0.10 
25 0.476 0.4761 1.38 0.748 -0.100 -0.10 
30 0.475 0.4753 1.38 0.745 -0.100 -0.10 
35 0.476 0.4756 1.38 0.746 -0.100 -0.10 
40 0.475 0.4755 1.38 0.746 -0.100 -0.10 
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Table A6.3.34 Selecting the order of the bivariate model: 
Inflation rate (DINF) vs real output (DGDPR) 
Lag order AlC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -751.1563 -819.8780 ------ ------
11 -748.4799 -812.2930 CHSQ( 4)= 2.6473[.618] 1.7854[.775] 
10 -750.8811 -809.7854 CHSQ( 8)= 15.4496[.051] 10.4195[.237] 
9 -747.8547 -801.8503 CHSQ( 12)= 17.3968[.135] 11.7327 [.467] 
8 -744.3680 -793.4549 CHSQ( 16)= 18.4234[.300] 12.4251[.714] 
7 -746.0435 -790.2217 CHSQ( 20)= 29.7744[.074] 20.0804[.453] 
6 -742.9951 -782.2647 CHSQ( 24)= 31.6776[.135] 21.3640[.617] 
5 -742.2533 -776.6142 CHSQ( 28)= 38.1940[.095] 25.7588[.586] 
4 -741.0696 -770.5217 CHSQ( 32)= 43.8266[.079] 29.5574[.591] 
3 -750.5378 -775.0813 CHSQ( 36)= 70.7631[.000] 47.7239[.091] 
2 -747.3706 -767.0054 CHSQ( 40)= 72.4287[.001] 48.8473[.159] 
1 -748.2970 -763.0231 CHSQ( 44)= 82.2815[.000] 55.4922[.115] 
0 -754.4471 -764.2645 CHSQ( 48)= 102.5817[.000] 69.1830[.024] 
Table A6.3.35 OLS estimation of inflation rate (DINF) equation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor 
DINF(-l) 
DINF(-2) 
DINF(-3) 
DINF(-4) 
DGDPR(-l) 
DGDPR(-2) 
DGDPR(-3) 
DGDPR(-4) 
CONST 
SI 
S2 
S3 
Coefficient 
-.42541 
-.15996 
-.23738 
-.15486 
.9712E-3 
.00105 
.2134E-3 
.762IE-3 
-.92913 
-.38148 
.88619 
1.65810 
Standard Error 
.10664 
.11447 
.11282 
.099471 
.3500E-3 
.3715E-3 
.3780E-3 
.3636E-3 
.61051 
.98435 
.96281 
.99212 
R-Squared = .36607 R-Bar-Squared = .28103 
S.E. of Regression = .98187 F( 11,82)= 4.3047[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable=: -.021596 S.D.= 1.1580 
T -Ratio[prob] 
-3.9891[.000] 
-1.3974[.166] 
-2.1040[.038] 
-1.5569[.123] 
2.7747[.007] 
2.8341[.006] 
.5646[.574] 
2.0961[.039] 
-1.5219[.132] 
-.3875[.699] 
.9204[.360] 
1.6713[.098] 
Residual Sum of Squares= 79.0538 Equation Log-likelihood= -125.2414 
AlC = -137.2414 SBC = -152.5012 
DW -statistic = 2.0257 System Log-likelihood = -780.6565 
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Table A6.3.36 Inflation rate (DINF) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
* LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= .3766[.984] 
*CHSQ(l)= 14.7111[.000] 
*CHSQ(2)=323 .9554[ .000] 
*CHSQ(l)= 2.6367[.104] 
* F Version 
* F(4,78)= .0784[.989] 
*FO ,81)=15 .0285[.000] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1,92)= 2.6551[.107] 
Table A6.3.37 OLS estimation of a real output (DGDPR) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor 
DINF(-I) 
DINF(-2) 
DINF(-3) 
DINF(-4) 
DGDPR(-I) 
DGDPR(-2) 
DGDPR(-3) 
DGDPR(-4) 
CONST 
SI 
S2 
S3 
Coefficient 
35.9067 
-1.8935 
-78.5083 
-61.1796 
-.0752 
-.1409 
.0320 
.3125 
899.6993 
-1397.7000 
-871.9562 
-912.8768 
Standard Error 
31.1743 
33.4624 
32.9804 
29.0779 
.1023 
.1086 
.1104 
.1062 
178.4686 
287.7524 
281.4557 
290.0216 
R-Squared = .90594 R-Bar-Squared = .89332 
S.E. of Regression = 287.0267 F( 11,82)::; 71.7986[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable = 119.3511 S.D.= 878.7908 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
1.1518[.253] 
-.0565[.955] 
-2.3805[.020J 
-2.1040[.038] 
-.7358[.464] 
-1.2975[.198] 
.2904[.772] 
2.9403[.004] 
5.0412[.000] 
-4.8574[.000] 
-3.0980[.003] 
-3.1476[.002] 
Residual Sum of Squares= 6755516 Equation Log-likelihood= -658.9613 
AlC = -670.9613 SBC = -686.2210 
DW -statistic = 1.9335 System Log-likelihood = -780.6565 
Table A6.3.38 Real output (DGDPR) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 3.5307[.473] 
*CHSQ(1)= 2.4717[.116] 
*CHSQ(2)= 1.8369[.399] 
*CHSQ(1)= 2.4505[.117] 
F Version 
*F(4,78)= .7610[.554] 
*F(1,81)=2.1874[.143] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1,92)=2.4625[.120] 
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Table A6.3.34 Selecting the order of the bivariate model: 
Inflation rate (DINF) vs real output (DGDPR) 
Lag order AlC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -751.1563 -819.8780 ------ ------
11 -748.4799 -812.2930 CHSQ( 4)= 2.6473[.618] 1.7854[.775] 
10 -750.8811 -809.7854 CHSQ( 8)= 15.4496[.051] 10.4195[.237] 
9 -747.8547 -801.8503 CHSQ( 12)= 17.3968[.135] 11.7327[.467] 
8 -744.3680 -793.4549 CHSQ( 16)= 18.4234[.300] 12.4251 [.714] 
7 -746.0435 -790.2217 CHSQ( 20)= 29.7744[.074] 20.0804[.453] 
6 -742.9951 . -782.2647 CHSQ( 24)= 31.6776[.135] 21.3640[.617] 
5 -742.2533 -776.6142 CHSQ( 28)= 38.1940[.095] 25.7588[.586] 
4 -741.0696 -770.5217 CHSQ( 32)= 43.8266[.079] 29.5574[.591] 
3 -750.5378 -775.0813 CHSQ( 36)= 70.7631[.000] 47.7239[.091] 
2 -747.3706 -767.0054 CHSQ( 40)= 72.4287[.001] 48.8473[.159] 
1 -748.2970 -763.0231 CHSQ( 44)= 82.2815[.000] 55.4922[.115] 
0 -754.4471 -764.2645 CHSQ( 48)= 102.5817[.000] 69.1830[.024] 
Table A6.3.35 OLS estimation of inflation rate (DINF) ~quation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
DINF(-I) -.42541 .10664 
DINF(-2) -.15996 .11447 
DINF(-3) -.23738 .11282 
DINF(-4) -.15486 .099471 
DGDPR(-I) .9712E-3 .3S00E-3 
DGDPR(-2) .00105 .3715E-3 
DGDPR(-3) .2134E-3 .3780E-3 
DGDPR(-4) .7621E-3 .3636E-3 
CONST -.92913 .61051 
SI -.38148 .98435 
S2 .88619 .96281 
S3 1.65810 .99212 
R-Squared = .36607 R-Bar-Squared = .28103 
S.E. of Regression = .98187 F( 11,82)= 4.3047[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable= -.021596 S.D.= 1.1580 
T-Ratio[prob] 
-3.9891[.000] 
-1.3974[.166] 
-2.1040[.038] 
-1.5569[.123] 
2.7747[.007] 
2.8341 [.006] 
.5646[.574] 
2.0961[.039] 
-1.5219[.132] 
-.3875[.699] 
.9204[.360] 
1.6713[.098] 
Residual Sum of Squares= 79.0538 Equation Log-likelihood= -125.2414 
AlC = -137.2414 SBC = -152.5012 
DW -statistic = 2.0257 System Log-likelihood = -780.6565 
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Table A6.3.36 Inflation rate (DINF) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
* LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= .3766[.984] 
*CHSQ(I)= 14.7111 [.000] 
*CHSQ(2)=323.9554[.OOO] 
*CHSQ(l)= 2.6367[.104]. 
* FVersion 
* F(4,78)= .0784[.989] 
*F(1 ,81)=15 .0285[.000] 
* Not applicable 
*F(I,92)= 2.6551[.107] 
Table A6.3.37 OLS estimation of a real output (DGDPR) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor 
DINF(-I) 
DINF(-2) 
DINF(-3) 
DINF(-4) 
DGDPR(-I) 
DGDPR(-2) 
DGDPR(-3) 
DGDPR(-4) 
CONST 
SI 
S2 
S3 
Coefficient 
35.9067 
-1.8935 
-78.5083 
-61.1796 
-.0752 
-.1409 
.0320 
.3125 
899.6993 
-l397.7000 
-871.9562 
-912.8768 
Standard Error 
31.1743 
33.4624 
32.9804 
29.0779 
.1023 
.1086 
.1104 
.1062 
178.4686 
287.7524 
281.4557 
290.0216 
R-Squared = .90594 R-Bar-Squared = .89332 
S.E. of Regression = 287.0267 F( 11, 82)= 71.7986[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable = 119.3511 S.D.= 878.7908 
T -Ratio [Prob ] 
1.1518[.253] 
-.0565[.955] 
-2.3805[.020] 
~2.1040[.038] 
-.7358[.464] 
-1.2975[.198] 
.2904[.772] 
2.9403[.004] 
5.0412[.000] 
-4.857 4[ .000] 
-3.0980[.003] 
-3.1476[.002] 
Residual Sum of Squares= 6755516 Equation Log-likelihood= -658.96l3 
AlC = -670.9613 SBC = -686.2210 
DW-statistic = 1.9335 System Log-likelihood = -780.6565 
Table A6.3.38 Real output (DGDPR) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functionai Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 3.5307[.473] 
*CHSQ(I)= 2.4717[.116] 
*CHSQ(2)= 1.8369[.399] 
*CHSQ(I)= 2.4505[.117] 
F Version 
*F(4,78)= .7610[.554] 
*F(I,81)=2.1874[.143] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1 ,92)=2.4625 [.120] 
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Table A6.3.39 Impulse and cumulative responses: 
Real output (DGDPR) vs inflation rate (DINF) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(a) to inflation rate shock (b) to real GDP shock 
DGDPR DINF IRD DGDPR DINF IRD 
1 -77.28 0.982 -0.10 286.98 -0.265 -0.70 
2 40.99 -0.493 -0.11 
-31.09 0.391 -9.55 
3 -11.56 0.010 -1.47 
-23.49 0.148 -4.77 
4 -83.20 -0.143 0.76 40.69 -0.056 -1.05 
5 -41.52 -0.119 0.46 72.08 0.175 1.84 
6 52.58 0.049 1.43 -50.76 -0.077 1.15 
7 8.15 0.011 0.94 -20.02 0.013 -0.48 
8 -16.88 0.029 -0.78 13.93 -0.052 -2.83 
9 -6.69 -0.035 0.25 . 16.10 0.048 2.25 
10 14.38 0.018 1.07 -14.12 -0.016 0.85 
11 -0.39 -0.001 0.52 -4.34 0.000 -0.07 
12 -6.53 0.002 -4.49 6.65 -0.006 -0.67 
13 -0.25 -0.008 0.04 2.78 0.010 2.69 
14 4.11 0.004 1.23 -4.40 -0.003 0.51 
15 -0.52 0.001 -0.60 
-0.89 -0.002 1.90 
20 -0.57 -0.001 1.47 0.74 0.000 0.41 
25 0.10 0.000 -3.88 -0.05 0.000 -1.42 
30 0.01 0.000 0.62 -0.03 0.000 0.87 
35 -0.01 0.000 3.80 0.01 0.000 -0.09 
40 0.00 0.000 -0.22 0.00 0.000 2.47 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
(c) to inflation rate shock (d) to real GDP shock 
DGDPR DINF LRD DGDPR DINF LRD 
1 -77.28 0.982 -0.10 286.98 -0.265 -0.70 
2 -36.30 0.489 -0.10 255.89 0.127 0.38 
3 -47.86 0.500 -0.13 232.39 0.274 0.90 
4 -131.06 0.356 -0.48 273.08 0.218 0.61 
5 -172.57 0.237 -0.96 345.16 0.393 0.86 
6 -119.99 0.286 -0.55 294.40 0.316 0.81 
7 -111.84 0.297 -0.50 274.38 0.329 0.91 
8 -128.72 0.326 -0.52 288.31 0.277 0.73 
9 -135.41 0.291 -0.61 304.41 0.324 0.81 
10 -121.03 0.309 -0.52 290.29 0.309 0.81 
11 -121.42 0.308 -0.52 285.96 0.309 0.82 
12 -127.95 0.309 -0.54 292.61 0.303 0.79 
13 -128.20 0.301 -0.56 295.39 0.313 0.80 
14 -124.09 0.306 -0.53 291.00 0.310 0.81 
15 -124.61 0.307 -0.54 290.11 0.308 0.81 
20 -126.04 0.306 -0.54 292.14 0.309 0.80 
25 -125.71 0.306 -0.54 291.91 0.309 0.80 
30 -125.68 0.306 -0.54 291.84 0.309 0.80 
35 -125.70 0.306 -0.54 291.87 0.309 0.80 
40 -125.70 0.306 -0.54 291.87 0.309 0.80 
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Table A6.3.40 Selecting the order of the trivariate V AR model: 
(DMl, DCPI, DGDPR) 
Order AlC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
12 -1576.2 -1708.7 ------
11 -1576.7 -1698.1 CHSQC 9)= 18.92l3[.026] 
10 -1570.2 -1680.6 CHSQC 18)= 23.9582[.156] 
9 -1564.6 -1664.0 CHSQC 27)= 30.7167[.283] 
8 -1560.5 -1648.8 CHSQC 36)= 40.5716[.276] 
7 -1563.7 -1641.0 CHSQC 45)= 65.0767[.027] 
6 -1560.0 -1626.3 CHSQC 54)= 75.6590[.027] 
5 -1555.6 -16lO.8 CHSQC 63)= 84.8339[.035] 
4 -1551.0 -1595.2 CHSQC 72)= 93.5647[.045] 
3 -1597.8 -1630.9 CHSQ( 81)= 205.1920[.000] 
2 -1624.1 -1646.2 CHSQC 90)= 275.7884[.000] 
1 -1633.8 -1644.8 CHSQC 99)= 3l3.2049[.000] 
0 -1679.1 -1679.1 CHSQClO8)= 421.7309[.000] 
Table A6.3.41 Cointegration test results: 
(MI, cpr and GDPR) 
(with unrestricted intercept and no trend in VAR, order = 7) 
Ci)Maximal Eigenvalue test 
------
11.0008[.276] 
l3.9292[.734] 
17.8585[.908] 
23.5881[.945] 
37.8353[.767] 
43.9878[.833] 
49.3220[.896] 
54.3981[.939] 
119.2977[.004] 
160.3421[.000] 
182.0959[.000] 
245.1924[.000] 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=O r= 1 18.5183 21.1200 19.0200 
r<= 1 r=2 6.1596 14.8800 12.9800 
r<=2 r=3 .0039 8.0700 6.5000 
Cii) Trace test 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=O r>= 1 24.6818 31.5400 28.7800 
r<= 1 r>=2 6.1636 17.8600 15.7500 
r<=2 r=3 .0039 8.0700 6.5000 
(iii) Using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AlC SBC HQC 
r=O -1597.9 -1654.9 -1726.8 -1683.9 
r = 1 -1588.6 -1650.6 -1728.8 -1682.2 
r=2 -1585.6 -1650.6 -1732.5 -1683.6 
r=3 -1585.6 -1651.6 -1734.8 -1685.1 
Note: Eigenvalues = .18232 .064760 .4289E-4 
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Table A6.3.42 OLS estimation of money (DMl) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T -ratio [Prob ] 
DM1(-1) -.0808 .12146 -.6655[.508] 
DM1(-2) .0147 .12333 .1192[.905] 
DM1(-3) -.1073 .12219 -.8785[.383] 
DM1(-4) .1752 .11680 1.5003[.138] 
DM1(-5) -.1644 .13711 -1.l994[ .234] 
DM1(-6) .0205 .13849 .1487[.882] 
DCPI(-l) 6.27l1 6.55510 .9566[.342] 
DCPI(-2) .1805 6.98860 .0258[.979] 
DCPI(-3) .1138 6.85700 .0166[.987] 
DCPI(-4) 1.1904 7.12640 .1670[.868] 
DCPI(-5) 15.3717 7.11000 2.1620[.034] 
DCPI(-6) -12.0584 6.83620 -1.7639[.082] 
DGDPR(-l) .1720 .14003 1.2284[ .223] 
DGDPR(-2) -.0166 .14304 -.1167[.907] 
DGDPR(-3) -.3378 .14183 -2.3818[.020] 
DGDPR(-4) .0417 .14465 .2888[.774] 
pGDPR(-5) .1662 .15268 1.0888[.280] 
DGDPR(-6) -.1903 .14574 -1.3061[.196] 
CONST -426.0536 264.59050 -1.6102[.112] 
T 4.9895 2.09650 2.3799[.020] 
S1 -178.7705 378.49190 -.4723[.638] 
S2 840.2089 391.12370 2.1482[.035] 
S3 428.1068 354.48910 1.2077[.231] 
R-Squared = .53339 R-Bar-Squared = .38461 
S.E. of Regression= 332.3615 F( 22,69)= 3.5852[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable=: 175.0435 S.D= 423.6781 
Residual Sum of Squares= 7622030 Equation Log-likelihood = -651.4815 
AlC = -674.4815 SBC = -703.4821 
DW-statistic = 2.0239 System Log-likelihood = -1571.6 
Table A6.3.43 Money (DMl) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functional Form 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 8.6498[.070] 
*CHSQ(I)= 3.5603[.059] 
*CHS(2) = 4.2202[.121] 
*CHSQ(1)= .8523[.356] 
FVersion 
*F(4,65)= 1.6864[.164] 
*F(I,68)= 2.7374[.103] 
* Not applicable 
*F(1,90)= .8416[.361] 
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Table A6.3.44 OLS estimation of price (DCPI) equation in the unrestricted VAR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T -Ratio[prob] 
DM1(-1) .00125 .00230 .5447[.588] 
DM1(-2) .00204 .00234 .8701[.387] 
DM1(-3) .3145E-3 .00232 .l353[.893] 
DM1(-4) .00179 .00222 .8097[.421] 
DM1(-5) .00177 .00260 .6803[.499] 
DM1(-6) .00276 .00263 1.0511 [.297] 
DCPI(-l) .34798 .12466 2.7916[.007] 
DCPI(-2) .21393 .13290 1.6097[.112] 
DCPI(-3) -.03618 .13040 -.2775[.782] 
DCPI(-4) -.04713 .13552 -.3477[.729] 
DCPI(-5) .06677 .13521 .4938[.623] 
DCPI(-6) .08888 .13000 .6837[.496] 
DGDPR(-l) .00356 .00266 1.3370[.186] 
DGDPR(-2) .00543 .00272 1.9997[.049] 
DGDPR(-3) .00123 .00269 .4560[.650] 
DGDPR(-4) .00452 .00275 1.6464[.104] 
DGDPR(-5) .7206E-3 .00290 .2481[.805] 
DGDPR(-6) . 1490E-3 .00277 .0537[.957] 
CONST 2.44740 5.03170 .4863[.628] 
T -.09878 .03986 -2.4776[.016] 
Sl -1.25720 7.19770 -.1746[.862] 
S2 2.11920 7.43790 .2849[ .777] 
S3 10.03790 6.74120 1.4890[.141] 
R-Squared = .53014 R-Bar-Squared = .38033 
S.E. of Regression = 6.3204 F( 22, 69)= 3.5388[.000] 
Mean of Dependent Variable = 8.9239 S.D = 8.0291 
Residual Sum of Squares= 2756.4 Equation Log-likelihood =-286.9375 
AlC = -309.9375 SBC = -338.9381 
DW-statistic = 1.9758 System Log-likelihood = -1571.6 
Table A6.3.45 Price (DCPI) equation diagnostic tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * FVersion 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B:Functional Fonn 
* C:Normality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
*CHSQ(4)= 2.0823[.721] 
*CHSQ(l)= 11.9018[.001] 
*CHSQ(2)= 653.6679[.000] 
*CHSQ(l)= 13.0841[.000] 
*F(4,65)= .37631[.825] 
*F(l,68)= 10.1041[.002] 
* Not applicable 
*F(l,90)= 14.9219[.000] 
",--" . ,', - ~,-
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Table A6.3.46 OLS estimation of real output (DGDPR) equation in the unrestricted V AR 
Regressor 
DM1(-1) 
DM1(-2) 
DM1(-3) 
DM1(-4) 
DM1(-5) 
DM1(-6) 
DCPI(-1) 
DCPI(-2) 
DCPI(-3) 
DCPI(-4) 
DCPI(-5) 
DCPI(-6) 
DGDPR(-1) 
DGDPR(-2) 
DGDPR(-3) 
DGDPR(-4) 
bGDPR(-5) 
DGDPR(-6) 
CONST 
T 
Sl 
S2 
S3 
Coefficient 
.1073 
.0215 
.1182 
.0360 
-.1660 
.0089 
5.1061 
-4.8071 
-l3.6437 
2.0959 
14.8769 
-16.2926 
-.1155 
-.1649 
-.0608 
.2258 
.0264 
-.1439 
978.3423 
-.0878 
-1364.3000 
-639.1422 
-959.8197 
Standard Error 
.1046 
.1062 
.1052 
.1006 
.1181 
.1193 
5.6477 
6.0212 
5.9078 
6.1400 
6.1258 
5.8899 
.1206 
.1232 
.1222 
.1246 
.1315 
.1255 
227.9649 
1.8063 
326.0997 
336.9829 
305.4194 
R-Squared = .91802 R-Bar-Squared = .89188 
S.E. of Regression = 286.3548 F( 22,69)= 35.1204[.000J 
Mean of Dependent Variable= 117.9891 S.D= 870.8617 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
1.0257[.309] 
.2030[.840] 
1.1229[.265J 
.3586[.721] 
-1.4060[ .164] 
.0752[.940] 
.9041[.369] 
-.7983[.427] 
-2.3094[.024] 
.3413[.734] 
2.4286[.018] 
-2. 7662[ .007] 
-.9574[.342] 
-1.3380[.185] 
-.4982[ .620] 
1.8119[.074] 
.2008[.841] 
-1.1461[.256] 
4.2916[.000] 
-.0486[.961] 
-4.1836[ .000] 
-1.8967[.062] 
-3.1426[.002] 
Residual Sum of Squares = 5657937 Equation Log-likelihood = -637.7743 
AlC = -660.7743 SBC = -689.7749 
DW-statistic = 2.0282 System Log-likelihood = -1571.6 
Table A6.3.47 Real output (DGDPR) equation diagnostic tests 
Test Statistics * 
* A:Serial Correlation 
* B :Functional Fonn 
* C:Nonnality 
* D:Heteroscedasticity 
LMVersion 
*CHSQ(4)= 9.8466[.043J 
*CHSQ(1)= 3.1658[.075] 
*CHSQ(2)= .3726[.830J 
*CHSQ(1)= .2271[.634J 
* F Version 
*F(4,65)= 1.9477[.113] 
*F(1,68)= 2.4233[.124] 
* Not applicable 
*F(I,90)= .2227[.638] 
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Table A6.3.48 Trivariate model impulse and cumulative responses 
(DGDPR, DePI, DMl) 
IMPULSE RESPONSES 
(a) to monetary shock (b) to output shock 
DGDPR DMI DCPI DGDPR DMI DCPI 
1 29.5 332.4 -0.600 286.3 34.2 -1.794 
2 29.2 -25.6 0.315 -38.6 35.2 0.439 
3 0.7 13.3 0.892 -27.3 -11.3 1.303 
4 44.7 -41.9 0.666 24.7 -95.0 0.725 
5 -2.1 67.3 1.336 51.3 42.2 1.719 
6 -64.8 -62.1 1.458 -51.0 44.6 0.859 
7 7.6 19.5 1.480 -39.2 -44.2 0.717 
8 12.4 0.1 0.511 10.0 -13.3 0.151 
9 -21.7 61.7 0.635 23.5 48.1 0.047 
10 -33.3 -29.5 0.043 -17.0 37.5 -0.028 
15 5.2 -6.3 0.160 -19.7 -34.6 0.024 
20 6.4 16.3 -0.036 16.5 3.8 -0.012 
25 -8.5 -3.2 0.016 -0.1 12.8 -0.016 
30 1.2 -5.4 0.006 -7.4 -7.0 0.024 
35 3.2 3.8 -0.011 3.6 -2.5 -0.006 
40 -2.0 0.7 0.004 1.7 4.1 -0.008 
CUMULATIVE RESPONSES 
(d) to monetary shock (e) to output shock 
DGDPR DM1 DCPI DGDPR DMI DCPI 
1 29 332 -0.60 286 34 -1.794 
2 59 307 -0.28 248 69 -1.355 
3 59 320 0.61 220 58 -0.053 
4 104 278 1.27 245 -37 0.673 
5 102 346 2.61 296 5 2.391 
6 37 283 4.07 245 50 3.251 
7 45 303 5.55 206 6 3.968 
8 57 303 6.06 216 -8 4.119 
9 35 365 6.69 240 41 4.166 
10 2 335 6.74 223 78 4.138 
11 12 343 6.98 181 30 4.439 
12 26 362 6.97 203 26 4.504 
13 3 378 7.32 216 46 4.450 
14 -16 352 7.47 192 64 4.624 
15 -11 346 7.63 172 29 4.649 
20 -7 375 7.56 196 39 4.483 
25 -21 370 7.63 196 55 4.468 
30 -19 363 7.64 186 46 4.507 
35 -14 368 7.63 191 42 4.503 
40 -17 369 7.64 193 48 4.49 
('c) to price shock 
DGDPR DMI DCPI 
-81.3 -31.5 6.320 
38.3 28.2 1.870 
'!., •....... 
-9.5 18.1 1.668 
-88.1 39.1 0.897 
-17.9 -29.1 -0.345 
98.9 98.4 -0.051 
-64.8 8.1 0.675 
-30.5 -2.6 0.738 
-6.0 -74.6 0.253 
14.5 52.9 0.572 
-13.2 10.0 -0.083 
-8.5 -20.4 0.013 
10.1 4.1 -0.002 
-1.2 6.9 -0.007 
-4.0 -4.6 0.013 
2.4 -0.9 -0.004 
(j) to price shock 
DGDPR DMI DCPI 
-81 -32 6.32 
-43 -3 8.19 
-53 15 9.86 
-141 54 10.76 
-159 25 10.41 
-60 123 10.36 
-124 131 11.03 
-155 129 11.77 
-161 54 12.03 
-146 107 12.60 
-169 124 12.54 
-192 111 12.84 
-182 98 12.69 
-164 128 12.61 
-177 138 12.53 
-195 111 12.76 
-180 119 12.72 
-182 128 12.72 
-187 122 12.75 
-184 120 12.74 
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APPENDIX 7.2 TESTS ON NEW ZEALAND MONETARY TRANSMISION MODELS 
Table A7.2.1 Stability test 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel Other asset price channel 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial Roots of Characteristic Polynomial Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Endogenous variables: Endogenous variables: 
DM1 DINT DKF DGDPR DM1 DINT DEXCH DEXPT DGDPR DM1 DPE DPCE DGDPR 
Exogenous variables: C S1 S2 S3 Exogenous variables: C S1 S2 S3 Exogenous variables: C S1 S2 S3 
Lag specification: 1 7 Lag specification: 1 7 Lag specification: 1 5 
Root Modulus Root Modulus Root Modulus 
-0.001242 - 0.9676301 0.968 -0.871730 + 0.4715861 0.991 -0.079755 + 0.9404481 0.944 
-0.001242 + 0.9676301 0.968 -0.871730 - 0.4715861 0.991 -0.079755 - 0.9404481 0.944 
0.376263 - 0.8707501 0.949 ·0.011326 - 0.9851421 0.985 -0.537609 + 0.7459751 0.920 
0.376263 + 0.8707501 0.949 -0.011326 + 0.9851421 0.985 -0.537609 - 0.7459751 0.920 
-0.860110 - 0.391831 I 0.945 0.780111 + 0.5460001 0.952 -0.905 0.905 
-.0.860110 + 0.3918311 0.945 0.780111 - 0.5460001 0.952 0.654702 - 0.5789841 0.874 
-0.624343 + 0.6613901 0.910 -0.949430 - 0.0301751 0.950 0.654702 + 0.5789841 0.874 
-0.624343 - 0.6613901 0.910 -0.949430 + 0.0301751 ·0.950 0.259784 + 0.7985441 0.840 
0.901582 + 0.0496311 0.903 0.412702 + 0.8458961 0.941 0.259784 - 0.7985441 0.840 
0.901582 - 0.049631 I 0.903 0.412702 - 0.8458961· 0.941 0.781 0.781 
0.559338 + 0.6649621 0.869 0.170738 - 0.9242701 0.940 -0.766 0.766 
0.559338 - 0.6649621 0.869 0.170738 + 0.9242701 0.940 0.717606 - 0.2374431 0.756 
-0.285760 + 0.7772101 0.828 -0.617141 - 0.7004221 0.934 0.717606 + 0.2374431 0.756 
-0.285760 - 0.7772101 0.828 -0.617141 + 0.7004221 0.934 -0.482082 + 0.5528751 0.734 
0.727975 - 0.3436121 0.805 0.876851 + 0.0996191 0.882 -0.482082 - 0.5528751 0.734 
0.727975 + 0.3436121 0.805 0.876851 - 0.0996191 0.882 -0.546527 + 0.2536931 0.603 
-0.789722 - 0.1533211 0.804 0.878 0.878 -0.546527 - 0.2536931 0.603 
-0.789722 + 0.153321 I 0.804 0.610333 + 0.5859871 0.846 0.212710 + 0.5514331 0.591 
-0.804 0.804 0.610333 - 0.5859871 0.846 0.212710 - 0.5514331 0.591 
-0.527791 - 0.6039091 0.802 -0.231621 + 0.8120071 0.844 0.204 0.204 
-0.527791 + 0.6039091 0.802 -0.231621 - 0.8120071 0.844 
0.632133 + 0.4362351 0.768 0.770190 + 0.3447271 0.844 
0.632133 - 0.4362351 0.768 0.770190 - 0.3447271 0.844 
-0.020322 + 0.7448531 0.745 0.513023 + 0.6575231 0.834 
-0.020322 - 0.7448531 0.745 0.513023 - 0.6575231 0.834 
0.102963 + 0.3278281 0.344 -0.650067 + 0.5163081 0.830 
0.102963 - 0.3278281 0.344 -0.650067 - 0.5163081 0.830 
0.137 0.137 -0.441625 - 0.6980871 0.826 
-0.441625 + 0.6980871 0.826 
-0.158345 + 0.7845441 0.800 
-0.158345 - 0.7845441 0.800 
-0.630466 + 0.2802661 0.690 
-0.630466 - 0.2802661 0.690 
-0.472 0.472 
0.380 0.380 
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Table A 7.2.1 (Continued) 
Credit-investment channel Credit-consumption channel 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: Endogenous variables: 
DM1 DCRED DKF DGDPR DM1 DCRED DPCE DGDPR 
Exogenous variables: C S1 S2 S3 Exogenous variables: C S1 S2 S3 
Lag specification: 1 5 Lag specification: 1 5 
I;· 
il c _ .co ',;-C-, 
Root Modulus Root Modulus 
0.961 0.961 0.979 0.979 
-0.738233 + 0.492719i 0.888 -0.080768 + 0.906311 i 0.910 
-0.738233 - 0.4927191 0.888 -0.080768 - 0.906311 i 0.910 
'0.004770 - 0.832045i 0.832 -0.886 0.886 
0.004770 + 0.832045i 0.832 -0.500800 + 0.681833i 0.846 
-0.762737 - 0.2001 06i 0.789 -0.500800 - 0.681833i 0.846 
-0.762737 + 0.200106i 0.789 0.352505 + 0.760906i 0.839 
0.123538 - 0.756705i 0.767 0.352505 - 0.760906i 0.839 
0.123538 + 0.756705i 0.767 -0.752716 + 0.3191221 0.818 
-0.291729 + 0.693426i 0.752 -0.752716 - 0.319122i 0.818 
-0.291729 - 0.693426i 0.752 0.520513 - 0.543533i 0.753 
0.741 0.741 0.520513 + 0:543533i 0.753 
0.398075 + 0.597944i 0.718 0.676703 - 0.093706i 0.683 
0.398075 - 0.597944i 0.718 0.676703 + 0.093706i 0.683 
0.618 0.618 -0.374289 - 0.506892i 0.630 
-0.572561 + 0.206795i 0.609 -0.374289 + 0.506892i 0.630 
-0.572561 - 0.206795i 0.609 -0.007798 - 0.517382i 0.517 
0.204298 - 0.243858i 0.318 -0.007798 + 0.517382i 0.517 
0.204298 + 0.243858i 0.318 -0.485 0.485 
-0.045 0.045 0.154 0.154 
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Table A 7.2.2 Serial Correlation test 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Sample: 1985:1 2002:1 Sample: 1985:1 2002:1 
Lags LM-Stat Prob Laos LM-Stat Prob 
1 20.4896 0.1990 1 32.2909 0.1498 
2 15.8442 0.4639 2 28.0962 0.3034 
3 10.5768 0.8348 3 18.6916 0.8117 
4 16.5378 0.4161 4 29.1054 0.2595 
5 11.2418 0.7943 5 38.8147 0.0384 
6 20.1214 0.2148 6 18.5237 0.8194 
7 12.5227 0.7073 7 19.7275 0.7610 
8 15.2126 0.5091 8 34.1598 0.1045 
9 10.2712 0.8521 9 13.1782 0.9742 
10 25.7301 0.0579 10 26.8410 0.3639 
11 8.4526 0.9342 11 13.2901 0.9727 
12 6.2222 0.9855 12 15.7652 0.9216 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
Other asset price channel Credit-Investment channel 
Laos LM-Stat Prob Laos LM-Stat Prob 
1 18.7881 0.2798 1 12.1489 0.7337 
2 20.3321 0.2056 2 18.9677 0.2703 
3 12.0380 0.7414 3 12.3895 0.7168 
4 18.7714 0.2807 4 12.5888 0.7026 
5 11.6555 0.7673 5 12.5501 0.7053 
6 15.5208 0.4869 6 13.9436 0.6029 
7 9.9412 0.8697 7 17.4032 0.3600 
8 21.1361 0.1733 8 19.9530 0.2223 
9 21.9859 0.1436 9 25.1354 0.0675 
10 7.6105 0.9596 10 16.7614 0.4012 
11 10.4457 0.8423 11 17.2335 0.3706 
12 20.7349 0.1889 12 15.2556 0.5060 
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
Credit-consumption channel 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 11.6406 0.7683 
2 15.9335 0.4576 
3 7.4974 0.9624 
4 16.6081 0.4114 
5 8.6102 0.9286 
6 16.4722 0.4205 
7 6.7994 0.9769 
8 9.5059 0.8911 
9 24.1618 0.0860 
10 20.8778 0.1833 
11 16.1855 0.4401 
12 6.3397 0.9840 
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
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Table A 7.2.3 Heteroscedasticity test 
Interest rate channel Other asset price channel 
Joint test: Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. Chi-sq df Prob. 
601.4417 590 0.363 462.6623 430 0.1336 
Individual components: Individual components: 
Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(59) Prob. Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(43) Prob. 
resl*resl 0.9976 60.8555 0.4089 resl*resl 0.7994 50.3608 0.2051 
res2*res2 0.9983 60.8959 0.4075 res2*res2 0.8729 54.9948 0.1038 
res3*res3 0.9462 57.7171 0.5229 res3*res3 0.6884 43.3693 0.4556 
res4*res4 0.9938 60.6203 0.4172 res4*res4 0.6900 43.4687 0.4513 
res2*resl 0.9995 60.9670 0.4050 res2*resl 0.8258 52.0227 0.1628 
res3*resl 0.9916 60.4892 0.4218 res3*resl 0.6680 42.0854 0.5109 
res3*res2 0.9710 59.2298 0.4671 res3*res2 0.7914 49.8595 0.2193 
res4*resl 0.9992 60.9489 0.4057 res4*resl 0.7170 45.1703 0.3814 
res4*res2 0.9441 57.5879 0.5277 res4*res2 0.7397 46.6041 0.3264 
res4*res3 0.9710 59.2321 0.4670 res4*res3 0.6954 43.8129 0.4368 
Credit-Investment channel Credit-consumption channel 
• Joint test: Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. Chi-sq df Prob. 
439.4640 430 0.3658 426.7643 430 0.5350 
Individual components: Individual components: 
Dependent R-squared Chi-~(43) Prob. Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(43L Prob. 
resl*resl 0.6127 38.5973 0.6625 resl*resl 0.6699 42.2060 0.5056 
res2*res2 0.7434 46.8338 0.3180 res2*res2 0.6383 40.2144 0.5928 
res3*res3 0.7752 48.8406 0.2500 res3*res3 0.6681 42.0917 0.5106 
res4*res4 0.7319 46.1103 0.3449 res4*res4 0.6629 41.7616 0.5250 
res2*resl 0.4117 25.9374 0.9816 res2*resl 0.4918 30.9831 0.9142 
res3*resl 0.8054 50.7376 0.1949 res3*resl 0.5450 34.3334 0.8245 
res3*res2 0.7893 49.7270 0.2231 res3*res2 0.7465 47.0283 0.3110 
res4*resl 0.6524 41.0986 0.5541 res4*resl 0.7920 49.8952 0.2182 
res4*res2 0.7871 49.5863 0.2272 res4*res2 0.8064 50.8040 0.1931 
res4*res3 0.8600 54.1786 0.1180 res4*res3 0.7402 46.6310 0.3255 
Note: There is not enough data to run the heteroscedasticity test for the exchange rate channel 
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APPENDIX 7.3 TESTS ON AUSTRALIAN MONETARY TRANSMISION MODELS 
Table A7.3.1 Stability test 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: 
OMl DINT OKF OGOPR 
Exogenous variables: C 81 8283 
Lag specification: 1 4 
Root Modulus 
0.9817 0.982 
-0.9086 0.909 
-0.247379 - 0.774773i 0.813 
-0.247379 + 0.774773i 0.813 
0.675920 - 0.409057i 0.790 
0.675920 + 0.409057i 0.790 
-0.615877 - 0.462118i 0.770 
-0.615877 + 0.462118i 0.770 
:0.316969 - 0.633348i 0.708 
-0.316969 + 0.633348i 0.708 
0.467130 - 0.48oo63i 0.670 
0.467130 + 0.48oo63i 0.670 
-0.026601 - 0.61 o225i 0.611 
-0.026601 + 0.610225i 0.611 
-0.5682 0.568 
0.3855 0.386 
Endogenous variables: 
OMl DINT OEXCH OEXPT OGOPR 
Exogenous variables: C 81 82 83 
Lag specification: 1 5 
Root Modulus 
-0.517615 + 0.746141i 0.908 
-0.517615 - 0.746141i 0.908 
0.403193 - 0.790181 i 0.887 
0.403193 + 0.790181 i 0.887 
0.834487 - 0.213995i 0.861 
0.834487 + 0.213995i 0.861 
-0.848 0.848 
0.677610 + 0.478494i 0.830 
0.677610 - 0.478494i 0.830 
-0.805214 + 0.197209i 0.829 
-0.805214 - 0.197209i 0.829 
-0.826 0.826 
-0.304181 - 0.728916i 0.790 
-0.304181 + 0.728916i 0.790 
0.096995 + 0.766639i 0.773 
0.096995 - 0.766639i 0.773 
-0.131383 - 0.755925i 0.767 
-0.131383 + 0.755925i 0.767 
-0.626448 - 0.409186i 0.748 
-0.626448 + 0.409186i 0.748 
0.695 0.695 
0.291771 - 0.410286i 0.503 
0.291771 + 0.410286i 0.503 
0.372 0.372 
0.022 0.022 
Other asset price channel 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: 
OMl OPE OPCE OGOPR 
Exogenous variables: C 81 82 83 
Lag specification: 1 4 
Root Modulus 
0.975 0.975 
-0.961 0.961 
-0.522188 - 0.733508i 0.900 
-0.522188 + 0.733508i 0.900· 
0.765958 - 0.2239561 0.798 
0.765958 + 0.223956i 0.798 
0.131412 - 0.73665Oi 0.748 
0.131412 + 0.736650i 0.748 
-0.714 0.714 
-0.419622 + 0.542042i 0.685 
-0.419622 - 0.542042i 0.685 
-0.043787 + 0.582636i 0.584 
-0.043787 - 0.582636i 0.584 
0.287263 + 0.468941i 0.550 
0.287263 - 0.468941i 0.550 
-0.182 0.182 
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Table A 7.3.1 Stability test (Continued) 
Credit- investment channel 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: 
DM1 DCRED DKF DGDPR 
Exogenous variables: C 81 8283 
Lag specification: 1 5 
Root 
0.985 
-0.920 
0.818609 - 0.1633411 
0.818609 + 0.1633411 
-0.542045 - 0.5918801 
-0.542045 + 0.5918801 
-0.195207 - 0.7489571 
-0.195207 + 0.7489571 
0.502813 - 0.5226991 
.0.502813 + 0.5226991 
0.268856 - 0.6623881 
0.268856 + 0.6623881 
0.086542 + 0.6401411 
0.086542 - 0.640141 I 
-0.384981 + 0.4966201 
-0.384981 - 0.4966201 
-0.542 
0.375 
-0.337064 + 0.0383591 
-0.337064 - 0.0383591 
Modulus 
0.985 
0.920 
0.835 
0.835 
0.803 
0.803 
0.774 
0.774 
0.725 
0.725 
0.715 
0.715 
0.646 
0.646 
0.628 
0.628 
0.542 
0.375 
0.339 
0.339 
Credit-consumption channel 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: 
DM1 DCRED DPCE DGDPR 
Exogenous variables: C 81 82 83 
Lag specification: 1 4 
Root Modulus 
0.988 0.988 
-0.956 0.956 
-0.535134 - 0.7443481 0.917 
-0.535134 + 0.7443481 0.917 
0.816424 + 0.1863751 0.837 
0.816424 - 0.1863751 0.837 
0.113031 - 0.7414921 0.750 
0.113031 +0.7414921 0.750 
0.053884 + 0.5798641 0.582 
0.053884 - 0.5798641 0.582 
-0.553559 - 0.0881501 0.561 
-0.553559 + 0.0881501 0.561 
0.317357 + 0.3286601 0.457 
0.317357 - 0.3286601 0.457 
-0.132084 + 0.3960851 0.418 
-0.132084 - 0.3960851 0.418 
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Table A 7.3.2 Serial correlation test 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Sample: 1985:1 2002:1 Sample: 1985:1 2002:1 
Lags LM-Stat Prob Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 21.0839 0.1753 1 35.7523 0.0754 
2 21.6527 0.1548 2 24.4871 0.4914 
3 21.7907 0.1501 3 31.3632 0.1773 
4 12.6840 0.6957 4 16.2007 0.9087 
5 6.3358 0.9840 5 24.3116 0.5014 
6 22.0144 0.1427 6 15.3300 0.9333 
7 19.7932 0.2297 7 15.8886 0.9181 
8 19.8783 0.2258 8 27.8641 0.3141 
9 17.1697 0.3747 9 20.7039 0.7090 
10 14.3737 0.5709 10 26.4502 0.3839 
11 6.8301 0.9764 11 25.5885 0.4298 
12 10.2169 0.8551 12 22.0188 0.6347 
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
Other asset price channel Credit-investment channel 
Sample: 1985:12002:1 Sample: 1985:1 2002:1 
Lags LM-Stat Prob Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 12.9410 0.6771 1 12.4982 0.7090 
2 14.2284 0.5817 2 13.6599 0.6240 
3 23.2393 0.1075 3 16.2361 0.4366 
4 7.2837 0.9674 4 14.5322 0.5591 
5 14.0126 0.5978 5 23.6060 0.0985 
6 18.2032 0.3121 6 19.4780 0.2447 
7 7.3915 0.9650 7 21.3576 0.1652 
8 13.7338 0.6185 8 11.2122 0.7962 
9 16.0710 0.4480 9 11.7586 0.7604 
10 13.7963 0.6139 10 15.4859 0.4894 
11 13.4083 0.6427 11 15.2343 0.5076 
12 11.4339 0.7819 12 15.4590 0.4913 
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
Credit-consumption channel 
Sample: 1985:1 2002:1 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 13.1864 0.6591 
2 9.6405 0.8847 
3 22.5721 0.1257 
4 10.2280 0.8545 
5 12.3610 0.7188 
6 18.4678 0.2972 
7 13.2110 0.6573 
8 15.7977 0.4672 
9 25.6394 0.0593 
10 17.4135 0.3593 
11 22.9289 0.1156 
12 15.0631 0.5200 
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
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Table A 7.3.3. Heteroscedasticity test 
Interest rate channel Exchange rate channel 
Joint test: Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. Chi-sq df Prob. 
353.1771 350 0.4424 807.1688 795 0.3744 
Individual components: Individual components: 
Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(35) Prob. Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(53) Prob. 
res 1 'res 1 0.5133 32.8534 0.5721 res1'res1 0.8112 50.2932 0.5802 
res2'res2 0.8021 51.3372 0.0368 res2'res2 0.9560 59.2738 0.2575 
,-: .. - --,".-. 
res3'res3 0.3543, 22.6722 0.9465 res3'res3 0.8885 55.0898 0.3955 
res4'res4 0.6631 42.4406 0.1810 res4'res4 0.9534 59.1116 0.2623 
res2'res1 0.5389 34.4872 0.4927 res5'res5 0.9399 58.2722 0.2876 
res3'res1 0.4996 31.9726 0.6150 res2'res1 0.9380 58.1538 0.2913 
res3'res2 0.5206 33.3209 0.5493 res3'res1 0.8051 49.9170 0.5950 
res4'res1 0.6536 41.8286 0.1985 res3'res2 0.9782 60.6467 0.2195 
res4'res2 0.6875 43.9979 0.1416 res4'res1 0.9184 56.9436 0.3306 
res4'res3 0.5589 35.7728 0.4320 res4'res2 0.9092 56.3705 0.3501 
res4'res3 0.8529 52.8787 0.4789 
res5'res1 0.9361 58.0394 0.2949 
res5'res2 0.9664 59.9162 0.2392 
res5'res3 0.9185 56.9500 0.3304 
res5'res4 0.8639 53.5614 0.4526 
Other asset price channel Credit-consumption channel 
Joint test: Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. Chi-sq df Prob. 
371.0793 350 0.2100 454.3193 430 0.2014 
Individual components: Individual components: 
Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(35) Prob. Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(43) Prob. 
res 1 'res 1 0.4424 28.3122 0.7810 res 1 'res 1 0.7644 48.1560 0.2721 
res2'res2 0.5825 37.2805 0.3646 res2'res2 0.8194 51.6217 0.1724 
res3'res3 0.6091 38.9835 0.2952 res3'res3 0.7660 48.2559 0.2688 
res4'res4 0.6819 43.6425 0.1499 res4'res4 0.7807 49.1824 0.2394 
res2'res1 0.4423 28.3055 0.7813 res2'res1 0.7921 49.9002 0.2181 
res3'res1 0.6061 38.7915 0.3026 res3'res1 0.7357 46.3477 0.3359 
res3'res2 0.4339 27.7697 0.8026 res3'res2 0.5911 37.2365 0.7187 
res4'res1 0.6030 38.5930 0.3104 res4'res1 0.7542 47.5115 0.2940 I ;.~ 
res4'res2 0.6738 43.1263 0.1627 res4'res2 0.6553 41.2831 0.5460 
res4'res3 0.6933 44.3688 0.1332 res4'res3 0.7050 44.4123 0.4120 
Credit consumption channel 
Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. 
380.6019 350 0.1252 
Individual components: 
Dependent R-squared Chi-sq(35) Prob. 
res 1 'res 1 0.4957 31.7271 0.6269 
res2'res2 0.4971 31.8126 0.6228 
res3'res3 0.6014 38.4927 0.3144 
res4'res4 0.7679 49.1455 0.0568 
res2*res1 0.4304 27.5475 0.8111 
res3'res1 0.6393 40.9158 0.2268 
res3'res2 0.6635 42.4614 0.1804 
res4'res1 0.6964 44.5695 0.1289 
res4'res2 0.6018 38.5182 0.3134 
Res4'res3 0.5750 36.8027 0.3854 
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Table A7.3.4 Exchange rate regression 
Dependent Variable: DEXCH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02105/04 Time: 12:30 
Sample(adjusted): 1985:2 2002: 1 
Included observations: 68 after adjusting endpoints 
DEXCH=C(1 )+C(2)*DINT +C(3)*DM 1 +C(4)*DEXPT +C(5)*DGDPR 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -0.001281 0.003103 -0.412888 0.6811 
C(2) 0.006018 0.003408 1.765995 0.0822 
C(3) 4.85E-06 7.14E-06 0.678931 0.4997 
C(4) 1.37E-06 7.16E-06 0.191045 0.8491 
C(5) -3.46E-06 3.50E-06 -0.988286 0.3268 
R-squared 0.065876 Mean dependent var -0.001412 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006567 S.D. dependentvar 0.023045 
S.E. of regression 0.022969 Akaike info criterion -4.63862 
Sum squared resid 0.033238 Schwarz criterion -4.475421 
Log likelihood 162.7131 Durbin-Watson stat 2.139712 
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APPENDIX 7.4 COUNTERFACTUAL ANAL YISIS 
Table A 7.4.1 Cointegration test for New Zealand model 
(DMl, DINT, DGDPR, DCPI) 
Trace test 
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. 01 CE(s) Eiqenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None •• 0.5971 95.8004 47.21 54.46 
At most 1 .. 0.3531 38.5317 29.68 35.65 
At most 2 0.1498 11.0887 15.41 20.04 
At most 3 0:0136 0.8612 3.76 6.65 
Maximum eigenvalue test 
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. 01 CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None ** 0.5971 57.2687 27.07 32.24 
At most 1 .. 0.3531 27.4430 20.97 25.52 
At most 2 0.1498 10.2275 14.07 18.63 
At most 3 0.0136 0.8612 3.76 6.65 
'Jable A 7.4.2 Serial correlation test for New Zealand model 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 17.7283 0.3400 
2 10.3698 0.8466 
3 18.1944 0.3126 
4 21.7331 0.1520 
5 16.5534 0.4150 
6 16.4239 0.4238 
7 10.6078 0.8330 
8 20.1428 0.2139 
9 23.2182 0.1080 
10 21.0193 0.1778 
11 7.1197 0.9709 
12 10.5061 0.8389 
Note: Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
- - - ~ - -
Table A 7.4.3 Heteroscedasticity test for New Zealand model 
Joint test: 
Chi-SQ dl Prob. 
572.8906 550 0.2417 
Individual components: 
Dependent R-squared F(55,6) Prob. Chi-sq(55) Prob. 
Res1*res1 0.9205 1.2637 0.4194 57.0731 0.3980 
Res2*res2 0.9273 1.3918 0.3636 57.4937 0.3830 
Res3*res3 0.9370 1.6228 0.2836 58.0946 0.3620 
Res4*res4 0.9649 2.9983 0.0836 59.8234 0.3049 
Res2*res1 0.9778 4.7994 0.0273 60.6221 0.2803 
Res3*res1 0.8515 0.6256 0.8349 52.7933 0.5594 
Res3*res2 0.9523 2.1769 0.1648 59.0412 0.3301 
Res4'res1 0.9408 1.7330 0.2530 58.3284 0.3540 
Res4'res2 0.9374 1.6325 0.2808 58.1164 0.3613 
Res4'res3 0.9447 1.8625 0.2222 58.5695 0.3459 
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Table A 7.4.4 Cointegration test for Australian model 
(DMl, DINT, DGDPR, DCPI) 
Trace test 
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CEls} Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None ** 0.4379 80.1746 47.21 54.46 
At most 1 ** 0.4088 43.8759 29.68 35.65 
At most 2 0.0951 10.7589 15.41 20.04 
At most 3 * 0.0683 4.4593 3.76 6.65 
Maximum eigenvalue test 
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CEls) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None ** 0.4379 36.2986 27.07 32.24 
At most 1 ** 0.4088 33.1169 20.97 25.52 
At most 2 0.0951 62996 14.07 18.63 
At most 3 * 0.0683 ·4.4592 3.76 6.65 
Notes: Observations = 63; trend assumption =linear deterministic trend 
Lag interval: 1 to 5· 
Table A 7.4.5 Serial correlation test for Australian model 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 14.0742 0.5932 
2 14.1432 0.5880 
3 11.5476 0.7745 
4 25.7224 0.0581 
5 14.6875 0.5476 
6 12.0278 0.7421 
7 8.0875 0.9462 
8 19.3117 0.2528 
9 15.5259 0.4865 
10 19.5229 0.2425 
11 16.7322 0.4031 
12 14.6269 0.5521 
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
Table A7.4.6 Heteroscedasticity test for Australian model 
Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. 
538.2512 550 0.6318 
Individual components: , 
Dependent R-squared F(55 ,61 Prob. Chi-sq(55) Prob. 
res4*res4 0.8193 0.4945 0.9219 50.7941 0.6360 
res2*res1 0.9320 1.4962 0.3246 57.7866 0.3727 
res3*resl 0.9737 4.0428 0.0416 60.3710 0.2879 
res4*res1 0.9027 1.0117 0.5579 55.9650 0.4384 
res4*res2 0.9451 1.8791 0.2186 58.5980 0.3449 
res4*res3 0.7818 0.3908 0.9706 48.4698 0.7207 
, , ~'- . " .. ' 
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